Stronger diplomatic action on Iran depends heavily on the policies of Russia and China.  According to two senior associates at the Carnegie Endowment, the actions that either country takes next should be understood in light of their threat perceptions, economic interests, and the strength of the U.S.-French-German coalition.

In a candid April 18 interview, Director of the Russian & Eurasian Program Andrew Kuchins and Director of the China Program Minxin Pei gave their perspectives on Russia and China’s foreign policy views of Iran. (Read More)

How long will it take for Iran to produce a nuclear weapon?

On April 11, 2006, Iran announced that it had enriched a small quantity of uranium to 3.5 percent in its experimental 164-centrifuge test cascade.  It also announced plans to begin building a 3,000-centrifuge cascade by the end of 2006.

The best estimates indicate that Iran is 5-10 years away from the ability to enrich enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon. But there are major uncertainties with these estimates. One worst-case scenario could have Iran with a nuclear bomb at the end of 2009, but that assumes that Iran does not encounter any of the technical problems that typically plague such programs.  

As reported in August 2005 by the Washington Post, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran concludes that Iran is closer to 10 years from having a nuclear bomb. The IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) hypothesizes that it would “likely require a few years to complete and operate a pilot-scale test facility of several thousand centrifuges” and “likely a few years to produce enough HEU for a single nuclear weapon.” One of the most comprehensive reports to date has been published by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein at ISIS (the Institute for Science and International Security).  The report speculates that it may be possible for Iran to build a nuclear weapon by 2009.

This analysis explores this worst-case estimate. It concludes that carefully tracking the Iranian progress over the next two years and giving IAEA inspectors the authority and ability to fully investigate all facilities will be the key to determining when, or if, Iran could achieve the ability to produce the material for a nuclear bomb. (Read More)

If Francis Fukuyama is right, the neoconservative movement is dying.  Good riddance.  Through their network within the Bush administration, these intellectuals wreaked havoc on American national security interests, ruined the international reputation of the country and drove up a staggering national debt.  In his February 19 New York Times magazine article, “After Neoconservatism,” Fukuyama pronounces the theory a failure, noting that all its major tenets have been discredited, including predictions about the need for and consequences of invading Iraq. He should know.  He was one of the leading architects of the movement he now dissects. 
 
“The so-called Bush doctrine,” he writes, “is now in shambles.  The doctrine…argued that, in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, America would have to launch periodic preventive wars to defend itself against rouge states and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction; that it would do this alone, if necessary; and that it would work to democratize the greater Middle East as a long-term solution to the terrorist problem.”