THE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF SEMANTICS

Alfred Tarski


Table of Contents

TITLE
BEGINNING OF ARTICLE
I. EXPOSITION

  1. THE MAIN PROBLEM -- A SATISFACTORY DEFINITION OF TRUTH
  2. THE EXTENSION OF THE WORD "TRUE"
  3. THE MEANING OF THE WORD "TRUE"
  4. A CRITERION FOR THE MATERIAL ADEQUACY OF THE DEFINITION
  5. TRUTH AS A SEMANTICAL CONCEPT
  6. LANGUAGES WITH A SPECIFIED STRUCTURE
  7. THE ANTINOMY OF THE LIAR
  8. THE INCONSISTENCY OF SEMANTICALLY CLOSED LANGUAGES?
  9. OBJECT-LANGUAGE AND META-LANGUAGE
  10. CONDITIONS FOR A POSITIVE SOLUTION OF THE MAIN PROBLEM
  11. THE CONSTRUCTION (IN OUTLINE) OF THE DEFINITION
  12. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEFINITION
  13. EXTENSION OF THE RESULTS TO OTHER SEMANTIC NOTIONS

II. POLEMICAL REMARKS

  1. IS THE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH THE "RIGHT" ONE?
  2. FORMAL CORRECTNESS OF THE SUGGESTED DEFINITION OF TRUTH
  3. REDUNDANCY OF SEMANTIC TERMS -- THEIR POSSIBLE ELIMINATION
  4. CONFORMITY OF THE SEMANTIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH WITH PHILOSOPHICAL AND COMMON-SENSE USAGE
  5. THE DEFINITION IN ITS RELATION TO "THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF TRUTH" AND TO VARIOUS EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRENDS
  6. ALLEGED METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS IN SEMANTICS
  7. APPLICABILITY OF SEMANTICS TO SPECIAL EMPIRICAL SCIENCES
  8. APPLICABILITY OF SEMANTICS TO THE METHODOLOGY OF EMPIRICAL SCIENCE
  9. APPLICABILITY OF SEMANTICS TO DEDUCTIVE SCIENCE
  10. FINAL REMARKS
BIBLIOGRAPHY