The Collapse
of WTO Negotiations: Implications for the Middle East
Robert Naiman
and Steve Niva
(Robert
Naiman is a Senior researcher at the Center for Economic and Policy
Research (CEPR) in Washington, DC. Steve Niva, former MERIP
Executive Committee member, teaches at Evergreen State College in
Olympia, Washington.)
January 13,
2000
The failure of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial meeting to agree to
launch a new global trade agreement, amidst protests of the WTO's
policies by labor and environmental activists outside the meetings
and developing countries' delegates inside, was a major setback for
proponents of greater deregulation of trade and investment flows.
The dissent in Seattle reflected a growing skepticism toward the
deregulatory economic model promoted by the dominant international
economic institutions over the past few decades. Critics charge that
the WTO has already imposed too many policies that serve the
interests of Northern corporations at the expense of post-colonial
countries, the poor, the environment, workers and
consumers.
Several of the
seven Arab delegations (Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar,
Tunisia and the UAE) of the 135-nation WTO membership were among
those pleased at the meetings‚ failure to launch a new round of
deregulation talks. Prior to the ministerial meeting, Egypt and
Morocco had been among the growing ranks of developing countries
that warned they would not be pressured into making any more
concessions until the biases of WTO rules favoring Northern
corporate interests were corrected. They argued that the unrelenting
pressure on developing countries since the end of the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1993 to
adopt a broader trade and investment deregulation agenda, if
successful, would further undermine developing countries' economies.
At a pre-WTO meeting of developing countries hosted by Egypt,
officials voiced their disillusionment that five years after the
WTO's creation they had seen too many costs and too few benefits in
implementing WTO policies.
Prior to the
meetings, former colonial countries had put forward many proposals
to resolve the problems that they had faced in implementing WTO
agreements, including adjusting some of the WTO rules for the
benefit of developing countries. These proposals were dismissed by
the United States and the European Union. Instead, the US and the EU
insisted on trying to impose even more burdens on developing
countries with proposals for further deregulation of foreign
investment (along the lines of the failed Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development [OECD]-Multilateral Agreement on
Investment) and government procurement. In fact, in an effort to ram
through an agreement, the US and EU reverted to the notorious "Green
Room" negotiating process, where they and hand-picked developing
countries negotiate an agreement, which is then imposed on all other
developing countries as an accomplished fact. Developing countries'
delegates -- emboldened, some suggest, by the demonstrations outside
-- rebelled against this process and declared their unwillingness to
sign any agreement so negotiated.
Commenting on
the meeting's failure to launch a new round, Egyptian Foreign
Minister Amr Moussa denounced the proceedings, saying that the "big
powers attempted to impose certain trade policies on the developing
countries in a way that could only lead to wide economic destruction
in the Third World."
The defiance of
developing countries at the WTO, including those from the Arab
world, is largely the product of growing frustration with the
consequences of economic models imposed by Washington on the South
over the last two decades. Developing countries in the Middle East,
like other former Western colonies, have been told by the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that there is only
one model for national economic development: deregulate the economy,
restructure it to focus on producing exports for the world market,
and reduce government spending and social protections for the public
that might discourage international investment. Follow this road and
prosperity will result from increased foreign investment and
increased access to First World markets; deviate from this model and
the economy will stagnate. For developing countries, establishing
the World Trade Organization five years ago, and the thousands of
pages of rules that it enforces, merely consolidated the IMF-World
Bank model of development.
Arab elites'
opposition at the WTO may seem surprising given that the IMF, World
Bank and the US government have long promoted Arab regimes
supportive of their agenda and fostered Western-educated leaders
schooled in the theology of deregulation, reduced social
protections, and export-led growth. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco
and Tunisia were all subject to IMF-imposed structural adjustment
programs. Along with Lebanon, they have all embarked upon export-led
development strategies and privatization schemes, dramatically
cutting back public services. Even Syria and the Gulf states have
recently moved in this direction.
Arab membership
in the WTO, which locks in the deregulatory model through
multilateral agreements backed by the threat of trade sanctions, has
grown during this period; Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar,
Tunisia and the UAE are all members; Jordan was admitted on December
17. Algeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan have begun the process
of negotiations to join the WTO. Many Arab states have also signed
multilateral agreements with Europe leading to create a
Mediterranean Free Trade Zone (MFTZ), encompassing the nations of
the Mediterranean region and the European Union, which will oversee
the dismantling of tariffs on industrial goods, while lowering
agricultural and service barriers. The EU has already pursued
bilateral trade agreements with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco and Jordan,
and negotiations are still underway with Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria and
Syria.
However, the
IMF, the World Bank, and the US‚ extreme policies and their
frequently disastrous consequences for economic growth and the
exacerbation of poverty have caused some of the same Arab elites who
previously embraced the model to fear that increased compliance with
WTO and IMF mandates may cause greater economic suffering and
thereby further undermine their legitimacy. This threat, and the
recent Asian economic crisis, accentuated fears among many in the
region about the dangers of unregulated capital flow, and of
following economic recipes cooked in Washington by IMF and US
officials. Such concerns were evidenced in Seattle.
The widespread
dissatisfaction at the WTO with the impact of globalization on
developing countries were overshadowed in part by the attention
given to the issue of whether violation of "social standards" -
workers' rights and environmental protections - should result in
restrictions on imports from offending countries. Preceding Seattle,
Morocco, Egypt, and other members of the Group of 77(G77) of
developing countries had rejected US and EU proposals to discuss the
relationship between international trade and social standards. Many
expressed anger when President Clinton announced that he supported
trade sanctions to enforce social standards, notwithstanding the US‚
lack of enthusiasm for its own official position.
Developing
country governments, which have surrendered much of their
sovereignty to the WTO with little to show for it, are
understandably skeptical about giving authority the WTO, an
unresponsive institution to Southern concerns, to adjudicate
violations of labor rights and the environment. They rightly fear
that such authority will largely be used to advance northern
economic interests. On the other hand, many developing countries
have demonstrated little interest in promoting labor rights or
environmental protections. Many Arab governments, for example, have
been historically hostile to independent labor unions; Bahrain,
Qatar, UAE and Kuwait do not permit labor unions, while Tunisia,
Morocco and Egypt have intimidated and imprisoned labor
activists.
At the same
time, the US commitment to social standards remains largely
rhetorical. There is no evidence that the US is prepared to
negotiate trade concessions to developing countries in order to win
acceptance of social standards. Indeed, the US rejected Egyptian and
other developing countries‚ proposals to review existing WTO rules
that have undermined food security and economic diversification in
the South. The US also rejected calls from the South to revisit WTO
agreements on intellectual property rights based on US-style patent
and copyright protections. These agreements are widely seen in the
developing world as a device to prevent the transfer of technology
from transnational corporations to developing countries and to
protect the monopolies of northern pharmaceutical and media
corporations. The intellectual property rules, with no basis in
"free trade" economic theory, had been inserted in the WTO by
US-based multinational corporations. The economic cost to developing
countries of obeying US patents and copyrights is many orders of
magnitude higher than the potential cost of enforcing labor and
environmental standards.
The weakness of
the US commitment is affirmed in that it now has the ability to
impose social standards on imports, for example by banning the
import of goods produced by child labor. The US could simply accept
any resulting WTO sanctions; this is what the European Union has
done in response to the WTO's decision against the EU's ban on
hormone-treated beef. This again suggests that the US is not very
serious about social standards. Other issues of deep disagreement,
for example, between the US and the EU on agriculture or investment
policy, were quite sufficient to scuttle the talks, with the US only
too happy, for the purposes of the Presidential campaign, to spread
the perception domestically that its "tough stand" on labor rights
had caused the collapse of negotiations.
In the
aftermath of Seattle, developing countries may try to abolish such
procedures as the "Green Room." Other voices in the South such as
Third World Network argue that short of dismantling the WTO
altogether, the only useful reforms are those which reduce or limit
the WTO's power, by denying it the authority to invalidate laws
passed pursuant to international environmental agreements, limiting
the application of WTO agricultural rules to the developing world,
or eliminating major areas from the WTO's intellectual property
claims agreements.
Seattle
revealed the growing dissent against the IMF/World Bank-imposed
model of economic development. The obvious alternative is to refocus
attention on domestically led development and gradual regional
integration, along with a comprehensive social justice agenda that
includes progressive taxation, strong labor rights, social welfare
programs and land reform. Such an agenda would require changing IMF
policies or ignoring its prescriptions. An important first step will
be to cancel or repudiate debts owed by developing countries to the
IMF and the World Bank; payments on these debts divert export
revenues from spending on health care, education, and domestic
investment, and, through the endless cycle of debt renegotiations
and conditionality, leave the macroeconomic policies of these
countries under IMF and World Bank control.
Since most of
the Middle East governments lack democratic legitimacy, and to
various degrees are dependent on external forces to prop them up,
they are unlikely to resist the IMF model and embrace an alternative
development agenda without significant pressure from below and
greater democratization across the region. But the opening created
by the protests in Seattle and the growing grassroots mobilization
around the world against trade and investment deregulation,
particularly in the developing world, may help encourage such
democratic efforts in the Middle East.

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