A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in
Yemen
Shelagh
Weir
During the past
two decades, a proselytizing, reformist, "Islamist" movement--mainly
characterized as "Wahhabi"--has gained increasing popularity
throughout Yemen. Wahhabism actively opposes both the main Yemeni
schools--Zaydi Shi'ism in the north and Shafi'i-Sunnism in the south
and in the Tihamah. It is closely connected with the political party
Islah, a coalition of tribal, mercantile and religious interests
that pursues a mixed social and political agenda.1
Though little
is known of Yemeni Wahhabism, it appears to have a particularly
strong following in the northern Province of Sa'dah where some of
its leading figures are based. Given that this region is in the
Zaydi heartlands of northern Yemen, the popularity there of
Wahhabism is surprising. Nevertheless Wahhabism has flourished in
the mountains of Razih in the west of the province precisely because
it has successfully mobilized a hitherto dormant resentment of key
tenets of Zaydism. Wahhabism may have been sown, as some suggest,
with foreign finance and encouragement, but it only took root
because the soil was fertile.
Wahhabism was
introduced into the province of Sa'dah by local men who had
converted while studying religion in Saudi Arabia or fighting with
the mujahidin in Afghanistan. Upon their return to the Sa'dah
region, they set up lesson circles, religious institutes and Wahhabi
mosques.
Beginning in
the mid-1980s, the tribally-organized communities of Razih became
riven by sectarian conflict as a fervent and growing minority of
Wahhabi-Sunni converts confronted the majority of
Zaydi-Shi'a.2 The Wahhabis, as others dub them (or
Sunnis as they prefer to be called), gained key positions in state
schools, opened religious teaching institutes and established or
took over a number of mosques. These activists were mainly young men
(shabab) from a wide range of "tribal" (qabili) and
low-status "butcher" families.3 These youths were
attracted to Islah (which they equated with Wahhabism) because of
its effective social welfare programs, and to Wahhabism because of
its opposition to the Zaydi religious elite (sadah, singular
sayyid), its direct, unmediated relationship to God, its
egalitarianism and what they saw as its clear, logical doctrines. A
major factor in their conversion was literacy; these shabab
were among the first generation to attend secondary school. They had
the skills, therefore, to study the plethora of religious
publications flooding Yemen at that time.
In addition to
the shabab, a minority of older men--mainly tribal leaders
(shaikhs and others)--tacitly supported the Wahhabi-Islah movement
in part because their traditional political positions were bolstered
by Islah and its powerful leader, Shaikh 'Abdullah al-Ahmar, and in
part because they approved of the anti-sayyid thrust of the
movement. The relationship between tribal leaders and prominent
sayyids has always been one of intermittent rivalry. Sayyids are,
predictably, aligned entirely on the Zaydi side of the conflict and
are supported by the national political party,
al-Haqq,4 which was formed primarily to defend
Zaydism against the Wahhabi challenge.
Although
sayyids have not been revered indiscriminately in Razih previously,
they and their claim to descent from the Prophet Muhammad through
his son-in-law 'Ali have been respected by the majority of people.
They maintained their high social standing despite the 1960s civil
war which had aimed to eliminate their privileges. The Wahhabis
primarily resented not the important official posts certain sayyids
had secured under the Republican government, but their religious
authority and influence, as well as their religious claims to
nobility.
The Wahhabis
accused the sayyids of blocking access to the "truths" of Sunni
doctrine, of propagating superstitious beliefs and practices and of
perpetuating social stratification by asserting their
divinely-sanctioned social superiority. They accused them of
reinforcing sayyid exclusivity by refusing to marry their
daughters to non-sayyids--a particularly bitter point of contention.
Razih, however, is replete with marriage prohibitions and
preferences, and no tribe will yet intermarry with "butcher"
families--an Achilles heel which sayyids were quick to exploit with
reciprocal taunts of social prejudice.
Sayyids
countered by accusing the Wahhabis of propagating their religion for
money and of importing a religious school of thought from Saudi
Arabia that was innappropriate for Yemen. Zaydism, they asserted,
was an authentically Yemeni school, and they were its prime
upholders. Although sayyids had formerly portrayed themselves as
immigrant "northeners" (Adnanis) in contrast to other Yemenis, who
were indigenous "southerners" (Qahtanis), in this new context they
sought to emphasize their Yemeni identity.5
The Wahhabi
opposition to sayyids and Zaydism also stimulated the emergence of a
new generation of Zaydi `ulema' with non-sayyid,
tribal status. These charismatic and ambitious young men vigorously
championed the Zaydi madhhab through teaching and religious
pamphleteering, and by encouraging Zaydi rituals. In so doing, they
predictably found themselves in competition with the sayyids of
their own sects.6
A striking
feature of the sectarian conflict in Razih was the tremendous
symbolic and emotional emphasis placed on spiritual and ritual
matters, with each side accusing the other of heretical beliefs and
practices. The greatest source of daily friction was the prayer
ritual. Wahhabis made a point of attending Zaydi mosques and, while
the majority of the congregation resolutely adhered to the customary
Zaydi prayer stance with arms extended, the Wahhabis provocatively
prayed in the Sunni manner, folding their arms during the prayer
sequence, and, contrary to the Zaydi practice, chanting
"amin" (like the Christian "amen").7
In 1991, a
major Zaydi reaction to the Wahhabi challenge occurred during a
public ceremony to mark the anniversary of `Id al-Ghadir when Shi`a
Muslims believe the Prophet designated `Ali as his successor. The
loud speeches, general clamor and celebratory gunfire of this
ceremony, which attracted men from all over Razih, dramatically and
defiantly flaunted Zaydi numbers and enthusiasm in the face of the
leading Wahhabi activist of Razih, who lived near the ceremonial
ground.
The
Zaydi-Wahhabi rivalry intensified. Wahhabis attempted to take over
the major mosque of Razih, which had become the centre for Zaydi
activists. The Wahhabis imported skilled preachers from elsewhere in
Yemen to deliver Friday sermons, tried to install their own mosque
officials, and assertively prayed in the Sunni mode--all strenuously
opposed by the Zaydis. In one incident, tussles took place over the
microphone and when the Wahhabis aggressively intoned "amin,"
the Zaydi congregation defiantly bellowed "kadhabin" (liars)
in response!
As the `Id
al-Ghadir of 1992 approached, the Wahhabis waged a fierce campaign
against Zaydi celebrations, threatening violence, and there were
armed standoffs in the main mosque. This tense situation reached a
bloody climax with the murder of the son of the leading Wahhabi on
the eve of `Id al-Ghadir--a shockingly dishonorable crime by tribal
standards, because it was disproportionate to the
provocation.
Two years
later, the leading Wahhabi on policing duties with the local
governor, having pursued his investigation and satisfied himself on
the identity of his son's assassin, returned to Razih and shot dead
an obscure sayyid. Thus he avenged his son's anonymous and
secretive murder openly and honorably. Eventually, this was deemed a
revenge killing in accordance with shari`a and the matter was
closed.
After this
incident the conflict subsided. Both sides felt things had gone too
far and wanted to avoid provoking further government intervention.
Local conflicts were also overshadowed by the 1994 war between north
and south Yemen, and a deterioration in the Yemeni economy. As
people concentrated on economic survival, religious differences were
de-emphasized and Wahhabis and Zaydis concentrated on promoting
their respective madhdhabs through religious schools and
institutes.8
The dramatic
and confrontational aspects of this "clash of fundamentalisms"
subsided because those divided by religious conflict are linked by
economic interests among networks of close neighborhood and
marriage. Leading sayyids have marriage links with leading Wahhabi
families which predate this conflict. The social status of sayyids,
however, may be vulnerable unless they modify their conduct and
precepts, particularly their adherence to the principal of
descent-based social primacy. In an early sign of such a compromise
a female sayyid (sharifah) recently married a
tribesman--predictably a wealthy merchant. The significance of this
first small breach in the bastion of sayyid exclusivity did
not go unnoticed. Crowds of men converged from all over Razih to
celebrate, singing the following song:
Oh
sayyids, you tricked us With your turbans, remedies and
charms Whenever we proposed marriage, you said "With a
sharifah, a sayyid's daughter? It's not allowed." God only
knows whose book you studied!
Author's
Note This article is based on information collected during 14
months of anthropological field work in Razih between 1977 and 1980,
a further three months of fieldwork in the winter of 1992-93, a
visit to Sana`a in 1994, and interviews in London. A version of the
article was presented at the Middle East Studies Association of
North America (MESA) meeting in 1995. I am grateful to Gabriele vom
Bruck, Sheila Carapico, Ianthe Maclagan and Madawi al-Rasheed for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
Shelagh
Weir, former Middle East curator for the British Museum, is
an independent writer and researcher.
Endnotes
1 Islah
gained 62 out of 301 parliamentary seats in the first Yemeni
nationwide multiparty elections in 1993 (Sheila Carapico, "Elections
and Mass Politics in Yemen," Middle East Report 23,
November-December 1994, p.3).
2 There
are no accurate figures to indicate the size of Wahhabi support in
Razih, but according to figures provided by local informants, the
Islah party received about 20 percent of the vote in the first
national election in 1994 (with five parties standing).
3 People
of qabili status comprise about 90 percent of the Razih population,
"butchers" (who pursue a variety of occupations, not only butchery)
about 5 percent, and the religious elite (sadah, singular sayyid)
the remaining five percent.
4 After
the 1997 elections, Islah lost all cabinet seats to the ruling
party, while al-Haqq picked up a single post, the Awqaf (Islamic
endowments) ministry.
5 I am
grateful to Gabriele vom Bruck for pointing out this switch in
self-identification.
6 See
Bernard Haykel, "A Zaydi Revival?" Yemen Update
36/1995.
7 For
the historical importance of prayer ritual for Zaydi identity, see
Bernard Haykel, "Al-Shawkani and the jurisprudential unity of
Yemen," in Michel Tuchscherer, ed., Le Yémen: Passé et Présent de
L'Unité. Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée (Edisud,
1994).
8 For
the recent upsurge in formal Zaydi education, see Abdelmalik Eagle,
"Yemeni Zaydis: the Imamate and its aftermath," Middle East
International, June 1995, and Haykel, op.cit.

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