 Published by the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace.
October 2006, Volume 4, Issue 8 Michele Dunne,
Editor Julia Choucair,
Deputy Editor Dina
Bishara, Assistant Editor
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Insights
and Analysis
Palestine:
How Weak is Hamas? Jarrett
Blanc
Egypt:
A Leap toward Reform—or
Succession? Joshua Stacher
U.S.
Policy and Yemen: Balancing Realism and Reform
on the Arab Periphery Jeremy M.
Sharp
Saudi
Arabia: Local Councils Struggling to Produce
Results Jafar Muhammad Al Shayib
Iraqi
Kurdistan: Time to Get Serious about
Governance Bilal Wahab
Readers
React
Find out how readers are reacting to articles
in the Arab Reform Bulletin. Join the
debate by sending your views to the editor at
arb@CarnegieEndowment.
org.
News
and Views
Iraq:
Parliament Passes Federalism Bill Yemen:
Presidential and Local Election
Results Bahrain:
Run-Up to Elections UAE:
First Elections Coming; Crackdown on Human
Rights Activists Kuwait:
MPs Blame Government for Electoral
Violations Jordan:
King Pardons MPs; Parliament Approves
Laws Syria:
Human Rights Developments Libya:
Verdicts by Abolished Courts Upheld; Prison
Clashes Upcoming
Political Events Views
from the Arab Media
Read
On
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publications on Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia,
Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and
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Insights and
Analysis
Palestine:
How Weak is Hamas?
Jarrett Blanc
Negotiations for a unity government between
Fatah and Hamas are the fruit of international
pressure, which has forced Hamas to consider
sacrificing some of its formal authority within
the Palestinian Authority (PA) despite the fact
that the Islamic movement and its allies hold 77
out of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative
Council (PLC).
How the international community should react
to Hamas-Fatah coalition negotiations depends in
part on whether international pressure has also
reduced Hamas's more informal sources of
authority. If Hamas retains meaningful authority
outside of PA institutions, forcing it from
government would simply make the PA ineffective
in serving the needs of either Palestinians or
Israelis. Measuring Hamas's power relative to
that of Fatah requires a look at its three
bases: social services, military force, and
popular support.
Palestinian and foreign
observers ascribed Hamas's victory in 2005 local
elections and 2006 legislative elections to its
network of efficient and honest social service
providers. These social service networks are
more than just a basis of Hamas' popularity;
they are also an indication of its
organizational strength. While it is difficult
to measure Hamas's social services precisely—it
does not publish disclosure forms or annual
reports—United Nations officials report that it
remains as active as it was prior to the
election. The stifling financial sanctions that
have all but eliminated the PA's ability to
provide government services have not,
apparently, diminished Hamas's capacity to
provide services on a smaller scale.
Hamas's military power gives it the
ability to launch terrorist attacks on Israel
and to fight Fatah military groups. From either
perspective, military power equates to real
authority within the PA. While it is also
difficult to measure Hamas's military power
directly, it is possible to observe its use.
Clashes between Hamas and Fatah forces in Gaza
since the beginning of October indicate that
Hamas has, at the very least, retained a rough
military parity with Fatah. Despite Israeli
incursions targeting Hamas military forces, news
reports indicate that one of Hamas's armed
groups, the Executive Force, has become strong
enough to force some Fatah commanders to leave
Gaza.
Regular public opinion polling in the PA
makes Hamas's popular support somewhat easier to
measure. In the legislative election, Hamas and
Fatah were close in terms of their share of the
popular vote, with Hamas winning 44 percent to
Fatah's 41 percent. Most opinion polls prior to
the election showed Fatah with a small lead over
Hamas, an error probably due to methodological
problems in polling and an understandable
reluctance of respondents to admit support for
Hamas given the possibility of Fatah or Israeli
reprisals. Immediately after the election,
support for Hamas in polls jumped to just over
its election result of 44 percent, perhaps
indicating a combination of a honeymoon for the
new legislative council and a reduction in
respondent fear.
While it is possible to cite more recent
polls, or parts of more recent polls, as
evidence that Hamas is loosing substantial
support, the broader trend in polling data
indicate that Hamas and Fatah remain evenly
matched. Polls since June show support for the
two parties settling at about 40 per cent
support for each, although the most recent
reputable poll shows a reduction of support for
both parties, with Fatah at 35 percent and Hamas
at 31 percent. Given the margin of error,
methodological problems, and possible respondent
fear factor, this result should also been seen
as evidence of generally equivalent public
support. Looking deeper into the polls, while
Hamas has a 44 per cent negative rating for its
role in post-election crises and a 60 per cent
“poor” rating for implementation of its election
program, 62 per cent still support Hamas's most
important decision: not to recognize Israel.
After seven months of severe political and
economic crisis, including the virtual closure
of Gaza and financial cut-offs leading to 170,
000 PA employees being paid less than two
months' salary, Hamas has indicated a
willingness to negotiate an agreement to share
formal authority in the PA. But while continued
pressure may succeed in forcing Hamas to cede
more (or all) of their formal authority within
the PA, experience thus far does not indicate
that it will undermine Hamas's other sources of
power.
In December 2005 and January 2006, the
international community pressed the PA to
conduct PLC elections as scheduled, overcoming
strong Fatah reservations to the electoral
process. In part, the international community
took this position because the Fatah-led
government did not reflect real power
relationships in the PA and so was unable to
deliver meaningful reform of PA institutions or
improvements in security for Israel. In making
decisions now about whether to accept a
potential government of national unity, the
international community must take into account
Hamas's real and apparently enduring strength.
Jarrett Blanc is a Council on Foreign
Relations International Affairs Fellow based at
the United States Institute of Peace. He was the
International Foundation for Election Systems'
Chief-of-Party in the Palestinian Authority from
March 2005 through March 2006.
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Egypt:
A Leap toward Reform—or
Succession?
Joshua Stacher
Egypt's ruling National Democratic Party
(NDP) convened its fourth annual conference
September 19-21, advertising it as “The Second
Leap Forward”. Speeches by senior party members
and carefully packaged briefing papers
emphasized the party's achievements in economic
and political reform and laid out a fairly
ambitious agenda for the coming year. The real
story at the conference, however, was Gamal
Mubarak's increasing political weight and
seemingly unstoppable ascent towards the
presidency.
Senior NDP figures such as Hossam Badrawi
added fuel to popular speculation that Gamal's
succession is inevitable. In an interview
published on the conference's first day in the
party's new organ Al Watani Al Youm,
Badrawi provided the most explicit scenario
yet by saying, "It is our right as a party to
nominate [during the next presidential election]
whoever has the qualifications for leadership
and it is his right to accept or decline…This is
not succession because, at the end of the day,
it must take place in a framework of
transparency and democracy." Not to be outdone,
Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif in his convention
speech made sure that all 2, 000 party members
in attendance knew who was responsible for
strengthening the party and its policies by
singling out “our brother Gamal” for his
efforts.
Gamal Mubarak for his part looked, sounded,
and performed like a seasoned politician. During
hours of briefing delegates and press
conferences, Gamal appeared well versed in
domestic and foreign affairs, attempting to
bolster his populist and nationalist credentials
by citing the urgent need to translate economic
reforms into improved living standards for poor
Egyptians and expressing independence from U.S.
plans for the Middle East. Gamal also made all
major announcements during the conference,
including Egypt's intention to pursue nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes and the need to
redefine the U.S. -Egyptian relationship.
President Hosni Mubarak's speech closing the
conference merely reiterated themes already
introduced by Gamal.
Although the younger Mubarak spoke in terms
of consensus, process, committees, and programs,
his descriptions did not match what actually
took place. NDP delegates from the nation's 26
governorates used the conference to air personal
concerns and rub shoulders with the country's
political elite, but did not appear to be
included seriously in policy debates. The few
who offered constructive comments at plenary and
committee sessions were often politely ignored
as senior NDP members simply reiterated policy
statements rather than addressing criticism or
suggestions.
On the conference's final day, when attendees
voted to transform the presentations into party
policies, dissent was entirely absent. Secretary
General Safwat Al Sharif reminded party members
that the papers being voted on were well studied
and that President Mubarak had approved the
measures. The climatic moment of internal
democracy happened in an instant. Almost before
Al Sharif could finish saying “all those in
favor,” he declared the measures “approved” as
hands immediately flung into the air.
The political reform proposals adopted in
rapid succession are ambitious, if only on the
surface. Political Training Secretary Muhammad
Kamal said the NDP would propose amending 20-25
articles of the constitution during the
parliamentary session that will begin in
November. According to speeches and policy
papers at the conference, amendments will pave
the way for replacing the state of emergency
with a specific counter terrorism law,
rebalancing parliament's powers vis-à-vis the
executive, changing the electoral system (most
likely to one of proportional representation),
and increasing local governing council powers.
While the proposals sounded impressive,
however, no specific amendments were discussed
at the conference. Given the NDP's failure so
far to consult with opposition forces, there is
widespread suspicion that the actual legislation
to be introduced will favor the interests of the
ruling party's upper echelons.
Opposition parties and movements responded to
the conference by trying to discredit it. The
Muslim Brotherhood's parliamentary bloc
discussed the impending onslaught of
NDP-authored legislation and is preparing its
own list of constitutional articles for proposed
amendment, but in general opposition groups
focused on the conference's popular perception.
Speaking to Al Ahram Weekly,
Brotherhood Supreme Guide Muhammad Mahdi
Akef characterized the conference as a step
backward, arguing that “If this conference had
Egypt's interests in mind, its agenda and the
topics they wanted to discuss should have been
made public. But there is consensus now that
there is a group within the NDP that makes
decisions and modifies laws that only enforce
tawreeth (succession). All the laws and
constitutional amendments they're cooking up
point in this direction. ”
This year's NDP conference did not officially
anoint Gamal Mubarak as Egypt's next president,
but it did foreshadow how hands will raise when
asked about his presidential candidacy. Whether
Gamal is the heir apparent is no longer an open
question in Egypt; the question for Egyptians
and outside observers now is simply how soon the
succession will take place. Joshua
Stacher is a lecturer of Political Science at
the British University in Egypt.
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U.S.
Policy and Yemen: Balancing
Realism and Reform on the Arab Periphery
Jeremy M. Sharp
In
an ironic turn of events, Yemen's September 20
presidential and local elections garnered
extensive favorable coverage by the normally
critical Al Jazeera, while they
received only scant attention from the U.S.
government, heretofore eager to highlight any
sign of reform in Arab states. Why did U.S.
officials refrain from highlighting what many
foreign observers have praised as successful
elections? Possible explanations include a
return to traditional priorities in which
security interests supersede democracy
promotion, a calculated U.S. effort to promote
Arab reform more quietly, or simply an oversight
due to other distractions.
Yemen, a resource-poor Arab country situated
at a healthy distance from the heart of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is a crucible of
sorts for U.S. attempts to strike a balance
between reform and other goals. U.S. -Yemeni
bilateral security and intelligence cooperation
has been, and remains, the top U.S. priority.
Since the 2000 Al Qaeda attack on the USS Cole,
the United States has helped Yemen build its
coast guard to patrol the Bab Al Mandab and to
meet an Al Qaeda-inspired terrorist threat that
recent events demonstrate to be very real. On
September 19, the day before the elections,
Yemeni security forces thwarted two terrorist
attacks against oil installations in the
northeastern region of Maarib and on the Gulf of
Aden coast at Dhabba.
In Yemen the United States also faces the
challenges of mixing encouragement and criticism
of Arab regimes'liberalization efforts and of
deciding how to deal with Islamists. This is
also true in Morocco and parts of the Persian
Gulf, where U.S. officials are quietly urging
liberalization. U.S. policy toward engaging
certain Islamist movements is left somewhat
vague—perhaps deliberately so—but there are
efforts being made to maintain contacts with
moderate, non-violent Islamist factions. In
Yemen members of the Islah party (a coalition of
old guard Muslim Brotherhood members, Salafists,
and tribes) appear to welcome dialogue on reform
and have participated, along with other Yemeni
political parties, in programs sponsored by the
U.S. -based National Democratic Institute. Still
U.S. officials exercise caution, as the leader
of the Salafist strain of Islah, Shaykh Abd Al
Majid Al Zindani, has been designated as a U.S.
Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the
U.S. Treasury Department for his alleged role in
providing financial support to Al Qaeda
operations and recruitment.
The Yemeni presidential election was about
more than just esoteric notions of political
reform; it was about the real issue of
presidential succession. As in Egypt, where
speculation abounds over the grooming of Gamal
Mubarak for succession, there is widespread
concern among Yemen's opposition parties over
the prospect of President Ali Abdullah Saleh's
37-year old son Ahmed inheriting the reins of
power. This fear was among the main motivations
that brought Yemen's diverse opposition parties—
socialists, Islamists, and Baathists—together in
this year's elections. In a recent
Washington Post interview, opposition
presidential candidate Faisal Bin Shamlan (who
received 21 percent of the vote) remarked that
“We subordinated our ideological agendas to the
one thing we all had in common, which was a
realization that political reform was a
necessity if we were to save democracy in Yemen
and stop the country's descent into endemic
corruption.”
President Saleh's victory surprised no one;
he is a populist leader who appeals to the
everyman, and the ruling party's overwhelming
resource advantage helped him considerably.
Despite opposition allegations of fraud, foreign
observers released preliminary conclusions that
the election was relatively free and fair with
the typical shortcomings seen in developing
nations: there were breaches in voting secrecy,
underage voters, and a number of inaccuracies in
the voting registry. U.S. government officials
were clearly encouraged by the relatively smooth
election, believing that process is important
despite imperfections.
The key policy question now is whether the
Yemeni government will derive any tangible
benefits from holding the election. In November
2005, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
suspended Yemen's eligibility for assistance
under its Threshold Program, concluding that
after Yemen was named as a potential aid
candidate in fiscal year 2004, corruption in the
country had increased. Yemen can reapply in
November of this year.
Despite the upcoming MCC decision, Yemen
remains largely absent in public U.S. policy
discussions regarding democratization.
Regime-manipulated political reform is but one
malady in a long list of Yemen's socio-economic
problems. The country is still recovering from
civil war and re-unification, and it has
enormous social challenges including endemic
poverty, high rates of illiteracy, and water
depletion. Yet, in a sense, the general lack of
U.S. attention to Yemen in itself creates
opportunities. Unlike U.S. relations with more
strategically important countries such as Egypt,
U.S. -Yemeni relations are not under a
microscope, giving policymakers on the ground
flexibility and freedom to experiment.
Jeremy M. Sharp is a Middle East policy
analyst at the Congressional Research Service.
The views expressed are the author's and not
necessarily those of the Congressional Research
Service.
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Saudi
Arabia: Local Councils
Struggling to Produce Results
Jafar Muhammad Al Shayib
The local councils of Saudi Arabia elected in
spring 2005, still in their formative stages,
have yet to make their mark on municipal
decision making. They are caught between the
promises that they made to voters during last
year's elections and the reality of dealing with
local governments known for deeply ingrained
bureaucracy. Although it is difficult to
evaluate fully the performance of the local
councils during their short tenure so far, the
general impression among Saudis is that the
councils have far to go in order to produce
tangible results for the citizenry.
Three main factors affect the local councils'
effectiveness. The first is the council members
themselves—elected and appointed—and their
understanding of their duties. The second is the
official administrative framework governing the
councils' operation, authority, and ability to
oversee local administration. The third is the
general public and its role in monitoring the
councils and interacting with them.
To begin with, the eight month gap between
the councils' election and taking office had a
negative impact, resulting in a retreat by the
electorate and even by the elected members from
local work. There had been great enthusiasm
after the general elections—held in Saudi Arabia
for the first time in many decades—and many
citizens had held high hopes that the local
councils would be a conduit for developing local
services, improving conditions in the
municipalities, and ending the spread of
financial and administrative corruption. In
addition, the selection of appointed council
members caused several problems. Although the
selection process was supposed to choose members
whose capabilities were appropriate to the
councils' activities, it in fact relied on
additional factors such as the need for regional
and tribal balance. This undoubtedly contributed
to a rearrangement of the agendas of some of the
councils according to the tendencies and
backgrounds of these new members.
A number of administrative and legal problems
surfaced in the relationship between the local
councils and municipalities. Although there are
statutes that clearly stipulate the councils'
authority in supervising all work carried out in
the municipalities, a number of conflicts have
arisen in dealings with the executive apparatus
due to the reservations of local officials and
to the municipalities' bureaucratic nature. In
most of these situations local councils have
been forced to find a compromise solution or
delay implementation of their decisions because
there is no administrative framework to enforce
their decisions.
Despite problems working with municipalities,
during their first ten months the councils
themselves have, on the whole, been active and
dealt with a number of important issues. They
first reviewed and approved municipal budgets
for the year 2007, then focused on improving
services in the municipalities in general and
dealing with enduring issues such as land grants
to citizens and reprioritizing municipal
projects. So far councils have not tackled
reorganizing municipalities and reviewing their
financial improprieties which are among the
councils' most important oversight functions.
However, measures are underway in some of the
councils to hold contractors responsible for
negligence and poor performance. Some council
members have proposed to do field research in
order to more clearly understand citizens' needs
and to learn about how other local councils
function, whether in Saudi Arabia or abroad.
Saudi citizens have shown a good deal of
interest in—and lack of satisfaction with—the
performance of the local councils. A number of
councils have held open meetings with citizens
to present to them the work they have done.
These meetings have witnessed sharp criticism of
council members and demands that they be more
active and focused on issues of importance to
citizens. A number of citizens have also offered
cooperation and professional expertise to help
improve local services in their neighborhoods,
but an appropriate framework for popular
participation so far has not materialized.
The future achievements of the local councils
will depend on their ability to carve out an
appropriate position for themselves through
which they can perform their prescribed duties.
The councils can do this by working more
actively with municipalities and delineating
clear mechanisms for monitoring implementation
of their decisions. They will also need to work
on achieving a more mature relationship and
greater unity of purpose among council members,
as well as between them and the general public.
Jafar Muhammad Al Shayib is president of
the local council of Al Qatif Governate in Saudi
Arabia. This article was translated from Arabic
by Kevin Burnham.
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Iraqi
Kurdistan: Time to Get Serious about Governance
Bilal Wahab
Virtually autonomous since 1992, the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq has
followed an uneven path on the road to good
governance. Six months have passed since the
formation of the current united Kurdish cabinet.
While Kurdistan has been increasingly stable and
secure, its potential for accountability and
clean government has yet to be fulfilled.
Corruption, low wages, incompetence, poor
management skills, and lack of opportunity for
young people are significant challenges facing
the KRG. After years of discord, conflict,
and parallel governments, the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK) formed a broad coalition and
competed jointly in the two post-2003 elections
for the Iraqi National Assembly as well as in
the elections for the Kurdish National Assembly.
Despite the 50-50 power sharing structure and
the co-chairing of some key ministries, the new
cabinet has performed better than many observers
anticipated.
Yet governance in Kurdistan faces challenges
due to the legacy of decades-long dictatorship,
wars, sanctions and political party monopoly.
When left to run the country in 1992, the Kurds
had one model of governance to follow: that of
the former regime. Hence government institutions
became vehicles through which political parties
maintained power. The government also remained
the largest employer; the KRG spends 60 percent
of its budget in salaries to heavily overstaffed
public offices. Overstaffing wastes revenues and
also gives public officials the opportunity to
dispense patronage and abuse their position.
Until recently Kurdish administrations have
had little incentive to better their
performance. Government officials in earlier
Kurdish cabinets were political appointees, and
as such were accountable only to their parties.
Having just emerged from almost a decade of
monopolistic rule, the current cabinet has
little experience with accountability and
transparency. Moreover, the role of Kurdish
political parties other than the PUK and the KDP
has been diminishing. These smaller parties are
financially or politically dependent on the
government, and hence are either co-opted into
alliances or silenced through pressure.
Increasing public discontent, however, may
mean that the KRG will soon have to address its
poor performance. Like the rest of Iraq,
Kurdistan has been suffering a shortage of gas
and electricity. Demonstrations and rebellions
against corruption and lack of services broke
out across the region in the spring and summer
of 2006, with demonstrators accusing party
officials of reaping the benefits of the
reconstruction boom. Discouragement about job
prospects has led to a new trend of emigration
among young people and intellectuals.
Furthermore, an increasingly vibrant media
and civil society demand more responsive
governance. Although the bulk of the media are
still party controlled, the audience for the few
independent newspapers and one independent radio
station is growing. Supported by local and
international NGOs, these free outlets have
acted as public mouthpieces and raised issues
considered taboo before.
Iraqi Kurdistan's need for foreign investment
is another important incentive to improve
governance and curtail corruption. The region is
expected to produce oil by the end of 2006.
Recent remarks by Iraq's Oil Minister casting
doubt on the legality of the contracts signed by
the KRG enraged Kurdish authorities, who deemed
such comments aimed at undermining the region's
efforts to appeal to investors. Having already
approved a new investment law, the Kurdish
parliament is expected to also approve a draft
oil law that recognizes the threat of corruption
in the oil industry and seeks to curb it.
On the positive side of the ledger,
Kurds—whether officials or not—have a sense of
ownership of their region. Even the many Kurdish
officials accused of becoming overnight tycoons
invest their newfound wealth in the region
rather than stashing it in Western banks. And
the KRG seems willing to respond to increasing
demands for transparency and good governance.
Steps in the right direction by the current
cabinet include choosing technocrats rather than
politicians as ministers and hiring Westerners
and returned expatriates as consultants in
building institutions, collecting better data
for all sectors, and teaching at universities.
Although the KDP-PUK deal dictates that the
two parties run jointly in 2007 elections, the
two groups should present separate platforms and
compete amicably in order to encourage
accountability. They should also tolerate other
opposition groups. Kurdish politics after Saddam
have become more open and outward looking, but
there is still room for some serious house
cleaning. Bilal Wahab is a Fulbright
fellow from Iraqi Kurdistan enrolled at American
University in Washington, DC.
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Readers React
It was refreshing to read Moataz El
Fegiery's conclusion (September 2006)
that in the Arab Middle East
(and perhaps elsewhere) official and
semi-official media are not helping secular
candidates to win elections. Building
constituencies is a painstaking, complicated
process not amenable to a quick fix by the
media, and one in which Islamists show more
patience and expertise than their secular
rivals. Many Arab voters also are deeply
suspicious of their local state-owned
media, so when this media promote
certain candidates or parties it might
do them more harm than good.
In addition to what El Fegiery has rightly
touched upon, there is a need to explore the
impact of regional (as opposed to
local) Arab media on national
elections. It has been fascinating to see how
fiercely candidates and parties compete to
appear on Al Jazeera, Al Arabiyya,
and other pan-Arab satellite channels
during elections. The relative credibility and
professionalism of these media outlets, along
with their extensive coverage of elections in
Arab countries, attract large audiences who
follow their local elections on regional
media. In studying election coverage by these
media there may be additional lessons to learn.
Khaled Hroub Director, Cambridge
Arab Media Project
I have just read Mahdi Abdul Hadi's note
on the social impact of the Islamist-secularist
struggle in Palestine (September 2006), which
attributes the process of social Islamization in
Palestine to external factors, primarily the
policies and practices of the Israeli military
occupation and to currents in Israeli culture
including Jewish religious revivalism. The
article reminded me of a conversation I had more
than thirty years ago with Shaykh Muhammad Ali
Ja'bari in Hebron. Ja'bari decried the influence
of Israel on Palestinian society, which he
insisted was the cause of growing
secularization. Whom to believe? In any event,
the idea of attributing to Israel a process of
social Islamization in Palestine that is also
taking place to one degree or another throughout
the entire Muslim world strikes me as rather
forced.
Mark A. Heller Director of
Research, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
Notwithstanding the positive developments
indicated by Paul Salem (September 2006), the
political structure in Lebanon remains extremely
fragile and susceptible to manipulation by
external forces, principally Iran and Syria.
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora finds
himself subject to a vicious campaign by the
Hizbollah-Aoun alliance supported by Syria,
aimed at eliminating him politically. A cabinet
crisis could easily degenerate into a
constitutional crisis, and tense Sunni-Shiite
fault lines—seen in the context of increasing
polarization between these two communities in
Iraq and other Arab countries—have all the
makings of a dangerous conflict. It is difficult
to see how the conflicting visions for Lebanon
presented by Hizbollah and by those who would
address the dysfunctional sectarian system while
developing relations with the outside world can
be reconciled any time soon. As the election of
a new president approaches in fall 2007, the
Lebanese body politic will face a moment of
truth it has tried to avoid since the end of the
civil war.
Hisham Melhem Washington
correspondent, Al Nahar newspaper and
Al Arabiyya television
Send your views on what you have read in
the Arab Reform Bulletin to the editor
at mailto:arb@carnegieendowment.org
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News and
Views
Iraq:
Parliament Passes Federalism
Bill
After months of deadlock, the Iraqi
parliament passed a law on October 11 setting up
a mechanism to implement a constitution
provision allowing the formation of federal
regions in Iraq, despite vehement opposition by
the Sunni coalition and two Shiite parties. The
bill was submitted by the largest Shiite bloc,
the United Iraqi Alliance, with the aim of
creating a Shiite autonomous state in southern
Iraq with broad powers over security and
petroleum resources. The Sunni Iraqi Accord
Front and the National Dialogue Front of Saleh
Al Mutlaq boycotted the parliamentary session
but a quorum was reached with 138 lawmakers (of
275) passing the 200 articles of the bill
unanimously. On September 24, Sunni parties
agreed to allow the bill to be presented for a
vote after reaching a deal that the law would
not come into effect for 18 months and that a
27-member committee would be created to review
the constitution. Sunni Arab politicians fear
that regional autonomy would deny other regions
access to oil revenues and want to amend the
constitution to strengthen the powers of the
central government.
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Yemen:
Presidential and Local Election
Results
After threatening to encourage its supporters
to stage street protests, Yemen's opposition
parties stated they would accept results of the
September 20 presidential election “for the sake
of peace and stability. ” The opposition
coalition known as the Joint Meeting Parties
that fielded former oil executive Faisal Bin
Shamlan as its presidential candidate initially
rejected election commission results giving
incumbent Ali Abdullah Saleh 77. 17 percent of
the vote and Bin Shamlan just 21. 82 percent,
claiming that the government had seized polling
stations and stolen ballot boxes. President
Saleh acknowledged “mistakes” in the elections
and pledged to rectify them in the next one, but
stood by his victory and thanked the opposition
for giving him his first real challenge in 28
years in power.
In its preliminary
report released on
September 21, the European Union Election
Observation Mission described the elections as
“an open and genuine political contest” but
cited shortcomings including underage voting,
voter intimidation, arrest of opposition
candidates, and the overwhelming use of state
resources by the ruling party during the
election campaign. Les Campbell, Director of the
National Democratic Institute's Middle East
Program, which assisted in monitoring the
elections, said that “Having watched democratic
developments for 10 years in the Middle East,
this may have been the most significant election
so far.” A report
by the Arabic Network for Human Rights
Information highlights restrictions imposed on
freedom of the press.
The Election Commission on October 4
postponed the announcement of results of local
elections also held September 20, citing a lack
of final results from all districts. Allegations
of fraud and election-related violence,
including the deaths of candidates and election
officials, have stalled the process. The
commission reported that 90 percent of the vote
count is complete and that initial results show
a victory of the ruling General People Congress
with over 80 percent of votes in the provincial
councils and 70 percent in district councils.
Approximately 65 percent of the 9. 2 million
registered voters cast ballots. Click here
for more details.
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Bahrain:
Run-Up to Elections
Protesters and opposition parties are
accusing the Bahraini government of extending
citizenship and voting rights to Sunni migrants
from other Arab countries as well as Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and India in order to dilute the
voting power of the Shiite majority in
parliamentary elections scheduled for November
25. A report by former government advisor Salah
Al Bandar describing a conspiracy by senior
government officials to rig the upcoming
elections to reduce the powers of Shiites has
added to the tension. According to the report,
this effort is led by the State Minister of
Cabinet Affairs and head of the Central
Informatics Organization Sheikh Ahmed bin
Ateyatallah Al Khalifa. Sheikh Ahmed (who also
heads the committee overseeing the November
elections) denied the claim, saying that the
report was an attempt by Al Bandar to erode
national unity, sow doubts about the forthcoming
elections, and undermine the credibility of
officials preparing the elections. Click
here to access the
report.
Bahrain's largest Shiite political society Al
Wefaq, which is planning to contest at least 19
seats in the 40-member lower house, has called
for an independent probe into the report's
allegations. Al Wefaq and four other political
societies boycotted the 2002 elections to
protest constitutional changes that granted the
appointed upper chamber of parliament equal
legislative powers to the elected lower chamber.
Nine candidates, including former member of
parliament Abdulnabi Salman, have established a
new alliance called the National Unity Bloc. Its
platform calls for promoting constitutional
reforms that would place legislative power
entirely in the hands of the elected lower
house, allow for the establishment of political
parties, and redraw electoral constituencies.
Bahrain's judicial authority announced that
it will for the first time fully supervise the
elections. The November elections will be only
the second time that Bahrainis will elect fully
representative municipal councils and the lower
house of the National Assembly. The 2002
parliamentary elections were Bahrain's first
since 1975, when former ruler Sheikh Isa bin
Salman Al Khalifa suspended the constitution and
dissolved parliament.
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UAE: First Elections
Coming; Crackdown on Human Rights Activists
The UAE government will hold its first-ever
indirect elections for half of the members of
the 40-member Federal National Council (FNC),
the closest body the country has to a
parliament, on December 16. The FNC serves in an
advisory capacity and lacks legislative powers.
Minister of State for FNC Affairs Anwar Gargash
announced election procedures in September;
click here for details. The
ruler of each of the seven emirates has named
members to the electoral colleges (6, 689
members in total, 1, 189 of them women), who
will then elect half the FNC members from
amongst themselves. The other half of the
council's members will continue to be appointed
by the leaders of the emirates. The UAE is the
only country among the six Gulf Cooperation
Council states that has yet to hold any form of
elections. In the past months, security
officials and the judiciary in the United Arab
Emirates have targeted several prominent human
rights defenders. A travel ban and arrest
warrant was issued on June 17 against Muhammad
Al Mansoori, president of the independent
Jurists Association and a prominent lawyer and
human rights activist. According to Al Mansoori,
the warrant charged him with “insulting the
Public Prosecutor” on the basis of his human
rights advocacy. Security officials detained
prominent lawyer and human rights defender
Al-Muhammad Al Roken on July 27 for 24 hours and
again on August 23 for three days on charges of
“immoral behavior” and questioned him about his
human rights activities and contacts. Also, the
Ministry of Social Welfare has not replied to
applications by two human rights groups for
licenses since 2004. Under the Associations Law,
the ministry should have replied within 30 days.
In a letter to UAE president Sheikh Khalifa bin
Zayed Al Nahyan, Human Rights Watch called on
the UAE to halt the harassment of human rights
defenders and allow independent human rights
groups to operate legally. Click here to read the
letter.
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Kuwait:
MPs Blame Government for
Electoral Violations
A parliamentary committee
established in July to investigate electoral
violations in Kuwait declared on October 1 that
it has evidence of government interference in
the June parliamentary elections. The committee
has not released details of its findings but has
requested that the government ask the head of
the Citizen Services Apparatus Sheikh Muhammad
Al Abdullah Al Mubarak Al Sabah to step down for
three months while the investigation unfolds.
Government officials have responded that the
constitution does not allow a parliamentary
committee to make such requests.
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Jordan:
King Pardons MPs; Parliament Approves Laws
Jordan's King Abdullah pardoned on September
30 two Islamist MPs, Mohammad Abu Fares and Ali
Abul Sukkar. The two were sentenced to 13-month
prison terms on charges of fuelling national
discord and inciting sectarianism after they
attended the funeral of Al Qaeda militant Abu
Musab Al Zarqawi in June. The Islamic Action
Front (IAF) welcomed their release but insisted
that the sentence had been unfair and that they
should regain their parliamentary seats.
Relations between the government and the IAF
have been further strained by legislation to
tighten control over mosque preachers. On
September 27, parliament approved the draft
iftaa (Islamic verdicts) law that requires
written approval from the religious affairs
minister for new mosque preachers and anyone
teaching the Quran in mosques. Under the law,
violators face penalties of up to one month in
prison and a fine of $142. On September 13
parliament approved a measure that allows only a
state-appointed council to issue fatwas
(religious edicts) and makes it illegal to
criticize these fatwas. IAF MPs rejected the law
on the basis that it curbs religious freedoms
and freedom of expression.
Parliament also approved legislation on
September 27 to fight corruption through the
creation of a “financially and administratively
autonomous” six-member commission tasked with
investigating corruption, including suspects
among current and former officials. To the
dismay of many human rights activists,
parliament endorsed a last-minute amendment to
allow the Prime Minister to appoint the members.
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Syria:
Human Rights
Developments
- Journalist Ali Abdullah and his son,
Muhammad, were released from prison on October 4
after completing six month-terms on charges
including “broadcasting abroad false or
exaggerated news which would damage the
reputation of the state.” A further charge
connected with allegations that he insulted the
Syrian president was dropped. Click here
for more details.
- Khalil Hussein, Mahmoud Issa, Suleyman
Shummar and Muhammad Mahfouz, considered
prisoners of conscience by Amnesty
International, were released on bail of 1, 000
Syrian Lira (US $20) on September 25 after they
were arrested for signing the Beirut-Damascus
Declaration of 12 May 2006.
- According to the National Organization for
Human Rights, Abdo Khalaf Wlo, a former leading
member of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic party,
was released from prison after being arrested in
mid-June.
- Anwar Al Bunni and Michel Kilo (who have
been held since 14 May) remain in prison,
reportedly on charges including “weakening
nationalist feelings and inciting racial or
sectarian strife. ” There is no date as yet for
their trial or information about which court
will hear their case. Click here for more
details.
- Eight Syrian students from the University of
Damascus arrested between January and March 2006
continue to be held incommunicado and without
legal counsel. The charges are not known, but
they were reportedly involved in
developing
a youth movement and in writing political
articles for various websites. They were
scheduled to appear before the State Security
Court September 26, but the trial has been
postponed until November 26. Click here
for more details.
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Libya:
Verdicts by Abolished Courts
Upheld; Prison Clashes
A court in Tripoli upheld on October 4 the
decision of the now abolished People's Court to
convict 190 prisoners arrested in the second
half of the 1990s on charges related to
membership of or links with an unauthorized
organization, believed to be the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group. The court had been ordered to
retry the cases by Libya's Supreme Court, which
reviewed and overturned the original sentences
following the abolition of the People's Court in
January 2005. Violent clashes in which at least
one prisoner was killed took place in the Abu
Salim Prison in Tripoli on October 4, after some
prisoners were brought back to the prison
following the hearing. Hundreds of political
prisoners have been detained there in recent
years and the prison was the scene of a mass
killing of detainees in June 1996, with
estimated figures of those killed ranging up to
1, 200. Click here
for more details.
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Upcoming
Political Events
- Bahrain: Legislative and municipal
elections, November 25, 2006.
- Algeria: Referendum on constitutional
revision, fall 2006.
- United Arab Emirates: Elections to the
Federal National Council, December 16, 2006.
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Views from the Arab
Media
Many Arab pundits commented on U.S. Secretary
of State Condoleeza Rice's recent visit to the
region:
- In an article in Al
Hayat on October 8 Mahmoud Awad argued that
Rice's recent trip failed to address the
region's real problems. The U.S. government
hoped to mobilize moderate Arab leaders against
Iran and Hamas. Rice found, however, that the
leaders of Egypt and Saudi Arabia were more
interested in a comprehensive resolution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict than in supporting
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas against
Hamas. They were also more worried about a
nuclear Israel than a nuclear Iran.
- An October 2 article in Jordan's
Al Ghad by Mohammad Abu Rumman argued
that the U.S. strategy of rallying moderate Arab
states against Iran's ambitions in the region
cannot succeed without a final solution of the
Palestinian problem. But due to the lack of
Israeli willingness to negotiate now and the
deteriorating situation in Palestinian internal
politics, there are no viable diplomatic
initiatives on this front. In this context, the
moderate Arab states seem destined to continue
to lose political credibility to Islamist groups
and Shiite movements.
- In an October 10 opinion article in the UAE's
Al Ittihad, Ahmed Youssef Ahmed
contended that Rice's assertions during her
recent visit highlight the contradictions
inherent in the U.S. democracy promotion policy.
First, the new focus on so-called moderate Arab
states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan
proves that the United States continues to seek
alliances with anti-democratic regimes. Second,
when the United States speaks of democracy, it
is not really interested in the democratic
process per se but in a desire to see friendly
forces come to power in particular Arab
countries. Finally, Rice's insistence that
democracy will pave the way for peace in the
region ignores the fact that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has nothing to do
with democracy in Israel or Palestine.
- An October 2 episode of Al
Arabiyya's “Panorama” debated
whether Rice's visit to the region signified a
change in U.S. policy. Riad Tabbara, former
Lebanese ambassador to the United States, argued
that the influence of neoconservatives is
decreasing and that the administration is now
more willing to work with Europe and through the
United Nations. Journalist Yehya Al Amir stated
the administration was turning to countries such
as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan for help in
solving the messy situation it created in the
region. Palestinian political analyst Ali Al
Jarbawi asserted that there has been no
fundamental change in the principles underlying
U.S. policy yet, only tactical adjustment.
- Abdul Monem Said wrote in a commentary in Ash
Sharq Al Awsat on October 4 that the
problem with U.S. policy is not tactics but the
strategy of preemption, which is not suited to
solving the problems of the Arab world. The
United States needs to recognize that it needs a
new strategy of engagement with its partners in
the region. Only in this way can the United
States acquire legitimacy for its actions.
In an article in Al
Ittihad on October 11, Khaled Hroub argued
that the polarization occurring in the region
between moderates and extremists leaves no room
for a large section of public opinion that does
not ascribe to either of these axes. Given the
weakness of civil society and independent
organizations in the region, these voices are
unfortunately the weakest link. Intellectuals
who seek to maintain their neutrality are
finding themselves marginalized in a system that
seeks to place everyone on one side or the other
of the divide.
Al Jazeera's “Akthar Min Rai” (More
than One Opinion) hosted an October 6 discussion
of the prospects for the Arab world in light of
rising tensions. Marwan Bishara, lecturer on
international relations in Paris, argued that
the deep internal divides in Iraq, Lebanon, and
Palestine call for national dialogue processes
where all sides can reach a compromise. A
situation where 51 percent of the population in
these countries governs over the remaining 49
percent is unsustainable. Walid Sharara,
political analyst at Lebanon's Al Akhbar
newspaper, argued that the U.S. drive
against Iran targets not just that country but
all voices of opposition and resistance to U.S.
ambitions in the region.
An opinion article by political
scientist Hassan Nafea in Egypt's Al Masry
Al Youm on September 24 argued that
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's speech at the
annual conference of the ruling National
Democratic Party on September 21 showed that the
president bears responsibility for Egypt's
deteriorating situation. Instead of focusing on
rebuilding and modernizing the country, he is
concentrating on clearing the path for his son's
succession to the presidency
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Read On
Yemen's elections in
September and the country's difficult political
history inspired several publications:
- The September 20 presidential ballot
solidified President Ali Abdullah Saleh's
position while giving foreign governments the
political cover they need to continue dealing
with him, argues Gregory D. Johnsen. In this
highly personalized system it will be up to
Saleh to decide whether to work to soften the
inevitable economic crash that will come when
Yemen's oil runs out or to invest his energies
in creating a family dynasty (“The Election Yemen Was Supposed to
Have,” Middle East Report
Online, October 3, 2006).
- Yemen's failed post-civil war experiment
with democratic elections in 1993 can shed light
on the challenges facing regionally divided
countries such as Iraq, argues Stephen Day in
“Barriers to Federal Democracy in Iraq: Lessons
from Yemen” (Middle East Policy, vol.
13, no. 3, Fall 2006, 121-39).
Several recent publications discuss
reform-related developments in North
Africa:
- Morocco's top-down reforms
have improved economic, social, and human rights
conditions significantly but have not changed
the distribution of power or the nature of the
political system, argue Marina Ottaway and
Meredith Riley in “Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to
Democratic Transition?” (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie
Paper no. 71, September 2006).
- Confronted with challenges such as
maintaining legitimacy, dealing with Islamist
oppositions, and supplying basic needs to
growing populations, Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia face three possible regime
scenarios: Islamization of the political sphere,
continuation of the authoritarian status quo, or
accelerated evolution towards democracy (Bruce
Maddy-Weitzman, “Maghreb Regime Scenarios”,
Middle East Review of International
Affairs, vol. 10, no. 3, September 2006,
103-19).
- In dealing with the challenges of Islamic
radicalism, Tunisia,
Algeria, Morocco, have
made changes to their constitutions and
political systems to allow the inclusion of
Islamist groups in formal politics and head off
any possible challenges to the survival of the
regimes, according to Michael Willis
(Mediterranean Politics, vol. 11, no.
2, July 2006, 137-50).
- On October 4, Reporters Without Borders
released a report based on its first
fact-finding visit to Libya in
20 years. The report states that
despite a relaxation of restrictions
in the past few years, the media remain
controlled by the Libyan regime and criticism of
Muammar Gaddafi continues to be taboo
(“In Libya, You Can Criticize Allah
but not Gaddafi.”) Click here for the English
version and here for the Arabic
version.
Several new publications treat developments
in Egypt and Gulf states:
- In “Constitutional Authority and Subversion:
Egypt's New
Presidential Election System,” Kristen Stilt
examines the legal and political context of
Egypt's recent constitutional amendment allowing
for the country's first multi-candidate
presidential elections (Indiana
International and Comparative Law Review,
vol. 16, no. 2, 2006, 335-73).
- In the “Islamization of
Egypt,” Adel
Guindy argues that the Islamic transformation
Egypt has undergone since the
1970s has turned Copts into second class
citizens and led to a regression in
modernization and westernization efforts in the
country (Middle East Review of International
Affairs, vol. 10, no. 3, September 2006,
92-102).
- The challenges facing Egypt's
ongoing democratic transformation
include the contested role of religion in
politics and the continued centralization of
power, argues Egyptian Ambassador to the United
States Nabil Fahmy in “Egypt's Unwavering Path
to Democratic Reform” (Mediterranean
Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3, Summer 2006,
1-11).
- The Bush administration's efforts to manage
the war on terrorism and promote regional
democracy have led to increased congressional
scrutiny of relationships with Saudi
Arabia and Egypt,
according to David Dumke (“Congress and
the Arab Heavyweights: Questioning the Saudi and
Egyptian Alliances,” Middle East Policy,
vol. 13, no. 3, Fall 2006, 88-100).
- Behind the façade of the United Arab
Emirates' development boom lies a
myriad of deficiencies, including an education
system focusing on training rather than
developing intellectual content; a culture that
sometimes rewards fantasy more than actual
accomplishments; and a social structure that
discourages young women from making an economic
contribution (Timothy N. Walters, Alma Karagic
and Lynne M. Walters, “Miracle or Mirage: Is Development
Sustainable in the United Arab
Emirates,” Middle East Review
of International Affairs, vol. 10, no. 3,
September 2006, 77-91).
Several new publications highlight
developments in the Levant:
- In Hamas: A Beginner's Guide,
Khaled Hroub explains the reasons
for Hamas's electoral success and provides an
overview of the movement's attitudes toward
Israel and its grassroots activities (London:
Pluto Press, 2006).
- Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and
Coexistence places Hamas's
ascendancy into context and shows that contrary
to its violent image, it is a social and
political organization that provides services
and makes careful political choices (Shaul
Mishal and Avraham Sela, New York: Columbia
University Press, 2006).
The United States must realize that the real
war on terrorism can only be
won within Islam and at a religious and
ideological level, argues Anthony H. Cordesman
in “Winning the ‘War on Terrorism': A
Fundamentally Different Strategy” (Middle
East Policy, vol. 13, no. 3, Fall 2006,
101-8).
So far the question of permanent U.S. bases
in Iraq has triggered no major political debate,
but developments point to the necessity of
maintaining a military presence in Iraq for
several years, notes Walter Posch in “Staying
the Course: Permanent U.S. Bases in Iraq?”
(Middle East Policy, vol. 13,
no. 3, Fall 2006, 109-20).
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