Curse on the Land:
A History of the Mozambican Civil War

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School of Humanities

Discipline of History

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Preface

I would like to thank those who have supported and assisted me during the production of this thesis, especially my friends and colleagues at the University of Western Australia, my family, and my partner Lindsay who has most closely witnessed and shared the joys and tribulations of my doctoral experience. I express my gratitude to my supervisors Professor Norman Etherington and Dr Jeremy Martens, who have given me guidance and feedback without smothering my initiative, to all the staff in UWA’s Discipline of History who have facilitated my candidature, and to Convocation – the UWA Graduates’ Association, who provided me with the 2003 Postgraduate Travel Award which greatly enhanced my experience of travel and research in southern Africa.

I would also like to thank all those scholars who have provided me with any level of assistance in my research, including: Ned Alpers, University of California, Los Angeles; João Cabrita; Michel Cahen, Montesquieu University, Bordeaux; João Paulo Borges Coelho, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane; Paul Fauvet, Agencia de Informação de Moçambique; Karen Harris, University of Pretoria; David Hedges, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane; Carrie Manning, Georgia State University; Maly Newitt, King’s College, University of London; Carolyn Nordstrom, University of Notre Dame, Indiana; and André Thomashausen, University of South Africa. Special thanks must go to the employees of the South African Foreign Affairs Archive, who went out of their way to make me welcome, and to Colin Darch at the University of Cape Town, without whose advice and resources this thesis would not have been possible.

Writing this doctoral thesis over the last four years has been more than a research project; it has been a way of life and a period of personal growth. The journey has been intellectually challenging, exciting and enjoyable, but sometimes also stressful, lonely and heartbreaking. Exploring Mozambican history has forced me to reassess my beliefs about ideology, religion, good, evil, misery and happiness, and gave me the opportunity to see some of the beautiful continent of Africa. I hope that my research will in some way benefit the people of Mozambique, and will make a worthwhile contribution to the study of African history.
Note on Spellings

In this thesis I have tried to conform to standard Australian English, but have retained original spellings within quotations and titles. I have found that many names of people and places involved in this history have multiple spellings and I have thus tried to identify the most common or accurate and remain consistent with that spelling throughout the text. A number of acronyms, including Renamo and Frelimo are written with only the first letter capitalised due to common usage of that style and this author’s personal preference.

Note on Maps

The maps included in this thesis are taken from the internet and borrowed from Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*, (London: Hurst and Company, 1997). A map of Mozambique from ITMB Publishing Ltd was the map most frequently utilised for reference by this author during the production of this thesis.
Common Acronyms

AIM  Agencia de Informacão de Moçambique (Mozambique News Agency)
ANC  African National Congress (South Africa)
BOSS Bureau of State Security (South Africa)
CCB  Civil Co-operation Bureau (South Africa)
CCM  Mozambican Christian Council
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
CIO  Central Intelligence Organisation (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe)
COREMO Comitê Revolucionário de Moçambique (the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee)
CUNIMO the Committee for Mozambican Unity
D-13  (the SNASP department dealing with Renamo)
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency (United States)
DMI  Directorate of Military Intelligence (South Africa)
DSL  Defence Systems Limited (private British security company)
EPG  Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group
FICO Frente Independente de Convergência Ocidental (Mozambique - FICO means ‘I stay’ in Portuguese)
FPLM Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique (People’s Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique – also known as the FAM, Mozambican Armed Forces)
FRECOMO Frente Comum de Mocambique (Mozambique Common Front)
Frelimo Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front/Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)
FREINA Frente Independente Africana (African Independent Front)
FUMO Frente Unida de Moçambique (United Front of Mozambique)
FUSSA Frente Unidade do Sul so Save (United Front South of the Save [river])
GEs  Grupos Especiais (Special Groups – Colonial Mozambique)
GEPs Grupos Especiais Para-quadistas (Special Groups of Parachutists– Colonial Mozambique)
GUMO Grupo Unido de Moçambique (United Group of Mozambique)
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ISLAM International Society for the Liberation of African Muslims
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jumo</td>
<td>Juventude Moçambicana (Mozambican Youth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JVC</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Verification Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESOMA</td>
<td>Socialist League of Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonrho</td>
<td>London and Rhodesia Holdings Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAFREMO</td>
<td>Malawian Freedom Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANC</td>
<td>Mozambique African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANU</td>
<td>Mozambique African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>Malawi Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement - Portugal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGBS</td>
<td>Mozambican Co-operative Management Centre (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONAMO</td>
<td>Movimento Nacionalista Moçambicano (Mozambican Nationalist Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MML</td>
<td>Movimento Moçambique Livre (the Free Africa Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular Libertacão de Angola (the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MYPs</td>
<td>Malawi Young Pioneers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NESAM</td>
<td>Nucleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundarios de Mozambique (the Nucleus of African Secondary Students of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PADELIMO</td>
<td>Partido Democratico da Libertacão de Moçambique (Mozambican Democratic Party of Liberation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALMO</td>
<td>Mozambique Liberal and Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCN</td>
<td>Partido de Coligação Nacional (the Party of National Coalition - Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIDE/DGS</td>
<td>Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (Portugal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Partido Revolucionário Moçambicano (the Revolutionary Party of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recce</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Commando (or a member of such a unit – South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REMO</td>
<td>Resistência Moçambicana (Mozambican Resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renamo</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance/MNR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renamo Branco</td>
<td>‘White Renamo’, predominantly white exiles who influenced Renamo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RJPC</td>
<td>Rhodesian Joint Planning Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SISE</td>
<td>Serviço de Informação e Segurança (Security and Information Service - Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNASP</td>
<td>Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular (Mozambican National Security Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>State Security Council (South Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South-West African People’s Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>União Democrática (Democratic Union - Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDENAMO</td>
<td>União Nacional Democrática de Moçambique (Mozambique National Democratic Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDI</td>
<td>Unilateral Declaration of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNALIMO</td>
<td>National Liberation Union of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>União Africana de Moçambique Independente (Independent Mozambique National Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMO</td>
<td>União Nacional de Moçambique (National Union of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAR</td>
<td>União Nacional Africana de Rumbezia (the Rumbezia African National Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPOMO</td>
<td>Union of the Peoples of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for Total Independence of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPOMO</td>
<td>União Politica Moçambicana (Mozambican Political Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOFA</td>
<td>Voz da África Livre (Voice of Free Africa – Renamo Radio Station)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOR</td>
<td>Very-high-frequency Omni-directional Radio transmitter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANLA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZLF</td>
<td>Zambézian Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZNA/ZDF</td>
<td>Zimbabwean National Army/Zimbabwean Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZR</td>
<td>Zimbabwe-Rhodesia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Glossary of Names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antonio, Manuel</td>
<td>28-year old mystic leader of the Naprama movement from Alto Molócué in north-eastern Zambézia, killed October 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arouca, Domingos</td>
<td>Leader of the Lisbon-based opposition party Frente Democrática de Moçambique (FUMO), 1976-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ataíde, João</td>
<td>Former Mozambican Ambassador to Portugal who defected to Renamo in 1982, possibly as a SNASP infiltrator. Killed in Malawi November 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banda, Hastings</td>
<td>President of Malawi, 1966-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanchard, James</td>
<td>Louisiana businessman and Republican lobbyist involved in Renamo’s support network in the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulhosa, Manuel</td>
<td>Portuguese industrialist supporter of Renamo supporter who employed the Renamo leaders Evo Fernandes and Jorge Correia in his publishing house, ‘Bertranel’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burt, Peter</td>
<td>Rhodesian CIO specialist on Mozambique and Portugal, involved in the formation of Renamo in the late 1970s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chagas, Alexandre Xavier</td>
<td>Former Portuguese PIDE informer who subsequently worked for SNASP. He was convicted along with Joaquim de Conceição Messias for the 1988 murder of Evo Fernandes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chipande, Alberto</td>
<td>Mozambican Defence Minister 1975-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chissano, Joaquim</td>
<td>Mozambican Foreign Minister 1975-1986, President 1986-2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cline, Ray</td>
<td>Former Deputy Director of the CIA who channelled funds to Renamo and published pro-Renamo material through the right-wing think-tank the United States Global Strategy Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cline, Sibyl</td>
<td>Authored pro-Renamo publications as part of Renamo’s American support network. Wife of Robert MacKenzie, daughter of Ray Cline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cristina, Orlando</td>
<td>Renamo founder and Secretary-General, killed April 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhlakama, Afonso</td>
<td>Renamo President, 1970-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dias, Máximo</td>
<td>Mozambican opposition activist. Leader of MONAMO 1979-present; also involved with Renamo, COINMO and UDÉMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domingos, Raul</td>
<td>Renamo leader who oversaw the groups finances and worked as Chief of Defence and Security, 1982-1986; Commander of the Southern</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fernandes, Evo

Founding member of Renamo; Secretary-General, 1983-1986; Head of Studies Department, 1986-1988; killed April 1988

Flower, Ken

Head of the Rhodesian and the Zimbabwean CIO, 1963-1981

Fonseca, Artur da

Renamo Secretary for Foreign Relations, 1984-1989

Graham, Daniel

Deputy Director of the American Central Intelligence Agency 1973-1974; Director of the American Defense Intelligence Agency, 1974-1976; founder of the right-wing lobby group High Frontier. Supported Renamo through Robert MacKenzie’s far-right organisation Freedom Inc.

Groenewald, Pieter ‘Tienie’


Guebuza, Armando

High-ranking Frelimo Politburo member who held various positions in government in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Oversaw ‘Operation Production’ in 1983 and negotiated with Renamo at the Rome talks in 1991 and 1992

Gumane, Paulo

President of COREMO; Vice-President of PCN, 1974; may have been executed by Frelimo in 1983

Hoile, David

British far-right activist who founded the Mozambique Institute and published pro-Renamo material, 1989-1994

Jardim, Jorge

High-profile politician and businessman who held the position of Deputy Secretary of State in Antonio Salazar’s regime in Portugal and supported Renamo until his death in 1982

Khanga, Melvin Maluda

Malawian Armed Forces Chief, 1980-1992

de Klerk, F.W.


van Koerering, Mark

Christian Aid worker who witnessed the Homoíne attack

Lopes, Mateus

SNASP agent, briefly worked as Renamo President Dhlakama’s Special Envoy. Killed with João Ataíde in November 1987

Machel, Samora

Frelimo Commander and Chief from 1970; President of Mozambique, 1975-1986

MacKenzie, Robert

Vietnam veteran who trained and fought with Renamo as part of the Rhodesian SAS and South African special forces; later a part of Renamo’s American support network and Director of Freedom Inc. Husband of Sibyl Cline

Mabote, Sebastião

Chief of the Mozambican Armed Forces, 1975-1987

Machungo, Mario

High-ranking member of Frelimo’s Politburo who held various posts during the 1970s and 1980s, before serving as Mozambique’s Prime Minister, 1986-1994
Magaia, Filipe  
Frelimo’s Defence and Security Chief, killed October 1966

Mahluza, Fanuel  
Founder of UDENAMO; Former Frelimo Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Renamo member who was head of Political and External Relations, 1983-1984; then involved in PADELIMO and CUNIMO in 1986

Malan, Magnus  

Matsangaissa, André  
Renamo President and Commander, killed October 1979

Matsinhe, Mariano  
High-ranking member of Frelimo’s Politburo who held various posts during the 1970s and 1980s, including that of Interior Minister and Security Minister

May, Eric  
Rhodesian CIO agent involved in the formation and training of Renamo in the late 1970s

Meque, Calisto  
Renamo Commander 1980-1988, killed 1988

Mocumbi, Pascal  
High-ranking member of Frelimo’s Politburo who served as Foreign Minister, 1987-1994, and subsequently as Mozambique’s Prime Minister

Moisés, Francisco Nota  
Renamo Swaziland representative, 1984; Secretary for Information 1985-1989

Mondlane, Eduardo  
Founding President of Frelimo, killed 1969

van Niekerk, Charles  
Head of DMI’s Directorate of Special Tasks during the 1980s who established Operation Mila to support Renamo

N’kavandame, Lázaro  
Makonde leader who was expelled from Frelimo in the late 1960s. He was involved in the PCN at independence, was subsequently arrested by Frelimo and executed in 1983

Oliveira, Paulo  
Member of Renamo from 1979 and possibly a SNASP agent. He worked for Renamo in South Africa in the early 1980s and later in Renamo’s Lisbon office, serving as Renamo’s European Spokesman, 1986-1987. He publicly defected to Mozambique in 1988

Phiri, Gimo  
President of the Partido Revolucionário Moçambicano (PRM), 1978-1982; high-ranking Renamo commander, 1982-1987; President of UNAMO, 1987-1992; President UDÉMO, 1992-1994

Reid-Daly, Ron  
Rhodesian Army Captain who formed and led the counter-insurgency unit the Selous Scouts, 1973-1979

Reis, Carlos  
Originally a member of Frelimo, he joined UNAR and subsequently PRM on the Mozambique-Malawian border. PRM merged with Renamo in 1982, but Reis and Phiri eventually split to create UNAMO in 1986, and Reis became leader after a split with Phiri in late 1991.

Rowland, Roland ‘Tiny’  
Multi-millionaire owner of the Lonrho company, which had extensive business dealings in southern Africa

dos Santos, Marcelino  
Founding Frelimo member, high-ranking Politburo member and Marxist-Leninist ideologue
**Schaaf, Thomas**  
Renamo supporter from 1979 who became their main contact in the United States. He may have been connected to the CIA.

**Semião, Joana**  
Former COREMO member who joined with Máximo Dias to form GUMO in 1974, and left to form the PCN later that year. Subsequently arrested by Frelimo and executed in 1983.

**Serapião, Luís**  
Renamo’s US representative, 1986-1989; academic at Howard University.

**Simango, Uria**  
Founding Frelimo member, expelled from the leadership in 1970. Joined COREMO in 1970, PCN in 1974, and was subsequently arrested by Frelimo and executed in 1983.

**Singlaub, John**  
Expert in unconventional warfare who worked for the CIA in South Korea and Vietnam. He was President of the far-right World Anti-Communist League during the 1980s.

**Sumane, Amós**  
Frelimo member expelled in the late 1960s. Formed MORECO with Joseph Chitenje, then became COREMO Vice-President in 1966. Subsequently expelled from COREMO, he formed UNAR in 1968, which became the PRM in 1976. Sumane was arrested by Malawian authorities in 1978 and executed in Mozambique in 1981.

**Tembo, John**  
Malawian political powerbroker and governor of the Reserve Bank during the 1970s and 1980s. Now leader of the Malawi Congress Party.

**Thomashausen, André**  
Renamo supporter and advisor throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Law academic at the University of South Africa.

**Ululu, Vicente**  
Renamo member from the early 1980s holding various posts, sitting on the National Council from 1986, and serving as Secretary-General in the 1990s.

**Veloso, Jacinto**  
High-ranking Frelimo Politburo member, often involved in diplomacy with South Africa.

**Vieira, Sergio**  
High-ranking Frelimo Politburo member and Machel-loyalist, often involved in diplomacy with South Africa.

**Vilankulu, Artur**  

**Viljoen, Constand**  

**Vorster, B.J.**  

**van der Westhuizen, P.J.**  
South African General who was the Chief of Staff of the Directorate of Military Intelligence.

**Wheeler, Jack**  
American ‘adventurer’ and conservative commentator who supported Renamo from the early 1980s and claimed to have operated on behalf of the CIA in Mozambique.
Mozambique – Provinces
Mozambique – Towns and Cities
Mozambique – Transport Corridors
Introduction

Mozambique’s achievement of independence on 25 June 1975 was a pivotal moment in the country’s history; a pause between the crushing oppression of Portuguese colonialism and the devastating civil war that Mozambique suffered until the early 1990s. For the revolutionaries of the victorious Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), this transitional moment was both the time to celebrate the victory of their decade-long liberation struggle and to look forward to a bright new future. Their vision, as Frelimo’s first cabinet announced, was that “all vestiges of colonialism and imperialism would be destroyed with a view to eliminating the system of exploitation of man by man, and to erecting the political, material, ideological, cultural and social basis of the new society”.

Led by Samora Machel, the new republic’s charismatic first President, the Frelimo government planned to implement a form of people’s democracy, in the context of a one-party state, and a programme of ‘scientific socialism’. They would create, a people’s State, forged through an alliance of workers and peasants, guided by FRELIMO and defended by the People’s Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique, a State which wipes out exploitation and releases the creative initiative of the masses and the productive forces.

But the overwhelming challenges facing Mozambique after independence would prevent Frelimo’s grand vision coming to fruition. These challenges included the scale of Mozambique’s underdevelopment, the ideological divisions that remained throughout the country and within the Frelimo party, and the devastation reaped by South African destabilisation and the country’s civil war. This final and greatest challenge, the Mozambican Civil War between Frelimo and the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo), is the focus of this thesis. It was the principal historical experience of Mozambique’s post-

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1 Frelimo: Mozambique Liberation Front/Front for the Liberation of Mozambique.
2 João M. Cabrita, Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy; (Basingstroke: Palgrave, 2000), p108.
4 Renamo: Mozambique National Resistance. The terminology used to discuss Mozambique’s civil conflict has been highly politicised. Some analysts who emphasise the involvement of external powers (primarily South Africa) reject the term ‘civil war’ and counter-pose it with the phrase ‘war of destabilisation’. Likewise, many have refused to call Renamo by its Portuguese title or acronym, taking the position that this ignores the creation of Renamo by English-speaking forces. They instead use its expanded English title or the acronym MNR as a point of political principle. Throughout the war the Frelimo government only referred to Renamo as ‘armed bandits’, ‘terrorists’ or occasionally ‘MNR bandits’, thus refusing to acknowledge that the group had any political legitimacy. Since then a marginal but vigorous (and some might suggest petty) debate has occurred over the issue of Renamo’s original name. In this study the terms ‘civil war’ and ‘Renamo’ will be used. While the creation, direction and support of Renamo by external powers will be examined in some detail, as will the involvement of pro-
independence period, and it was within its context that issues of underdevelopment and political divisions unfolded.

Now, more than a decade after Mozambique’s first multi-party elections marked the end of the conflict, changes in regional and global politics provide the prospect for the writing of a comprehensive history of the civil war period. Over the last decade the creation of multi-party democracies in Mozambique and Malawi, the fall of Apartheid in South Africa and the end of the Cold War have created many new research opportunities for historians of south-eastern Africa. Archives have been opened for public scrutiny and actors on both sides of the conflict have become increasingly accessible and candid about their wartime experiences. The aim of this study is to present a detailed narrative of the political and military history of the Mozambican Civil War, drawing on a wide variety of sources that include documents from the South African and Malawian archives, and conversations with figures from both sides of the conflict. Too often literature on the war has ascribed monolithic motivations and goals to both Renamo and Frelimo, but to gain a deeper understanding of the complexity on both sides of the conflict it is necessary to appreciate the multiple and competing agendas of factions within each. These internal divisions can be most clearly discerned during crises and flashpoints of factional rivalry, and this thesis aims to demonstrate the centrality of these divisions in the history of the civil war. This study primarily takes the form of chronological narrative. Though some historians today view narrative as old-fashioned and theoretically problematic, it is the view of this author that history written as a story can sometimes demonstrate elements of causation, social interconnectedness and the dynamics of change better than an abstracted analysis, while maintaining theoretical sophistication. No narrative is objective and it is the nature of history that the spaces between facts are filled by the suppositions of the historian, thus the necessary subjectivity of this text is recognised. However, this history is by its nature politically controversial and it would be difficult, if not intellectually negligent, not to arrive at definite moral and political conclusions about the subjects examined. In addition to utilising the literature that has been produced around the topic of the war, primary documents from South Africa, Malawi and Renamo will provide further insight into this period of Mozambican history. Close examination of newspaper and magazine

Frelimo forces from Zimbabwe and Tanzania, the vast majority of participants in the war were Mozambicans, and it is now generally accepted that Renamo did enjoy support from sections of the population. These factors induce my usage of the term ‘civil war’, though its use in no way denies Renamo’s relationship with external powers. I also think it unlikely that the name ‘Mozambique National Resistance’ ever existed without its Portuguese translation, and that these names were probably created simultaneously.
articles allowed this researcher to delve into many specifics of the war that were passed over in other studies, and to gauge the thoughts and opinions of those within the historical context, without the interference of hindsight.

**Theses**

Following Cabrita, the historical narrative in this thesis will lay its roots in Frelimo’s internal conflicts of the 1960s to both follow the progress of the various individuals and groups who eventually united to form Renamo, and to identify internal fracture lines that remained within the Frelimo party from this time. It will be argued that, while Renamo evolved from Rhodesian counter-insurgency strategies of the early 1970s, its embryonic structure was reinforced by genuine black nationalist activists, white Mozambicans and Portuguese who opposed the Frelimo state for ideological or financial reasons, and collaborators of the former colonial regime. Thus Renamo was infused with their agendas, as well as those of their Rhodesian and South African backers, which would sometimes conflict and provide observers with some insight into the organisation’s internal machinations. At the time of Renamo’s creation the leadership held the genuine objective of overthrowing and replacing the Frelimo government, and only later did elements within the Apartheid regime subjugate Renamo to the purpose of destabilisation. From the beginning Renamo leaders, such as Orlando Cristina, worked to diversify Renamo’s sources of support in order to free the organisation from the control of their sponsor states.

When Renamo was transferred to South African soil, divisions emerged within the South African establishment on how Renamo should be used within Mozambique. Using (and slightly altering) terminology borrowed from Kenneth Grundy, it can be seen that factions emerged that could be said to have minimalist, maximalist, and putschist objectives. These factions were united in the goal of protecting the Apartheid regime from Communism and black rebellion through a ‘Total Strategy’, but divided in what tactics should be used. The minimalists, primarily represented by the Department of

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5 Kenneth W. Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p125. Grundy uses the term ‘minimalists’ to describe those advocating strategic destabilisation, and ‘maximalists’ for those advocating Frelimo’s overthrow. In Grundy words, “The minimalists support diverse military manoeuvres. They differ from the maximalists in not necessarily favouring an attempt to overthrow the Frelimo government. Minimalists seek to destabilize Maputo to force it to change its political behaviour, not to change its governmental structures”.

6 The concept of a ‘Total Strategy’ was first enunciated in the 1977 South African Defence White Paper, seeking to respond to internal and external threats to Apartheid through the co-ordination of the military, economic, psychological, political, sociological, diplomatic, cultural and ideological fields of state activity. Mark Swilling and Mark Phillips, “State Power in the 1980’s: From ‘Total Strategy’ to ‘Counter-
Foreign Affairs and South African trade institutions, did not object to the use of Renamo as a tool of destabilisation, but sought its use in a strategic fashion that would encourage Mozambique’s economic dependence on South Africa and draw them into a political ‘Constellation of States’.

The maximalists, whose presence was predominantly in the South African Defence Forces (SADF), wanted to maintain Mozambique in a state of complete disarray in order to eliminate it as a military threat and to discourage its support for the African National Congress (ANC). They saw the minimalist position as weak and a capitulation to the Communist threat, but thought that overthrowing the Frelimo government would overstretch the South African military and could precipitate direct Soviet or Cuban intervention and create a second Angola-style conflict. Meanwhile the putschist position, held by some members of the SADF and South African Military Intelligence (DMI), was that Renamo should be supported in their original objective of overthrowing the Frelimo regime, and that merely supporting them strategically was a betrayal of their cause. These factions were in a constant battle for dominance within South Africa’s State Security Council (SSC), though the maximalist position often dominated (either overtly or covertly). The putschists would also support the

Revolutionary Warfare”, in Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan (eds), War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa, (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), p135. This was necessitated by the fact that South Africa was under a ‘Total Onslaught’ by Communist forces. According to the South African 1982 White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, “the ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA and to replace it with a Marxist-orientated form of government to further the objectives of the USSR, therefore all possible methods and means are used to attain this objective. This includes instigating social and labour unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the RSA and the intimidation of Black leaders and members of the Security Forces. This onslaught is supported by a worldwide propaganda campaign and the involvement of various front organizations and leaders”. Grundy, Militarization, p11.

According to Mac Maharaj, the Foreign Affairs department differed from the military in that it tended to focus more on the international consequences of South Africa’s actions, had a longer-term view, and thus placed more emphasis on economic measures. However, “[t]he Foreign Ministry accept[ed] the basic goal of establishing Pretoria’s regional hegemony as well as the other shorter term objectives defined by the ‘Total Strategy’. Moreover, it [did] not totally reject military action as one of the means of achieving these goals”. Mac Maharaj, “Internal Determinants of Pretoria’s Present Foreign Policy”, (Paper presented at the Seminario em Memoria de Aquino de Bragança e Ruth First, Centro dos Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, 21-22 January 1988), p15.

“To meet [the] ‘total onslaught’, Botha and Malan ensconced the country’s security operations at the centre of decision-making through the establishment of the State Security Council (SSC). This … weakened considerably the role played by parliament and the cabinet in government…. Until the introduction of the SSC, South Africa operated a limited access … democracy with strong authoritarian tendencies. The re-location of the security structure, however, marked its demise. The new system's preoccupation with security issues … terminated, for example, the limited independence of South Africa's judiciary. The … states of emergency … further weakened the courts; time after time, court decisions were overturned by the fiat of powerful bureaucrats within the security establishment”. Peter Vale, “The Inevitability of the Generals: The Anatomy of White Power in South Africa”, (Paper presented at the Seminario em Memoria de Aquino de Bragança e Ruth First, Centro dos Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, 21-22 January 1988), pp18-19. “The SSC [was] the central organization through which security policy [was] determined and its implementation [was] coordinated … the SSC [had] a complex of supporting agencies and committees more extensive and complete than any other
diversification of support networks for Renamo, while the maximalists worked to keep very strict control of Renamo’s operations until the mid-1980s. A key example of the split between the agenda of Renamo and their putschist supporters, and that of the minimalists and maximalists, occurred in early 1983. It will be argued that Renamo’s southward offensive towards Maputo in late 1982 ground to a halt because the maximalists did not want the Mozambican capital to be captured, and that Orlando Cristina and several other Renamo members were assassinated by the SADF to prevent Renamo expanding their network of support and ridding itself of dependence on South Africa. The negotiations between Frelimo and South Africa that surrounded the betrayal of Renamo in 1983 laid the foundations for the later Nkomati Accord. During this time minimalists seem to have gained some dominance in the SSC and thus, with help from the United States Department of State, were able to push through a number of peace accords in the region. The SADF was already working to undermine these measures, however, delivering massive supplies of weapons to Renamo in the pre-Accord period, and later continuing supply drops. Following Nkomati South African maximalists then encouraged diversification of Renamo’s support, including from American conservatives. The American influence on Renamo would thus grow after this time, with missionary groups contacting Renamo, sometimes with the collaboration of Renamo’s putschist supporters. After Renamo’s defeat in Zambézia province in 1986-87, their forces turned to a strategy of massacres in southern Mozambique. The horror of incidents such as the massacre at Homoíne destroyed any hope of Renamo receiving official support from the U.S. Congress and this, combined with the rise of the pro-western Joaquim Chissano to the Mozambican Presidency and the end of William Casey’s reign as Director of the CIA, led Renamo’s backers in the CIA to push them towards negotiations with Frelimo. It will be demonstrated that in terms of the conflict’s military dynamics though Renamo did engage in a number of major campaigns during the conflict, their guerrilla war was predominantly decentralised and that major shifts of geographical focus were often prompted by government counter-insurgency campaigns.

Parallel to Renamo’s complex history were divisions and conflict in the Frelimo government. Within the Frelimo party and the Mozambican armed forces (FPLM) existed a layer of nationalists who sought the development of a black bourgeoisie in Mozambique, cabinet committee … [it was] a body composed of political heavyweights supplemented by the highest-ranking political and governmental experts in security and strategy. When they recommend policy, the cabinet [was] not likely to deny them. It [was] the prestige and influence associated with the individuals and their offices that assure[d] that the SSC continue[d] at the hub of governmental decision making in so many areas of state policy”. Grundy, Militarization, pp49, 51.
advocates of the free market, and elements who simply aimed for self-aggrandisement by any method. These groups were inevitably at odds with President Machel and the dominant Marxist forces within the Frelimo party. From the early 1980s Machel made enemies within these groups through his campaigns against corruption and abuse of power within the bureaucracy and armed forces. The alliance of these forces, led by Joaquim Chissano, thus seem to have made a number of political and military coup attempts on Machel in the first half of the 1980s. The status quo of war was very profitable for various elements within the military and government, so Chissano and his allies again attempted to remove Machel in 1984 to prevent the Nkomati Accord. They failed in this attempt and Machel temporarily marginalised his enemies, but corruption within the military continued and some elements became increasingly involved with Renamo both politically and commercially with the supply of weapons and supplies. After the capture of Renamo’s main Gorongosa base in 1985, Machel became convinced that there could be no military solution to the conflict and that peace negotiations could not be conducted through South Africa. He thus began to establish dual contacts with black and Portuguese Renamo supporters through Mozambican intelligence (SNASP) agents such as Paulo Oliveira and Mateus Lopes. During 1986 Machel also began to work towards dislodging corrupt generals from the armed forces, and placed increasing pressure on Malawi to break links with Renamo. Thus, it will be argued, that corrupt elements within the FPLM, with the support or at least the knowledge of Joaquim Chissano and his allies, collaborated with maximalists in South Africa in the assassination of Samora Machel in September 1986.

Upon taking power Chissano turned away from his predecessor’s strategy of negotiations with Renamo and re-emphasised the military solution. Over the next two years Chissano purged the Politburo and military of pro-Machelist elements, and physically eliminate the channels of dialogue that Machel had established by assassinating Mateus Lopes, João Ataíde and Evo Fernandes. Chissano also began to move Mozambique towards his nationalist goal of a more open economy, thus implementing structural adjustment from 1987. The economic goals of Chissano’s free marketeer allies could only come to fruition in a situation of peace, but his power base rested on sectors of the military profiting from war and elements in the state who opposed change, thus he would have to balance those interests throughout the late 1980s. From 1989, with the rise of F.W. de Klerk and changes in international and regional politics, a negotiated settlement to the conflict became virtually inevitable, but Chissano stalled negotiations as long as possible and always pushed

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9 SNASP: The *Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular*, the National Security Service/Mozambican Intelligence.
for a dominant negotiating position through military pressure. He also invited various opposition parties to return to the country, perhaps in an effort to develop alternatives to Renamo and split the opposition vote when elections eventuated. As constitutional changes were implemented and peace grew closer, elements in the military once again planned to remove the national leader, but were prevented from carrying through their plans in 1991 and 1993.

This study will also devote some attention in chapter ten to arguments surrounding the involvement of Malawi in the Mozambican Civil War. No conclusive evidence will be presented here to support a particular theory of Malawian involvement, but the main theories will be critically assessed and it will be argued that the best explanation of Malawi’s connections with Renamo is that a relationship was fostered between the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYPs), the Malawian Police Force and Renamo, under the direction of the Governor of Malawi’s Central Bank, John Tembo. Tembo sought to succeed Banda and become President of Malawi, but faced challenges from various competitors, including the leadership of Malawi’s armed forces. By aiding Renamo with training and free transit, and thus also building a relationship with their South African and American backers, Tembo hoped that Renamo could be called upon as a third force to support him during a succession crisis.

**Background**

The most immediate obstacle for Frelimo at independence was the sheer scale of the task that faced them. Though Frelimo carried out very successful health and literacy campaigns in the years after independence, their broader goal of following the Soviet example of development through large-scale, state-sponsored industry and agriculture, would be difficult in such an underdeveloped and unstable country. Under Portuguese rule three sources of revenue had formed the basis of the Mozambican economy: mass migrant labour in the South African mines; transport linkages between landlocked states and Mozambique’s ports; and the export of agricultural produce and plantation crops. The structure of this colonial economy meant that, “the whole territory was infrastructurally neglected. [As] This type of economy required few investments in the infrastructure of industrial development in order to function”.\(^\text{10}\) It left 95% of Mozambique’s twelve million citizens in a pre-literate state, and a working class probably numbering less than million

(including rural, migrant and domestic workers). Those workers who operated the economically vital ports and railways were overwhelming white, and many of them were suspected of still being hostile to the new regime. Worse still, the mass exodus of Portuguese settlers after independence reduced the white community from 250,000 to about 20,000 by the end of 1976, creating an acute shortage of technicians and professionals. Adding to this loss was the vandalism that many settlers targeted at goods and machinery they could not take with them. Thousands of domestic servants, and workers in the building and tourism industries also became unemployed due to the fall in demand for their skills. As companies were simply abandoned by their white owners, long before Frelimo was in any position to take control of the country less begin nationalising the economy, the state had to take over the abandoned businesses on an ad hoc basis, and rely on the workers to learn the skills necessary to run those operations. Mozambique faced these crises in the context of punitive reductions in trade by South Africa and only very limited support from the Soviet Union and other donors. Though Mozambique successfully raised production levels until the early 1980s, Frelimo’s investment into heavy industry at the expense of other sectors of the economy absorbed much of its foreign currency, and this led to shortages of consumer goods and the rapid growth of a black market.

Another major impediment for the Frelimo leadership was that support for all the elements of their Marxist project was far from universal, both throughout the country and within the party itself. Frelimo had only become dominated by Marxist elements after the

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12 Vines, RENAMO, p8.


15 Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire, (London: Zed Press, 1984), p98. The organisations that took control of many businesses until the late 1970s were the Grupos Dinamizadores (Dynamising Groups), structures that were effectively workers’ councils and were probably the only institutions in the People’s Republic of Mozambique that resembled the soviets of the Russian Revolution. According to Hanlon, “The GDs took over more and more official function from the steadily collapsing colonial apparatus. In a form of workers’ control, they ran abandoned factories. In villages and neighbourhoods, they served as councils, courts, police and social workers. In rural areas, they replaced the Portuguese-appointed règulos …. More than anything else, it was the GDs that introduced Mozambique to Frelimo and to ‘peoples’ democracy’, and it was the GDs that kept the country running”. Hanlon, The Revolution Under Fire, p49.


17 Abrahamsson and Nilsson, Mozambique, pp48-54.
assassination of its first leader Eduardo Mondlane on 3 February 1969, and the subsequent instalment of Samora Machel as leader of the party. Various factions had struggled for control of the party since its creation in Dar es Salaam on 25 June 1962. According to Joseph Hanlon,

Frelimo remained a very loose grouping of exile organizations which distrusted each other and were already infiltrated by Pide [Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado]. The first years were marked by infighting, intrigues, purges, and defections. ‘Almost immediately after the closing session of the First Congress some members of the central committee began manoeuvring to expel others’ …. Within three years, most of those who had founded Frelimo had left.

Issues of ethnicity were often mobilised in these power disputes, including the claim that southerners were marginalising representatives of the north within the Frelimo leadership. Ethnic Makonde were particularly sensitive to this issue because of the predominance of Makonde in Frelimo’s liberation army. The haemorrhaging of Frelimo’s cadre continued in the late 1960s as the party was split into radical and conservative factions, personified by Samora Machel and the Makonde leader Lázaro N’kavandame. Debates between these factions centred on issues such as the relations between political and military sections of the party, what kind of economy should be developed within the liberated zones, whether a class or race-based ideology would guide Frelimo’s programme, and whether liberated Mozambique would retain traditional social structures or create new social relations.

Machinations within the party would eventually lead to the defection of N’kavandame to the side of the colonial administration, and the expulsion of other conservative leaders

18 Cabrita, Mozambique, p57. It is widely accepted that the parcel bomb that killed Mondlane was assembled by Casimiro Monteiro, an agent of the Portuguese Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE), [Portuguese Secret Police, also know by the acronym DGS], though the assassination may have been planned with the co-operation of rival members of the Frelimo hierarchy. Iain Christie, Samora Machel: A Biography, (London: PANAF, 1989), pp57-58; Hall and Young, Confronting Leviathan, p18; and Alex Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique, (London: James Currey, 1991), p12. Though it is generally held that Mondlane himself was not Marxist in orientation, some quotes attributed to him may suggest otherwise. A 1968 interview with Mondlane in Algeria credits him with the comment that, “the conditions of life in Mozambique, the type of enemy we have, permit no other alternative. It is impossible to create a capitalist Mozambique. It would be ridiculous for the people to fight to destroy the enemy’s economic structure and then reconstruct it for the enemy… We are going to construct a socialist system and there now exists a wealth of experiences from various socialist countries that we shall study carefully …. The training of politico-military cadres includes instruction about socialism”. Eduardo Mondlane,“The Evolution of FRELIMO”, an unpublished interview with Aquino de Bragança, Algiers, 1968, in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds), The African Liberation Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements, Volume 2, (London: Zed Press, 1982), p121.


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20 The Makonde predominantly inhabit Cabo Delgado province in Mozambique’s north, which was the front-line during the war against the colonial administration.

such as Uria Simango in 1969-70.\textsuperscript{22} But the victory of Frelimo’s radical faction over those conservatives they termed the ‘new exploiters’ did not erase divisions within the party. Frelimo was still a ‘front’ of varying elements with a united goal of decolonisation, and ideological fracture lines such as socialism versus the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie, and tribalism, regionalism or racially-exclusive nationalism versus the creation of a non-racial republic. Many of Frelimo’s front-line soldiers would not have been involved in the ideological disputes of the political cadre, and also carried more conservative ideas into the era of the new republic. Though Frelimo’s post-independence leadership would always show remarkable unity, a struggle would continue within the Central Committee between ideologically divergent elements; a theme that will play an important part in this study.\textsuperscript{23}

On a national level, much of Mozambique’s population had remained untouched by Frelimo’s politics until after independence. The political activism that preceded the creation of Frelimo emerged as early as the mid-1940s, as the end of World War Two brought a surge of anti-colonial politics amongst the generation of school students who were growing up in a radicalising Africa, and workers who suffered terrible working conditions and political repression. Organising covertly, workers launched a series of strikes in the docks and plantations around Lourenço Marques in 1947, culminating in an abortive uprising in 1948; but the colonial administration conducted a severe crackdown on dissidents involved.\textsuperscript{24} The next series of dock strikes did not occur until 1956 and again ended with terrible repression that killed 49 participants.\textsuperscript{25} Meanwhile student activists, including Eduardo Mondlane and future Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, formed the Nucleo dos Estudantes Africanos Secundarios de Mozambique\textsuperscript{26} (NESAM), which worked to spread ideas of nationalism and resistance amongst urban youth.\textsuperscript{27} Resistance to colonial rule also developed in Mozambique’s rural areas, with a number of large-scale boycotts against cotton growing in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{28} The most significant political events leading up to the creation of Frelimo occurred in the late 1950s on the Mueda Plateau in Cabo Delgado, where Lázaro N’kavandame led local farmers in creating an independent cotton-growing association.\textsuperscript{29} The irritation that this co-operative caused for the colonial government and

\textsuperscript{22} Cabrita, Mozambique, pp57-61.
\textsuperscript{23} Hanlon, The Revolution Under Fire, pp206-209, 249.
\textsuperscript{24} The capital was renamed Maputo after independence.
\textsuperscript{26} NESAM: The Nucleus of African Secondary Students of Mozambique.
\textsuperscript{27} Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, pp112-116.
\textsuperscript{28} Isaacman and Isaacman, From Colonialism to Revolution, p66.
\textsuperscript{29} The African Voluntary Cotton Society of Mozambique.
white cotton-growers led to the 16 June 1960 massacre of peaceful protesters by colonial forces, and precipitated the departure of many anti-colonial activists to form opposition parties in exile. After the formation of Frelimo in Tanzania their early agitation included covert industrial organising in Mozambique’s ports, which led to a series of strikes in Lourenço Marques, Beira and Nacala in 1963. Again the strikes were brutally repressed and ended in the deaths and arrests of many participants. And when Frelimo attempted to set up urban cells the colonial administration quickly suppressed them, banning NESAM and smashing Frelimo’s embryonic urban branches by arresting members or driving them into exile. In total 1,500 Frelimo supporters based in Lourenço Marques and Swaziland were arrested, and sympathisers in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were held in check by their respective police forces. Thus, the colonial regime’s rapid and violent reaction to organised resistance in urban areas effectively forced Frelimo into a strategy of rural guerrilla warfare, and prevented their political message spreading to the cities. Only in the guerrilla bases maintained in Mozambique’s neighbours, and in the liberated zones established in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete, and parts of Manica, was Frelimo able to conduct political education and experiment with collectivised production before independence. The areas of central Mozambique that had had little or no contact with Frelimo during the independence struggle would later become the centre of opposition to the new government.

Of those who had come into contact with Frelimo’s politics, there must also remain a question of how many understood its nuances, and how many would accept them. In many rural areas traditional social structures still retained great strength and legitimacy with the local population. Frelimo’s intense hostility to traditional hierarchies, and their failure to understand or communicate effectively with rural populations, would alienate many from their political programme, and in some cases turn them into enemies of the regime. This pertains not only to the 95% of the population who were pre-literate, but even to the party’s intellectual elite. Margaret Hall and Tom Young note that,
Frelimo’s protean ignorance of the [Marxist-Leninist] great books (dismissed by Frelimo’s leaders as irrelevant academic affectation) extended to the actual economic and political experiences of the Marxist states (however defined). In this context it was precisely because of its lack of Marxism that the Frelimo leadership was ill-equipped to assess outside sources of advice critically…

Machel’s own Marxist views were sometimes imbued with a distinct moral conservatism and, as Hall and Young point out, focus on a range of colonial experiences rather than on class analysis. Machel provides an example in his description of colonialism as,

exploitation, oppression, humiliation, social and economic discrimination, racism, tribalism and regionalism. That’s what colonialism means: bribery, corruption and immorality; robbery; nepotism, favouritism and patronage; individualism and ambition; servility and subservience; prostitution; vagrancy; banditry; unemployment and delinquency; begging; orgies, bacchanalia and drunkenness; drugs; destruction of the family; social disruption, insecurity and fear – all synonymous with colonialism.

Thus, in addition to the usual proliferation of interpretations that accompany the analyses of the revolutionary left, the various levels of comprehension of those politics within Mozambican society and the Frelimo party may have lead to a miscellany of approaches to their implementation.

However, the greatest trial facing the Mozambican government, interacting with and providing the context for those challenges already mentioned, was the civil war prosecuted by the Renamo’s guerrilla army. This war, which was spawned in central Mozambique by Rhodesia’s counter-insurgency efforts during the 1970s, spread throughout Mozambique like a plague during the next two decades. Renamo represented an alliance forged between anti-Frelimo elements that united to fight Mozambique’s new government; combining nationalist and conservative Mozambicans with disaffected Frelimo followers, anti-communist Portuguese and white Mozambicans, and the white

‘obscurantism’, and towards any cultural, regional or ethnic diversity. From the beginning anti-racism and anti-tribalism thus had a dual nature. There was a classical, sympathetic dimension of hostility to racial and ethnic discrimination; but at the same time there was a fierce denial of the relevance, even of the existence of all the different communities”. Cahen, “Nationalism”, p4.

35 Hall and Young, Confronting Leviathan, p68. “Frelimo’s usage of marxisant terminology was reshaped to articulate national and racial concerns. Concepts of class were not used in any sense of economic agents generated by a mode of production, nor were they deployed in any kind of ‘class analysis’ in the conventional sense. Rather, they designated a whole series of colonial experiences, including status hierarchies and notions of racial inferiority and division. Ideas of exploitation referred not to economic relationships but rather to experiences of racial humiliation and unfair and discriminatory treatment. Machel’s repeated references to ‘exploitation’ concern unfair trading practices of the kind perpetrated on African peasants by traders; they were always about unfair exchange … as Henrikson put it, ‘Frelimo castigates capitalism more as a wicked instinct than as a mode of production’”. Hall and Young, Confronting Leviathan, p66.

supremacist forces of Rhodesia and South Africa. Using an army of largely conscripted Mozambicans, in tandem with attacks by first Rhodesian and then South African Special Forces, Renamo maintained a guerrilla campaign directed primarily at civilian targets, and social and economic infrastructure. One hundred thousand Mozambicans died as a result of this brutal conflict and the deaths of up to a million more may have been caused by war-induced famine and the denial of medical services. In addition, almost five million Mozambicans were displaced from their homes and forced to become refugees.\(^{37}\) The decimation of Mozambique by the war must be recognised as the greatest impediment to the country’s development and the achievement of Frelimo’s vision. As asserted by the prominent Mozambique analyst Joseph Hanlon,

> The primary cause of suffering in Mozambique [was] destabilisation and foreign intervention. Without these the crisis would have been much less severe. No conceivable set of Frelimo errors could have resulted in a million dead and $18 billion in economic losses. To put the primary responsibility on Frelimo or socialisation makes nonsense of history; it is blaming the victim.\(^{38}\)

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Chapter 1: Review of Literature and Sources.

Literature

Mozambique has a comparatively small, but richly diverse historical literature devoted to it. During the 1970s pioneer authors such as Malyn Newitt, Edward Alpers, Ruth First, Allan Isaacman, Keith Middlemass, William Minter, A.K. Smith, E. Stephan and C.S. Lancaster began work on Mozambique, discussing the histories of the Mozambican people, Portuguese colonialism, and the Mozambican liberation struggle. The collection of scholars working in this field expanded greatly with the coming of independence and the proclamation of the Mozambican Revolution. Though a few would use this turning point to look back specifically at the history of colonialism and the liberation war in Mozambique, most devoted their attention to the revolution itself and the future of the post-revolutionary society. Prominent among these analyses were: Barry Munslow, Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins; Allen and Barbara Isaacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution; J.H Mittelman, Underdevelopment and the Transition to Socialism in Mozambique and Tanzania; Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution Under


Fire; and John Saul, *A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*. This focus on the revolutionary society and the Frelimo party dominated the historiography of Mozambique until the mid-1980s. While many of these authors critically engaged with the development of Mozambique’s political-economy, in order to judge and assist in the progress of the revolution, Marxist scholar Michel Cahen is particularly notable for his critical analysis of the revolution and his concern at what bureaucratisation meant for the socialist project. He would later join a number of other scholars in challenging dominant interpretations of the civil war.

As the decade progressed, the intensification of Renamo’s guerrilla war and its negative effects on Mozambique’s development created a growth in the literature about the organisation and their part in the Apartheid regime’s international designs. The Mozambican media had monitored the development of Renamo since dissidents coalesced

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6 Michel Cahen, “Corpratisme et Colonialisme. Approche du cas Mozambicaine, 1933-1979: I. Une Genèse Difficile, Une Mouvment Squelettique”, *Cahiers d’Études Africaines*, Vol XXIII-4, No 92, 1983, pp383-417; “Corpratisme et Colonialisme. Approche du cas Mozambicaine, 1933-1979: II. Crise et Survivance du Corporatisme Colonial, 1960-1979”, *Cahiers d’Études Africaines*, Vol XXIV-1, No 93, 1983, pp5-24; “État et Pouvoir Populaire dans le Mozambique Indépendant”, *Politique Africaine*, No 19, 1985, pp36-60. Cahen showed particular disdain for changes in the regime between independence and the 1977 Third Frelimo Party Congress, during which revolutionary structures were actually disassembled and suppressed: “When [Frelimo] arrived in the capital (September 1974), it announced the dissolution of the elected workers’ committees which had emerged, and replaced them with ‘dynamising groups’, which were party structures … The Academic Association, a dynamic student organisation, was dissolved and replace by the youth party organisation; the old corporate unions democratised after 1975, were also dissolved in 1979, having been progressively replaced since 1976 by ‘production groups’”.

Cahen, “Check on Socialism”, p51.
around the Rhodesia-based radio station *Voz da África Livre* (Voice of Free Africa) in the mid-1970s, so it is not surprising that the first analyses of Renamo emerged from that milieu. After a number of defeats at the beginning of the decade, Renamo had been revitalised by the South African military and was rapidly expanding by 1982, thus attracting increasing attention. Journalists Paul Fauvet and Alves Gomes were amongst others who published scathing articles about Renamo in the Mozambican press and throughout the world via the Mozambique News Agency (AIM). The *Guardian* newspaper’s correspondent Joseph Hanlon also ensured a steady flow of reports for the western media. By this stage authors whose interest centred on the progress of the revolution could no longer ignore the growing menace of the ‘armed bandits’. Allen and Barbara Isaacman make some reference to Renamo in their *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution*, published in 1983, while Fauvet published his important article, “Roots of Counter-Revolution: the Mozambique National Resistance”, in 1984. Hanlon wrote about Renamo in his *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*, of the same year. Following from the crisis that Renamo had precipitated in Mozambique by 1984, and the subsequent signing of the Nkomati Accord with South Africa, a deluge of literature was produced with a focus on South Africa’s ‘Total Strategy’ of destabilisation. This work, in which Mozambique was examined as a case-study alongside the other Front-line States, dominated the field into the late 1980s. By examining South African relations with the whole of southern Africa, their analysis made clear that the republic had a premeditated regional strategy that aimed to cripple states that opposed Apartheid and to maintain South African hegemony. Hanlon was again prominent among these authors with his *Beggar Your Neighbours*; as were Phyllis Johnson and David Martin with *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*, and later

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Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization Report.\textsuperscript{12} In these works Renamo was described as a South African proxy army without domestic support. Their role was not to replace the Mozambican government, but to destabilise Mozambique in order to politically neutralise it and to maintain its economic dependence on South Africa. The discovery of the Gorongosa documents in 1985, which provided evidence of continued South African aid to Renamo even after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, and the later release of the Gersony and Minter Reports, gave these analyses particular cogency.\textsuperscript{13} Political scientists such as Robert Davies, Steven Metz, Dan O’Meara and Colin Legum also made contributions to this literature; while others such as Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa; and Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics, focused their analysis on the authoritarian trends within the South African government and society during the 1980s.\textsuperscript{14}

Emerging alongside those analyses of the Civil War in its regional context was a branch of the historiography that sought to explain the war as a product of Frelimo’s own policies within Mozambique. While Renamo propaganda had always claimed their war was a popular uprising against a totalitarian government, these academic analyses had their

\textsuperscript{12} Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, (London: James Currey, 1986); also, Hanlon, Apartheid’s Second Front: South Africa’s War Against its Neighbours, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986); Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds), Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War, (Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986), (which had contributions by other authors such as William Minter); Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization Report, (London: James Currey, 1989); also Johnson and Martin, Frontline Southern Africa, (Peterborough (UK): Ryan Publishing, 1989).

\textsuperscript{13} These reports involved interviews with refugees from Renamo-controlled areas, in the case of Gersony, and with former Renamo members themselves in the case of Minter. They concluded that Renamo was carrying out a brutal campaign against civilians, directly leading to the deaths of no less than 100,000 people, and that a very high percentage (up to 90\%) of Renamo soldiers were forcibly recruited. Gersony, Summary of Mozambican; and William Minter, “The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by Ex-Participants”, Development Dialogue, No 1, 1989.

roots in an anthropological attempt to view Frelimo’s socialisation of the countryside from the local perspective. This approach would also embrace complexity by demonstrating that different regions had particular reactions to the central government and Renamo according to their local history and ethnic linkages. Particularly prominent amongst these researchers were Christian Geffray, Michel Cahen and Otto Roesch. Geffray’s anthropological work in Nampula province convinced him that Frelimo had alienated the local population with their rural policies, and that this created discontent upon which Renamo could feed. Frelimo’s virulent opposition to traditional authority and their goal of villagisation were particularly antagonistic to the Nampulan population. In his early work Geffray emphasised that support for Renamo came from disgruntled chiefs, farmers disadvantaged by collectivisation, and by rural youth who felt excluded from the social order. Later he would emphasise that Frelimo’s socialisation policies were a form of imposed administrative control that threatened the society’s cultural identity. Roesch’s work in the south demonstrated regional contrasts as he argued that in Gaza province Frelimo had mass support, communal villages were very popular, and that long-standing ethnic enmity between the Shangaan of Gaza and the N’dau of central Mozambique (who made up most of the Renamo leadership) ensured a hostile reaction to Renamo. The conclusion of these analyses was anathema to many of the commentators who shared Frelimo’s revolutionary goals, and were unable to accept that Renamo had any popular support within Mozambique. Fierce debate over this ‘paradigm shift’ broke into the open in late 1989 after the publication of Gervase Clarence-Smith’s book review, “The Roots of the Mozambican

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18 Englund, From War to Peace, p16.
Counter-Revolution”, in the *Southern African Review of Books*.\(^{19}\) Clarence-Smith’s praise of new work whose analyses indicated that Frelimo’s rural policies were to blame for Renamo’s success\(^{20}\), by authors including Cahen, Geffray and Peter Meyns\(^{21}\), precipitated an exchange of vitriolic letters to the *Review* over the following editions. Fauvet and Minter wrote letters criticising Clarence-Smith for conflating hypotheses with facts and, “follow[ing] Cahen in glibly presenting sweeping generalizations unsupported by evidence”.\(^{22}\) Minter reasserted the destabilisation position and denied any local support for Renamo, quoting a finding of the Gersony report that, “the relationship between Renamo and the population appears to revolve solely around the extraction of resources, strictly by force, without explanation, with no tolerance for refusal, and without reciprocation”.\(^{23}\) Fauvet, meanwhile, provided statistics to show that Renamo activity actually had an inverse relationship with villagisation, rather than being caused by it.\(^{24}\) Clarence-Smith’s reply maintained that,

The essence of [Clarence-Smith’s] argument is that most of the rural population of Mozambique has been so antagonized by Frelimo that it has been quite apathetic towards infiltration by Renamo rebels.\(^{25}\)

Roesch wrote supporting the analysis that Geffray and Pedersen had made of Nampula province, and venturing the hypothesis that, “Renamo has an active basis of support only in those areas where popular traditional authorities are willing and capable of organizing it for them”.\(^{26}\) Cahen’s reply most clearly articulated the conclusion that could be drawn from this work: that Frelimo had alienated the rural population and their traditional authorities; that, although Renamo would have existed regardless, it would never have grown to such an extent without rural dissatisfaction; and that the war had become “an authentic civil


\(^{20}\) According to Clarence-Smith, “the problems of today lie mainly in the terrible logic of the villagisation policy as it developed in independent Mozambique”; “Cahen stresses that villagisation as been the key ingredient in RENAMO’s astonishing success and rapid expansion across the whole country”; and “Frelimo’s urban policies have further contributed to the growth of unrest in the countryside, notably as a result of the infamous ‘Operation Production of 1983”. Clarence-Smith, “The Roots”, pp7-8. The article also put forward the proposition that there existed a significant amount of ‘social banditry’ outside of the control of Renamo.


\(^{23}\) Gersony quoted in Minter, “Clarence-Smith”, p23.


war”, gained its own dynamic, and would continue even if external support came to a complete halt. While the merits of these arguments will not be appraised here, this debate established the foundations for the next evolutionary step in the historiography of Renamo.

Studies by Margaret Hall and Tom Young were released in 1990, seeking to place Renamo within the context of South African destabilisation, but to also understand the domestic stimuli for the movement by drawing on authors such as Geffray. Young would provocatively proclaim that,

Writing on post-independence Mozambique has been dominated by ‘redfeet’ either in pursuit of revolutionary dreams that they cannot attain in their own societies or of the psychic rewards of ‘solidarity’ campaigns… Serious work has begun only recently on Renamo… The authors of this new work have concentrated on the internal dynamics of Renamo, for it is precisely this that has been obscured by the deafening repetition of the ‘just puppets’ refrain.

While Young’s dismissal of previous research may be considered overly zealous, this new work did mark a turn towards a broader understanding of Renamo that took into account the organisation’s internal and external dynamics. Following this trend Alex Vines would release the book RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique the next year. Vines’ book is arguably the most comprehensive ever written about Renamo, examining the history of the groups’ creation, its international network of contacts, its internal structure, its tactics, its

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splinter groups, and its relations with Mozambique’s population. Vines emphasised that, while Renamo was not a puppet of South Africa and did have some indigenous support, they also lacked a clear ideology and operated for the most part through coercion.\footnote{Vines, RENAMO, 1996, pp1-3.}

In his introduction Vines stressed that, a wider analysis of Renamo is well overdue. The research for [RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique], however, only covered fragments of what Renamo actually represents. Given that it is a study of a contemporary war situation, reliable information is frequently obscured by censorship and propaganda. In this respect what is recorded here remains very preliminary to what future research will reveal…\footnote{Vines, RENAMO, 1991, p3.}


William Minter did release his comparative, Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique, in 1994, and Vines updated his original study and re-released it as, RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?, but further to these, the only significant study dealing with the war has been João Cabrita’s, Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy, which will be dealt with in some detail below.\footnote{William Minter, Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique, (London: Zed Books, 1994); João M. Cabrita, Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy, (Basingstroke: Palgrave, 2000).}

Instead, the literature moved its focus onto the Mozambican peace process and the post-war society. Vines remained prominent amongst authors writing on the peace process, examining issues including military demobilisation and the financial incentives needed to bring Renamo into negotiations.\footnote{As well as Vines’ updated RENAMO: Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique, also see Alex Vines, ‘No Democracy Without Money’: The Road to Peace in Mozambique 1982-1992, (London: IIR Briefing Paper, Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992); “The Business of Peace: ‘Tiny’ Rowland, Financial Incentives and the Mozambican Settlement”, Accord, No 3, 1998; and João Coelho and Alex Vines, Pilot Study on Demobilization and Re-Integration of Ex-Combatants in Mozambique, (Oxford: Refugee Studies Program, University of Oxford).} He was later joined by other authors such as Stephen Chan and Moisés Venâncio, with their War and Peace in
Mozambique, Chris Alden with Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State: From Negotiations to Nation Building and Carolyn Nordstrom with her fascinating post-modernist, anthropological analysis, A Different Kind of War Story. In the 1990s Joseph Hanlon turned his attention from destabilisation to what he obviously now viewed as an even greater danger to Mozambique, which he insisted was, “nothing less than the recolonisation of Mozambique, albeit with a new and more acceptable face called the ‘World Market’”. Structural adjustment had been implemented in Mozambique from 1987, and thus in 1991, before the war with Renamo had even ended, Hanlon confronted this modern form of neo-colonialism with his book Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots? This would later be followed by his cutting analysis of global financial institutions and the NGO sector in Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocked Rebuilding in Mozambique. Hanlon was joined in his focus on contemporary Mozambique by Carrie Manning, whose work has so far focused on Mozambique’s post-war political landscape and Renamo’s participation in the democratic process, such as her article, “Constructing Opposition in Mozambique: Renamo as Political Party”, and her recent book The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization 1992-2000.

Throughout the Civil War the cabal of far-right-wing Renamo supporters in Europe and the United States, and Renamo’s own organs of propaganda, also created a small counter-literature in parallel to the conventional academic discussion of the conflict. Renamo’s propaganda wing had effectively existed before Renamo did. Voz da África Livre began transmission out of Rhodesia from 1976, its broadcasts evolving as opponents of the Mozambican government coalesced around it. Eventually it became the voice of the new Renamo organisation. Later Renamo’s various (and competing) international representatives would also irregularly release magazines and newsletters carrying Renamo’s


message and version of events in Mozambique. However, supporters of Renamo seldom intervened in more academic fora (in the case of some the conservative publications noted below this term is used with some generosity) until the mid-to-late 1980s. One of the first academic advocates of Renamo, Professor André Thomashausen, began to publish material about Renamo in 1983, perhaps as part of a campaign organised by South African Military Intelligence (DMI) that will be discussed later in this study. His article, “The National Resistance of Mozambique”, appeared in Africa Insight that year, at around the same time that journalist Alexander Sloop was publishing some of the first positive pieces about Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama in the international press. Thomashausen, a Professor of Law at the University of South Africa, was an old friend of Evo Fernandes and would go on to become a key adviser to the Renamo leadership, assisting with their post-Nkomati negotiations and in the creation of their political programme.

From late 1984 the American ‘adventurer’, conservative commentator and director of the Freedom Research Foundation, Jack Wheeler, published a number of pro-Renamo articles in various conservative journals. These included, “From Rovuma to Maputo: Mozambique’s Guerrilla War”, in the American periodical Reason; and “RENAMO: Winning One in Africa”, in the mercenary industry-journal Soldier of Fortune. According to

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Wheeler, he made contact with Renamo in 1983 and attempted to enter Renamo zones within Mozambique in 1983 and 1984, but was prevented from crossing into the country until 1985.\textsuperscript{46} Wheeler, who also wrote articles supporting the anti-communist activities of the Contras in Nicaragua, the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan, and Unita in Angola, claims that he collaborated with U.S. Intelligence from at least 1983, and thus it is plausible that his involvement with Renamo marked the beginning of clandestine support for the organisation by American intelligence agencies.\textsuperscript{47} In October 1984 Renamo also began to receive support from within American academia in the form of Mozambican ex-patriot Luis Serapião, an associate professor at Howard University.\textsuperscript{48} Howard’s paper, “Mozambican Foreign Policy and the West 1975-1984”, claimed that early in Frelimo’s history it had become dominated by a ‘gang’ of mostly non-black Marxists, led by Marcelino dos Santos and Aquino de Bragança, who had wrested control of the party by assassinating Frelimo’s legitimate Black Nationalist leaders.\textsuperscript{49} It went on to imply that,

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\textsuperscript{46} Wheeler, “From Rovuma to Maputo”, p32.

\textsuperscript{48} One of his previous works (and his only book to date) was, Luis B. Serapião and Mohamed A. El-Khawas, \textit{Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence}, (University Press of America, 1979).

because Renamo was fighting a popular struggle against Marxist tyranny, they should receive aid from the West. Serapião would later go on to staff the pro-Renamo Mozambican Information Office, in co-operation with Tom Schaaf, and engage in various other activities to assist Renamo. The notorious mercenary Robert MacKenzie would also follow in Wheeler’s footsteps, publishing a number of articles in *Soldier of Fortune* magazine, under various pseudonyms, in 1987 and 1988. MacKenzie was a Vietnam veteran who had travelled to Rhodesia and served as a commander in the SAS. He was involved in training Renamo soldiers in Rhodesia, and in South Africa as part of a Reconnaissance (Recce) unit, later claiming that, “One of our [the SAS'] most long-lasting, significant jobs was to get the MNR [RENAMO] going properly”. He also led Renamo soldiers in at least one mission within Mozambique. In 1987 his article, “Renamo: Freedom Fighters’ Agenda for Victory”, was published in *Soldier of Fortune* under the name Bob Mckenna; and in 1988 “Mission Mozambique: SOF Escorts Missionaries Out of Combat Zone”, was published.


published under the name Bob Jordan in the same magazine. 56 MacKenzie’s wife, Sibyl Cline, also published some pro-Renamo material in the late 1980s, including the book, *RENAMO: Anti-Communist Insurgents in Mozambique: The Fight Goes On.* 57 That book was published by the United States Global Strategy Council, a right-wing think-tank associated with Sibyl’s father, Ray Cline, who was a former Deputy Director of the CIA and is thought to have been involved in channelling funds to Renamo. 58


Since the mid-1990s little has been published celebrating Renamo’s guerrilla struggle. The major exception is João Cabrita’s, *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy*, which stands apart from virtually all of the conservative literature on Renamo in its academic quality. Its sophisticated analysis and historical methodology suggest that Cabrita’s work could be legitimately considered as the first pro-Renamo history (and indeed the first history) of the Mozambican Civil War. Cabrita’s work presents a coherent narrative that constructs a portrait of Renamo as an independent, genuine nationalist movement. What makes his study so powerful, however, is the clever and subtle fashion in which Cabrita acknowledges the influence of Rhodesia and South Africa in the creation and maintenance of Renamo, but shifts authority and agency into the hands of Renamo’s leadership. One example of this is the importance Cabrita places on *Voz da África Livre* in the formation of Renamo. He acknowledges that the radio station was created by Rhodesia, but provides a depiction of events in which Orlando Cristina and other Mozambican exiles manoeuvred to take over the station with the help of sympathetic Rhodesians. He also emphasises conflict between Renamo and the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), claiming that they initially dismissed André Matsangaissa’s plan to create Renamo, instead creating a purely military unit called the Mozambique Resistance (REMO), disliked by genuine nationalists due to the influence of white members in its leadership. He also minimises the influence of non-blacks within Renamo, the so-called *Renamo Branco* such as Orlando Cristina and Evo Fernandes, always emphasising the authority of the black leadership inside Mozambique. The centrality of the Renamo organisation itself in his history (as opposed to a focus on southern Africa’s regional dynamics) allows Cabrita to recognise the international assistance that Renamo received, but to sideline its significance. Cabrita also constructs a plausible military history of the conflict’s campaigns that denies cross-border assistance from Malawi and the Comoros Islands, and emphasises domestic support for the movement. A major component of Cabrita’s case for Renamo’s political legitimacy is the attention he gives to the history of Mozambique’s liberation period. By tracking the intricacies of divisions within the independence movement from the early 1960s, Cabrita is able to demonstrate that an indigenous opposition to Frelimo had existed since the organisation’s creation. He then links that legitimacy to Renamo through long-time nationalist activists, such as Fanuel

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61 A few exceptions such as Marks, “Remembering RENAMO”, do exist.
Mahluza and Artur Vilankulu, who joined their ranks. Cabrita also gives an interesting account of Cristina’s past, which rehabilitates him as an anti-colonial nationalist and former Frelimo supporter.

While linking Renamo to this earlier nationalist history is very important for Cabrita’s portrayal of the group, the amount of space devoted to Mozambique’s liberation period over-balances the focus of the work, with more than half the book devoted to the pre-independence period, and two thirds to the period up until 1980. This focus may also be partly explained by the weighting of Cabrita’s primary sources. He used Freedom of Information laws in the United States to obtain many American government and intelligence documents about the Mozambican liberation struggle, and these sources are all from the pre-independence period. Cabrita supplements these with many interviews with former Renamo participants and some South African Military Intelligence officers. In fact, most of the sources used in Cabrita’s study are primary sources. While this is initially impressive, it creates a number of problems. Firstly, some of the interviews cited by Cabrita are difficult to verify as they were conducted up to 30 years before the publication of his work, with people who have since passed away, such as Orlando Cristina who was assassinated in 1983. These sources are quite important for elements of Cabrita’s argument, but are virtually unverifiable by other researchers. Secondly, the focus on primary sources means that Cabrita has ignored the majority of academic literature produced about the conflict in Mozambique, and is thus able to leave practically unmentioned the barrage of criticism that Renamo had received from virtually all points of the political spectrum during the civil war. Though Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy was published in 2000, it never cites or mentions the major works on the civil war produced in the previous decades by authors such as Hanlon, Cahen, Geffray, Vines, Hall or Young. By isolating his work from the major scholars in the field, Cabrita is able to produce a sanitised history of Renamo. An analysis of Renamo’s tactics of ultra-violence directed at civilians would not

64 During the liberation struggle Mahluza and Vilankulu were members of the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO), which was much smaller than Frelimo and had virtually disappeared by independence.
65 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp134-135.
66 Many of these documents are now accessible by the public at, CPHRC: Portugal’s History Online. www.cphrc.org.uk/, accessed: 21 July 2004.
fit comfortably with the popular Renamo that he depicts. He deals with Renamo’s brutality only very briefly, in a limited fashion, and effectively places blame for these tactics on the government. Cabrita’s lack of academic sources is part of a wider problem of poor referencing in his work. Frequently specific facts and figures are left unsourced and often very controversial claims, such as that Ruth First’s death resulted from Frelimo’s own internal conflicts, or that President Chissano had the Renamo members Mateus Lopes and João Ataíde assassinated in Malawi, are made without any supporting evidence. Cabrita’s book is a very important contribution to the historiography of the Mozambican Civil War, but its purposeful political bias, its emphasis on Mozambique’s pre-independence history, its disregard for most of the scholarly work on Mozambique, and its poor referencing, mean that it is far from a comprehensive history of the conflict.

Sources

Historians must often work with imperfect sources. In the quest for historical truth the researcher may be faced with difficulties in finding complete and credible sources, especially in the context of African underdevelopment and conflict. Even the most comprehensive record is itself the product of social and historical processes that must be taken into account. Nonetheless history must be written with what materials are available, and corrected and updated as new sources come to hand. Thus, in the production of any history, it is vital that historians have the utmost awareness of the limitations and biases of the material they utilise. What follows is an interrogation of the sources that will be deployed in this thesis, to probe and thus become fully cognisant of their weaknesses and limitations. This study draws on a wide variety of sources, including: the academic literature previously surveyed; thousands of newspaper articles and transcripts of radio broadcasts; documents produced by South Africa, Malawi and the Renamo organisation; and conversations with former participants in the conflict.

The first question that arises from the preceding list of sources is, in a history of the Mozambican Civil War, why are no documents from the Mozambican government examined? The Frelimo government has no tradition of transparency, and the releasing of documents for the historical record does not yet seem to become an established practice. While this may be due to the political landscape, in which Renamo has become the main opposition party, and both they and Frelimo maintain their war-time leadership, it is also

69 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp222, 246.
possible that there actually is no official government archive. Neither researchers nor government officials within Mozambique could even confirm the existence of such an archive, much less inform this author about how it might be accessed. However, even if these archives were accessed there would remain many questions regarding the veracity of their information about the civil war. It is known that information flow within the military, and between the military and government, was often poor. Units left abandoned without supplies in the Mozambican wilderness, often scavenging to survive, could not be expected to provide complete and accurate reports. Soldiers may have withheld negative details, or concocted positive news, so as not to offend superiors; and the military leadership is thought to have misled the government as to the progress of the war. In addition, at the conclusion of the war it was discovered that massive fraud had been occurring, and that up to 12,000 soldiers who had died or retired had been kept on the payroll so their wages could be embezzled.\textsuperscript{70} It was thus in the interests of soldiers at all levels of the military to mislead their superiors.\textsuperscript{71}

Documents that could be accessed included some from South Africa, Malawi, and Renamo. Specifically the South African documents were harvested from the South African Foreign Affairs archive and the South African National Archive. South Africa has a reasonably efficient archival system for its documents, and a structured system of rules for accessing them. Access to the military archives could be arranged, but any documents requested would be screened for security purposes at a cost prohibitive for researchers without extensive financial resources.\textsuperscript{72} Documents were also collected from the Malawi National Archives though, as could be expected, the Malawian archives are not as well maintained as those in South Africa. A number of important files had been recalled from


\textsuperscript{71} One great prize that might be found within the Mozambican government’s archives is the complete Gorongosa documents. These documents were captured in the 1985 offensive on Renamo’s Gorongosa headquarters, and provided evidence of continued South African support for Renamo. Though the Frelimo government announced that, “[w]e have in our possession many dozens of kilos of documents intact, and others partially destroyed that we are piecing together”, [“Transcript of Press Conference on Gorongosa Documents”, (Maputo, 30 September 1985), p1] only three notebooks were ever released to the public. The contents and location of the remainder of the documents seems to have gone completely without investigation. An alternative fate for the documents, suggested to this author, was that the Zimbabwean forces that initially captured Gorongosa took most of the captured material, and that Mozambican intelligence was left with only “shitty documents”, \textit{Conversation with Former Mozambican Intelligence Agent}, Maputo, 19 June 2003.

\textsuperscript{72} The South African History Archive, at the University of Witswatersrand, has launched a series of legal challenges over the last few years in order to access documents that have been concealed by the South African military establishment, demonstrating that the end of Apartheid has not ended the secrecy about that period. See The South African History Archive, \url{http://www.wits.ac.za/saha/programme.htm}, accessed: 11 August 2004.

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the archive by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, permission to view files from that
department had to be given by the Minister himself, some files had been extensively water-
damaged and organisation within the archive was somewhat lacking. One initial problem
regarding the use of documents from both these archives is that it should be expected that
materials stored there were censored. Though this may be the case, enough documents of
interest remained in the archives to make the research worthwhile. Another issue is that
information is not shared evenly with a government, or even within a department, and thus
the documents collected may have been created by authors with an imperfect knowledge
of their subject matter. For example, the South African Foreign Affairs department could
not be expected to know the full activities of their SADF counterparts. Indeed, differences
in perspective or opinion may also occur within a department and so any document may
only represent the attitude of its author, or a minority position. Documents from Renamo
have been predominantly accessed from a private collection. It is hard to place some of
these documents into context without knowing the minutiae of Renamo’s internal
workings. For others it is virtually impossible to ascertain their authenticity with certainty.
These problems can only be dealt with through assessment of each individual document
and the triangulation of evidence, within the framework of other documents collected and
the wider historical context. They are imperfect sources, from which the historian must
glean as much as possible. Verbal sources have very similar problems to documents, with
the exception that they can be questioned and probed to a far greater degree by the
researcher while being interviewed. Sources spoken to could be asked to develop on
important points, and their accounts scrutinised for inconsistencies. However, the
researcher must still treat these accounts carefully as they may contain falsehoods deployed
intentionally or by failure of memory. The source may not have had access to all the facts,
or may self-censor for various reasons.

Articles from newspapers, magazines and radio broadcasts constitute a large
component of the sources used for this study, providing the finer details of historical
events. Can the details of these sources be trusted to be accurate, and how complete a
record of events do these sources created? In southern Africa’s regional struggles a great
amount of emphasis was placed on the war of propaganda. South Africa constantly strove
to create legitimacy for itself in the international arena, or at least deflect hostile opinions,
as the issue at stake was access to the western lifelines that allowed Apartheid to exist.
Similarly, anti-Apartheid campaigners saw information as a weapon to battle the Apartheid
state, by exposing the injustice of the system and placing political pressure on those who
supported it. The region’s propaganda war also encompassed South Africa’s interventions in neighbouring states. Supporters of Frelimo and opponents of Apartheid thus strove to expose South Africa’s covert support for Renamo. Pro-Renamo supporters such as David Hoile, however, claimed that in the case of the Mozambican Civil War the Frelimo party dominated people’s understanding of events through, “an essentially one-sided information flow from the party and state news agencies”, and that they, “exercise[d] a virtual monopoly of information dissemination…” The print sources used in this study include newspapers from Mozambique, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania, Britain, the United States, Portugal and France. To judge how much trust can be placed in these news sources it must be ascertained to what degree they were influenced by state control; whether the journalists themselves could be trusted to deliver accurate news; and how reliable those journalist’s sources were.

While the press in the United States and Europe had virtually complete freedom to publish news about the conflict in Mozambique, journalists in southern Africa were subject to various levels of constraint on their reporting. The precise scale of state influence on the press in southern Africa could only be measured through an extremely detailed investigation of that issue, but some insight may be gained through a short discussion here. Governments in southern Africa could influence the news media through various methods of pressure and deceit, the most obvious being: censorship; appointment of sympathetic editors or journalists; direct commissioning of articles; and the dissemination of misinformation to journalists. South Africa was notorious for its censorship laws, and the strategy of ‘banning’ individuals so that they could not be

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73 Hoile, Mozambique: Propaganda, p5.
mentioned in the press. This form of state intervention was very direct and overt. The Apartheid state also had close relationships with various publications, including the Afrikaans newspaper *Beeld*, which represented the interests of the administration.\(^{75}\) Certain elements within the South African government, including Eschel Rhodie and Connie Mulder, even secretly established and financed the English-language publication *To The Point* between 1972 and 1980 in collaboration with the Bureau of State Security (BOSS).\(^{76}\) These activities became public when the ‘Muldergate’ Information Scandal broke in South Africa, exposing the role of Rhodie and Mulder in funding *The Citizen* newspaper, and the bribery of hundreds of foreign journalists.\(^{77}\) President Vorster was also implicated in the scandal, leading to his resignation and the rise of P.W. Botha to the presidency in 1978.\(^{78}\) During this period BOSS agent Gordon Winter was active as a journalist at a number of newspapers, and used his position to disseminate articles commissioned by the Apartheid administration. In this context a number of pro-Renamo articles were commissioned by BOSS and published by Winter and reporter Jose Ramalho in 1976 and 1977.\(^{79}\) Such clandestine activities undoubtedly continued throughout the 1980s.\(^{80}\) South African agents

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\(^{75}\) Fauvet and Mosse, *Carlos Cardoso*, p72.


\(^{77}\) Winter, *Inside BOSS*, pp522-525. It was also revealed that they had planned to purchase the *Rand Daily Mail* newspaper in South Africa, and the *Washington Star* and *Sacramento Union* newspapers in the United States.


\(^{79}\) Winter, *Inside BOSS*, pp547-549. These included articles by Winter in *The Citizen* on 4 August, 18 August and 29 November 1977; and Jose Ramalho, “Resistance Fights for Freedom from Frelimo”, *To The Point*, 19 August 1977, p57. Other pro-Renamo article, published without authors’ names, were “Resistance Leader Hits Out”, *To The Point*, 19 January 1979, p37; and “The Threat from Within”, *To The Point*, 13 July 1979, pp 8-11.

\(^{80}\) One example of a clandestine contact between a journalist and the Apartheid administration, though perhaps more an incident of journalistic manoeuvring than of misinformation, involved the dealings of Rand Daily Mail journalist Don Marshall around his investigations of South Africa’s presence in the Comoros Islands. Marshall approached South African Foreign Affairs official Glen Babb on 7 March 1983 to seek information. According to Babb’s report, “He said that the Comorian armed forces used our uniforms, that the islands are ideally situated strategically, that SAA could easily land at Hahaya and that it was common knowledge that SAA was looking for alternatives to Mauritius and Seychelles. He also alleged that Mr Kotzenburg was in the employ of the SA government. In the face of this he said we could not aver (sic) that we did not have an official interest in the Comoros”. Babb asked Marshall to hold his story for a month, with the promise that “we may be able to add some elements”, “Interest Shown by the Press in the Comoros”, G.R.W. Babb, 8 March 1983, the South African Foreign Affairs Archives, File 1/203/3, p.1. Marshall did this, later publishing the article as, Don Marshall, “SA Set for Diplomatic Links with Comores”, *Rand Daily Mail*, 16 April 1983, pp 1, 5. While he makes mention in the article of the
would also act to spread misinformation through well-meaning sources. One particularly amazing example of plans for a South African Psychological Operation (or PsyOp in military vernacular) was that, in the context of wider propaganda efforts to sustain the fragile Rhodesian government in 1979, an operation would have the SABC edit tapes of President Machel’s speeches in order to create fake speeches that made new and unattainable promises.\textsuperscript{81} These broadcasts, which were to be so realistic that genuine Mozambican news outlets would believe them and copy their material, would be spliced into normal Radio Moçambique broadcasts. This would be complemented in the print media by the plan to forge Mozambican newspapers, with stories created by South African intelligence, and have these distributed by Renamo.\textsuperscript{82} Despite the Apartheid government’s interventionist tendencies and its varied strategies of censorship and misinformation, liberal journalists were still able to publish articles exposing Renamo’s atrocities and their connections with South Africa, thus allowing a balanced coverage of the civil war in the South African media.\textsuperscript{83}

The situation in post-independence Mozambique was quite different. According to leading Mozambican journalist Paul Fauvet\textsuperscript{84},

\begin{quote}
No revolutionary movement can have come to power in a more favourable climate of public opinion that Frelimo did in 1975. Organised opposition had disappeared after the collapse of the 7 September coup. Frelimo did not have to take over or purge the press. By the time the
\end{quote}

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islands’ strategic importance, and South Africa’s plans to expand development aid and South African Airways routes to the Comoros, he makes no mention of secret military connections with the republic.\textsuperscript{81} See for example the document, “RIPC Psychological Action Directive No 2 (Revised and Continuing Psychological Action Strategy)”, Chairman of the Rhodesian Joint Planning Centre, Rhodesian Joint Planning Centre, 25 April 1979, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, File 144/5/1/1/4, Vol 1, April 1979-September 1979.
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\textsuperscript{82} “Die bekom van Mosambiekse koerante en publikasies vir identiese vervalsing en waar ons ‘n nuwe geselekteerde inhoud aan gee en deur middle wan die weerstandsbewegings versprei onder de bevolking”.
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\textsuperscript{83} “Insa-Optrede In Mosambiek: MGBS”, 1979, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, File 144/5/1/1/4, Volume 2, pp4-5.
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\textsuperscript{84} Virtually nothing has been written about the media in Mozambique; indeed, “[w]ith a few honourable exceptions … recent Mozambican history written by Mozambicans is notable for its absence”; Paul Fauvet, “Biography of Uria Simango Launched”, \textit{Agencia de Informação de Moçambique}, 28 July 2004. The new book by Fauvet and Mosse, \textit{Carlos Cardoso: Telling the Truth in Mozambique,} is a rare glimpse into that world. While it may be legitimately argued that this is far from an objective source, nothing presenting a contrary view-point has yet come to this author’s attention.
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transitional government was sworn in on 20 September 1974, the media was entirely in the hands of fervent supporters of full independence under Frelimo.\(^85\)

In the context of Mozambique’s new ‘revolutionary’ society,

press freedom was initially regarded as a bourgeois concept and as a smokescreen behind which monopoly capital manipulated the western media. In Mozambique it was openly recognised that journalists were not free agents: they were at the service of the revolution. They took sides – with the revolution and against reaction. And being with the revolution meant accepting the ‘leading role’ of the revolutionary party.\(^86\)

In those circumstances of a press dominated by Frelimo’s political disciples, it might be expected that the state would easily consolidate control over the media. However, accepting state control of the media was neither intrinsic to the journalists’ political consciousness, nor their relationship with the Frelimo government. As Fauvet recounts,

rather than welcoming such a friendly press, Frelimo displayed, after the initial euphoria of victory, considerable suspicion. Much of the Frelimo leadership inhabited a different cultural universe from the young urban intellectuals running the newsrooms. As [journalist João] Machado da Graça put it: ‘Right from the start, there was almost no dialogue. The government distrusted those newsrooms made up of young people, with a relatively high academic level, who lacked the military discipline that prevailed in combat zones, and who wanted an active and critical media. And, apart from all this, with a high percentage of whites.’ … [And as for the media] [o]ne thing was very clear: the journalists were not used to taking orders. They had broken free of the colonial censor and had no intention of submitting to a revolutionary censor instead. They did not equate supporting the Frelimo line with obeying diktats from the ministry of information. The idea of instituting any regime of formal censorship was also repugnant to Frelimo. … It soon became clear, however, that journalists were expected to censor themselves. The party had set down ‘guidelines’, and they were told to follow them. But the guidelines often proved vague, sometimes contradictory, and certainly did not provide instant answers to ever problem … The most outspoken journalists fought, not for ‘freedom of the press’, but for the right to criticise.\(^87\)

Thus, rather than explicit state control of the Mozambican media, there instead seems to have been an implicit but vague understanding of what would be tolerated, and a continuous tension between journalists and the state as the former probed the boundaries of acceptable reporting. Indeed, contradictory messages would come from the state itself, with some elements working to impose the party’s will and “top-ranking officials … declar[ing] whole areas taboo to the press”\(^88\), while others such as President Machel would actively encourage press criticism.\(^89\) Within the limits of this partial press freedom a spectrum of political commentary evolved, with the newspaper Notícias representing the

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\(^85\) Fauvet and Mosse, \textit{Carlos Cardoso}, p33.
\(^86\) Fauvet and Mosse, \textit{Carlos Cardoso}, p34.
\(^87\) Fauvet and Mosse, \textit{Carlos Cardoso}, pp 36-37.
\(^88\) Fauvet and Mosse, \textit{Carlos Cardoso}, p85.
\(^89\) Fauvet and Mosse, \textit{Carlos Cardoso}, p54. In these circumstances journalists sometimes wrote articles critical of the government, only to have them cut by their editor; or would moderate their criticism of Frelimo to the level that their point could be made without appearing counter-revolutionary. An example of this given by Fauvet is the way journalists could not criticise the policy of relocating urban poor during Operation Production in 1983, but could attack the way it was implemented.
views of the administration, while Tempo and the Agência de Informação de Moçambique (AIM – Mozambique News Agency) were more critical and generally to the left of the government. But there was no room for pro-Renamo views in the mainstream Mozambican media. It would be foolish to believe that any journalist is without ideological bias, but with such an openly political press in Mozambique could those journalists be trusted to accurately report the news? This is a question that will have to be investigated in future studies, but when asked whether he considered his war-time reporting objective, Paul Fauvet gave the believable response, “of course not! We were Fremilista! But we always did our best to ensure our facts were right”.  

For the most part, media that did present Renamo’s view-point were under the direct control of Renamo, or sympathetic right-wing organisations. Renamo’s main media outlet was their clandestine radio station Voz da África Livre, though they also published press releases and newsletters through their foreign representatives. The direct control of Renamo’s political leadership over these sources is one key reason to distrust them, especially since that leadership has a history of lying to the international media and thus, it must be extrapolated, to their own supporters. In addition, the outside leadership of Renamo often had little idea of what was really happening within Mozambique, was itself splintered into factions, and sometimes relied on what information they could glean from the broadcasts of Voz da África Livre or other news outlets. Renamo also occasionally used the tactic of inviting sympathetic journalists into Renamo-controlled territory in order to plant stories in the western media. As these stories usually emphasise the journalist’s clandestine trip to Mozambique, they are easily identifiable. Renamo’s media outlets are thus to be treated with great suspicion. However, there are occasions on which these news outlets reported attacks on or by Frelimo that no other media outlet covered. With the political and logistical limits on other media sources, it must be considered that these

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90 Fauvet and Mosse, Carlos Cardoso, p47.  
92 The most obvious and long-standing lies relate to Renamo’s denial of its relationship with South Africa, however other examples exist. One astounding assertion by Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama was that over 1,750,000 Mozambicans were put in concentration camps by Frelimo “where they were killed” (more than 10% of Mozambique’s population), and that 14,000,000 Mozambicans were forced into communal villages (Mozambique’s entire population at the time). Afonso Dhlakama, “On the Peace Talks in Mozambique”, Press Release, 3 February 1991, Gorongosa, Mozambique, in Renamo on Peace and Negotiation in Mozambique, (London: Mozambique Institute, September 1991), p7.  
93 See previous discussion of Jack Wheeler and Robert MacKenzie for example. Sometimes these reporters were exposed as secret Renamo-sympathisers, see Paul Fauvet, “New York Times Reporter’s Trip Aids MNR Bandits’ Dirty War”, Guardian, 17 August 1988.  
reports may have been factual. As with other documents of questionable validity, each report must be individually considered, and the best decision made on the evidence available.

Of course for all these media outlets, their reporting on the war was affected by the availability of sources for their reports. Mozambique, being one of Africa’s most underdeveloped countries and immersed in a bloody civil conflict, could not be expected to provide an environment conducive to the free flow of information.\textsuperscript{95} For the Mozambican press, the source of information closest to the action was the military, so “[m]edia coverage of the war consisted of sporadic military communiqués, mostly about bandit bases captured and bandits killed. Almost never were any figures given for FPLM dead and wounded”.\textsuperscript{96}

Later, according to Fauvet,

\textit{Attempts were made to improve coverage of the war. In mid-1982, there was a series of meetings intended to organise regular liaison between the FPLM general staff and the media. … The link between the reporters and the general staff would be a small group of Snasp [Mozambican intelligence] agents…}\textsuperscript{97}

Unfortunately, in addition to the problems inherent in having this information channelled through Mozambique’s secret service, these contacts did not last. Journalist Carlos Cardoso then used personal contacts with high-ranking military figures for information, though these too only lasted a short time.\textsuperscript{98} Journalists would always have to struggle for accurate information about the civil war. The historian of the conflict must also face these challenges. In analysing the materials gathered for this study this author has been conscious that documents, initially created by subjective authors with imperfect knowledge of events, were in all probability also censored; that verbal sources may contain falsehoods, either deliberate or through fault of memory; and that articles from newspapers, magazines and radio broadcasts, suffer from ideological bias, censorship, misinformation, and a deficiency of reliable sources.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{95} A notice to this effect appeared regularly in Mozambiquefile: “Due to the poor state of communication in the country, many MNR bandit attacks in remote areas do not come to the attention of the media. This record is therefore incomplete”. See for instance, “Destabilisation Calendar”, Mozambiquefile, July 1989, p23.

\textsuperscript{96} Fauvet and Mosse, Carlos Cardoso, p87. FPLM: The Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique/The People’s Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique. The FPLM would also be known by the acronym FAM, for The Mozambican Armed Forces

\textsuperscript{97} Fauvet and Mosse, Carlos Cardoso, p89.

\textsuperscript{98} Fauvet and Mosse, Carlos Cardoso, p89.

\textsuperscript{99} As most newspaper articles never mention the sources of their information, it is even more difficult for the historian to judge the credibility of the news they report. For further comment see, David Robinson, “Researching Renamo: Fact, Speculation and Evidence in the History of the Mozambique National Resistance”, (Paper presented at the African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific 26th Annual Conference, Adelaide, October 2003).
Chapter 2: Analysing Renamo

As is apparent from an examination of the literature surrounding the Mozambican Civil War, much effort has been devoted to analysing the nature of Renamo as an organisation. This debate, which is the ideological battleground upon which the legitimacy of Renamo and its insurgency is confirmed or refuted, has primarily focused on Renamo’s external political and military connections, Renamo’s brutal tactics of killing and mutilation, and the popular support garnered by Renamo from rural Mozambicans who were alienated by the Frelimo government’s policies. This chapter will survey and comment on some of these theoretical perspectives about the nature of Renamo, particularly in relation to the movement’s aims, strategy, organisation, and support base.

Renamo’s Aims:

The aim or purpose of a political organisation is often the fundamental starting point from which that entity’s structure and strategy are determined. It is well established that Renamo was created in the context of operations against Zimbabwean rebels by Rhodesian authorities and Mozambican nationalists to “conduct a psychological and clandestine campaign against the Marxist Mozambican government – and create a sufficiently strong opposition to challenge the existing authority”¹, but Renamo’s specific self-stated aims evolved throughout the duration of the war. Alex Vines cites a 1979 radio interview on Voz da África Livre by Renamo’s first President André Matsangaissa saying, “We are not interested in policy making … later we will have to work out politics but first communism must go from our country”, as reflecting Renamo’s initial lack of a clear political vision.² Subsequently, Renamo broadcast a four-point plan in 1981 calling for the extinction of the communist system, formation of a government of ‘national reconciliation’, the review of all Frelimo nationalisations, and the establishment of the private sector to be the ‘dynamising sector of the country’. A more developed ‘Manifest and Programme’ that emerged from Renamo’s 1982 congress called for:

- the creation of a multi-party democratic state;
- a free economy based on private enterprise;

- a state respecting the rights of man, where all citizens are equal before the law;
- the existence of public and private health systems and education that helped the disadvantaged;
- the state as a guarantor of economic infrastructure;
- submission of the military to the political establishment, and the immediate dismantlement of instruments used to suppress citizens’ rights;
- respect for international organisations, and international relations based on mutual respect and non-interference; and,
- a freely elected assembly to approve a new constitution based on principles of political and economic democracy, and respect for the rights of its citizens.

However, Vines notes that this program was predominantly created as propaganda for Renamo’s external offices to gain international support, and that in practice the rebels made little attempt to justify its actions to the civilian populations under its control.3

Supporters of Renamo, and analysts such as Christian Geffray, have placed much emphasis on the alienation of Mozambique’s peasantry by Frelimo’s implementation of collectivised villages and marginalisation of traditional authorities. While the reversal of these policies was clearly a tactic of Renamo to gain local support, they were never clearly articulated as aims of the organisation, except perhaps obliquely under the auspices of calls for private enterprise and the extinction of communism. The aims listed above are more like those of a western-style, modernising, nationally-orientated political party, rather than that of a peasant’s movement to protect traditional authorities, religions and farming practices. Actually, as noted by Colin Darch, Renamo’s western spokesmen rarely used opposition to villagisation as a key argument against Frelimo.4

If the war in Mozambique is a struggle against an undemocratic Frelimo government and against forced villagisation, we should expect locally-based fighters trying to get their land back. But no: ‘the final form of control is a systematic process of transferring recruits away from their home areas’, according to William Minter’s research. Minter goes on to say that ‘almost all (recruits) described marches of at least two days from the point of capture to the training base. One commander in Manica specifically said that they had a policy of transferring soldiers in order to make it harder for them to run away’.5

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3 Vines, RENAMO, pp76-78.
5 Darch, “Are there Warlords in Provincial Mozambique?”, pp45-46.
While Frelimo supporters such as Paul Fauvet always maintained that Renamo had no aims other than strategic destabilisation on behalf of the South African military, even more moderate analysts such as Alex Vines maintain that Renamo’s agenda did not extend beyond,

vague anti-communism and anti-Frelimoism, with the promise of a better future once the war is won by Renamo… Political ideology does not appear to play an important role within internal Renamo.

According to Vines, essentially,

What unites Renamo is the desire for power. Renamo’s leadership core is derived of disgruntled or disillusioned Frelimo members who were unable to progress far enough for their ambitions within the party, or were not important enough to be protected from prosecution for their corrupt activities, as the cases of [Renamo Presidents] Matsangaissa and Dhlakama illustrate. This is Renamo’s true ideology which continues to motivate its internal leadership.

In fact, all of these perspectives contain some truth because, as will be highlighted throughout this study, Renamo was a conduit for multiple and competing agendas that could for the most part agree on a strategy of rural insurgency to achieve their aims.

While Renamo evolved from Rhodesian counter-insurgency strategies of the 1970s, its embryonic structure was reinforced by genuine black nationalist activists, white Mozambicans and Portuguese who opposed the Frelimo state for ideological or financial reasons, collaborators of the former colonial regime, and Frelimo deserters. Thus from the very beginning Renamo was a vessel imbued with varying agendas, such as: to restore the colonial order; to retrieve assets nationalised by the Frelimo government; to create a new independent and non-communist state; and to accumulate wealth and power beyond the opportunities provided by the Frelimo government. These aims were further supplemented and complicated when South Africa adopted sponsorship of Renamo in 1980 and the divergent minimalist, maximalist, and putschist agendas of elements within the South African establishment also gained influence on how Renamo should be used within Mozambique. The minimalists within the Department of Foreign Affairs and South African trade institutions sought to support Renamo in a strategic fashion that would encourage Mozambique’s economic dependence on South Africa, but did not seek a Renamo takeover. The maximalists, whose presence was predominantly in the South African Defence Forces (SADF), aimed to stabilise Mozambique and thus eliminate it as a military or political threat, but again did not support a seizure of power in the short-term.

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7 Vines, RENAMO, p78.
8 Vines, RENAMO, pp93-94.
However, some within the SADF and South African Military Intelligence (DMI) did hold a putschist position and aimed for the overthrow of the Frelimo regime. The difference in these political aims was predominantly hidden beneath the day-to-day operations of Renamo’s forces but, as will be explore in more detail later, became visible at various points where aims became incompatible. These conflict points included the assassination of Renamo Secretary-General Orlando Cristina in April 1983, the failure of negotiations between Renamo and Frelimo in October 1984, the South African government’s crackdown on maximalists within its ranks after the discovery of the Gorongosa documents in 1985, and factional struggles to dominate Renamo in the late 1980s. But for the most part the gradual expansion of Renamo’s rural insurgency throughout the 1980s satisfied all of its supporters’ agendas.

Renamo’s Military Strategy:

Until the fall of Rhodesia in early 1980 Renamo effectively operated as a wing of the Rhodesian security forces, primarily assisting them in reconnaissance and small operations against Zimbabwean rebels and Mozambican infrastructure. Renamo’s first bases were established inside central Mozambique under the guidance of the Rhodesian SAS, though again this was with the intent of conducting anti-ZANLA operations. Once Renamo was transferred to South African sponsorship in April 1980, and set back significantly by Mozambican counter-insurgency operations in June 1980, a new strategic direction had to be charted. The initial reluctance of Renamo’s black leadership, by this time directed by Afonso Dhlakama, to expand their territory or engage with government forces during late 1980 and early 1981 probably indicates that their aim of accumulating wealth and power was being satisfied by their local influence and South Africa’s regular supply drops.\(^9\) It was only under South African pressure, and the influence of Renamo Branco such as Orlando Cristina, that Renamo established a headquarters at Gorongosa and fronts in mostly unoccupied areas in central and southern Mozambique.

From that point Renamo adopted the fairly typical strategy of rural insurgency. Their primary objective was to expand the territory under their nominal control, and to increase the number of fighters at their disposal. As Darch notes, the war had no real battlefronts, and Renamo rarely sought to hold towns, mostly focused on hit and run attacks.\(^10\) This was both because of the government’s conventional superiority, and South

\(^9\) Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
\(^10\) Darch, “Are there Warlords in Provincial Mozambique?”, p38.
Africa’s priority of destabilising Mozambique rather than supporting conquest by the rebels. Renamo thus flourished in remote areas that were difficult for Mozambican forces to access, and from there projected their power against targets representing the state, civilian and military traffic on Mozambique’s vulnerable national highways, and military targets whenever possible. As Vines records, between 1980 and 1988 these targets included 1,800 schools, 720 health units, 900 shops and 1,300 trucks and buses, in an attempt to ‘exorcise’ Renamo-controlled areas of government influence. Extensive looting was also an essential part of the Renamo economy, with some materials transported to Malawi for sale.\(^\text{11}\) While the Renamo leadership may have regularly used their sophisticated communications system to direct forces to move into particular strategic areas or to unite for larger-scale assaults, for the most part Renamo’s campaign was made up of opportunistic attacks and ambushes, often contingent on where they had to move to avoid government counter-insurgency operations. The majority of incidents involving Renamo were probably small-scale attacks on or the kidnapping of civilians as part of their on-going control of populations and acquisition of new porters and fighters. This will be discussed in greater detail below. The broad strategic aims laid out for Renamo by South African Generals in preparation for the 1984 Nkomati Accord, and recorded in the Gorongosa documents, were to: “destroy the Mozambican economy in the rural zones; destroy the communications routes to prevent exports and imports…and the movement of domestic produce; [and to] prevent the activities of foreigners (cooperantes) because they are the most dangerous in the recovery of the economy”.\(^\text{12}\) These clearly aimed to cripple Mozambique’s economy, without presenting any plausible route for a Renamo take-over of power.

The few actual large-scale offensives launched by Renamo, including their drive towards Maputo in late 1982 and their Zambézia offensive during 1986 and 1987, were primarily precipitated by government forces driving them out of previously safe regions and by the expulsion of Renamo forces from South African and Malawian territory.

Facilitating the delivery of external supplies and troop reinforcements was also a major strategic consideration for Renamo. This meant that Renamo activity was common along the South African, Swaziland and Malawian borders, which were entry points for Renamo units and supply columns and also provided escape routes to safety from FPLM operations. Renamo’s Gorongosa headquarters would remain a central hub for the distribution of supplies of primarily South African origin, and airstrips such as that at

\(^{11}\) Vines, *RENAMO*, pp17, 87.
\(^{12}\) *The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary*, (Maputo, 30 September 1985).
Maringué became increasingly important for supply shipments as civilian aircraft replaced air-drops by military planes from the mid-1980s. Access to beaches for supply drops via ship or submarine also influenced the placement of some Renamo camps, especially in Gaza and Inhambane provinces.

Most of the time this continuing strategy of low-level guerrilla conflict could satisfy the competing aims of Renamo’s supporters: gradually creating a more powerful organisation, for those who planned an eventual Renamo takeover, or sought to use Renamo as a pawn in negotiations, such as the Renamo Branco; increasing the wealth and power of those seeking self-aggrandisement through Renamo’s activities; cutting Mozambique’s transport linkages and increasing its dependency on South Africa, as sought by South African minimalists; and creating widespread destabilisation of Mozambique for South African maximalists. As will be explored later in chapter five, the exception to this was Renamo’s Limpopo offensive in late 1982, when government counter-insurgency activities in central Mozambique forced Renamo troops into a desperate dash southwards. For putschists within Renamo, such as Secretary-General Orland Cristina, this sudden offensive towards Maputo was seen as Renamo’s first and best opportunity to capture the capital and destroy the Frelimo regime. This offensive eventually failed due to lack of support by South Africa, and it will be argued that Cristina’s subsequent backlash against this ‘betrayal’ led to his assassination by South African agents in April 1983.

Following from the 1988 Gersony report, it is generally agreed that Renamo related to territory in terms of three categories: Control, Tax and Destruction Zones. Control Zones were effectively ‘liberated zones’ providing food and services for Renamo troops, in a form of plantation economy. Whether the population was predominantly captive or broadly supportive of Renamo remains a matter of debate and probably varied from region to region. This will be discussed in more detail below. Analysts such as Vines emphasise that production was controlled through fear and force, and was policed by local collaborators known as Mujeeba. Tax Zones were often adjacent to Renamo controlled areas, but were territory that was difficult to control or possessed a dispersed population, thus making them unfeasible as Control Zones. In these areas Renamo primarily demanded food and labour as a ‘tax’ without providing having any permanent presence. Destruction Areas were those along the shifting borders of Renamo and Frelimo territory, or those controlled by government forces. These were the areas where most atrocities took place, as Renamo
aimed to devastate the area and turn it into a no-mans land. Massacres, pillaging and forced recruitment through kidnapping were widespread in these zones.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Renamo’s Organisation:}

For an organisation motivated by a variety of sometimes competing aims, with no clear strategic focus beyond the expansion of its territory and the goal of isolating government influence within Mozambique’s cities, and whose members were spread across a relatively large and ethnically diverse area, one of the most significant facets of Renamo’s organisation was its ability to maintain an effective centralised leadership. According to Alex Vines the key to the success of this leadership was very advanced radio technology provided by South Africa, which allowed a centralised military command structure to operate effectively over large distances.\textsuperscript{14} Though Otto Roesch argued that at a local level Renamo leaders “enjoy a de facto autonomy of considerable scope, which keeps the Renamo central command very busy trying to hold all its commanders under some sort of discipline and control”\textsuperscript{15}, there is no evidence that Renamo commanders ever operated as independent warlords. Even the most prominent Renamo commanders, such as Calisto Meque, remained subservient to the central command.\textsuperscript{16} William Minter’s work interviewing former combatants also helped to demonstrate that Renamo was not a loose collection of warlords and had the ability to coordinate or restrain attacks across the country.\textsuperscript{17} This network of semi-autonomous regional commanders was particularly appropriate to accommodate a strategy primarily based around attacks of opportunity and adaptation to fluid local circumstances.

President Afonso Dhlakama and a number of senior members of staff headed Renamo’s military hierarchy. According to Vines, ranked below them were three Chiefs of Staff for the three operational zones into which Renamo divided Mozambique (north, central and south), and a provincial commander for each of the country’s ten provinces (excluding Maputo city).\textsuperscript{18} The system of lower ranks is less clear, however at the lowest end of the Renamo hierarchy were the \textit{Mujeeba}, a type of civilian police force who enforced Renamo control at a local level, particularly in those areas described as \textit{Control and Tax Zones}, who dealt out death or mutilation as punishment for dissent. Vines notes that the

\textsuperscript{13} Vines, \textit{RENAIMO}, pp91-94.
\textsuperscript{14} Vines, \textit{RENAIMO}, pp80-83.
\textsuperscript{16} Darch, “Are there Warlords in Provincial Mozambique?”, p37.
\textsuperscript{17} Vines, \textit{RENAIMO}, p82.
\textsuperscript{18} Vines, \textit{RENAIMO}, p81.
Mujeeba were commonly recruited from those who had been petty officials under Portuguese colonialism and were subsequently displaced from power under the new Frelimo government. Some Mujeeba may have been local civilians who just saw the position as an opportunity for social advancement, while others may have been coerced into the position. There was much variation in the maintenance of the system from region to region, but the importance of the Mujeeba was their in-depth knowledge of the local population and goings-on.¹⁹

At a political level Renamo was governed by President Afonso Dhlakama, and a Secretary-General who lived externally to Mozambique, at first Orlando Cristina and subsequently Evo Fernandes. While the position of Secretary-General was theoretically subordinate to that of President, during Cristina’s time as Secretary-General he was undoubtedly more important in determining both Renamo’s political and military trajectory. Though Renamo claimed to have had a National Council since mid-1981, it seems more likely that the Council was formed in 1982 as Cristina attempted to expand Renamo’s political and military alliances by incorporating politically experienced representatives of the Mozambican exile community and the forces of the Zambézia-based Partido Revolucionário Moçambicano, led by Gimo Phiri, into the existing Renamo organisation. The new National Council supposedly consisted of 12 men with specific portfolios, who were subordinate to the President and Secretary-General. Really the Council seems to have had a very basic structure, the portfolios often shifted in title and occupant, and those positions appear to have been nominal in their role, rarely dealing with designated assignments such as ‘Education’, ‘Civilian Affairs’, ‘Agriculture’ or ‘Information’.²⁰

Margaret Hall and Tom Young assess that, “[t]he formation of the National Council therefore represented a move in 1982 to graft a political superstructure on to an existing military organisation”.²¹ While various political battles within the National Council demonstrate that it must have had some decision-making capacity, it does not seem to have become a body considering broad political issues until the beginnings of the peace process, when it held its First Congress at Gorongosa in June 1989. While this Congress expanded the National Council to include representatives from all ten provinces, it also moved to focus more power in the Renamo headquarters within Mozambique and in Dhlakama’s own position, taking key political positions away from representatives in exile and

¹⁹ Vines, RENAMO, pp92-93.
²⁰ Vines, RENAMO, pp80-83.
combining the position of Secretary-General with that of President. There have been some claims that those of the N’dau ethnicity have dominated Renamo’s political and military hierarchy, but Renamo should not be thought of as merely representing that ethnic group. N’dau dominance within the leadership seems to have mainly been due to the geographical proximity of that ethnic group to Rhodesia during Renamo’s formative years, and Renamo’s forces did not seem to particularly discriminate in the ethnicity of those they recruited. However, some knowledge of N’dau language did seem to be necessary for those within the leadership. Some work by Ken Wilson indicates that a belief that those of N’dau ethnicity often had greater access to magical resources may have assisted the spread of Renamo in some areas, and there are claims that non-Shona entering Renamo’s leadership had to attend special classes to initiate them into the N’dau ethnicity.

So what was the factor that kept Renamo’s domestic forces united as a centralised organisation, rather than the fractured assortment of local warlords that they could have become? The explanation may be the resources supplied by Renamo’s South African support network. It would be a mistake to underestimate the scale and importance of South African assistance to Renamo. This support was significant, involving deliveries of food and weaponry, military training, communications technology, intelligence, financial support and facilitation of Renamo’s political activities. Apart from South Africa having nurtured Renamo with supplies and strategic direction during the early 1980s, available evidence from sources such as Renamo supporters and captured documents indicates thousands of tonnes of materiel were delivered to Renamo throughout the decade. A desperate plea for arms sent from President Dhlakama to South African Colonel Charles

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van Niekerk in mid-1984, only a few months after the Nkomati Accord, is demonstrative of Renamo’s reliance on South African assistance. South African food and medical supplies were also useful for bolstering grassroots support for Renamo by sharing the resources with locals. South African intelligence on Mozambican government counter-insurgency strategies and troop movements played a continuing role in battles between Renamo and the FPLM into the late 1980s. Possibly thousands of Renamo fighters were trained by South African instructors, and even deployed within Angola and Namibia, with evidence from former Renamo soldiers indicating that this training continued until at least 1988 inside both South Africa and Mozambique. South African contacts were also a vital part of Renamo’s economy of plunder. While South Africa and Renamo’s other external supporters carried a large financial burden, the task of supporting a 20,000-man army was massive. Taxing civilians and looting towns was key to the survival of Renamo as an organisation, as was the exploitation of Mozambique’s natural wealth. Elephant ivory, lion and zebra skins, precious stones and even timber were all taken from Mozambique’s interior and sold internationally. The South African military networks that facilitated these transfers have in some places remained up until today in the form of organised crime. Renamo’s supporters within the South African Defence Forces organised and distributed these resources and services through Renamo’s centralised leadership. Any Renamo commander who may have considered breaking away to become a regional warlord would know that by doing so they would lose access to the South African support that made Renamo a viable organisation. In addition, there may have been some understanding that those who tried to break away from South African control could be dealt with harshly, such as in the assassination of Orlando Cristina in April 1983. The only commander known to have broken away from Renamo was Gimo Phiri, former leader of the Zambézian opposition group the *Partido Revolucionário Moçambicano* (PRM), who split with 500 fighters in 1987 to create the *União Nacional de Moçambique* (UNAMO). Phiri’s Zambézian fighters

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seemed to have maintained a unique identity within Renamo after merging with the organisation in 1982, and were perturbed by internal conflict (possibly fuelled by Mozambican intelligence) that led to their victimisation by N’dau commander Calisto Meque.

Renamo’s domestic leadership, and particularly President Afonso Dhlakama, were thus the conduit through which influence over the organisation had to be channelled. This does not, however, mean that Dhlakama was a strong or visionary leader. While Dhlakama has doubtlessly demonstrated that he possesses some level of cunning and political savvy, remaining as leader of Renamo until the present day, during the Civil War period he is notable for his lack of profile and political inspiration. Following the death in combat of Renamo’s first President André Matsangaissa, a seemingly brave and charismatic leader, Dhlakama emerged triumphant from a power struggle in which his rivals for the Presidency were killed. Alex Vines notes that support for Dhlakama originally seems to have come from Orlando Cristina and the Renamo Branco and that the South African military never seemed to have much respect for the new Renamo President.\footnote{Vines, \textit{RENAMO}, pp15-16, 24-25. One South African document indicates they were not that impressed with André Matsangaissa either, note Renamo’s lack of dynamic leadership. “Mosambiek: Binnelandse Onrus en Terrorisme”, NGBS: Mosambiek, April-September 1979, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 144/5/1/1/4, Vol 1, pp1-2} This seems to have been true, but would later become a positive for Renamo’s South African supporters. As will be discussed further in chapter five a meeting of high-ranking South African military officials in late 1982 decided that, in the context of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi’s success in developing an independent public profile, Dhlakama’s own profile would be kept to a minimum in order to maintain Renamo as a subordinate force. Orlando Cristina, as the organisation’s truly dynamic and visionary leader, was soon after eliminated.\footnote{Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.} The South African maximalists understood that Dhlakama’s primary motivation was that of accumulating power, and found it easy to convince him that their strategy of destabilisation would eventually allow Renamo to conquer Mozambique. And following the Nkomati Accords, at which time South African minimalists and the Renamo Branco were at the peak of their influence, the South African maximalists used their sway over Dhlakama and Renamo’s black leadership to scuttle the October 1984 negotiations with Frelimo.\footnote{Joseph Hanlon, “Stealing the Dream”, \textit{New Statesman}, 19 October 1984; “Mozambique: An Infamous Accord”, \textit{Africa Confidential}, Vol 25, No 24, 28 November 1984, pp4-7.} The importance of Dhlakama as President of Renamo thus primarily lies in the fact that in the early 1980s he was easily subordinated to the will of South African maximalists, and that in
the late 1980s he was weak enough that various factions in both Renamo’s domestic and external leadership could compete to win influence over him.

Apart from Renamo’s military backers in South Africa, the organisation’s external wing was always quite extraneous to the operating of Renamo within Mozambique. Though many Renamo supporters were resident in Portugal, and from the early 1980s representatives of the organisation were maintained in a number of countries such as the United States, West Germany and Kenya, these offices usually only dealt with international propaganda efforts and fundraising, while remaining isolated from and poorly informed about Renamo’s actual operations.33 Powerful Portuguese industrialists such as Jorge Jardim had provided financial and political support for Renamo from the time of its creation, but South African maximalists otherwise retained a tight rein over Renamo’s external connections during the early 1980s, only beginning to encourage the diversification of Renamo’s funding sources following the Nkomati Accord in early 1984. Initially this led to the empowerment of Renamo’s Lisbon office and wealthy supporters amongst the Renamo Branco. Negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo representatives quickly followed in October 1984, though South African maximalists and Renamo’s black leadership scuttled them. Subsequently efforts were made by Renamo’s black leadership to increase relations with anti-communist elements in the United States; CIA funding equivalent to the assistance provided to the Nicaraguan Contras or Afghan Mujaheddin being the possible alternative to South African backing. These connections developed in 1985 as right-wing religious elements such as the Shekinah Ministries, and independent Cold War Warriors including Robert Mackenzie and Jack Wheeler began to promote Renamo’s interests in America. The importance of these connections expanded even further in late 1985, as the discovery of the Gorongosa documents implicating the South African military in supporting Renamo coincided with Renamo’s success in making allies with members of the World Anti-Communist League. American conservative organisations such as Freedom Inc, the Heritage Foundation, the Conservative Caucus, the American African Public Affairs Council, the Conservative Action Foundation, the Free Congress Foundation, the Council for National Policy and Free the Eagle, would all soon give Renamo political and financial support. But these connections with Conservative forces in the US also brought Renamo into contact with their inter-organisational struggles, and policy conflicts between the CIA, US State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense. Free the Eagle and the Conservative Action Foundation clashed over which candidate

would be Renamo’s Washington representative, and a number of moderate Renamo factions formed in Europe with CIA support. Subsequently in 1986 Renamo opened their Mozambique Information Office in Washington D.C. and American conservatives opened the Mozambique Research Center. As will be discussed in chapter ten, the CIA seemed to approach Renamo with a more pro-negotiation mentality. It will be argued that this led Frelimo agents to actually encourage the CIA’s influence over the Renamo leadership. In the end these external factional squabbles had little effect on the progress of the war in Mozambique, and the South African government played a far more important role in bringing Renamo into peace talks.

**Renamo's Domestic Support:**

The debate about how much support Renamo received from Mozambique’s population has been one of the most furiously contested in recent times. The Mozambican government always maintained that Renamo had no domestic support at all, predominantly referring to them throughout the war as ‘Armed Bandits’. While it should be expected of many Frelimo sympathisers to also reflect this conclusion in their writing, even those studies recognised as more balanced, such as by Alex Vines, have made similar conclusions. While Vines agrees that Frelimo’s policies did erode rural support for the government, he maintains that,

> What makes Renamo so different from most successful rebel movements is that the equation between popular support and rebel strength does not generally apply. Although Renamo obtains some support from the Mozambican peasantry, most of this is obtained through terror and coercion.

The 1988 Gersony Report by the US State Department also concluded that, “the relationship between Renamo and the population appears to revolve solely around the extraction of resources, strictly by force, without explanation, with no tolerance for refusal, and without reciprocation”. Christian Geffray has been the main proponent of the alternative interpretation that Frelimo’s policies of marginalizing traditional authorities,

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suppressing traditional religious practices, and enforcing a re-organisation of agricultural processes and living conditions, created an environment highly conducive to Renamo’s spread. By the early 1980s 1.8 million Mozambicans had been moved into communal villages. Geffray conducted an anthropological examination of communities in Nampula and argued that Frelimo’s villagisation policies led to social differentiation within communities, as families with land near the new villages benefited politically and economically at the expense of those who have to relocate. This effectively created a new class dynamic, which left the material losers disgruntled. Frelimo also alienated traditional authorities by barring any leaders connected to Portuguese colonialism from holding positions of power. This ignored the fact that populations had developed real loyalties to these local leaders, and the national state’s interference only stoked people’s allegiance to them. Renamo’s arrival in an area thus allowed locals to challenge the arrangements established by the government, and as such Renamo were welcomed as liberators. Dissident zones formed under Renamo’s control in which traditional society was reconstituted around the new needs of providing for Renamo forces, and chiefs were reinstated and subsequently acted as Renamo’s political interlocutors. Finally, young Mozambicans often joined Renamo to escape the village life, and to circumvent elders’ control over land, agriculture and marriage. Membership of Renamo provided access to manufactured consumer goods, relief from agricultural labour, the services of youngsters to do domestic chores, and sometimes a captive ‘wife’. In totality Geffray emphasised that Frelimo’s socialisation policies were a form of imposed administrative control that threatened Nampulan society’s cultural characteristics, and that support for Renamo was an effort to defend this identity. Similarly Michel Cahen “stressed that villagisation [was] the key ingredient in RENAMO’s astonishing success and rapid expansion across the whole country”.

40 Dinerman, “In Search of Mozambique”, pp573, 575.
41 Dinerman, “In Search of Mozambique”, p584.
rural dissatisfaction, that the war had become “an authentic civil war”, gained its own
dynamic, and would continue even if external support came to a complete halt. 44

Analysts such as Paul Fauvet and William Minter vehemently opposed the
interpretation that Frelimo’s villagisation policies led to support for Renamo. Colin Darch
expounded the case effectively that,

The war began in 1980, and for villagisation to have made a major causal contribution, one
would expect there to be some sort of geographical correlation between the extent of
villagisation in a given area, and the spread of the fighting… In 1980, according to official
government figures, the percentage of the rural population living in villages (only living, not
involved in collective production) in the provinces most affected by MNR activity was low. In
Manica it was six per cent and in Sofala it was eight per cent. The provinces where villagisation
was most advanced were Gaza (as a result of extensive floods along the Limpopo valley in
1977), with 37 per cent of the rural population living in concentrated settlements, Niassa with
13 per cent, and Cabo Delgado (Frelimo’s heartland) with 89 per cent… it was not until 1983
that the MNR appeared in [Nampula] province; a long wait indeed, if villagisation is a major
factor. 45

However, Otto Roesch wrote supporting the analysis that Geffray had made about
Nampula province, but venturing the hypothesis that, “Renamo has an active basis of
support only in those areas where popular traditional authorities are willing and capable of
organizing it for them”. 46 Roesch was sceptical of attempts to generalise the findings in
Nampula to the rest of the country, writing that,

if Geffray and Perdersen’s work showed anything, it was that Renamo’s relative success in
exploiting popular disenchantment with Frelimo was the result of specific social and culture-
historical conditions prevailing in Nampula. 47

Roesch’s fieldwork in Gaza province convinced him that Renamo did not enjoy significant
popular support in southern Mozambique, even though development policies in Gaza had
led to a villagisation rate second only to Cabo Delgado. 48 He emphasised that traditional
structures were weaker in southern Mozambique, and that the Frelimo leadership was
heavily representative of the south’s population. 49 In addition, many politically engaged
peasants in the south accepted Frelimo’s policies and implemented them out of
commitment to national reconstruction. One interpretation he advanced was that where a
more precarious agricultural existence was led, which was heavily dependent on traditional

44 Michel Cahen, “Is Renamo a Popular Movement in Mozambique? (letter)”, *Southern African Review of
45 Darch, “Are there Warlords in Provincial Mozambique?”, pp45-46.
47 Roesch, “Renamo and the Peasantry in Southern Mozambique”, p463.
practices, Frelimo’s policies were more disruptive and thus more greatly resented. He also believed that long-standing ethnic enmity between the Shangaan of Gaza and the N’dau of central Mozambique (who made up most of the Renamo leadership) ensured a hostile reaction to Renamo in the south.

Ken Wilson’s work builds on the work of Geffray and Roesch from an additional perspective, noting that the spiritual power associated with Renamo fighters could often help legitimate their authority and garner them support. N’dau ethnicity was seen as allowing greater access to magical resources, so in Zambézia province Renamo leaders were often seen as individuals with the greatest personal spiritual power. Fear of spirits was also used as a tool to inspire fear in new Renamo recruits who might think of escape. According to Wilson, this cult of ritual power was “clearly drawing on long and deep traditions of magical military powers”, including the power to turn bullets to water, which appeared in risings against the Germans, British and Portuguese in the early twentieth century. Renamo victories that in reality reflected their “military capacity to muster large numbers of well-armed troops to attack what were really very poorly defended towns largely because of past weapons shipments and the powerful radio network”, were used as evidence of Renamo’s spiritual power and magically ability to foresee government troop movements.

It is unreasonable to maintain that Renamo’s insurgency had no popular support within Mozambique. Assessments such as those made by Christian Geffray in areas of Nampula province, and more recently by Michel Cahen regarding the Mambone and Machunga regions in Inhambane and Sofala provinces, cannot be dismissed and do demonstrate populations who were sympathetic to Renamo occupation. It seems reasonable that in various communities Frelimo’s policies towards traditional hierarchies, religions and agricultural practices may have created sympathy for Renamo’s spread. However, as Roesch observes, Renamo’s success in different areas seems to be “the result of specific social and culture-historical conditions”. Renamo’s campaign may have appealed to some sections of the Mozambican population, but the Mozambican Civil War cannot be seen as a popular uprising against a hated government. Some communities were

51 Roesch, “Renamo and the Peasantry in Southern Mozambique”, p470; Englund, From War to Peace, p16.
54 Wilson, “Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique”, p547.
56 Roesch, “Renamo and the Peasantry in Southern Mozambique”, p463.
willing to support Renamo’s presence and individuals were willing to join their cause, but this was not uniform across the country. Collaboration between government forces and Renamo will be noted in this thesis. At the upper echelons of the Mozambican Armed Forces this was motivated by a mixture of political sympathy and war profiteering, while at the rank and file level the harsh realities of surviving in the bush were enough to bring the two armies into informal peace agreements. However, there seems to be no record of significant numbers of government troops defecting to Renamo. Renamo also had little support within the cities, and contrary to assertions regarding Renamo’s religious supporters, there is no evidence of significant support amongst Mozambique’s Catholic or Islamic communities. In addition, Michel Cahen’s assertion that the war had gained its own dynamic, and would continue even if external support came to a complete halt, was simply incorrect.\textsuperscript{57} Renamo’s war ended when external support vanished and internal conditions of drought and displacement had significantly reduced the guerrillas’ ability to tax domestic populations. Understanding that Renamo had popular support from some communities also says little about the nature of Renamo as a political movement. Renamo’s policies of reinstating traditional structures were never more than a tactic to gain local support, quite separate from their overall aims, strategy and organisation. Even Renamo’s black leadership sought to become part of a modern, national government, quite far from the experience and probably contrary to the expectations of rural Mozambicans. Renamo will never return to the bush to protect traditional authorities, religions and practices from the ravages of capitalist progress that Mozambique will experience with economic development. In communities where Renamo’s collaborative tactics did not win support from the local population the rebels had another mode of operation: extreme violence. It is this pervasive brutality that is rightfully seen as the signature of Renamo’s insurgency.

**The Role of Violence:**

The Mozambican Civil War was a brutal conflict in which one hundred thousand Mozambicans were killed as a direct result of warfare and up to another million perished because of war-induced famine and the denial of medical services. Almost five million Mozambicans were displaced from their homes, many fleeing into the government-controlled cities to escape the conflict.\textsuperscript{58} But it has often been the gruesome stories of

\textsuperscript{57} Cahen, “Is Renamo a Popular Movement in Mozambique?”, pp20-21.
killing and mutilation accompanying the war, rather than the statistics, that have crystallised international opinion against Renamo. While Renamo’s attacks on civilian settlements for the forced recruitment of new fighters, porters and slave labour were an essential process for the continued functioning of the organisation, their violence against civilians was seemingly random and without any direct strategic benefit. These attacks often involved burning down homes, mutilating individuals by cutting off limbs, ears or breasts, and public killings. According to Ken Wilson,

Renamo’s violence is not a peripheral aberration, reflecting for example poor military discipline, but is on the contrary one of Renamo’s central operational tools and has been elaborated for this purpose to become virtually a ‘cult’. A ‘cult of violence’ could be distinguished from other violent activity by the presence of ritualistic elements which the perpetrators – who in such circumstances see themselves as some kind of brotherhood socially discrete from the victims – believe provides or imputes value or power into the activity... Their purpose is to instil a paralysing and incapacitating fear into the wider population. They do this by conjuring a vision of inhumanity and maniacal devotion to the infliction of suffering that sets them outside of the realm of social beings and hence beyond social control and even resistance.59

Thus, as Carolyn Nordstrom explains, “torturing or killing one person is not an act intended to destroy one body, but one intended to destabilise a whole ‘body politic’”.60 Contrary to Geffray’s argument that Renamo was an expression of resistance to protect the local community’s culture and identity, the “violence is about the destruction of culture and identity in a bid to control (or crush) political will”.61

Terror-warfare is predicated on the assumption that if all the supports that make people’s lives meaningful are taken from them, they will be incapacitated by the ensuing disorder: whether hapless victims or Hobbesian animals, they will be shorn of political agency.62

This also took the form of ritualised destruction of property. Beyond the motivation of looting for profit, material of little value was taken for symbolic reasons and annihilation of what remained was often meticulous.63

This violence was greatest in areas where Renamo could not maintain an occupation, or where they experienced resistance.64 Under Gersony’s analysis these were termed Destruction Zones and were most common in areas where Frelimo’s influence was greatest, such as in Mozambique’s south and near cities. The Homoíne massacre was the largest and most well-publicised Renamo atrocity, when a heavily-armed contingent of

59 Wilson, “Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique”, p531.
62 Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story, p14.
63 Wilson, “Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique”, p538.
64 Wilson, “Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique”, p534.
several hundred Renamo fighters slaughtered 424 civilians at the small town of Homoíne in southern Inhambane on 18 July 1987. This incident gained significant international attention and the subsequent uproar foiled any chances of the organisation gaining the official support of western governments. But the massacre was clearly within the scope of Renamo’s normal pattern of behaviour, as Renamo forces regularly conducted attacks on civilian settlements and traffic in which dozens of people were killed. Homoíne, and a number of other large-scale massacres the followed during 1987, only differed in their scale. The fact that the Renamo leadership was oblivious to the massacres’ counter-productive effects on their public image indicates how completely normalised extreme violence had become in Renamo’s regular operations, and that supplies from Renamo’s external backers had never been contingent on ethical treatment of civilian populations. Mutilation and the leaving of witnesses after massacres was a form of psychological warfare against the population that transmitted a lasting image of Renamo power into areas where their forces were actually marginal. The committing of atrocities was also often demanded of new recruits, as this would cause fear of retribution if they were to desert. Thus extreme violence, rather than being senseless or nihilistic, was an important tactic for the subjugation of populations from which Renamo knew it would not gain voluntary support. The violence facilitated the extraction of personnel and resources from the population, and free movement through territory. Rather than being the result of indiscipline, Renamo’s centralised leadership mandated this widespread violence. Rather than being endemic to traditional Mozambican practices, violence arose from a modern and rootless movement imposing itself on an unwilling population. Similarly, the reports of Renamo using child soldiers that emerged as early as 1982 and increased as the war progressed, demonstrate that Renamo was seeking compliant rather than politically motivated fighters. Child soldiers have become common across Africa over recent decades as rebel groups find them easier to capture and brainwash, more obedient and less constrained by conscience, and requiring less resources to maintain. It cannot yet be established whether Renamo fighters

66 Vines, RENAMO, p90.
were directed to use such violence and to recruit child soldiers by their South African sponsors, but those supporters were certainly well aware of these activities and never attempted to lessen their implementation.

In the light of this analysis of Renamo as an organisation serving the interests of foreign backers and a greedy domestic leadership, with only vague political ideas and a propensity towards extreme violence, how can the electoral support Renamo received in Mozambique’s first multi-party election of October 1994 be explained? In those elections Renamo President Dhlakama won 33.7% of the Presidential vote, against Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano’s 53.3%, while Renamo won 112 seats in the national assembly against Frelimo’s 129 seats.68 While this process has been examined in much more detail in other publications, some rudimentary comments can be made here. Firstly, it should be noted that for a government that Renamo supporters always claimed was widely despised by the Mozambican population, Frelimo won a decisive victory in 1994 and has not lost power since. Electoral support for Renamo was, however, significant. As with understanding Renamo’s war-time support base, why people voted for Renamo can only really be judged by examination of the specific local experiences of those communities, but generally a number of key factors can be cited. The most obvious reason, and one which would make most sense in a normal democratic environment, was that some voters legitimately thought that after twenty years of Frelimo rule it was time to give another party a chance at running the government. They may also have found Renamo’s vague electoral promises attractive. Supplementing this was the fact that at the time of elections Renamo still controlled large swaths of Mozambican territory and actively blocked government access to those areas. Renamo thus began establishing its own administrations in those areas and took credit for the cessation of war and any international aid delivered to their occupants. In addition, by the time of the elections there had been little education about the electoral process or campaigns by the parties, leading to apathy and fear amongst the general public. Many rural Mozambicans would vote according to the wishes of their traditional leaders, who were predominantly pro-Renamo, and in general voters would predominantly vote for those they believed would bring peace. Pro-Renamo graffiti that remained in Inhambane at the time of this author’s last visit perhaps best encapsulates the atmosphere of fear the Renamo continued to try and profit from: “Vote for Renamo and Peace is Assured”.

68 Vines, RENAMO, p1.

The origins of the Mozambican Civil War lay in the wars of liberation fought in Mozambique and Rhodesia during the 1960s and 70s. Mozambique’s war can be thought of as a continuation of these earlier struggles, with many key figures and factions from this earlier era re-emerging in the Mozambican conflict and fighting over the same issues in a changed political landscape. Though this pre-history of the war has been covered numerous times in the existing literature, most recently by Cabrita, it is essential for a coherent understanding of the period. It was during this time that the interests of the Rhodesian and South African states, white Mozambicans and black nationalist activists began to align in opposition to Frelimo’s growing power.

The Beginnings of the Armed Struggle

The Frelimo Party was formed on 25 June 1962 in the Tanganyikan capital Dar es Salaam, following the earlier repression of political activity within Mozambique and the beginning of revolt in the Portuguese colony of Angola in 1961. Its membership was drawn from a complex array of existing organisations, though mainly from the Rhodesia-based União Nacional Democrática de Moçambique (UDENAMO), the Tanganyika-based Mozambique African National Union (MANU), and the União Africana de Moçambique Independente (UNAMI), which had sanctuary in Malawi and was close to that country’s ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP). All three organisations established headquarters in Dar es Salaam, which in the 1960s hosted radical organisations from various countries including South Africa, South-West Africa, Rhodesia, Malawi, and the Republic of Congo (Leopoldville). But the Frelimo party did not completely unify the various factions of Mozambican anti-colonial activists. Not only was Frelimo still a ‘front’ containing various ideologies united around a vaguely leftist, nationalist platform, but the unification had also split a number of the parties involved, leaving factions outside of their union. Both MANU and UDENAMO had non-participating factions, the latter led by Adelino Gwambe, while UNAMI chose to act as the Malawian-wing of Frelimo without integrating with the main organisation. Only a few weeks after Frelimo’s formation most of what remained of

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1 João M. Cabrita, Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy, (Basingstroke: Palgrave, 2000).
2 UDENAMO: Mozambique National Democratic Union; UNAMI: Independent Mozambique National Union.
MANU split from the front, and in August 1962 former MANU leader Mathews Mmole was expelled. Lucas Fernandes, secretary of the Mozambique African Association in Mombassa, resigned from Frelimo in sympathy with Mmole and subsequently joined MANU, becoming its military chief after repression in Tanganyika forced them to shift their headquarters to Kenya. As the expulsion of Mmole left Frelimo without a major Makonde leader, Frelimo’s leadership was forced to co-opt the important Makonde figure Lázaro N’Kavandame into the front in late 1962 to prevent ethnic tension, regardless of their distrust of him. But internal division continued to plague Frelimo, leading to the expulsion of six members in January 1963. When Frelimo’s Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs and representative in Cairo, Fanuel Mahluza, accommodated a number of these former members, he too was expelled in March 1963. Thus Mahluza, a former founder of UDENAMO, joined with those expelled members to create Udenamo-Moçambique, with Paulo Gumane as President. Meanwhile, Gwambe had reorganised his wing of the party as Udenamo-Monomotapa and was based in Uganda. A short time later, in May 1963, Gwambe and Mmole announced the amalgamation of MANU and UDENAMO-Monomotapa to form the Frente Unida Anti-Imperialista Popular Africana de Moçambique (FUNIPAMO).

During this period other forces that would later play a part in Mozambique’s conflict were also at work. The liberation struggle for Rhodesia was entering a new era of militancy, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) formed in 1963 with Ndabaningi Sithole as President, after splitting with Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). In Mozambique itself Frelimo’s enemies were manoeuvring to protect Portugal’s colonial rule. Jorge Jardim was a high-profile politician and businessman who had previously held the position of Deputy Secretary of State in Antonio Salazar’s regime in Portugal. In Mozambique he had many contacts with powerful industrialists and owned the major newspaper Noticias de Beira. From 1961 Jardim began to establish

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4 Michel Cahen, “The Mueda Case and Maconde Political Ethnicity”, Africana Studia, No 2, November 1999, pp29-46. While focusing on the true history of Mozambique’s ‘Mueda Massacre’, Cahen’s article develops on the complexity of the political landscape before and after the formation of Frelimo.
5 Cahen, “The Mueda Case”, pp29-46. N’Kavandame was contacted in December 1962 and offered the chairmanship of his home province of Cabo Delgado. He then travelled to Tanganyika in 1963.
6 Cabrita, Mozambique, p17. Also see André E. Thomashausen, “The National Resistance of Mozambique”, Africa Insight, Vol 13, No 2, 1983, p125. It seems that the two organisations may have maintained separate leadership and operations, though officially unified.
diplomatic relations with the newly independent Malawi on behalf on the Portuguese government. It was clear that Malawi's conservative President Hastings Banda was a potential friend in the region and was more interested in annexing parts of Mozambique’s territory in the north than he was in Mozambican independence. Discussions of development in northern Mozambique demonstrated that there could be economic benefits in collaboration with the Portuguese, especially the rehabilitation of the port of Nacala and the plan to extend the railway line from Nacala to Malawi. Jardim visited Malawi for the second time in 1963, at which point the then Malawian foreign minister Kanyama Chiume claims he,

> convinced Banda that [the Portuguese settlers] would give him the northern portion of Mozambique in return for not allowing freedom fighters to pass through Malawi and for the recognition of Mozambique’s Independence after the death of Salazar.  

Thus from 1964 Malawi imposed restrictions on Frelimo’s use of its territory to conduct operations. Jardim became so close to the Banda government that he was later appointed as Malawi’s honorary consul in Beira after Banda visited Nacala for further discussions in 1964. Soon,

> [cooperation between the two governments [was] extended to the security field, with Portugal providing military hardware and training to the [paramilitary] Malawi Young Pioneers. Information on the threat posed by Malawi’s domestic and exiled opponents was [also] regularly passed on to the Malawian authorities.

Jardim’s dealings with Malawi would further hamper Frelimo’s anti-colonial struggle and lay the foundations for future hostility between Malawi and an independent Mozambique.

At the same time one of Renamo’s future leaders, the white Mozambican Orlando Cristina, was also working to defend the Portuguese colony from Frelimo infiltration.

Cristina had been born in Portugal in 1927. His father later served in the Portuguese Army and married a Yao woman in Mozambique’s northern province of Niassa. After studying law in Lisbon, Cristina was conscripted into the Portuguese army in 1948, later living in Niassa with his father and working as a big game hunter. From November 1962 Cristina began working for Portuguese Military Intelligence, submitting weekly situation reports on

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9 Malawi experienced its first general elections in 1961, bringing the Malawi Congress Party to power, but was still undergoing a process of constitutionally acquired decolonisation until 1964 when it gained full independence.


underground activity in Niassa. In 1963 he crossed the border to join Frelimo, claiming he was dissatisfied with the Portuguese regime.\textsuperscript{14} He then returned to Mozambique in 1964, before becoming active against Frelimo in private hunting brigades led by the notorious Daniel Roxo. These informal counter-insurgency units were connected to the Portuguese secret police (PIDE/DGS), and Roxo was also involved with Jorge Jardim.\textsuperscript{15} Cabrita claims that Cristina’s defection to Frelimo was motivated by genuine Mozambican nationalism, and that the fact he was arrested by Mozambican authorities upon his return, and only released through Jardim’s personal intervention, proves this to be the case.\textsuperscript{16} However, while Cristina may have wanted Mozambican independence, in the same way that Jardim was working towards it in the long-term, considering his previous involvement with Military Intelligence and later association with Daniel Roxo it seems most likely that he infiltrated Frelimo on behalf of the Portuguese authorities.\textsuperscript{17} After becoming involved with Jorge Jardim through the militias in Niassa, Cristina helped him to train the Malawi Young Pioneers’ militias, which were an important force for the maintenance of Banda’s authoritarian rule.\textsuperscript{18} He also helped establish the Mecanhelas Self-Defence System, a militia of about 800 fighters that used the terrain and ethnic make-up of southern Niassa to prevent Frelimo infiltration from there into Zambézia province.\textsuperscript{19} Meanwhile another future Renamo leader, the mestiço Mozambican Evo Fernandes, was also working for Jorge Jardim in Beira as an editor at his newspaper, and as a legal advisor to the colonial police.\textsuperscript{20}

Entering 1964 Frelimo was still rivalled in their influence by a number of other organisations, each competing for official support from the communist powers and the resources that would accompany it. In June 1964 Lucas Fernandes infiltrated 150 members of the MANU Youth League into Mozambique to prepare to launch military actions, in the hope that this activity would attract Soviet sponsorship. However, contrary to the official

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, pp133-135. During this time he may have travelled to Algeria for training with Frelimo. Alex Vines, \textit{RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique}? (London: James Currey, 1996), p11.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Conversation with Dr. João Paulo Borges Coelho at Eduardo Mondlane University, 12 June 2003. These units involved 75 African militiamen and struck at Frelimo forces in areas of Niassa that they considered to be safe. Roxo would later be involved in the unsuccessful coup attempt by the \textit{Moçambique Livre} movement in September 1974. He was eventually killed by a landmine while fighting in southern Angola in 1976. “‘White Devil’ Roxo Killed in Angola”, \textit{Rhodesian Herald}, 9 September 1976.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, pp133-135.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} João Santa Rita and Trevor Jones, “Maputo Rebel Leader Killed in Pretoria”, \textit{Star}, 21 April 1983.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Alves Gomes, “Pretoria Embaraçada Com Assassino de Dirigente da ‘Resistência Moçambicana’”, \textit{Expresso}, 23 April 1983; Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, p136.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, p136.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} “Shadowy Head of MNR”, \textit{Africa Now}, No 42, October 1984, p31; “The Threat from Within”, \textit{To the Point}, 13 July 1979, p11; Paul Fauvet and Alves Gomes, “‘Ex PIDES’ Colaboram Com a RNM”, \textit{O Jornal}, 15 October 1982. ‘Mestiço’ means of mixed race.
\end{itemize}
history which credits Frelimo with the first shots in Mozambique’s liberation war, the armed struggle against the Portuguese began in July 1964 as the armed wing of Gwambe’s UDENAMO-Monomotapa launched a small-scale assault in the Tacuane region of Zambézia province. This seems to have been the same region that MANU had transited, close to the Malawi border near the Mount Milange region. MANU seems to have quickly followed with their own assault, but in August 1964 made a significant mistake by killing the Dutch missionary Daniel Boorman and thus losing the support of Catholic missions in Mozambique’s north. This permitted Frelimo to operate exclusively in the Makonde areas along Mozambique’s border with Tanzania and consequently gain ascendancy within the liberation movement.21 Frelimo then launched their armed struggle in Mozambique in September 1964 with less than 300 trained guerillas, combining hit-and-run attacks against Portuguese outposts with politicisation of the local population.22 The commencement of Frelimo’s military campaign was probably hastened by their rivals’ previous actions. Meanwhile, as the struggle to liberate Mozambique was gaining momentum in 1964, Frelimo’s allies in South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) had their own struggle disrupted by their leaders’ imprisonment following the Rivonia Trial in Pretoria.23

During this period Frelimo’s internal troubles continued. Though differing chronologies are given in a number of texts, it seems that in mid-to-late 1964 six more Frelimo members were expelled from the party. These included Leo Milas, who was accused of being a black American rather than a Mozambican, and of possibly being a CIA agent. He initially travelled to Sudan, from where he issued anti-Frelimo propaganda, before Orlando Cristina recruited him into Renamo in 1977.24 Two of the other members expelled were Amós Sumane and Joseph Chitenje, who quickly moved to form the organisation MORECO.25 As Frelimo’s influence grew their rivals decided to unify the non-Frelimo anti-colonial forces and thus, according to a letter sent to the Afro Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), the groups UDENAMO-Moçambique, MANC (Mozambique African National Congress), UDENAMO-Monomotapa, UNAMI and MANU merged in Lusaka, from 24-31 March 1965, to form the Comitê Revolucionário de

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Moçambique (COREMO).\textsuperscript{26} COREMO’s leadership included Gwambe as President, Gumane as Secretary-General, and Mahluza as Chief of Defence. The formation of COREMO in Lusaka seems to have had Zambian President Kuanda’s consent if not his encouragement, and some of its members, including Mahuza, travelled to China for military training.\textsuperscript{27} By mid-1965 COREMO launched some minor military operations in Tete province, and in 1966 unsuccessfully attempted to operate in Zambézia province. However, a CIA report from the time noted that COREMO lacked “the capacity to threaten [the Frelimo] leadership either in terms of external support or political following”.\textsuperscript{28} Frelimo had also begun to operate in Zambézia during 1966, but according to Cabrita, “[o]perations were discontinued when the Malawian government, faced with domestic dissent and fearing Portuguese encouragement of it, prohibited Frelimo from operating militarily through Malawi”.\textsuperscript{29} COREMO held their first annual conference in Lusaka from 12-16 May 1966, with delegates from Zambia, Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania. The Central Committee members elected included Gumane as President, Sumane as Vice-President, Chitenje as Secretary-General; Mahluza as Secretary for Education and Culture, and Gwambe as Secretary for Labour and Social Services.\textsuperscript{30} At the time Artur Vilankulu, a Maconde activist who later joined Renamo, represented the organisation in the United States. The apparent marginalisation of Gwambe in this committee is significant as he left the party soon afterwards, in November 1966, and formed the Partido Popular de Moçambique (PAPOMO). Some claim this was due to his dubious handling of COREMO’s finances, though it has also been suggested that he was exposed as a Portuguese agent. By mid-1967 COREMO was losing what little military influence they initially had.\textsuperscript{31}

The Late 1960s

In Mozambique’s north-eastern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado Frelimo steadily grew and created ‘liberated zones’ along the border with Tanzania. By 1967 they had recruited 8,000 guerrilla fighters and formed local militias, which managed to hold

\textsuperscript{26} COREMO: The Mozambique Revolutionary Committee. Letter from the Secretary-General of COREMO Paulo José Gumani to the Secretary-General of the Afro Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). November 1965.
\textsuperscript{28} Cabrita, Mozambique, pp38-39.
\textsuperscript{29} Cabrita, Mozambique, p30.
\textsuperscript{30} COREMO Press Release, 12-16 May 1966, p1.
ground against the 70,000 soldiers deployed by the Portuguese government to fight the insurgency. Though Frelimo was making military progress, they remained factionalised. From 1965 a faction calling itself the Mozambique Revolutionary United People’s Party (MRUPP) had emerged within Frelimo led by Uria Simango, and included Frelimo’s Defence and Security Chief Filipe Magaia and Lázaro N’Kavandame. Filipe Magaia, who was very popular within the armed forces, was later killed in Niassa in October 1966. Supporters claim that he was actually assassinated to allow Samora Machel to take his place. This faction was ethnically Makonde, and so there was a northern versus southern aspect to the division. According to Cahen,

it was a social gap between two very different petty-bourgeois milieus: the rural modern merchant elite, and the urban bureaucratic petty-bourgeois elite of military Frelimo leadership. This social gap combined itself with, and was made worse by, the fact that this merchant milieu was ethnically Maconde, from the far north of Mozambique under the influence of British colonial free capitalism, when the bureaucratic one was ethnically Shangaan and assimilado (assimilated, Blacks having Portuguese citizenship) or mulatoes, from the capital city and other towns of southern Mozambique where the small African elite was not at all merchant, but had small bureaucratic and service jobs.

Though Cahen dismisses the idea that these factional divisions were primarily ideological, it seems clear that the factions had differing political positions on the issues of relations between political and military sections of the party, what kind of economy should be developed within the liberated zones, whether a class or race-based ideology would guide Frelimo’s programme, and whether liberated Mozambique would retain traditional social structures or create new social relations. As Cahen says, “[t]he Maconde did not want independence for Mozambique; they did want freedom for their land, but were ready to follow whoever was able to wage war”. N’Kavandame was,

the prototype of the ‘big man’, the modern African merchant and planter…. For him, Frelimo was the way to achieve what he had attempted by other means; his aim had not changed: allowing Maconde people and himself to modernize as in Tanganyika with ‘free’ British capitalism.

While the Makonde faction wanted to implement an ethnically-based system of petty-bourgeois capitalism, the radical faction personified by Samora Machel sought to combine the modern form of a non-racial, national state with non-capitalist economic development.

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33 Cabrita, *Mozambique*, p47.
Tension between these two factions grew after Magaia’s death and was fuelled when the Roman Catholic priest Fr. Mateus Gwenjere joined Frelimo at the end of 1967 with 20 of his seminary students. He immediately began to foster the existing discontent amongst students at Frelimo’s Mozambique Institute in Nairobi. Riots at the Institute in 1968 led to dissident students breaking with Frelimo and forming the groups MOLIMO and FUMO. Then on 9 May 1968 a group of Makonde guerrillas who were convinced that the Frelimo leadership was plotting against them marched on the Frelimo headquarters in Dar es Salaam with the intention of killing the leadership, including Frelimo President Eduardo Mondlane. Early warning of their attack meant that most personnel at Frelimo’s offices escaped unharmed. Meanwhile Gwenjere was planning to use Makonde fighters to oust Mondlane and make Uria Simango the Frelimo President. However the coup was not launched as Simango’s nerve gave way, and instead it was decided to force a change in the Presidency at the next Party Congress. Frelimo held their Second Congress in July 1968 inside a liberated zone in Mozambique’s Niassa province. These liberated zones had basic social, educational and administrative infrastructure and were secure enough for this meeting of the entire Frelimo leadership, delegates from all over Mozambique, and representatives from the African National Congress (ANC), the Movimento Popular Libertação de Angola (MPLA), and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). This was a show of confidence in Frelimo’s growing strength, demonstrated by the fact that in the same year Frelimo opened a second front in Tete province from bases in Zambia. But the decision to hold the conference inside Mozambique was also an outcome of Frelimo’s factional struggle. According to Alex Vines, “N’Kavandame wanted [the congress] to be held in Tanzania where he felt he had the strongest support for his bid for the presidency”. The Makonde faction subsequently claimed that the holding of the Congress in Niassa was a tactic to rob them of support.

The declining COREMO was also plagued by internal factionalism in which Vice-President Amós Sumane, backed by Artur Vilankulu amongst others, unsuccessfully

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39 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp55-57.  
40 MPLA: The Popular Liberation Movement of Angola. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, p187. According to Vines, while “[p]ropaganda about the economic, social and political achievements of the liberated areas played an important part in winning for Frelimo in its international relations the high moral ground of the war. In practice, the literacy classes and vaccination clinics, together with the communal production units where the ‘new men’ already flourished, existed for the most part on paper”. Vines, RENAMO, p6.  
41 Vines, RENAMO, pp11-13. Cabrita claims that the Makonde faction had put forward Simango as their candidate for the Frelimo presidency. Cabrita, Mozambique, pp55-57.  
42 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp55-57.
attempted to oust President Gumane. The plot’s discovery led to the expulsion of Sumane and his subsequent creation of the União National Africana de Rumbezia (UNAR) in January 1968. UNAR claimed to be following in the footsteps of Mondlane, Gumane and Gwambe, while being opposed to both Frelimo and COREMO, and both western and communist imperialism. Citing the supposed southern bias within Frelimo one UNAR statement declared that,

the Rumbezians have concluded that it is necessary to form a national political organization solely for the people north of the Zambezi River, a region which comprises provinces of Tete, Zambezia, Mozambique [Nampula], Cabo Delgado, and Niassa. This region will be known as Rumbezia, a name derived from both of its great rivers the Rovuma and the Zambezi.

Based in Malawi, UNAR brought together dissidents from Frelimo and COREMO, including: former Frelimo representative in Lilongwe Calisto Trindade as UNAR Information Secretary; former UDENAMO and then Frelimo member José Massamba as the Secretary of the UNAR; and former COREMO militant Domingos Zacarias. However, it is very unlikely that UNAR had financial and ideological independence. While they operated in the Milange region near Mozambique’s border, their headquarters was housed in the Malawi Congress Party building in Malawi’s capital, Lilongwe. UNAR’s desire to create the state of Rumbezia closely paralleled Banda’s own desire for a greater Malawi, and the group was obviously sponsored by the Malawian government. Jorge Jardim’s close links to Banda, including his involvement in training the Malawi Young Pioneers, have led some to suggest he may also have been one of UNAR’s sponsors. Though UNAR never grew large enough to have much influence in Mozambique, a reincarnation of the organisation would arise in the late 1970s and eventually unite with Renamo in the early 1980s.

The Fight for Zimbabwe

While Mozambique’s liberation fighters gathered their forces and launched their campaigns on that country’s soil, the nationalist struggle in Rhodesia was also beginning to intensify. Though ZAPU and ZANU had been banned in the early 1960s they were gradually preparing for the conflict to come. But they could not escape the attention of Rhodesia’s security forces. According to the former Chief of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) Ken Flower,

CIO’s penetration of the [Zimbabwean] guerrilla organizations from pre-UDI days until the early 1970s was as complete as it could have been. There was virtually nothing we did not know of their inner workings at all levels, for our informers served us no less faithfully than they served their nationalist leaders.  

Nevertheless, Rhodesia’s liberation war began tentatively alongside Mozambique’s, with the first shots being fired in July 1964. The real beginning of what the Zimbabwean fighters called the Chimurenga, however, occurred five months after Rhodesia had made its Unilateral Declaration of Independence, when ZANU members clashed with Rhodesian security forces in April 1966. In response Rhodesia began to form the first counter-insurgency ‘pseudo units’, effectively an embryonic form of what Renamo would be a decade later. These units aimed to imitate the counter-insurgency techniques deployed in Kenya during the Mau Mau rebellion, and a number of veterans of that conflict were used as advisors. According to military historian Peter Stiff,

In 1966 Special Branch first formed pseudo terrorist groups or counter gangs. … Experts in the field, like ex-Superintendent Ian Henderson, who had won the George Medal in Kenya, and Lieutenant Spike Powell who had also performed well in Kenya, were secretly brought in to assist. … The pseudo groups … consisted of captured guerrillas who had been persuaded to change sides and black Special Branch policemen working undercover. … Primarily they operated against ZAPU/ZIPRA, perceived as the principal enemy in what was still a low-key insurgency.

The first units underwent training near the confluence of the Lundi and Sabi Rivers from 24 October to 4 November 1966, under the supervision of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Lieutenant Powell. South Africa was first drawn into Rhodesia’s counter-insurgency in August 1967 when a joint force of 80 ZIPRA and South African

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ANC guerrillas sought a southward route through the Wankie (Hwange) Game Reserve in north-west Rhodesia. General van der Bergh of South Africa’s Bureau of State Security (BOSS) subsequently arranged for South African Police and helicopters to be sent to Rhodesia to aid in border protection. By 1968 Rhodesian security forces had broken the morale of the Zimbabwean nationalists and the war went quiet for a number of years, with no clashes with guerrillas in 1969. Meanwhile, ZANU were changing their tactics and beginning to follow the Maoist principle of politicising local populations before launching offensives.\(^52\)

**Frelimo in Crisis**

By 1969 the factional infighting within Frelimo had reached a crisis point. In late 1968 N’Kavandame and his Makonde guerrilla’s began to close Cabo Delgado province to other Frelimo elements, and Tanzania had to close the border in September to stop Frelimo members killing each other inside Mozambique. In order to re-take control President Mondlane had Gwenjere arrested on 28 December, and N’Kavandame was suspended on 3 January 1969. Only a month later Mondlane was then killed by a parcel-bomb on 3 February 1969 at Oyster Bay.\(^53\) It is commonly believed that N’Kavandame and Simango engineered the assassination as part of the struggle for Frelimo’s leadership.\(^54\) N’Kavandame fled into Mozambique when faced by a police investigation and defected to the Portuguese in March.\(^55\) Cahen claims that N’Kavandame,

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\text{had been} \text{ led, probably by} \text{ Maconde} \text{ elders in contact with Pide agents in [Tanzania], to believe that the Portuguese administration would now authorize a kind of economic autonomy for the Maconde area, with him as a regional chairman. … [Though by] July 1970, N’Kavandame understood that Portugal was not at all ready to accept any kind of autonomy for the Maconde people.}\(^56\)
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According to Cabrita, through the police investigation N’Kavandame was found to have,

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amassed a great deal of money from his handling of trade with Frelimo-controlled areas in Mozambique … Cabo Delgado farmers took produce across the border. The Tanzanian government would then buy it covertly and place money in Kavandame’s personal bank account. Kavandame was then supposed to buy manufactured goods to send to Mozambique, but apparently very little reached Cabo Delgado. … [Kavandame also had] military training of Makonde youths loyal to him given at one of the farms registered in his name. As the CID
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\(^{52}\) Flower, *Serving Secretly*, pp107-110.  
\(^{54}\) Vines, *RENAMO*, p12. However, blame for the killing has also been attributed to Casimiro Monteiro. As a hit man who had previously killed a Portuguese anti-fascist leader, fought for Franco in Spain, and was wanted for murder in Britain, some authors have accused him of being an assassin for the PIDE/DGS. Iain Christie, *Samora Machel: A Biography*, (London: PANAF, 1989), pp57-58.  
\(^{56}\) Cahen, “The Mueda Case”, pp29-46.
learned, Kavandame’s youth leaguers were better fed, dressed and equipped than the Frelimo guerrillas themselves.\textsuperscript{57}

To maintain political stability within Frelimo after Mondlane’s death a Presidential Council was formed consisting of Simango, Marcelino dos Santos and Machel. This committee was still split along factional lines, now inflamed by Mondlane’s assassination. After Simango published an attack on Machel, dos Santos and Janet Mondlane, Eduardo’s widow, he was purged from the Presidential Council and subsequently expelled from Frelimo in February 1970. Samora Machel then became Frelimo President and dos Santos his Vice-President. Simango fled to Cairo in May 1970.\textsuperscript{58}

Taking advantage of the internal division that followed Mondlane’s death the Portuguese launched the largest offensive of the war, Operation Gordian Knot, which swamped northern Mozambique with 35,000 soldiers and pummelled the liberated zones with air strikes. After seven months the offensive was called to a halt as it was expending vast resources, but had inflicted only minimal casualties on Frelimo’s guerrilla force.\textsuperscript{59} Still, Frelimo was shaken by the offensive and their advanced bases in north-eastern Mozambique had been destroyed. So following Operation Gordian Knot Frelimo regrouped and shifted their campaign into Tete province from bases in Zambia. In this new area of operations for the first time, “Frelimo had real targets for attack in the trans-Zambesi and Beira railways and in the schemes associated with the Cahora Bassa dam”.\textsuperscript{60} But movement into Tete province also brought Frelimo into conflict with their much smaller rival COREMO. Frelimo had first clashed with COREMO in 1968, and further conflict in 1970 led Frelimo to imprison a number of COREMO members. But according to Cabrita by this time, COREMO had become,

more of a nuisance than a threat to the Portuguese. Coremo succeeded in gaining some public attention in January 1971 when its forces abducted six Portuguese agriculturists and five Mozambicans working on the Zambeze basin. The six were believed to have been executed by Coremo.\textsuperscript{61}

In the same year COREMO seems to have attracted Uria Simango to its leadership, following his expulsion from Frelimo a year earlier.\textsuperscript{62} Further conflict erupted in February 1972 after Frelimo killed two COREMO commanders in an ambush. After this the

\textsuperscript{57} Cabrita, Mozambique, pp60-61.  
\textsuperscript{58} Vines, RENAMO, pp12-13; Cabrita, Mozambique, p63.  
\textsuperscript{59} Christie, Samora Machel, p59.  
\textsuperscript{60} Vines, RENAMO, p6.  
\textsuperscript{61} Cabrita, Mozambique, pp40-41.  
\textsuperscript{62} Vines, RENAMO, p13.
Zambian government intervened to calm relations between the groups.\textsuperscript{63} COREMO held their second General Conference from 27-29 January 1973, at which it was decided that smaller groups like MOLIMO, FUMO and MANU would dissolve and unite with the larger organisation.\textsuperscript{64} Even so, the Africa Contemporary Record of that year maintained that, “[a]lthough the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) claimed to be active in the Tete province [in 1972-73], little was heard of its activities during the year”.\textsuperscript{65} COREMO never had a significant military impact in Mozambique, though in 1974 their President Paulo Gumane, “claimed that much of the credit attributed to Frelimo really belonged to his own forces in [Tete] – a claim that cannot be taken very seriously”.\textsuperscript{66}

**Frelimo and Rhodesia**

As Frelimo infiltrated into north-west Mozambique in the early 1970s their presence along Rhodesia’s north-eastern border gave ZANU’s armed-wing, ZANLA, a safe-haven in which they could operate.\textsuperscript{67} According to the former Chief of Rhodesia’s Selous Scouts, Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Reid-Daly, “From late 1970 on, it was strongly suspected that ZANLA were definitely using the FRELIMO infrastructure as a means to move freely from Zambia to the Rhodesian border. But no positive proof existed”.\textsuperscript{68} From early 1970 Detective Section Office Winston Hart, stationed north of Salisbury at Bindura, began collecting intelligence for Special Branch inside Mozambique on Rhodesia’s north-eastern border.\textsuperscript{69} In addition Stiff claims that,

[although long officially denied, Rhodesian Army units had commenced operating in the Tete Province of Moçambique in support of the Portuguese in 1970. It was in Rhodesia’s interest to keep FRELIMO insurgents away from her north-eastern border. … the Portuguese had virtually abandoned the countryside and were concentrating their forces in the towns and *aldeamentos* – protected villages…. Units involved in those anti-FRELIMO operations were regular units, the SAS, the Rhodesian African Rifles and the Rhodesian Air Force.\textsuperscript{70}

As Frelimo’s escalating campaign in north-west Mozambique was fuelling the Rhodesian authorities’ concern for their own security, on 14 February 1971 a top-level conference was

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\textsuperscript{63} Cabrita, *Mozambique*, p40.
\textsuperscript{68} Reid-Daly, *Pamwe Chete*, p5.
\textsuperscript{69} Reid-Daly, *Pamwe Chete*, p5.
\textsuperscript{70} Stiff, *The Silent War*, p85.
held in Salisbury with the heads of Rhodesian, South African, Mozambican and Portuguese intelligence in attendance. According to Henrik Ellert,

The intelligence service chiefs agreed to establish a joint consultative intelligence steering committee whose broad terms of reference provided for the exchange of intelligence and security information relative to the common threat and to permit clandestine executive operations on a trilateral basis. Under this agreement each service could run agents and informers in each other’s territory, arrange kidnapping and repatriation of security suspects and take any other action considered necessary under the terms of this agreement. An exchange of intelligence officers for liaison purposes was agreed upon and one of the first Rhodesians to be posted to Lisbon was Peter Burt who after his return to Rhodesia in 1973 joined the special operations department of the CIO with responsibility for the formation of [Renamo].

Then, in September 1971, Ken Flower travelled to Lisbon and suggested to the Portuguese Prime Minister Caetano that Fletcha (Arrow) units should be established in Mozambique. Fletchas, unlike pseudo units, were made up of local Africans whose knowledge of the countryside and determination to protect their home ground made them effective counter-insurgency operatives. Dr São José Lopes, Chief of the PIDE/DGS in Angola, had established the first Fletcha units there in the 1960s where they “were used as a hunter force”. Though the Portuguese had collaborated with the Rhodesians in experiments with units of African scouts in the mid-1960s, the Portuguese military hierarchy initially rejected this proposal. General Kaúlza de Arriaga’s replacement of General Augusto dos Santos as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in 1969 had ushered in an administration hostile to the use of irregular African units. Without co-operation from the Portuguese Rhodesia’s need to expand its forward defences was becoming more urgent, and by 1972 ZANLA began a new offensive in Rhodesia’s north-east, having used the break in combat since 1969 to build up a popular support network. In March 1972 the Rhodesian SAS attacked Frelimo’s Matimbe base near Gungwa Mountain in Mozambique, at which time some documents were found confirming that ZANLA was operating out of Frelimo bases. Rhodesian authorities now had no doubt that their own survival was inexorably linked to the defence of Portuguese rule in Mozambique. In August 1972 Flower again travelled to Lisbon to meet Caetano. According to Flower, “[the CIO] offered to develop

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71 Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, pp54-55.
75 Reid-Daly, Pamwe Chete, p6; Stiff, The Silent War, p88.
an internal resistance movement in Mozambique along the lines of the Fletchas in Angola. We felt we could do it better than the [PIDE/DGS]”. 76 After that second meeting Caetano appointed Dr. Lopes as Joint Controller of PIDE/DGS Operations for Angola and Moçambique and he began moves to establish Fletchas. This provided “a cover for small-scale pseudo operations CIO had already started there”, though planning meetings between Flower, Lopes, and BOSS Chief General van der Bergh during 1972 and 1973 achieved little. 77

From December 1972 the war entered its most intense phase yet as ZANLA began strikes into the Centenary and Mount Darwin areas of Rhodesia. 78 An attack on Altena Farm near the north-east frontier on 21 December was followed by almost daily attacks as African peasants were now willing to protect and support ZANLA cadres inside the country. “Rhodesian security officials were [also] alarmed at the greatly increased scale and success of FRELIMO’s operations in Tete … and conceded that FRELIMO’s guerrillas were a vastly tougher proposition than the Zimbabwe infiltrators”. 79 The Rhodesian security forces’ response was called Operation Hurricane, a campaign that aimed to combine a free-fire zone along the border with ‘Fire Force’ attacks involving commandos carried quickly to positions near rebel camps by helicopter gunships. 80 General de Arriaga assisted by granting Rhodesia the right to conduct military operations in Tete province, south of the Zambezi river. 81 Meanwhile, the Portuguese armed forces’ inability to combat Frelimo’s campaign led them to drastic measures. In the north-east the Portuguese had attempted to stem Frelimo’s influence by forcing up to a million people into fortified villages, predominantly in the province of Cabo Delgado. 82 At the same time in the north-west Portuguese forces targeted innocent villagers in a series of massacres. The worst of these incident occurred on 16 December 1972 at Wiriyamu, Chawola and Juwan, a group of villages south of Tete. On 15 December Chico Cachari, an African security official, visited the villages asking about Frelimo activity. When villagers denied knowledge of any activity, Portuguese forces returned the following day and killed the inhabitants. Survivors

77 Stiff, The Silent War, pp88-89.
78 Smith, The Great Betrayal, p159.
79 Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1972-73, ppB451-B452.
80 Flower, Serving Secretly, pp121, 123.
81 Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, pp61-62.
and a Spanish priest working in the area reported more than 400 dead from the massacre.\(^{83}\) An earlier massacre in Ngunda and Ncenc villages on 21-22 March 1972 left 200 people dead, and smaller massacres also occurred at Mucumbura, Inhaminga, Chai, Napandika, Zambezi, Chauaro and Brâmualo in the provinces of Tete, Manica and Sofala. These massacres may have been retaliation for government casualties in the war, as Frelimo’s position in the region grew stronger.\(^{84}\) A 1974 UN report claimed that 1,000 Africans had been tortured or massacred in West-Central Mozambique by Rhodesian and Portuguese troops between 1971 and 1974.\(^{85}\) The Portuguese secret police had also arrested more than 10,000 Mozambican dissidents since 1967.\(^{86}\) It is known that 865 political prisoners were killed by the PIDE/DGS between 1971 and 1974, and another 3,000 only gained their freedom upon Mozambique’s independence.\(^{87}\)

Though the war in Rhodesia had fallen quiet in 1969 Rhodesia’s security forces had maintained a small ‘pseudo unit’ capability and, after ZANLA recommenced their Chimurenga in 1972,

[n]ew experiments in the pseudo concept were begun by the Special Branch in Rhodesia’s northeast, using larger gangs of turned ZANLA or FRELIMO guerrillas and black Special Branch policemen, stiffened by white operators from the SAS.\(^{88}\)

In January 1973 Special Branch formed the first all-African pseudo unit, consisting of two African constables and four former insurgents, who were deployed with ZANLA uniforms and communist weapons in the Bushu Tribal Trust Lands near Shamva.\(^{89}\) As the pace of Rhodesia’s counter-insurgency campaign quickened, the SAS also launched their first officially sanctioned parachute insertion into Mozambique in the same month, on 19 January 1973.\(^{90}\) From February the all-black pseudo units were deployed in the Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands, and other areas such as the Chinamora Tribal Trust Lands near

\(^{87}\) Hall and Young, Confronting Leviathan, p21.
\(^{88}\) Stiff, The Silent War, p218.
\(^{90}\) Rogers, Someone Else’s War, p40.
From 1973 the Portuguese also finally began to recruit all-African counter-insurgency units known as Special Groups (Grupos Especiais - GEs) and Special Groups of Parachutists (Grupos Especiais Para-quadistas - GEPs), which consisted of volunteers deployed near their home districts, mainly in central Mozambique. PIDE/DGS, with the help of Jorge Jardim and Orlando Cristina, had conducted limited experiments with African paramilitary units in northern Mozambique as a continuation of the private hunting parties operative there since the mid-1960s. Small Fletcha units may also have been formed by PIDE/DGS after their discussions with Rhodesia in 1972, but General Arriaga’s conflicts with the Portuguese secret police made him reluctant to allow widespread usage of these units. Thus it was not until 1973 that Africans were recruited to these units in substantial numbers, and they did not begin operating until Arriaga was dismissed from his position in 1974. While the CIO Chief Ken Flower did his best throughout 1973 to co-ordinate Rhodesian efforts with the half-hearted contributions of South Africa and Portugal to the counter-insurgency campaign, eventually gaining permission to create his own Fletcha units inside Mozambique in late 1973, the Rhodesians also aimed to create a force of its own that could launch devastating strikes against the Zimbabwean freedom fighters. This force was the Selous Scouts, a cross-border strike force that formed in November 1973 and eventually grew to be 1,800 strong. The Selous Scouts, who were under the authority of the Army and CIO, though overseen at the day-to-day level by Special Branch, were given top priority in access to military resources and drew personnel from throughout the security forces. Under the command of Captain Ron Reid-Daly this force used the *modus operandi* of the pseudo units. They specialised in capturing and turning insurgents and using their intelligence to co-ordinate assaults by ‘Fire Force’ commandos often supported by helicopter gunships. According to Reid-Daly,

[s]hortly after accepting the task of forming the Selous Scouts [he] was sent to the Fletchas’ military camp near Vila Pery (now Chimoio) in Mozambique, to study their methods and tactics which had proved highly successful in Angola.

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91 Reid-Daly, *Pamwe Chete*, p10.
92 Coelho, “African Troops”, p145. Cabrita claims that Orlando Cristina and Jorge Jardim organised the GEs and GEPs from 1971 as an independent force that could help them defeat Frelimo and secure an independent Mozambique. It is probable that they held commanding positions in the counter-insurgency groups that operated in Mozambique’s north, though Coelho’s primary document research casts doubt on whether they were officially known as the GEs and GEPs. Cabrita, *Mozambique*, pp133-135.
93 Flower, *Serving Secretly*, p140.
95 Reid-Daly, *Pamwe Chete*, p36.
96 Reid-Daly, *Pamwe Chete*, p61.
The unit then launched their first external operation in February 1974 at Chiawa, Zambia, under the direction of the CIO.\textsuperscript{97} For Rhodesia the activation of the Selous Scouts could not come too soon, as by this time Frelimo had penetrated as far south as the Beira corridor and had established a base in the mountainous Gorongosa region.\textsuperscript{98} Frelimo’s guerrilla force now numbered 11,000 men, with an equivalent number in training and another 20,000 organised into local militias.\textsuperscript{99} Thus, from their strategic position in central Manica and Sofala, they could pose a significant threat to the transport infrastructure that connected Rhodesia to the coast, and assist the expansion of ZANLA’s area of operations down Rhodesia’s eastern border. Subsequently when Flower travelled to Lourenço Marques in March 1974 and met with Dr Lopes and Major Silva Pais, the Director General of the PIDE/DGS in Mozambique, Rhodesia was given permission to operate their \textit{Fletchas} within Mozambique without restriction.\textsuperscript{100} These \textit{Fletcha} units, which Rhodesia had already been operating in Mozambique for a number of years, were the prototype for Renamo. Though the Portuguese ‘Carnation Revolution’ in April 1974 would put an end to Portuguese counter-insurgency efforts and begin the transfer of power in Mozambique to the Frelimo party, Flower notes that the “CIO proceeded with the recruitment of Mozambicans who were encouraged to do their own thing in Mozambique without having to rely on support from Rhodesia”.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{97} Reid-Daly, \textit{Panwe Chete}, p94.
\textsuperscript{99} Hall and Young, \textit{Confronting Leviathan}, p30.
\textsuperscript{100} Stiff, \textit{The Silent War}, pp88-89; Flower, \textit{Serving Secretly}, p301.
\textsuperscript{101} Flower, \textit{Serving Secretly}, pp300-302. This quote, from an April 1974 document reproduced in Flower’s Appendix, entitled ‘\textit{Fletchas} and the Formation of the ‘Mozambique National Resistance’’, continues: “The surprising ease with which the Mozambique Resistance Movement developed indicated that we were proceeding on right lines (sic), particularly as we kept the movement small and clandestinely manageable during the first five years whilst it could provide the eyes-and-ears of our Intelligence in Mozambique”. Cabrita challenges the validity of this document and attempts to use it to discredit all of Flower’s assertions about Renamo’s history (see Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, p153). Cabrita’s argument is that this quote, and another quote that states that in Rhodesia’s 1977 simultaneous attacks on ZANLA camps near Chimoio and Tembue, “CIO was in a position to offer invaluable help through elements of the MNR who had been our ‘eyes and ears’ in these areas for more than five years” (Flower, \textit{Serving Secretly}, p192), must be lies as Renamo was not created until 1977. Cabrita argues that Flower always opposed Renamo and published comments, such as that “[t]he objectives of the MNR were essentially to provide the opportunity for Rhodesia to deal with [ZANLA] in Mozambique without doing so directly, and to perpetuate instability in areas of Mozambique” (quoted in Johnson and Martin, \textit{Destructive Engagement}, pp6-7), because he wanted to discredit them. Cabrita’s own history of Renamo asserts that the idea of creating a resistance movement in Mozambique came from Renamo’s first leader André Matsangaissa when he defected to Rhodesia in 1976 (Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, pp145-147), so it is important for him to cast doubt upon the reliability of Flower’s testimony. Cabrita’s criticism is flawed, however, as Flower never claims that Renamo had existed in the early 1970s, but merely that Rhodesia had been using Mozambicans in counter-insurgency for a number of years and that some of these operatives eventually became part of Renamo. Sources with no sympathy for Frelimo, such as Reid-Daly and Stiff, confirmed Rhodesia’s use of pseudo-units and \textit{fletchas} since the mid-1960s, and thus Flower’s comments are consistent with this history and demonstrate the continuum between these units and Renamo. One thing that is unusual about the document reproduced in Flower’s Appendix is its use of the past tense when
The Transition to Independence

Though Frelimo’s guerrilla campaign continued to expand and push the Portuguese administration to the limits of its resources, the harbinger of independence for Mozambique was not Frelimo’s military success but the revolution in Lisbon by the Movimento das Forças Armadas (the Armed Forces Movement) on 25 April 1974. The ascendant Junta of National Salvation, led by General António de Spinola, called for a rapid end to Portugal’s wars and the complete independence of the colonies under the existing anti-colonial movements. The confusion emanating from Lisbon until July was mirrored in Mozambique, with political instability and mass desertions from the army. Progressive elements of the white population in the cities began advocating Frelimo’s platform and lobbied for reform of the PIDE/DGS, succeeding in having 600 secret police arrested by colonial authorities for murder and torture. Portugal’s new Junta of National Salvation thus began negotiations with Frelimo for Mozambican independence and the transfer of power to their leadership, while Frelimo used the threat of renewed warfare as a political bargaining chip. Meanwhile, Zambia acted to facilitate the process by dropping support for COREMO and barring them from talks with the Portuguese. According to Cabrita,

Coremo offices in Lusaka were ordered to close down, while the Zambia National Defence Force rounded up Coremo guerrillas assembled in bases on the Mozambique border. Those arrested were subsequently handed over to Frelimo in Tanzania.

Malawi later aided the COREMO leaders Paulo Gumane and Marcelino Khonde to escape south to Swaziland in May 1974 by contacting the South African government and arranging permission for their journey. As restrictions on opposition activity dissolved in Mozambique, other political forces began to take advantage of the transition to independence. The Grupo Unido de Moçambique (GUMO), led by Máximo Dias, had formed in February 1974. He began to operate openly in the new political environment and Joana Semião, a former COREMO member who had returned to Mozambique in 1971, worked

referring to events that were occurring concurrently with the production of the document and the apparent reference to events that would not take place for a number of months, such as that “the Portuguese had acted too hastily in transferring power to a liberation movement which could not establish popular support through free elections” (Flower, Serving Secretly, p302). Though this does not falsify Flower’s claims regarding Renamo, it does raise questions about whether the text was a reproduction of a document created in April 1974 or whether it was written later as a reflection on events.

102 Hall and Young, Confronting Leviathan, pp36-39. 
103 Cabrita, Mozambique, p72.
together with Dias for a short period. GUMO soon split in June 1974 due to Semião’s connections to Portuguese intelligence, and subsequently collapsed in July that year. Semião then merged her faction with MANC to form the Frente Comum de Moçambique (FRECOMO). Soon Semião began campaigning to bring non-Frelimo political leaders into a single organisation, meeting COREMO leaders in Malawi and contacting Frelimo dissidents in Nairobi. Uria Simango returned to Mozambique in early July and joined her in the formation of the Partido de Coligação Nacional (PCN) on 24 August. PCN fused FRECOMO with N’kavandame’s Union of the Peoples of Mozambique (UNIPOMO), Mateus Gwenjere’s Frente Independente Africana (FREINA), Jorge Jardim’s CDM, COREMO, and MONA, to create a coalition of anti-Frelimo forces. By September 1974, PCN had also gained the support of the far-right settlers’ party the Frente Independente de Convergência Ocidental (FICO, which means ‘I stay’ in Portuguese). Simango was adopted as PCN’s president, Gumane as Vice-President, Semião as head of education and culture, and Gwenjere as national adviser.  

David Hoile claims that as tension over Mozambique’s future increased Frelimo militants attacked PCN’s rallies. Meanwhile, fears of being abandoned by Lisbon and “increasing ‘non-racial’ concessions to black Mozambicans induced settler businessmen, farmers and military to intensify speculation of a white UDI [Unilateral Declaration of Independence], Rhodesian (or Algerian OAS) style.”

In early September the Lusaka Accord between Frelimo and the Portuguese authorities established the framework for a transitional Frelimo government to rule Mozambique during a nine-month period of decolonisation. This angered the other opposition parties and provoked an abortive coup attempt in the capital Lourenço Marques. On 7 September 1974 250 members of FICO and the ‘Dragoons of Death’ (a paramilitary organisation consisting of extreme right-wing commandos and secret police), working under the name of the Movimento Moçambique Livre (the Free Africa Movement), took over the airport, post office and radio station, attacked the offices of the newspapers Noticias and A Tribuna, and freed approximately 100 secret police from gaol. From the radio station they broadcast calls for an uprising and appealed to Mozambicans to “remain Portuguese, and to fight against all people who betray Mozambique and want to trample on

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105 Vines, RENAMO, pp13-14; Cabrita, Mozambique, pp72-73. GUMO: Mozambique United Group; FRECOMO: Mozambique Common Front; PCN: The Party of National Coalition
107 Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1973-74, pB528.  
108 Minter, Apartheid’s Contras, p11; Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record 1974-75, (London: Rex Collings, 1975), pB393. The figure of 250 militants being involved in the uprising is in Hall and Young, Confronting Leviathan, p45.
Despite their rhetoric it seems the MML did not oppose independence, but wanted the formation of a coalition transitional government.\(^{109}\) Gwenjere and Simango also went on-air during the MML’s broadcast, supporting the uprising on behalf on the PCN.\(^{111}\) Cabrita claims that,

\[\text{[t]aking advantage of this rare opportunity to air their views nationwide, the PCN used the MML platform to state its opposition to the independence accord, and insist on the holding of free elections before Portugal relinquished its powers. The PCN’s association with the settler uprising was to haunt its leaders for the rest of their lives. Frelimo used this as evidence that they too stood for a neo-colonial alternative.}\(^{112}\]

The Portuguese forces did nothing to quell the rebellion until a violent backlash began in the majority black suburbs surrounding the city, at which point the rebels backed-down and were allowed to leave without being arrested.\(^{113}\) Meanwhile, hearing of the rebellion and assuming that the MML were making a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, South African Minister of Defence P.W. Botha despatched an armoured column to invade Mozambique and support their rebellion. This was only recalled through the personal intervention of South African Prime Minister Vorster, who ordered BOSS operatives to intercept the column as it waited in Komatipoort, on the Mozambican border. White settlers had also set up roadblocks along the Beira Corridor in the expectation that Rhodesian troops would support the uprising, but this never eventuated.\(^{114}\) Though the rebellion was easily suppressed, disorder continued in the capital throughout the month as inter-racial conflict resulted in 77 blacks and fourteen whites being killed and hundreds injured by mob violence.\(^{115}\) In one incident Portuguese soldiers dispersed a crowd of African protesters by firing on them with live ammunition, killing 115 and wounding 600. The violence heightened the fear of the white population and accelerated their exodus, with 5,000 Portuguese settlers fleeing Mozambique between 11 and 17 September alone. Further rioting in October led to 50 deaths and 160 injuries. The large number of arrests made during this turbulent period led to the establishment of prison camps to house inmates.\(^{116}\)

Frelimo was now forming government in a country that was particularly underdeveloped and in which they had been denied the opportunity to openly cultivate a

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\(^{112}\) Cabrita, *Mozambique*, p80.
\(^{113}\) Legum, *Africa Contemporary Record 1974-75*, pB393.
\(^{115}\) Minter, *Apartheid’s Contras*, pp11-12.
\(^{116}\) Hall and Young, *Confronting Leviathan*, pp44-46.
political presence. Mozambique’s fragile economy depended on its strongest neighbours, Rhodesia and South Africa, who were intensely hostile to Frelimo’s ideology and had assisted Portugal in fighting them for a decade. And a political crisis had erupted even before Frelimo had taken power, with an attempted coup followed by months of inter-racial clashes and the rapid exodus of much of the settler population, who were the wealthiest and most educated portion of Mozambique’s citizenry. Though the Portuguese were finally relinquishing power over their colony, the new government’s rule was precarious and seemingly beset by enemies on all sides. In this context Frelimo, having fought a decade-long liberation war against the Portuguese, saw themselves as the rightful heirs to power in Mozambique and acted to suppress political opposition. While Frelimo’s transitional government was being established in Lourenço Marques from 25 September 1974, they tried to pre-empt any further uprising by arresting several hundred PCN members and officials, including Gumane, Simango, Semião and N’Kavandame.  

Meanwhile Orlando Cristina, who had been involved with FICO before the hand-over of power to Frelimo, had slipped across the border into Rhodesia by December 1974 and was kept on the payroll of Jorge Jardim’s company Lusalite. Ellert suggests that Cristina was welcomed as he had previously worked as a CIO source inside Mozambique before Frelimo came to power. Along with Cristina, “hundreds of Portuguese [PIDE/DGS] officers, professional soldiers and Portuguese settlers poured into Rhodesia at Umtali”.  

In addition to those white settlers who were able to flee the new Frelimo government, many black Mozambicans had been involved in supporting the colonial state. After the 1968 change of leadership in Portugal from Salazar to Caetano there was an Africanisation of the Portuguese military to avoid the problems created by recruiting such large numbers of Portuguese citizens into the armed forces, and the trouble those troops had adapting to African conditions. Coelho also notes that the military developed the “same element theory’ that guerrillas could be fought more efficiently by a force that mirrored their organisation, weaponry and knowledge of the terrain”. By 1973 there were over 27,000 African soldiers in Mozambique, making up more than 50% of total troop numbers. Africans also fought for the colonial state in the mostly black Voluntary Police

117 Vines, *RENAMEO*, pp13-14. Cabrita claims Simango, Gumane and ten other PCN officials were only arrested later in Malawi, whose authorities then handed over to Frelimo. Joana Semião was arrested after arriving back in Mozambique from Malawi. Cabrita, *Mozambique*, pp81-82.  
119 Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War*, pp64-70.  
120 Coelho, “African Troops”, p139.  
Organization, the *Fletchas*, the GEs and GEPs, so the end of Portuguese rule in Mozambique left “a detritus of many thousand black collaborators with military training, some of them associated with atrocities against Frelimo and their supporters”.

Overall, more than 100,000 Mozambicans of all colours voluntarily participated in the organisations of the colonial state. After independence these people were known as ‘the compromised’. Most of them remained free but were stripped of the right to vote or hold office, while those deemed the worst offenders were sent to re-education camps. Rather than widespread retribution against collaborators a scheme was created to encourage the reintegration of ‘the compromised’ into Mozambican society, and many of them took advantage of this system. However, thousands were still arrested and imprisoned by the Frelimo government, who could hold suspects indefinitely without charge or trial. This system was supplemented by the creation of a national security service, the *Serviço Nacional de Segurança Popular* (SNASP), in late 1975. According to Amnesty International,

> [a]t the time of the FRELIMO’s accession to power in a transitional government in September 1974, it was already responsible for the imprisonment of a number of people at camps in northern Mozambique and southern Tanzania. During 1975, a considerable number of ‘re-education’ camps were established throughout Mozambique and both suspected opponents of the FRELIMO and other prisoners were sent to such camps for periods of indefinite detention without charge or trial. Between 1975 and 1978, inmates of ‘re-education’ camps reported that torture, beatings and corporal punishment were used extensively, in particular against suspected opponents of the FRELIMO. Torture and other forms of ill-treatment were also reported at prisons and detention centres in Maputo and other towns.

Thus, with the option of participating in government closed to them, and the threat of incarceration for any activities directed against the new regime, Frelimo’s political opponents had to flee the country or continue to organise covertly. As Frelimo took control in Mozambique and excluded both black and white opponents from power, they made themselves a common enemy for those who had rivalled Frelimo in the liberation struggle and those who had fought to defend Portuguese rule.

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122 Hall and Young, *Confronting Leviathan*, p26.
124 Coelho, “*African Troops*”, p150.
Chapter 4: The Rise of Renamo and the Fall of Rhodesia.

Though Frelimo had emerged victorious in Mozambique, the struggle for Zimbabwe was still taking place in the centre of the country and would rapidly expand into a covert war as ZANLA guerrillas received the support of the Mozambican state. As Rhodesian forces expanded their counter-insurgency campaign in Mozambique, and began direct attacks on FPLM troops and Mozambican infrastructure, the context was created in which opponents of the Frelimo government would coalesce in Rhodesia and unite under Rhodesian guidance to form Renamo. While Renamo initially operated as a Rhodesian unit, those commanding the group hoped they would grow to form an alternative to the Frelimo government. With the rise of P.W. Botha to power in South Africa Renamo received that chance, rapidly growing in size, establishing bases inside Mozambique and being integrated into Apartheid’s new ‘Total Strategy’. As Rhodesia transformed in Zimbabwe in 1980 Renamo was transferred to South African soil, though not before being almost annihilated. Meanwhile, divisions were beginning to develop in the South African administration as they decided how to approach the new political landscape in southern Africa.

Mozambique and Rhodesia at War

As Frelimo took power in 1974 South Africa and Rhodesia remained ambivalent about the new regime in Maputo. Prime Minister Vorster hoped South Africa could create détente in the region and so in 1974 signed a secret treaty of mutual non-aggression with Mozambique.1 Meanwhile, Rhodesia was in the midst of a growing insurgency that would be aided by Mozambique’s new government, but did not want to alienate Frelimo as they could block Rhodesia’s access to the ports at Maputo and Beira.2 Rhodesia feared an escalation of rebellion to the extent that from 1974 they began to force tens and then hundreds of thousands of peasants (eventually more than 500,000) into ‘consolidated’ villages to crush ZANLA’s popular support network along the Mozambican border.3 Mindful of their relationship with Mozambique, however, Ian Smith’s government rejected the offers of various GE commanders to cross the Rhodesian border with thousands of

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men. Nevertheless Rhodesia did provide sanctuary for some of those fleeing Frelimo, including Colonel Cardoso of the Fletchas and some of his men, who subsequently served for a short period under Reid-Daly’s command. As 1975 progressed Rhodesian strikes against ZANLA began to penetrate deeper into Mozambique and the Selous Scouts took on a more central role in the counter-insurgency. One such strike occurred in March 1975 when the Selous Scouts attacked a ZANLA base near Caponda village, 55 kilometres from the Rhodesian border. ZANLA’s campaign also began to gather strength, and after the Mozambican government formally declared independence on 25 June 1975 more than 20,000 young Zimbabwean fighters flooded in Mozambique to join the Chimurenga. This “brought an infusion of new blood into the guerrillas’ ranks with demands for younger leaders in place of old politicians”. During this period the first signs of domestic military resistance to Frelimo were also beginning to emerge in Mozambique with the creation of the small Cabo Delgado Front in the country’s north, whose members were primarily Makonde. Members of that ethnic group had also opposed supposed Shangaan dominance of Frelimo in the late 1960s. Thirty five members of the Front were later arrested at Nangada, Cabo Delgado, in 1976. Makonde troops were also involved in a rebellion near Maputo on 17 December 1975, in which the 400-strong battalion of discontented Makonde soldiers blocked roads near the capital and seized a number of key military installations. They eventually stormed the Presidential Palace and occupied it for two days, though President Machel was out of the country at the time and so was not endangered. A Malawian diplomatic report of the incident claims the Makonde battalion clashed with Tanzanian troops, noting, “it is an open secret that Tanzanian troops are still in Lourenço

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5 João M. Cabrita, Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy, (Basingstroke: Palgrave, 2000), p150.
Meanwhile, in September 1975 Orlando Cristina began to clandestinely circulate the anti-Frelimo pamphlet ‘Magaia’ inside Mozambique, hoping to foment rebellion within sections of the Mozambican armed forces.12

From 1976 the war for Rhodesia began to quicken its pace as ZANLA attacks, now facilitated by Mozambican infrastructure, began to penetrate further into Rhodesia’s white heartland. Frelimo also increased pressure on Rhodesia’s white regime by implementing sanctions from 3 March 1976, thus cutting Rhodesian access to the ports at Maputo and Beira. This border closure intensified Rhodesia’s dependence on South Africa, a 1976 CIO report stating that, “Rhodesia is wholly dependent upon South Africa for military and economic survival”.13 As South Africa and the United States progressively put more pressure on Rhodesia to negotiate with moderate Zimbabwean forces, Rhodesia increasingly turned to military raids into Mozambique and Zambia to stall their enemy’s advance.14 Rhodesian forces had continued raids into Mozambican territory after its independence with, for example, a Selous Scout attacks on a ZANLA transit camp near Chicombidzi on 17 January 1976, and on a ZANLA base north of Pafuri on 24 February 1976, under the name of Operation Small Bang.15 But after Mozambique imposed sanctions on Rhodesia they increased the tempo of cross-border raids, even though the South Africans feared these incursions would damage regional détente. Between 1976 and 1978 Rhodesia would make more than 400 forays into Mozambican territory, attacking both ZANLA and Frelimo targets.16 Raids during early 1976 included: the Operation Traveller strike against Caponda, near the Mozambique-Zambia border, on 27 April 1976; Operation Detachment, which aimed to disrupt vehicle movement in Gaza province by laying mines and ambushes, and included an attack on Chigamane, on 13 May 1976; an ambush of ZANLA fighters travelling in Frelimo vehicles along the Chimoio-Tete highway on 28 May 1976; and the Operation Long John attack on Mapai and Chicualacuala in northern Gaza, on 26 June 1976.17 Despite Prime Minister Vorster’s goal of a negotiated

12 Cabrita, Mozambique, p137.
13 Flower, Serving Secretly, p132; Moorcraft, African Nemesis, pp127-131; Reid-Daly, Pamwe Chete, p113.
14 Flower, Serving Secretly, p163.
15 Reid-Daly, Pamwe Chete, pp176, 181.
17 Reid-Daly, Pamwe Chete, pp184-191; Stiff, The Silent War, p239.
end to the Rhodesian conflict, Peter Stiff claims that South African commandos were also active inside Mozambique during this period:

[South African Reconnaissance Commando (Recce)] operators attached to the Selous Scouts were operating from Rusape [in Rhodesia] in 1976. Reconnaissance patrols, seeking ZANLA staging posts and bases, were conducted routinely some fifty to sixty kilometres deep into Mozambique by SAS and Selous Scouts teams. Recce based in the Manicaland area on a rotating basis also operated across Rhodesia’s border into Mozambique during this period. They, like the SAS and Selous Scouts, located a few isolated ZANLA groups but not the target they were seeking [ZANLA’s Pungwe Base]… The presence of Recce operators in Rhodesia in 1976 was a closely guarded secret, known only to a few Special Forces’ and other Rhodesian officers.18

Meanwhile the Rhodesian CIO created the radio station Voz da África Livre (the Voice of Free Africa, referred to herein as VOFA), imitating the anti-Rhodesian radio station Voice of Zimbabwe, which broadcast via Radio Moçambique with Iain Christie as its presenter. Section C of the CIO’s Special Operations division broadcast VOFA from a ‘Big Bertha’ radio transmitter near Gwelo, Rhodesia, while day-to-day running of the station was left to Orlando Cristina, who from December 1975 received funding from CIO officer Peter Burt.19 Cabrita claims that VOFA began its Portuguese-language broadcasts in April 1976, but surprised Cristina and other anti-Frelimo activists with its racial bias and nostalgia for the colonial era. Cristina and several Mozambican exiles then manoeuvred to take control of the radio station and changed the programme’s focus to opposing the Frelimo government’s domestic and foreign policies, attacking their human rights abuses and control of the judiciary and legislature, and criticising the collectivisation of agriculture. On 5 July 1976 VOFA began daily one-hour broadcasts and by the end of August Cristina’s group had complete editorial control over the station. It has also been suggested that the activists who took control of VOFA were under Jorge Jardim’s patronage.20

As Rhodesian counter-insurgency operations continued in Mozambique and the Frelimo government sustained their support for ZANLA’s liberation fighters, it could be said that a low-level and mostly covert, but very real state of war existed between Rhodesia and Mozambique. A number of Rhodesian actions in August 1976 brought this conflict to a new intensity, including Operation Prawn, which attacked targets along the Limpopo railway line in Gaza, and also involved the ambush of a Frelimo troop train. But the most devastating action of 1976 was the Operation Eland raid on 9 August against the Nyadzonya (or Pungwe) camp where it was estimated more than 5,000 guerrillas were

18 Stiff, The Silent War, pp239-240.
19 Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, pp69-70; Cabrita, Mozambique, pp138-140.
based. A team of 80 Selous Scouts, accompanied by some Portuguese-speaking Mozambicans, crossed the border in FPLM-style vehicles and drove straight to the camp along Mozambique’s main road network. Once there they were able to enter the camp before opening fire on thousands of assembled Zimbabweans. Reid-Daly claims that ZANLA documents captured in a separate raid estimated those killed in the attack at over 1,000, with 1,000 missing, and 309 wounded. ZANLA insisted that Nyadzonya was a refugee camp and that the act was an atrocity. According to Minter,

[m]ost of the dead were unarmed refugees waiting for training as guerrilla recruits. But as a Rhodesian African soldier later remarked, ‘We were told … it would be easier if we went in and wiped them out while they were unarmed and before they were trained rather than waiting for the possibility of them being trained and sent back into Rhodesia’.

The raid embarrassed Vorster and prompted him to withdraw much of South Africa’s military support for Rhodesia. He also encouraged Henry Kissinger to use the incident to force Smith into a diplomatic corner. But Rhodesia’s strategy would continue unabated for the meantime, with further actions inside Mozambique such as Operation Mardon on 30 October 1976, in which Selous Scouts attacked ZANLA bases at Chigamane, Machalia, Jorge de Limpopo and Massangena, in northern Gaza, as well as targets in Tete. In mid-November the Selous Scout’s derailing of a train near Jorge de Limpopo closed the line until late 1979. Mozambican airspace was also frequently violated in various operations.

While Rhodesia’s Selous Scouts struck at ZANLA militarily, VOFA continued its propaganda war against the Mozambican government, for example appealing to Mozambicans on 17 December to oppose the war with Rhodesia, to overthrow the Frelimo government and to establish a ‘Federal Democratic Republic of Mozambique’ with FUMO activist Dr Domingos Arouca as President. These broadcasts had some success in attracting defecting military personnel, both from former colonial units like the Fletchas and from Frelimo itself. The Rhodesian security forces, who already had experience deploying

22 William Minter, Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique, (London: Zed Books, 1994), p113. According to Flower, the CIO did not appreciate the Selous Scouts operation and, “we could not devise a formula which would account for the deaths of such large numbers of unarmed, untrained people”. Flower, Serving Secretly, p151. Ian Smith later wrote in his autobiography that, “[w]e were concerned about reports of women and children in [ZANLA’s] camps … it was no easy problem to solve, as the majority of women were trained and used arms. The older women prepared the food and the children carried the supplies. It was explained to me forcibly that it was impossible to separate them, that they were all terrorists, and that part of the communist teaching was to use women and children as a means of protecting the fighting men”. Smith, The Great Betrayal, p195.
23 Flower, Serving Secretly, p152; Moorcraft, African Nemesis, p132.
24 Stiff, The Silent War, p243; Reid-Daly, Pamwe Chete, p258, 268; “Ao Inimigo Não Se Responde Com a Boc Responde-se Com Balas”, Tempo, No 311, 19 September 1976, p22.
Mozambicans in irregular units, were now looking for a new way to divert the resources of the Mozambican armed forces and found it in the reversal of the Fletcha concept: recruiting these locals and using them as low-key raiders in an insurgency against the Mozambican government. André Matsangaissa, the black Mozambican who would be Renamo’s first President, was one of those to defect to Rhodesia in late 1976, though he was soon recaptured in a failed attempt to release prisoners from the Sacudzo re-education camp in December that year. Cabrita claims that Matsangaissa proposed the creation of Renamo upon his defection, and that he raided the Sacudzo camp near Gorongoza in an attempt to prove to Rhodesia that his idea of creating an opposition movement could work. However, it seems very implausible to assign responsibility for the concept of Renamo to Matsangaissa alone, considering Rhodesia’s long history of using pseudo units and Fletchas. If there was any advocate for the creation of Renamo, outside of the Rhodesian security forces, it was more likely Orlando Cristina who already had experience commanding such units. Meanwhile, though Matsangaissa was again imprisoned in Mozambique, Rhodesia formed a commando unit called the Resistência Moçambicana (REMO), consisting mostly of former members of the Portuguese Armed Forces. The group of fifteen, which included one mestiço Mozambican and three Africans, was trained at a white farm in the Chimanimani mountains before undertaking reconnaissance near Chimoio in January 1977. Their mission ended in disaster with Rui Manuel Nunes da Silva being shot and captured, and the unit was soon disbanded. Ellert asserts that this group’s training base was at Rusape and that Peter Burt was in charge of operations. According to Ellert, in early 1977 REMO also attacked the Sacudzo re-education camp and released prisoners who became the core of the new Rhodesian insurgency unit: Renamo. Renamo’s first base was established at an old tobacco farm outside Odzi, near Umtali, in March 1977. CIO agent Eric May ran the camp and brought in SAS personnel and former members of the Portuguese military to train the embryonic army. Nevertheless, Orlando Cristina seems to

26 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
27 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp145-147.
28 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
30 Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, pp69-71. Ellert claims that 250 prisoners were released. While this number is higher than other estimates of Renamo’s numbers during its early stages, not all of those prisoners may have been willing or able to join the new unit.
have been Renamo’s representative to the CIO during this period, which indicates that even at this early stage Renamo had some autonomy from the security services that were funding and training them.31

Renamo’s First Years

While the Rhodesian security forces and Mozambican exiles had now created Renamo, the organisation that would become the main antagonist in Mozambique’s long civil war, they were not yet of any significance and were a force of only 76 men by September 1977.32 In the meantime Rhodesia’s war against ZANLA and Frelimo continued. Major incursions into Mozambican territory included Operation Aztec in late May, which destroyed a number of ZANLA camps along the Limpopo railway as far as Mabalane in central Gaza, and included attacks on Mapai and Pafuri; and Operation Virile in late November, which aimed to neutralise road and rail traffic in southern Manica by destroying five bridges between Chimoio and Espungabera.33 Then on 23-24 November the Rhodesians launched their largest operation to date, Operation Dingo, an attack on the ZANLA headquarters near Chimoio and a base north of the Cabora Bassa dam at Tembue, which were estimated to have held 9,000 and 4,000 people respectively. In the attack on Chimoio, a DC8 plane owned by the notorious Rhodesian mercenary pilot and sanctions-breaker Jack Malloch overflew the ZANLA camp a few minutes before the main attack to panic and confuse the guerrillas. The SAS and Rhodesian Light Infantry then attacked with air support, killing more than 2,000 people and weakening ZANLA’s forces by up to 4,000 through injury or desertion. However, the Chimoio complex also held school and hospital facilities, so it is thought that many of the 2,000 killed were women and children. Twenty four hours later they attacked the ZANLA base at Tembue with less success.34 In an indication that Renamo had absorbed Mozambicans already operative with the Rhodesians, and that Renamo was assisting Rhodesian forces in a reconnaissance

32 Cabrita, Mozambique, p149.
33 Reid-Daly, Pamwe Chete, pp304-305, 315. It seems Mozambicans were being used for reconnaissance for some of these operations, though it is not clear whether they were Renamo members or employed by other sections of the Rhodesian security forces. See stories surrounding the capture of Afonso Cotoi in “Maputo Home Service, 17 September 1977: Rhodesian Agent on Impending Operations against the PRM”, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 September 1977; “Capturado Agente do Exercito Rhodesiano”, Tempo, No 364, 25 September 1977, pp62-64; Shadrack Soko, “The Confessions of a Mozambican Spy”, Facts and Reports, 2 November 1977; and “A Tale of Two Spies”, Africa, No 75, November 1977, pp 27-28. And later reports of captured agents in “Mozambique Capture of ‘Agents’ of Smith Regime” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 January 1979; and “Mozambique Appearance of ‘Enemy Agent’”, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 February 1979.
capacity, Flower later wrote that for the Operation Dingo attack on Chimoio the “CIO was in a position to offer invaluable help through elements of [Renamo] who had been our ‘eyes and ears’ in these areas for more than five years”.35

During this period South Africa again began to take an active role in assisting Rhodesian counter-insurgency. In October 1977 the Rhodesian SAS took over the responsibility of combating infiltration from Gaza province and at this time formed a D Squadron, consisting of soldiers from the South Africa Reconnaissance Commando (Recce) units, for deployment primarily inside Rhodesia and Gaza. According to Stiff,

> It seems unlikely that Premier Vorster was aware of the formation of ‘D’ Squadron SAS, but it appears likely that Defence Minister P W Botha was…. It was formed from Recces. While serving with the SAS they wore Rhodesian camouflage uniforms … They took deployment orders from the SAS commander on internal operations and operationally fell under Rhodesian command. Their presence on external raids, however, was always subject to prior clearance from Special Forces’ HQ in Pretoria.36

This subversion of Vorster’s authority by Botha and the military highlights the split that was growing between the civilian and military hierarchies in South Africa. The Soweto uprising in 1976, arising out of a combination of poor living conditions and discrimination, and in the context of black governments coming to power in Mozambique and Angola, and a newly assertive Black Consciousness movement in South Africa, shook the Apartheid establishment. While Vorster had been following a line of détente and negotiation in the region, the military’s solution to internal and external unrest was the formulation of the ‘Total Strategy’, which was presented for the first time publicly in the 1977 Defence White Paper. The Total Strategy involved co-ordination of the military, economic, psychological, political, diplomatic and cultural fields of state activity to fight subversion by a supposed international conspiracy against South Africa, led by the Soviet Union.37 It seems that the CIO and Orlando Cristina had approached South Africa around this time to seek their support for Renamo, but their requests were refused because Vorster still held hopes for the détente between South Africa and Mozambique. This changed in late 1978 when the ‘Muldergate’ information scandal led to Vorster’s replacement as Prime Minister by P.W. Botha and the appointment of General Magnus Malan as Defence Minister.38 Under Botha the military began to exert influence in social planning, and an alliance was formed between the political hierarchy and the growing military-industrial complex. Power was centralised

35 Flower, Serving Secretly, pp192-193.
36 Stiff, The Silent War, p244.
38 Vines, RENAMO, p18.
in the executive and the security establishment developed into the primary co-ordinating force within the state, as the establishment of the State Security Council (SSC) considerably weakened the role played by parliament and the cabinet in government. An ideology of militarism increasingly permeated South African society, promoted by state-run radio and television, which glorified the South African Defence Forces (SADF) while demonising political opponents and the ANC. The introduction of compulsory national service for white males and weapons training in schools helped to saturate the white population with these values. Meanwhile the regime stepped-up its use of counter-revolutionary techniques such as co-opting black leaders, press restrictions, mass detentions, vigilante and death squad activities, bannings and harassment by the security forces. On a societal level the Total Strategy also called for some welfare measures and counter-organisation of education and civil society, creating an urban black middle class divorced from the impoverished rural masses, and ameliorating the worst inequities of Apartheid. But overall the Total Strategy aimed to modify society enough to quell revolution, while leaving Apartheid essentially intact.

Renamo had grown to almost 300 men by early 1978 and continued to recruit members, but according to Cabrita from the time of Botha’s rise to power in late 1978 the Renamo leadership were “given the green light to recruit as many people as [they] wanted” and Renamo numbers thus increased to more than 900 by the end of that year. During 1978 the liberation war against Rhodesia had continued to gain strength, with thousands of Zimbabwean fighters and an estimated 50,000 locally trained cadres now inside Rhodesia, prompting the Rhodesian government to place 75% of Rhodesia under martial law by December 1978. Facing an increasingly dire security situation, and with a new atmosphere in Pretoria, Rhodesia began to prepare Renamo for operation as an autonomous unit. According to Tom Marks, a colleague of the former Rhodesian SAS commando Robert MacKenzie,

Rhodesia provided the training, and a variety of sources upped the limited funding available from Salisbury itself: anti-communist South Africa and Saudi Arabia, for instance, as well as private sources from Portugal. Sanitized weapons came from Egypt.

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42 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp152-154.
43 Moorcraft, African Nemesis, pp138, 140.
44 Tom Marks, “Remembering RENAMO: The Counterinsurgency that Almost Won”, Soldier of Fortune, January 2000, p42. Two Israeli commandos may also have helped instruct Renamo forces. Alves Gomes,
Cabrita also claims that Cristina was attempting to independently acquire funds from the Middle East during this period. The presenter of a VOFA program for the Mozambican Muslim community, Juma Abudo, was sent to the Middle East in 1978 to present Renamo’s case that Muslims in Mozambique were being oppressed by the Frelimo government and to obtain financial support. Though Cristina never heard from Abudo again, the CIO suddenly showed signs of having more funds and so he assumed that Abudo had been successful. Cristina later found out that the CIO had known of this initiative and had acted to contain it. If true, this may have been one of the first skirmishes between Orlando Cristina and Renamo’s sponsor state over the organisation’s autonomy. Nevertheless a number of South African documents confirm that Renamo began their first independent operations in December 1978, though they did not get enough funds and weapons to be a serious threat in their own right. It is thus unlikely that Renamo was involved in bomb blasts that occurred earlier in the year in Maputo, Tete and Chimoio. As the wet season began in Mozambique, Renamo began to deploy in the Beira Corridor - Cabrita claims as far east as the road south from Inchope to Maputo and the road north from Dondo to Inhaminga. Renamo’s operations at this early stage remained at a very low-level. In early January 1979 Renamo voiced claims over VOFA that they had: destroyed an armoured vehicle in the area between Moatize, in Tete, and the Zambian border; carried out four ambushes on the Nacala-Nampula road in November; killed 42 soldiers and destroyed thirteen FPLM vehicles in operations in Sofala up to 17 December; destroyed three FPLM vehicles between Guro and Changara on 19 December, and on the same day blown up the bridge over the Mocambeze river in Manica; killed nineteen FPLM soldiers near Gorongosa on 21 December; and throughout the month attacked Frelimo positions in Mwinga, Bombe, Sussundenga, Vanduzi and Rutanda. It is hard to separate truth from propaganda in this broadcast, though it is immediately clear that Renamo’s claims of activity in eastern Tete and in Nampula are false, as they were outside of their area

45 Cabrita, Mozambique, p152.
of operations at the time. The attack that Renamo claims to have made on FPLM vehicles between Guro and Changara is also cast into doubt by a Mozambican government report that aircraft had bombed the convoy. Otherwise it is difficult to discern whether these attacks actually occurred, and if so whether they involved Renamo soldiers. The Mozambican government claimed that Rhodesian-backed forces (potentially Renamo fighters) had attacked Machaila and Chicalucualula in Gaza province on 18 and 21 December, respectively. However, the bombing of a rail bridge in Mecito, Tete, on 17 December appears to have been a commando operation carried out by six white and two black operatives.50

Though Renamo would undergo a number of shifts in their patron state, leadership and the make-up of their political cadre before the insurgency ballooned into civil war, the debate over the organisation’s political nature can still be clarified through examining its earliest incarnation. There is no doubt that Renamo was a Rhodesian creation. Renamo was founded with Rhodesian funds, arms and training. They utilised the counter-insurgency methods devised by the British and Portuguese, and developed by the Rhodesians over a decade of experimentation, and was deployed under the direction of the Rhodesian security forces as part of their campaign to defend Rhodesia’s white-dominated social structures from the military offensive by Zimbabwean fighters. Even Cabrita confirms that at this time “Renamo had no control over the funds raised on its behalf by the CIO”.51 Those authors keen to delegitimise Renamo as a political movement have always highlighted the conditions in which the organisation was formed and the patronage they received, and concluded they were ‘puppets’ whose aim was to destabilise Mozambique rather than to seize power. On the other hand, proponents of Renamo have sometimes ignored or denied Rhodesia’s role in its creation and thus robbed their accounts of credibility. As this study will demonstrate, Renamo’s political nature was always complex, and what purpose Renamo was thought to serve often depended on the interests of the observer. It is easy to understand why the motivations for the creation of Renamo are the subject of debate when even supporters of Renamo at the time give contradictory assessments. Some senior members of the CIO have asserted that when Renamo was formed their “objectives were essentially to perpetuate or create instability in areas of Mozambique”.52 Former CIO Chief Ken Flower also claimed that “[n]one of us was ever deluded that this was going to

51 Cabrita, Mozambique, p154.
overthrow the Machel government”.53 However, some members of the Rhodesian security forces who worked more closely with Renamo claim that from the very beginning Renamo’s leadership wanted to be as independent as possible, and that Renamo was seen by Rhodesia as an alternative government for Mozambique in the long-term.54 Barbara Cole, whose husband Lieutenant Peter Cole trained Renamo as part of the Rhodesian SAS, claimed that the CIO aimed to use Renamo to “conduct a psychological and clandestine campaign against the Marxist Mozambican government – and create a sufficiently strong opposition to challenge the existing authority”. 55 In fact, she claims that the CIO itself emphasised that “the resistance’s main objective was to overthrow Machel”.56 Rather than assuming that those advocating one of these perspectives is being misleading, it is more probable that differing understandings of Renamo’s purpose and their potential for success did exist within the Rhodesian establishment. In the short-term Renamo was to assist in fighting ZANLA, and in the long-term they could potentially be an alternative to Frelimo. What is important here is that from the start at least some of those intimately involved with the Renamo leadership had a ‘putschist’ vision for the overthrow of the Mozambican government. While Renamo’s rank and file might have been attracted to the group for little more than the pay and lifestyle, or the need to escape repression by the Mozambican authorities, it seems illogical that Orlando Cristina and other members of Renamo’s leadership would involve themselves in fighting for the Rhodesian state without also planning to take power in Mozambique. For the Rhodesian state itself it would also be unviable in the long-term to have a hostile government in Maputo. Frelimo had enforced sanctions on Rhodesia, cutting its access to the coast, and dedicated themselves to aiding the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. The Rhodesians were fighting for survival and they did not plan to lose, so while it may not have been universally believed within the Rhodesian security establishment that Renamo itself could take power, it was certainly understood that Frelimo had to be either overthrown or beaten into submission. This position is confirmed by a document from the Rhodesian Joint Planning Committee that states that as of early 1979 “the accepted strategy [was] that Mozambique should be kept

54 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
56 Cole, The Elite, p245.
completely unstable until an anti-communist government [could] be installed”.\(^{57}\) So at this early stage the goal of the Renamo leadership to take power in Mozambique was also consistent with the aims of their Rhodesian backers, but this situation would change within a number of years.

Meanwhile, as Renamo began to grow rapidly under the patronage of the Rhodesian security forces, other opposition groups had also formed throughout Mozambique. A Malawian government communiqué from the time points out that by 1979 Mozambique was suffering “increasing pressure both from the anti-Frelimo campaign which is being waged by several dissident groups as well as the pre-emptive strikes which the Rhodesian Government has been waging inside Mozambique [my italics]”.\(^{58}\) In addition to the Cabo Delgado Front that was mentioned earlier in this text, South African documents from 1979 also report the existence of the Zambebian Liberation Front (ZLF), the Frente Unidade do Sul so Save (FUSSA), and the National Liberation Union of Mozambique (UNALIMO). It appears that an unsuccessful attempt was made to unite these forces into a Federal Liberation Army of Mozambique in June 1978.\(^{59}\) Another opposition group, the Frente Democratica de Moçambique (FUMO) led by Domingos Arouca, was based in Lisbon. FUMO primarily focused on releasing propaganda and attempting to organise strikes, such as that of rail workers at Maputo Harbour from 9-14 November 1978.\(^{60}\) Joaquim Nyoka, leader of a small new party the Partido Democratico da Lerbtação de Moçambique (PADELIMO), seems to have approached Malawi in 1979 for support against “the barbaric communist Marxist regime of the fascist dictator Moises Samora Machel”, but was rebuffed.\(^{61}\) The International Society for the Liberation of African Muslims (ISLAM) conducted low-level activity in northern Mozambique in 1978 and 1979.\(^{62}\) But the South African reports confirm that Renamo was the most active resistance group in Mozambique and that they were beginning to cost Frelimo large amounts of money, preventing traffic

\(^{57}\) “RJPC Brief No 2”, Rhodesian Joint Planning Centre, 26 April 1979, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 144/5/1/1/4, Vol 1, p4.

\(^{58}\) “Developments in Mozambique”, from the Malawian Secretary for External Affairs to the Secretary for the President and Cabinet, 31 January 1979, Malawi National Archives, file EA/10/6/71, p1.


\(^{61}\) PADELIMO: Democratic Party for the Liberation of Mozambique. “Partido Democratico da Lerbtação de Mocambique (PADELIMO)”, from R.N.L Nkomba, Malawian High Commissioner to Kenya, to the Secretary for External Affairs, 13 June 1979, Malawi National Archives, file EA/10/6/71, pp1-3; “Partido Democratico da Lerbtação de Mocambique (PADELIMO)”, from the Malawian Secretary for External Affairs to the Malawian High Commissioner to Kenya, 27 June 1979, Malawi National Archives, file EA/10/6/71, pp1-2.

movement and creating instability in the provinces of Manica, Sofala and Gaza. It is noted, however, that the group was not adequately supplied and was hampered by ethnic and ideological divisions, and by the lack of a dynamic leader.\textsuperscript{63} One other group of importance was the \textit{Partido Revolucionário Moçambicano} (PRM), which operated against Frelimo from southern Malawi, and would eventually join Renamo. The PRM was formed by Amós Sumane, Bernardo A. Gimo (Gimo Phiri?), Matius Ntenda and A. Njanje, on 6 June 1976 and claimed to have began armed operations on 8 August 1978 in Jalasse Zone in Milange district. Sumane split from COREMO in 1968 to form the UNAR in Malawi, and as the PRM was based in the same region near Milange it is very plausible that it was a new incarnation of UNAR. They do not seem to have had the same support from the Malawian authorities, however, and thus Sumane was arrested and held prisoner in Malawi during 1978 and 1979, before being deported to Mozambique in 1980. In February 1981 Frelimo tried 32 PRM members, sentencing four to death and the rest to gaol, and Sumane seems to have been executed around this time. PRM expanded into Niassa in 1979 and Tete in 1982, under the command of Gimo Phiri, and seems to have carried out mostly political and low-level military actions.\textsuperscript{64}

As Renamo commenced their insurgency in Mozambique in late 1978-early 1979, they conducted a number of higher-level operations under the guidance of the Rhodesian special forces. One of the first of these, in January 1979, was a joint Renamo-Rhodesian SAS attack on the Mavuze hydro-electric power station on Chicamba Real Dam, southwest of Chimoio.\textsuperscript{65} In the same month sabotage near Vila de Manica, only a few kilometres from the Rhodesian border, cut Beira’s power and water in a style that would be repeated many times throughout the duration of the war. Between 8 and 15 January 1979 Rhodesia and Renamo mounted seven attacks inside Mozambique, targeting army barracks, civilian trains and buses, and planting landmines on main roads. Due to the increasing sabotage Frelimo placed Gaza, Tete and Manica under military control, began to mobilise peasant militias, and increasingly involved SNASP agents in anti-guerrilla operations.\textsuperscript{66} By this time

\textsuperscript{63} “Mosambiek: Binnelandse Onrus en Terrorisme”, pp1-2; “Mosambiek”, April-September 1979, p118; “Korttermynstrategie”, pp1, 3. “Agv ideologiese en mee in besonder etniese verskille tussen die leierselemente van die onder skedel weerstands bewegings, kon die ontevredenheid onder die plaaslike bevolking egter nog nie optimal teen FRELIMO uitgebuit word nie”. “Mosambiek: Binnelandse Onrus en Terrorisme”, p1.
the reality of the war’s magnitude, increasing emigration from within the white community, economic sanctions and massive international pressure from the international community led Rhodesian decision-makers to accept that majority rule was inevitable. In this context every effort would be made to support moderate Zimbabwean figures, such as Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa, and to continue to militarily challenge the more radical forces involved in the insurgency. To this end Flower claims that in early February 1979 he utilised Rhodesia’s links with Moroccan intelligence and accompanied Sithole to Morocco to request financial assistance for his election campaign. King Hassan apparently donated a million dollars to help defeat the communists. 67 Meanwhile Rhodesian forces continued their assaults against ZANLA bases inside Mozambique, with one South African document claiming that air raids struck at a ZANLA headquarters and ammunition store in Chokwe, in southern Gaza, on 12 and 15 March; an ammunition store at Dondo, Sofala, on 16 March 1979; and a ZANLA base near Chimoio on 17 March. 68 Renamo also claimed that during March they ambushed traffic on roads near the Rhodesian border, heading north and south from Chimoio, and attacked the towns of Dombe, Catandica, Changara and Chioco, all in Tete and Manica within striking distance from the border. 69 But the most spectacular attack against Mozambique that month was on the Munhava fuel depot at Beira on 23 March 1979. Explosives planted at the Mobil Oil tanks destroyed 10 million gallons of fuel worth US$3 million, and the Shell, Caltex and Petrolmoc tanks were also damaged. A Renamo spokesman in Lisbon, Roberto Chitanga, immediately claimed responsibility for the Beira attack and VOFA announced “a special assault task force of the Mozambican resistance” had carried out the attack. 70 Though Cole later wrote that it was a joint Renamo-Rhodesian SAS operation, research by Stiff reveals that Renamo played no part. The assault was primarily an SAS action, led by Robert Mackenzie, aided by South Africa’s Four-Recce commandos and launched from South African ships, which may have been the SAS Drakensberg and the SAS Protea. Though Rhodesia credited Renamo with the attack, it was part of Rhodesia’s campaign of retaliation against the Front Line States for oil

67 Flower, Serving Secretly. p217.
68 “Lugaanvalle In Mosambiek”, to the South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 21 March 1979, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/113/5.
sanctions, which began with a strike on the Shell/BP tank farm in Lusaka on 30 October 1978.\footnote{Stiff, \textit{The Silent War}, p260.}

During April Renamo claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties on a Frelimo brigade in Mavita on 6 April, released 379 prisoners and killed sixteen soldiers at the Gorongosa concentration camp on 10 April, engaged in a fire-fight with FPLM soldiers near Mavonde on 18 April, and destroyed heavy FPLM vehicles with mines at Rotanda and Candiado, near the Chicamba Real area.\footnote{“Mozambique Dissident Group’s ‘Military’ Claims”, \textit{BBC Summary of World Broadcasts}, 23 April 1979.} These claims seem very plausible since all the towns except Gorongosa are within a few kilometres of the Chimaninani mountains along the border, making it easy for Renamo to slip quickly back to sanctuary in Rhodesia. By this time preparations were being made in Rhodesia for a hand-over of power to a moderate black government. Bishop Muzorewa had been made the Prime Minister of what was now called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and it was expected that when the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher took power in Britain on 3 May 1979 they would recognise Muzorewa’s government.\footnote{Stiff, \textit{The Silent War}, p286.} At this critical juncture South Africa pledged its support for moderate forces in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. According to South African documents from April 1979, the Rhodesian Joint Planning Centre (RPJC) determined that South Africa would give full support to the Rhodesian Interim Government. South Africa’s tasks would include providing Zimbabwe-Rhodesia with “all possible military support”, and to do everything necessary “to induce or coerce the terrorist host countries to stop or reduce their assistance to anti-ZR [Zimbabwe-Rhodesia] and anti-RSA [Republic of South Africa] terrorists”.\footnote{“RJPC Brief No 2”, p1.} To interrupt assistance to radical Zimbabwean forces the Department of Defence would “totally disrupt the Tazara Rail and Road System”, and “ensure that the Benguella Railway line is kept inoperative indefinitely”.\footnote{“RJPC Brief No 2”, p2.} Support from the SADF and South African Police (SAP) would include: “deployment of RSA forces within ZR close to the RSA border”; “air support for offensive action against terrorist and other targets”; “special operations when and as mutually agreed”; “electronic warfare” and “photographic reconnaissance”.\footnote{“RJPC Brief No 2”, p2.} The RJPC also discussed the use of psychological actions during the elections in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and propaganda to discourage
terrorism. Meanwhile a high-level diplomatic team would go to Maputo and negotiate the reduction of assistance to ZANLA. The RJPC Brief also made clear that, while perpetuating instability in Mozambique,

a modus vivendi must be devised to fully commit [Zimbabwe-Rhodesia] and [Mozambique] to [South Africa] to avoid at all costs that collusion takes place between President Machel/Robert Mugabe and Bishop Muzorewa because this may jeopardise [South Africa’s] total strategy in southern Africa.

Ultimately, in response to the unity of the Front Line states, South Africa would deploy “a counter strategy designed at promoting the concept of a ‘community of Southern African States’ which is anti-communist and African orientated”.

By mid-1979 South African Military Intelligence was supplying Renamo with weapons and supplies as part of their support for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Plans were also made to transfer Renamo to South African soil if Rhodesia were to fall to radical Zimbabwean forces. It appears that if South Africa had not given support to Renamo before this, then there was at least acquiescence to their political presence in South Africa.

A South African document from January 1979 discussing the capacities of the Mozambican intelligence agency, SNASP, notes that,

[a] source claims that the SNASP is well informed about the activities of the Mozambican resistance movement in Johannesburg. This source is of the opinion that this information was obtained through the Mozambican agents working for the official Mozambican authorities in South Africa.

Subsequently, at a meeting with South African representatives in Maputo on 14 August 1979, Mozambican representative Sergio Vieira warned South Africa that he knew “groups were being trained in South Africa and being sent through Rhodesia for action against Mozambique”. Specifically he claimed that “Portuguese who were organising activities against Mozambique from South African soil” were coordinating from the

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78 “RJPC Brief No 2”, p3.
81 Vines, RENAMO, p18; Moorcraft, African Nemesis, p261.
82 “Laasgenoemde bron beweer dat SNASP op hoogte is van die aktiwiteite van die Mosambiekse weerstandsbewegings in JOHANNESBURG. Die bron is van mening dat hierdie informasie bekom is deur Mosambiekse agente wat vir die amptelike Mosambiekse instansies in SUID-AFRIKA werk”. “Mosambiek: Beleid en Beplanning”, 11 January 1979, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/113/5, p1.
83 “Discussion with Mocambique: 14 August 1979”, from the South African Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary for Finance and the Secretary for Commerce, 20 August 1979, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 144/5/1/1/4, p4.

Buoyed by South African aid, Renamo fighters continued small-scale attacks inside Mozambique, killing 10 FPLM troops at a Frelimo Base in Gorongosa on 25 May 1979, and ambushing traffic between Tete, Chimoio, Beira and Maputo. By July Renamo forces had penetrated deep enough into southern Manica to attack the town of Muchaze and from 21 August 1979 Renamo’s president Matsangaissa led a 300-man battalion from Odzi to the Gorongosa Mountains to set up a permanent base. Arriving on 5 September the battalion split into companies of 100 men, with one based to the east and one to the south-west of the mountain. The deployment of Renamo forces to bases within Mozambique was directed by the SAS under the codename Operation Bumper. It was hoped that with Renamo well inside Mozambique, they might be able to cut supplies to ZANLA bases along the Rhodesian border. At Gorongosa Renamo fighters were trained by an SAS team led by Lieutenant Charlie Buchan, and soon after another base was established at Gogo, near the Rhodesian border south of the Beira corridor. While Renamo was still in transit to their new Gorongosa base a major operation, designed to shake Frelimo’s nerve and cut rebel supply lines before the opening of the Lancaster House conference about the future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, cut deep into Gaza province destroying various targets. On 2 September 1979 the joint South African and Rhodesian offensive, called Operation Bootlace/Uric, struck at ZANLA and Frelimo bases in Gaza at Chigamane, Malvernia, Pafuri, Chicualacuala ‘B’, Mpuzi, Combomune, a logistics base at Mabalane and a Troposcatter communications centre. Aldeia de Barragem, Mapai and Machalia were hit by air-strikes. The Rhodesian SAS attacked the bridges at Aldeia de Barragem, while South African Recce teams destroyed bridges over the Changane and Mazimchopes Rivers, and the Rhodesian Light Infantry destroyed the bridge at Chokwe. A few weeks later on 18 September 1979, under the title of Operation Ingrid, Rhodesian SAS and South African Four-Recce saboteurs were infiltrated into Mozambique near Beira with instructions to sink the Tanzanian vessel the SS Mpanduzi, which was suspected of ferrying ZANLA guerrillas from Tanzanian training camps. When they found the ship wasn’t there they instead sunk several dredgers, blocking the shipping lane, and attacked the dry dock.

84 “Discussion with Mocambique”, p4.
86 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp154-157.
87 Stiff, The Silent War, pp177-178.
89 Stiff, The Silent War, pp261-271.
Another team was to attack a ZANLA armoury on the docks, while a third team was to hit Beira’s telephone exchange and possibly the local prison, but these missions were aborted due to contact with Frelimo guards. Stiff claims that the operation was probably launched from the South African Navy’s SAS Tafelberg. Though Renamo was again credited with the attack, they were not involved.\(^{90}\)

**South Africa Backs the Insurgency**

By this time South Africa was developing a coherent strategy for dealing with Mozambique and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. In documents from August and September 1979 South African analysts examining strategic economic targets in Mozambique identified the country’s weaknesses as infrastructure, like the Cabora Bassa powerlines, and their direct reliance on South Africa for trade, transport routes, finance and employment for migrant workers. In addition Mozambique was threatened by “[p]otential internal unrest coupled with the operations of resistance movements”.\(^{91}\) Taking this into account, some key tasks for South Africa’s short-term strategy towards Mozambique were for them to provide,

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\text{[t]he maximum possible covert support for any non-communist, anti-Frelimo movements in Mozambique. … covert assistance to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in secret military operations against terrorist bases in Mozambique. … [and] to make Mozambique dependent on the Maputo-Komatipoort [rail] link. All other national [transport] connections must be denied or disrupted (but not as such that Malawi’s trade through Nacala is disrupted).}\(^ {92}\)
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The SADF would give “covert and clandestine support to direct political, economic and psychological actions to influence the government of Mozambique”.\(^{93}\) Radio Propaganda would remain important and so South Africa planned to “[disrupt] Radio Maputo … [and] create a clandestine radio [station] [of our own and/or in cooperation with [Zimbabwe-}

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Rhodesia] … [which would have guest Mozambican commentators].

Psychological actions would “take advantage of ethnic divisions in Mozambique to create support for anti-government movements. … [and] subtly influence Mozambican contract-workers in favour of [South Africa]”. The State Security Council (SSC) document, ‘Korttermynstrategie vir Mosambiek: Voorbeeld van Ekonomies - Strategiese Teikens’, details that,

special operations would include the disruption of logistical infrastructure, oil-pipelines and harbours (excluding Maputo) … [and] clandestine support of resistance movements in terms of military weaponry, key personnel, training and advice.

It is then declared in the SSC Directive of 28 August 1979, on the implementation of the short-term strategy for Mozambique, that the council had approved the immediate commencement of the strategy to force Mozambique to stop aiding ZANLA. The departments involved included Foreign Affairs, the SADF, Finance, Trade, Intelligence, National Security, Police, Rail and Harbours, and each nominated representatives to the Mozambican Cooperative Management Centre (MGBS). The directive made it clear that,

[n]o large military operations directly traceable back to the RSA security forces should be undertaken. Special operations and other non-traceable clandestine security actions must be undertaken as soon as possible as part of the coordinated actions against Mozambique as described in the short-term strategy.

Developing on the State Security Council Directive, the SADF Short-Term Strategy for Mozambique outlines the precise measures that would be implemented against Mozambique over three phases of increasing intensity. ‘Phase One’ would last until the end of September. Though the document indicates that this would be the more subtle phase of diplomatic, economic and indirect military pressure on Mozambique, it would still involve

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94 “Belemmering van Radio Maputo … Daarstelling van ‘n klandestine radio (opeie en/of in samewerking met ZR) … Gasteprogramme vir meningsvormers uit Mosambiek”. “Implementering”, 5 September 1979, p10. A document from October 1979 then says that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia offered to hand control of their clandestine radio stations, aimed at Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique, to South Africa. The document notes that Voz da África Livre was having some internal problems.


96 “Spesiale Operasies insluitend die ontwriging van die logistieke infrastruktuur, olieopslagplekke en havens (behalwe Maputo) … Bedekte steun aan weerstandsbewegings ten opsigte van militêre uitrusting, sleutelpersoneel, opleiding en advies”. “Korttermynstrategie”, pp14-15.

97 “SVR Direktief No 1”, pp1-3.

98 “Geen grootskalaanse militêre operasies direk terugspoorbaar tot die RSA veiligheidsmagte moet onderneem word nie. Spesiale operasies en ander nie-terugspoorbare klandestiene veiligheidsaksies moet egter so spoedig moontlik uitgevoer word as deel van die gekoördineerde optrede teen Mozambiek soos in die korttermynstrategie beskryf”. “SVR Direktief No 1”; pp1-3.
cooperation with Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to destroy FPLM, ZANLA and ANC bases in southern Mozambique, destruction of infrastructure used to assist ZANLA and the ANC, and the covert support of anti-Frelimo organisations. ‘Phase Two’, from the beginning of October to the end of November, would involve the intensification of that pressure towards the goal of ending Frelimo support for ZANLA and the ANC. South African strategy would enter ‘Phase Three’ after December 1979, hastening operations to physically neutralise radical forces based in Mozambique. During this phase operations would be conducted more openly, though still with the hope they could not be traced to South Africa. While attacks on ZANLA bases would continue, pre-emptive assaults would be conducted against FPLM bases as far as Sofala. The South African Army, Air Force and Navy would be used in operations against Mozambican infrastructure, and might even take part in large-scale conventional operations against radical forces. Mozambique’s air defence capabilities might be destroyed and their harbours mined.\(^9\) In addition, there would be an expansion of the departmental strategy for assistance to resistance movements in Mozambique, with the details of those operations to be dealt with by the special operations units themselves.\(^10\) Though these documents show the planning for South Africa’s Mozambique strategy at its early stage, they constitute a virtual blueprint for the destruction of Mozambique over the next fifteen years.

Continuing their counter-insurgency efforts, now with the full backing of South Africa’s State Security Council, between 27 and 30 September Rhodesian forces crossed into Mozambique near the Honde River, north-west of Mavonde, and attacked a series of ZANLA bases with artillery, armoured vehicles and aircraft.\(^11\) This action was called Operation Miracle. The bases surrounding Chimoio, known as the ‘Chimoio Circle’, covered 64 square kilometres. Prior to the attack eleven SAS soldiers and four Renamo members were deployed near the area by helicopter to conduct reconnaissance of the ZANLA camps.\(^12\) Around this time Frelimo began mobilising brigades of their troops based in Chimoio, Tete and Beira to launch a joint operation against Renamo forces in Gorongosa. Renamo had consolidated control of the area around Gorongosa, north to the towns of Maringué and Macossa, hampering traffic by destroying a number of bridges near

\(^9\) “SAW Korttermynstrategie”, pp5-8.
\(^12\) Reid-Daly, \textit{Pamwe Chete}, pp434-435.
A second Renamo battalion had left Odzi for Gorongosa in October 1979 to reinforce their presence in the area. Meanwhile, a Rhodesian operation on 12 October destroyed a bridge on the Beira-Moatize railway, between Cambuladzi and Doa near the Malawian border. By this stage Renamo had around 1,500 fighters and relative freedom of movement in Mozambique’s central provinces. A South African document from October 1979 notes that Frelimo was very concerned about the ease with which Renamo’s operations were being conducted, and the effect they were having on FPLM morale and discipline in central Mozambique. The South Africans were aware that the FPLM was preparing a counter-offensive and that, along with the mobilisation of brigades to increase pressure on Renamo forces at Gorongosa, Frelimo was also mustering local militias and deploying SNASP agents to gather intelligence on Renamo activities. FPLM troops would also be deployed south of the Beira Corridor to locate Renamo’s base near Gogoi and prevent Renamo infiltration from there into Manica. It is unclear at what point South Africa collected this intelligence about the FPLM’s mobilisation or if it was passed to Renamo, but as Frelimo’s forces were beginning their operations around Gorongosa from mid-October a brazen attack led by Renamo President Matsangaissa against a now well-defended FPLM position resulted in his death on 17 October 1979. The FPLM assault on Gorongosa, which lasted until 26 October, killed over 100 Renamo fighters and captured 22 prisoners. In a propaganda victory for the Frelimo government a Rhodesian helicopter was also shot down by FPLM troops near Catandica. However, the offensive failed to permanently dislodge Renamo from their base at Gorongosa, and Renamo’s senior instructor Major Dudley Coventry sent units to establish new bases in the Sitatonga Mountains, on the Buzi River and on the Save River, all in southern Manica. In November a Renamo battalion left Odzi for the new Sitatonga base. During this period following Matsangaissa’s death a power struggle over who would succeed him is reported to have led to a gun-fight between two Renamo factions, from which Renamo’s Vice-

105 “Verbindings”, pp2-3; Flower. Serving Secretly, p244.
107 “Verbindings”, pp4-5.
President Afonso Dhlakama emerged the winner and thus as the new President. Orlando Cristina remained Renamo’s Chief of External Affairs.

While the Lancaster House Conference in London slowly negotiated the future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and thus the region as a whole, South African authorities planned for each contingency. One fascinating document, recording two policy options put to a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the State Security Council, gives some insight into the thinking behind South Africa’s regional strategy. Though the policy option document clearly favours a more moderate Southern Africa Strategy, South Africa’s policies towards the region would eventually embrace regional destabilisation. A summary of the two options for South Africa’s approach to the region outlines that,

The first is to concentrate on economic cooperation and maintain a low political profile. … It is predicated upon breaking down barriers by genuine cooperation and in the final result rendering other states in the region so dependent upon South Africa … that war becomes too costly a proposition to contemplate and sanctions unrealistic. The logical culmination of this approach is the creation of a constellation of states.

“The other option is to destabilise these territories and … overthrow … their governments, sabotage their infrastructure and support their dissident movements”.

‘Policy Option One’ notes that in order to survive “it is essential that White South Africa arrive at an accommodation with the blacks in South Africa to achieve peaceful coexistence within the geographical confines of greater South Africa”. To do this it would be necessary to convince black South Africans that the South African government would work towards equity in education, employment, housing, health and political representation. “In blunter terms it means keeping the bulk of the black population satisfied while preventing the revolutionaries from engineering a major uprising”. After soothing internal discontent, the next most important task was,

the need to come to an accommodation with South Africa’s neighbouring states and through them with the rest of Africa. The ideal is to develop cooperation within a constellation of states which rejects Marxism and through this mechanism terminate conditions of war in the region.

109 Vines, RENAMO, p16. Cabrita claims that there was no power-struggle following Matsangaissa’s death and that Dhlakama took over afterwards because, “he had already established his credentials in the battlefield as the one most likely to succeed Matsangae (sic)”. Instead he says that there was a challenge to Dhlakama’s leadership in the first quarter of 1980, by which time Dhlakama was already leader.

Cabrita, Mozambique, pp161-162.

110 “The Threat from Within”, To the Point, 13 July 1979, p10.


113 “Policy Options”, p1.

114 “Policy Options”, p1.

115 “Policy Options”, p1.
According to this more moderate position,

there can be no military solution in South Africa’s favour - no matter how many battles we win, African bases will be used indefinitely to launch new attacks on us. Moreover, we would have to win all the major battles/wars as to lose one would mean a final military solution against us, i.e. our extinction.\textsuperscript{116}

The best use for the SADF would be as a threat that would rarely, if ever, be deployed. The SADF “would be fatally over-extended if simultaneously committed in South West Africa and Rhodesia and at the same time required to protect South Africa’s borders” against hostile forces in Botswana and Mozambique.\textsuperscript{117} And if regional conflict sparked external intervention the SADF would probably be unable to defend against, “a major extended conventional war mounted by the Russians or by East Germany, North Korea and other surrogates…”\textsuperscript{118} Referring specifically to Mozambique, ‘Policy Option One’ concludes that,

South Africa should at all costs avoid involvement in Mozambique against Frelimo forces. It is regrettable that the Rhodesians have been compelled to attack Mozambican as opposed to Patriotic Front targets within Mozambique, thus creating a state of war with Mozambique, into which South Africa could be dragged.\textsuperscript{119}

The alternative perspective articulated in ‘Policy Option Two’ was that,

South Africa is by far the most powerful state in Southern Africa…. The West can on no account permit South Africa to fall under Marxist and indirect Russian control, because of South Africa’s share of raw materials … Militarily South Africa can easily deal with any purely African threat … Therefore it is better to deliver an ultimatum to neighbouring countries who harbour terrorists and, if it is ignored, to act openly and powerfully against them to eliminate the threat, than it is to sit back and wait for terrorism and guerrilla warfare to develop …\textsuperscript{120}

It is thus quite clear by this stage that the Apartheid establishment was split between these two perspectives on regional strategy, corresponding roughly with the ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ positions that would later contest Renamo’s role. The minimalist position, held predominantly by those the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, looked to the concept of the ‘constellation of states’ as a sustainable model for South African hegemony in southern Africa. The granting of independence to the homelands of Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979 and Ciskei 1981 was part of the constellation of states project, though they were not internationally recognised as independent states. While plans to include Zimbabwe in the constellation of states suffered a blow with Mugabe’s

\textsuperscript{116} “Policy Options”, pp2-3.
\textsuperscript{117} “Policy Options”, pp5-6.
\textsuperscript{118} “Policy Options”, pp5-6.
\textsuperscript{119} “Policy Options”, pp7-8.
\textsuperscript{120} “Policy Options”, p14.
election victory, the concept would remain an important influence on the minimalist position.\footnote{Minter, *Apartheid’s Contras*, p118.}

\section*{Renamo After the Fall of Rhodesia}

The build-up of FPLM forces near Gorongosa had continued since their initial offensive in October and from January 1980 they launched a new three-pronged attack on the Renamo base there, know as Casa Banana. Renamo quickly abandoned Casa Banana and began a move to the new Sitatonga base, in which they would be fully settled by April 1980.\footnote{Cabrita, *Mozambique*, pp171-176; “Controladas as Actividades da ‘Resistencia Moçambicana’”, *O Jornal*, 18 July 1980, p29.} Meanwhile, with the conclusion of the Lancaster House negotiations Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was nearing its transition to Zimbabwe, which would occur under a new government to be elected in February 1980. South Africa and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s white population still hoped that this would be a moderate government that would remain within the traditional alliance with South Africa. As part of the effort to ensure this result the CIO and South African Recces tried to kill ZANU-PF leader Robert Mugabe on a number of occasions. Under the code name Operation Hectic members of the Rhodesian and South African special forces created numerous plans for Mugabe’s assassination and unsuccessfully put a number of these into action. A car bomb was located along Mugabe’s route to the airport in Maputo on 27 January 1980, but when his car did not appear it was driven back to South Africa; a plan to kill Mugabe when he travelled to Bulawayo for a major election rally was foiled when his trip was cancelled; and a remote-controlled explosion missed Mugabe’s car as he left an election rally at Fort Victoria on 10 February 1980.\footnote{Stiff, *The Silent War*, pp292-294.} Supposed plans for a massive surprise assault against ZANLA forces congregating at assembly points after the election, code named Operation Quartz, were never put into effect.\footnote{R. Allport, *Operation Quartz – Rhodesia 1980*, http://home.wanadoo.nl/rhodesia/quartz.htm, accessed 16 March 2005.} ZANU easily won a majority in the nation’s elections and would form a government in Zimbabwe from mid-April 1980. Preceding the transfer of power in April 1980 Orlando Cristina and his staff were transferred to Phalaborwa, in the Transvaal near the Mozambican border, where they re-established VOFA.\footnote{Jack Wheeler, “From Rovuma to Maputo: Mozambique’s Guerrilla War”, *Reason*, December 1985, p34.} As had been discussed in the lead-up to the Lancaster House Conference, the ascent to power of radical forces in Zimbabwe led to the full transfer of Renamo to South African soil, and South African
patronage. About 200 Renamo soldiers still at Odzi at the time of transition were flown to South Africa and trained at the Letaba camp near Phalaborwa. The Letaba site was an old hunting camp near what would become the base of the Five-Reconnaissance Commandos. South Africa’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), of which Lieutenant-General P.J. van der Westhuizen was the Chief of Staff, was placed in charge of the Renamo operation, while Brigadier van Tonder and Colonel Charles van Nickerk dealt with Renamo’s day-to-day running. Colonel van Nickerk was head of DMI’s Directorate of Special Tasks, and he established Operation Mila to support Renamo, working out of the Zanza building on Proes Street in Pretoria. Cabrita claims that at the time of VOFA’s transfer to South Africa DMI was more committed to REMO and FUMO’s Domingos Arouca, but there seems to be no evidence that this was the case. By the time Renamo transferred to South Africa they already had a membership of approximately 2,000 and had forged international connections to Portuguese intelligence through Evo Fernandes. It thus seems unlikely that DMI would favour a small force like REMO, made up of predominantly white Portuguese, over a fully operational force of 2,000 fighters based in Mozambique.

By May 1980 the new Zimbabwean government was beginning to collaborate with their allies in Mozambique to destroy Renamo. During that month military and intelligence chiefs from Mozambique and Zimbabwe, including Ken Flower, who was kept on as Chief of the CIO, and FPLM Chief-of-Staff Sebastião Mabote, met in Salisbury to discuss an anti-Renamo strategy. Ironically three units of white soldiers who originally trained Renamo were subsequently sent to fight them in south-eastern Zimbabwe. A car bomb defused outside of Maputo’s main hotel on 23 May can only have contributed to Frelimo’s determination to defeat anti-government forces. By this time South Africa had begun re-evaluating its policy towards Renamo. While the SADF had automatically followed plans to bring Renamo to South African soil when ZANU-PF won power, a May 1980 document from South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs shows that those with more minimalist leanings were also considering Renamo’s potential. The document states that, “[w]ith the independence of Zimbabwe and the discontinuation of that country’s help to [Renamo],

127 Cabrita, Mozambique, p166.
128 Conversation with a former Mozambican Intelligence Agent, Maputo, 19 June 2003.
the survival of [Renamo] comes more to the forefront”. This matter was of increasing urgency since there had been reports that Mozambique and Zimbabwe were now planning a joint operation against Renamo. It is noted that while the SSC’s short-term strategy did make provision for assistance to Renamo, this decision was made while support was being channelled through Rhodesia and so would have to be reassessed. A major influence on Foreign Affairs thinking about the issue was the support it believed the ANC was receiving from Mozambique and through its harbours. Thus the conclusion was made that,

"we should get clarity on the matter of support to [Renamo] before we speak to [Mozambican representative] Mr Vieira. We should use it as a lever to get to a point of understanding with Mozambique on their support to the SAANC, and not as a long-term strategy to destabilise the Mozambican government [my italics]."

It is clear that at this time the minimalists did not object to the use of Renamo as a tool of South African foreign policy, in this case as a bargaining chip in discussions about Mozambican support to South African dissidents, but did not see them as the lynchpin in their Mozambican strategy.

Meanwhile, Mozambique was preparing to conclusively destroy this threat to their security. In late June a joint Mozambican-Zimbabwean operation commenced to storm Renamo’s Sitatonga base, in Massurize region near their shared border. Sitatonga II, the mountain on which Renamo’s base was situated, is approximately 100 kilometres southwest of Chimoio and offered a dangerously steep slope covered with thick forest. Therefore the FPLM had to use helicopters to transport troops up the mountain. Mozambican forces were also given authority to transit through Zimbabwean territory and Zimbabwean troops sealed the border to prevent Renamo retreating. Ken Flower was probably responsible for passing on precise information to the Mozambican government about the location and capabilities of Renamo’s forces. The FPLM thus assaulted Renamo’s northern position on 25 June, but were thwarted by the area’s terrain. Subsequently they concentrated on

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132 “Die Korttermynstrategie vir Mosambiek is nog nie ingetrek nie, alhoewel dit eintlik hersien moet word in die lig van veranderde omstandighede. Die KTS maak voorsiening vir steun aan die M.R.N. Dit is egter opgestel en goedgekeur toe die meeste steun deur middle van die Rhodesiërs gegee kon word”. “Mosambiekse Weerstandsbevordering”, p2.
attacking Renamo’s southern flank with the aid of artillery. A final offensive on 30 June was successful in occupying enemy positions in the south, though skirmishes would continue for a number of days. However, as Mozambican forces drove Renamo from their refuge South African helicopters appeared to transport survivors out of range of the FPLM attack, with final reports estimating that 272 Renamo fighters were killed and over 100 captured. Renamo also lost their stockpiles of light weapons, machine guns, bazookas, and anti-personal and anti-tank mines. The operation had delivered a significant, but not decisive blow against Renamo, and Cabrita claims this demonstrated the FPLM’s lack of counter-insurgency expertise. Nevertheless, on their own Renamo were a broken force. Their leader André Matsangaissa had been killed, their patron state had been taken over by their enemies, and they had been driven from their bases on Mozambican soil. But South Africa was by now considering what role Renamo could have in their regional strategy, and with their help Renamo would soon rise like a phoenix from the flames.


Between mid-1980 and 1983 Renamo recovered from its initial defeat by the Frelimo government and grew into a formidable guerrilla army that operated in most of Mozambique’s provinces. The Apartheid regime provided extensive assistance to Renamo during this period, supplying weapons, communications equipment, training and bases on its territory. Renamo thus became integral to South Africa’s Total Strategy for Mozambique, and its strategic aim a point of debate in the South African administration. The minimalist and maximalist factions that first formed in the lead up to Zimbabwean independence thus solidified in the early 1980s, as minimalists argued for a calculated guerrilla deployment and maximalists worked to augment Renamo’s strength. Meanwhile, the Renamo leadership continued to develop politically, and Orlando Cristina was particularly central to the forging of international connections, organising a merger of forces with the Malawi-based Partido Revolucionário Moçambicano (PRM), and the creation of Renamo’s National Council. However, in the context of a southward offensive in late 1982 that South Africa allowed to fail, Renamo’s maximalist supporters in South Africa grew increasingly concerned by Cristina’s quest for autonomy and would eventually have him assassinated in April 1983.

Renamo Rebuilds

Following the Mozambican armed forces’ (FPLM) defeat of Renamo at their Sitatonga base in June 1980 the scattered rebels, now led by Afonso Dhlakama, began to regroup in a base 26 kilometres from the Zimbabwe border at Chicarre, also referred to as Garágua.1 In this sparsely populated area of southern Manica Renamo’s now bedraggled army could operate with impunity. Meanwhile Orlando Cristina and Renamo’s European spokesman Evo Fernandes, a former PIDE/DGS agent and employee of Jorge Jardim, released an anti-communist ‘Manifesto and Program of Renamo’ that proclaimed a very generic, pro-western political platform. South Africa was now Renamo’s primary sponsor, Renamo’s headquarters had been moved into the Transvaal near the Mozambican border, and many of Renamo’s former Rhodesian trainers had integrated into the South African

Reconnaissance Commandos (Recces). Cristina remained the key link between Renamo and the South African leadership despite this transfer, again indicating the autonomy of the Renamo leadership. 2 South African forces continued to teach a wide variety of skills to Renamo cadre and guided bi-weekly airdrops of arms and equipment into Mozambique. “As from Rhodesia, all [weapons] were sanitized, selected not only ‘clean’ but also to match the weapons and ammunition of the FRELIMO opponent”, possibly from weaponry captured in Angola. 3 South Africa had also provided very advanced radio technology, which in future years would allow a centralised military command structure to operate effectively over large distances, and would make a major contribution to Renamo’s military success. 4 With a steady stream of supplies from South Africa, Renamo avoided combat beyond destroying a number of bridges and settled into a relatively comfortable life-style without any wider strategy. However, the Mozambican government gradually became aware of their continued presence and connections to South Africa, some have suggested through radio intercepts. 5

Meanwhile, elements within the South African government were still deciding what approach they should take to their newly acquired insurgency force. These internal debates took place as South Africa watched the formation of the Southern African Development Community Conference (SADCC), an anti-Apartheid alliance of South Africa’s neighbouring states, and was suffering from an oil shortage that was intensified by a loss of supplies due to the Iranian revolution. On 1 June 1980 the ANC bombed two Sasol plants that made oil from coal, deepening the crisis and heralding a series of ANC initiatives. 6 South Africa was already heavily involved in Angola in support of UNITA’s forces and during this time they launched Operation Sceptic, which became an extended action against

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5 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.

SWAPO forces in southern Angola. The July 1980 document “Korttermynstrategie ten Opsigte van Mosambiek”, presented an argument for a minimalist strategy in Mozambique. The document noted that Renamo and other resistance groups had been damaging morale, discipline, training and logistics within the FPLM and gaining popular support, but that their effectiveness was limited because they received little external help and lacked a dynamic leader. Two options for South African strategy towards Mozambique were then put forward and analysed: either that South Africa conduct covert destabilisation of Mozambique, or that they build a relationship based on co-operation. Examining the pros and cons of each option the document states that, while destabilisation is a pro-active strategy that might force Samora Machel’s government to change their policies or replace their leader, and could draw Mozambique into further dependence on South Africa, it might also intensify South Africa’s international isolation and force Mozambique into an even closer relationship with the Soviet bloc. The document also notes that at the time there seemed to be no alternatives to Machel’s government except for even more radical elements. On the other hand, while a co-operative strategy would demonstrate South Africa’s willingness to work with its neighbours, and economic development in Mozambique would lessen dependence on the Soviet Union and demonstrate the benefits of capitalism, it might also allow Machel’s government to exploit co-operation to further their Marxist goals and lessen Mozambican dependence on South Africa.

9 “Eerstens ‘n strategie wat ten doel het om op ‘n beheersde, doelbewuste wyse die situasie in Mosambiek kovert te destabiliseer; Tweedens om kontakte met Mosambiek op te bou ten einde ‘n verstandhouding van samewerking te verkry”. “Korttermynstrategie Ten Opsigte van Mosambiek”, p8.
10 “(a.) Die RSA tree pro-aktief en daadwêreld op om die situasie in Mosambiek tot sy voordeel uit te buit. (b.) Machel kan ôf sy houding verander ten gunste van die RSA se belange ôf verwag word deur ‘n meer gematigde regering. (c.) Dit sal samewerking tussen Mosambiek en Suid-Afrika op die basis van ‘n konstellasie van state bevorder deur ‘n groter bewussyn van Mosambiek se afhanklikheid van die RSA by Maputo tuis te bring…. (a.) Aangesien Mosambiek in die huidige stadium redelik stabile is, sal die optrede tot die RSA herlei word, wat internasionale isolasie en strafmaatreëls tot gevolg sal hé. (b.) Onstabiliteit kan verhoogde ongewenste inmenging van buite, dit wil sê die Sowjet-unie en Oos-Duitsland, onthol. Hier moet die Vriendskaps – en Samewerkingsooreenkomst tussen die USSR en Mosambiek in gedagte gehou word. (c.) ‘n Nuwe matige leier wat algemeen aanvaarbaar is, bestaan tans nie. Machel en sy regering kan deur ‘n meer radikale regering vervang word”. “Korttermynstrategie Ten Opsigte van Mosambiek”, p9.
11 “(a.) Die RSA bewys sy bereidwillingheid om met ander lande in Suidelike Afrika saam te werk, ongeag politieke bestel/ideologie…. (c.) Mosambiek word op die korttermyn van ekonomiese ondergang beredder, met die gevolg dat die land nie noodwendig dieper onder die Russiese invloedsfeer gedwing word nie. (d.) Mosambiek word die langtermyn van die geleenheid gebied om sy ekonomiesestruktuur te versterk en dus verder van die Russiese invloedsfeer te beweeg, wat stabiliteit in Suider-Afrika kan bevorder…. (a.) Die optrede sal tyd verg en Mosambiek manoevreeruimte bied. (b.) Samesprekings en ekonomiese verhoudings kan deur Machel uitgebuig word om sy Marxistiese doelwitte te bereik. (c.) Die
reaches the minimalist conclusion that the detrimental implications of a destabilisation strategy were too great, and that South Africa was already making progress with Mozambique through economic and political co-operation.\textsuperscript{12}

Thus for almost six months between mid and late 1980, while the South African military continued delivering supplies and South African officials debated their strategy towards Mozambique, Renamo did little more than stockpile equipment and recruit new fighters. They did this quite successfully, however, and Zimbabwean military intelligence reported that by December 1980 Renamo had 6-7,000 recruits and 10,000 by February 1981.\textsuperscript{13} Though some of these recruits were local volunteers, others were mustered by coercion and South African recruitment from the tens of thousands of Mozambican migrant workers resident in South Africa.\textsuperscript{14} One attack that did occur during this quiet period was the derailing of a train on the Beira railway by a landmine on 21 September, which closed the route for two weeks.\textsuperscript{15} By October Renamo’s sponsors in the South African military began encouraging the rebels to increase the scope of their operations in Mozambique. Thus on 20 October the 200 Renamo soldiers who had been trained at the Letaba camp were airlifted into Gaza, just south of the Save River. They crossed the river while travelling north to the base at Chicarre, but suffered many casualties because the river was flooding.\textsuperscript{16} Dhlakama was then flown to Phalaborwa to meet Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) representative Colonel Charles Van Niekerk, who urged him to commence new military operations in Gaza and Inhambane provinces. In Inhambane it was hoped that Renamo could situate troops close to the coast to facilitate the supply of equipment by sea, as airdrops were very expensive.\textsuperscript{17} Mozambican sources also reported that soldiers were dispatched from five South African helicopters in the locality of Massingir in Gaza on 26 October and that they subsequently ambushed a FPLM patrol.\textsuperscript{18} A
South African Foreign Affairs document from January 1981 refers to these airlifts noting that,

[the South African Air Force] plane and helicopter movements over southern Zimbabwean territory to support [Renamo] in the period 21 to 23 October were reported to the CIO by members of the security forces and locals. Mr [Ken] Flower [Chief of the CIO] is consequently aware of the continuing support for [Renamo].

Another South African document from November 1980 indicated that a senior diplomat at the British embassy in Maputo approached South Africa claiming that he had evidence of their support for Renamo, including photographs, and that he thought destabilisation only encouraged Mozambique’s dependence on the USSR. The document concludes that support for Renamo could be justified if they countered the ANC, but not simply on the basis of destabilising Mozambique.

In order to boost Renamo’s international credibility and to garner support Renamo’s leaders, Orlando Cristina and Afonso Dhlakama, conducted a European tour in late 1980/early 1981. They met representatives of the business community, the Roman Catholic Church and members of the Social Democratic Party in Lisbon, representatives of the Christian Social Union and Christian Democratic Union in West Germany, and an adviser to the President of France. This trip was another example of Orlando Cristina’s attempts to broaden Renamo’s support base and thereby lessen their dependence on South African patronage. To coincide with this European tour Renamo launched a number of military attacks inside Mozambique, their first offensive in almost six months. On 22-23 November the Beira oil pipeline was sabotaged near Chimoio; on 27 November the Cabora Bassa power lines were sabotaged for the first time; in late November/early December the towns

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21 Vines, RENAMO, p20.
of Dombe and Espungabera in central Manica were attacked and Dombe was occupied; on 6 December a long section of the Cabora Bassa powerlines were brought down with dynamite and Beira’s water supply was cut; on 7 December a Frelimo troop carrier was ambushed north of the Gorongosa river and several troops were killed; on 8 December the town of Chibabava in western Sofala was captured; and on 9 December the FPLM garrison at Magomburi was attacked. While Renamo’s European diplomacy may have had some success making contacts in Portugal and West Germany, a South African document from January 1981, “Beweere RSA Steun aan MNR Beweging”, indicates that following the tour the French ambassador to South Africa warned the South African government that France would not oppose UN sanctions if they became aware of South African support for Renamo. The document also stated that Zimbabwean authorities were aware of continued airspace violations in support of Renamo, and feared that they would be compelled to shoot down South African helicopters and thereby creating a confrontation. In addition, they were aware that Renamo’s radio station had renewed broadcasts from its new South African base, 100 kilometres north-east of Pietersburg. Intelligence acquired by the South African Foreign Affairs department in late 1980 also confirmed that Zimbabwe was increasingly alarmed by South African support for Renamo and other insurgent groups. According to Paul Moorcraft, intelligence about Zimbabwean involvement in Mozambique and information about Frelimo activities was regularly leaked by South African agents in Zimbabwe’s special branch and the CIO, which had retained much of their personnel from the Rhodesian period. One particular communiqué states that a South African agent,

learned from a well-placed source that Mr Mugabe’s visit to Nigeria, publicised as an economic mission, was in fact an endeavour to obtain funds for arms and support for – 1. Use against the Mozambique Resistance Movement which apparently uses Zimbabwean territory as a retreat. The informant said that President Machel is increasing his pressure on Mugabe to actively assist in wiping out the movement, and 2. For preparations in the event of an attack on Zimbabwe by South Africa. According to [the] informant the Zimbabwean authorities have information to the effect that South Africa is actively supporting the Mozambique Resistance Movement as well as the Patriotic Front … against the Mugabe government.

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22 Cabrita, Mozambique, p193; “Strikes at Pylons, Pipelines”, Star, 17 December 1980. Reports of several helicopters flying over the high-tension Cabora Bassa powerlines south of Songo on 3 December 1980 may be connected to the sabotage of those lines. Cardoso, “RSA Viola”; Cardoso, “Aviação Militar”.
26 Moorcraft, African Nemesis, p265.
27 Communiqué to Political Branch, 23 December 1980, p1. Also see Communiqué to Political Branch from Salisbury, 29 December 1980, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/113/3, pp1-2.
These concerns were not without foundation as South Africa had begun applying pressure on Zimbabwe by withdrawing railway technicians and engineers, and creating unexplained hold-ups of goods destined for that country. Then, in December 1980, ZS$250,000 worth of arms were stolen from Cranborne Barracks in Harare, probably by South African agents. As suspected South Africa was also training Zimbabwean dissidents with the aim of destabilising Mugabe’s regime. South Africa would continue to destabilise Zimbabwe through attacks such as the explosions at the Inkomo Barracks armoury which destroyed ZS$50 million worth of weapons and ammunition on 16 August 1981, the blowing up of ZANU-PF headquarters in Harare on 18 December 1981 which killed seven and injured 124, and explosions that destroyed 13 Zimbabwean Air Force planes at Thronhill base near Gweru on 27 July 1982.28

Destabilisation Intensifies

After Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as President of the United States of America in January 1981 the small amount of aid that Mozambique received from the US quickly diminished due to Reagan’s new hardline stance against communism. Tensions between the countries heightened later in 1981 when Mozambique expelled six American diplomats from Maputo, accusing them of being CIA agents working to overthrow the regime. The US accused the USSR of engineering the incident, recalled its ambassador and suspended food aid to Mozambique.29 In this new atmosphere, in which the US would permit and often encourage open assaults on communist interests, South Africa felt free to make its 30 January 1981 attack on three buildings occupied by South African refugees in Matola, on the outskirts of Maputo, which killed up to fifteen people. In the attack South African commandos in FPLM uniforms and with blackened faces crossed the border and headed south to Matola. At 1.30 am they simultaneously attacked three widely-separated buildings, which they claimed were a network of ANC safe-houses used to plan the attacks on the Sasol plants and other targets. The ANC denied this, but it is clear that South Africa’s description of the targets was probably accurate.30 Then in March, FPLM and South African Defence Force (SADF) troops clashed on the beach at the border of Natal and Maputo provinces. South African soldier Corporal Petrus Viljoen was killed in the

skirmish. South Africa claimed the soldiers had “unwittingly crossed the border at Ponta de Ouro”, but Mozambique suspected a larger attack was planned and that Mozambican defences were being probed. Thirty one fly-overs of Ressano Garcia, Mapulanguene and Catuane by South African aircraft in April 1981 can also only have been designed to intimidate the Mozambican government or gather intelligence, as they were too far south to have been supply-drops for Renamo forces. Following the Matola raid and the clash at Ponta de Ouro, Mozambique began to reorientate towards what it thought was likely to be a sustained conflict with South Africa. They also declared war on ‘the internal enemy’, purging eight military officers and claiming that the Matola raid “was made possible partly by the infiltration by South African agents of the higher echelons of Mozambique’s armed forces”.

One South African Recce member who had been sent into Mozambique in 1981 recognised that, with the exception of their military actions in November and December 1980, Renamo’s forces conducted few operations and maintained a poor training regime. With 40-60 tonnes of supplies and equipment dropped by parachute on a monthly basis, Renamo personnel had little motivation to expand the territory under their control or to engage government forces. The situation persisted regardless of Renamo’s co-operation with South African special forces and Cristina’s own presence inside Mozambique on some occasions. This particular Recce member was given the task of persuading the Renamo leadership that they were in danger lingering at the Chicarre base as Frelimo had intelligence about their operations and was preparing another offensive against them using Mozambican, Zimbabwean, Tanzanian and possibly Zambian forces. He had some success convincing them of the threat and built a strong working relationship with Cristina.

Though some right-wing publications claimed that by March 1981 Renamo controlled much of the area between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers, this was little more than propaganda. In reality Renamo continued to operate in an area bounded by the Beira Corridor to the north and Save River to the south until a 300-strong contingent of Renamo troops left to open a front in Inhambane on 4 July 1981. The column travelled south-east from Chicarre base, crossed the Save River into Inhambane and established a base in the

32 Cardoso, “RSA Viola”; Cardoso, “Aviação Militar”.
33 Marcelino Komba, “Mozambique’s Return to Arms”, *Africa*, No 118, June 1981, pp 52, 61-62. The campaign against corruption and infiltration of Frelimo will be discussed in more details in chapter seven.
34 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
Chicholane area of the sparsely-populated Zinave National Park. South African airspace violations during July and August may have been to drop supplies to this column. Some beach landing sites may also have been established for supply drops by mid-1981, probably deployed from the South African naval vessels SAS Tafelberg and Protea, or by shorter-range boats launched from Natal. Renamo seems to have had little conflict with government forces for most of 1981, though they continued to expand their zone of operations as a troop column led by Calisto Meque left Chicarre and headed towards northern Manica in October 1981, marching to the east of the Chimoio-Tete road and picking up supplies dropped along the way by the South African military. The column would reach the Mungari region in northern Manica by December.

Meanwhile, South Africa’s own covert activities inside Mozambique continued, with three South African soldiers were killed while sabotaging the Beira-Zimbabwe railway on 14 October. A more successful attack by South African commandos on 29-30 October destroyed the road and rail bridges that crossed the Pungwe River near Beira, cutting land traffic between Beira and Zimbabwe and destroying the Beira oil pipeline. This attack coincided with the movement of four trainloads of North Korean arms destined for the Zimbabwean Fifth Brigade in Umtali. Only the Umtali Special Branch knew about the shipment, and it seems the Special Branch Head had been leaking information to the South Africans. The attack may also have been connected to others that occurred in the lead up to the SADCC conference held in Malawi on 19-20 November 1981. Following the destruction of the two bridges across the Pungwe River, Malawi’s oil supply route through Mozambique seems to have been cut for a short period, and on 13 November eight marker buoys were destroyed in Beira harbour. While the buoys were replaced within 48 hours, their destruction, in combination with other South African manoeuvres that included deliberately delaying oil shipments into Zimbabwe, constituted an attack on the economic

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36 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp194, 196.
38 Cabrita, Mozambique, p199.
independence of the SADCC states. It is clear from South African documents detailing their ‘Total Strategy’ towards Mozambique that, although Mozambique posed no military threat, the South Africans thought Mozambican infrastructure lessened the SADCC states’ dependence on the Apartheid regime and that it could be used by Mozambique’s Soviet bloc allies to harass South Africa. Though Renamo claimed credit for the attack, the buoys were up to 40 kilometres out to sea and would have required skilled navigation to find. Peter Stiff has since confirmed that the operation was actually a purely South African one and that it was carried out by a Five-Recce team under the command of Major Bert Sachse, which embarked from the SAS Tafelberg.

One journalist estimated that by November approximately 500 people, including Renamo fighters and FPLM personnel, had been killed in the civil conflict in 1981. This was set to increase as a second Renamo column left Chicarre in November 1981 and travelled south-east to link with Renamo forces deployed in the Zinave National Park, before moving into Gaza province and establishing a camp in the Banhine National Park. These two contingents then began to expand their activity southwards. Renamo could now harass traffic on the main north-south highway along the coast. Meanwhile, Renamo’s political representatives had begun to broadcast a four-point political programme via their South African-based radio station *Voz da África Livre* (VOFA). This programme set out the basic principles that Renamo stood for:

1. The extinction of the communist system; 2. the formation of a government of ‘National Reconciliation’; 3. all nationalisations by Frelimo to be reviewed; 4. the private sector to be the ‘dynamising sector of the country’.

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42 “Alhoewel die gewapende magte van Mosambiek nie ‘n direkte bedreiging vir die RSA inhou nie, bestaan daar wel ‘n potensiële bedreiging indien ‘n surrogaatmag Mosambiek se grondgebied, fasiliiteite en die FAM se uitrusting sou gebruik…. ‘n Berdere aspekt is die feit dat Mosambiek sy hawegeriewe en vervoerbindings, indien die voldoende verbeter kan werk, tot ‘n groter mate tot die beskikking sal kan sel van lande war tans tot ‘n meerder of mindere mate van die RSA se infrastruktuur afhanklik is om so hulle afhanklikheid op hierdie gebied van die RSA te verminde”. “SVR-Riglyne vir ‘n Totale Strategie vir Mosambiek”, Secretariat of the South African State Security Council, November 1981, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/113/3, p2.


44 Ward, “Mozambique: Lifelines under Attack”.


While this programme is very low on substance, points two and three demonstrate two of the agendas driving Renamo’s leadership: for Renamo’s leaders to be incorporated into positions of power within the Mozambican government (and thus be able to form profitable client-patron networks); and for Renamo’s Portuguese supporters (the so-called Renamo Branco) to regain their assets that had been nationalised after independence.

By late 1981, with Renamo operating in Manica, Sofala, Inhambane and Gaza provinces, Frelimo made a decision to start mobilising local militias. Over 400 Tanzanian soldiers arrived to assist with their training, along with seventeen tons of weapons and uniforms from Portugal. President Machel began to re-emphasise the virtues of the old guerrilla army, which produced its own food and politically educated local populations. He also again planned to strike a decisive blow against Renamo’s main base, this time at Chicarre. The FPLM thus began an artillery and air assault on 4 December, possibly using equipment provided by East Germany. The Chicarre base was a dispersed target that consisted of about 400 huts spread over about 20 kilometres, and included a helicopter landing-pad. João Cabrita claims that intercepts of Frelimo communications had revealed the FPLM build-up some time before the assault, so that by the time of the attack there were only 520 guerrillas at the base. In anticipation of the offensive one column of Renamo fighters had fled northwards towards Gorongosa, while another headed south to take refuge with the forces in northern Inhambane. As FPLM troops closed in on the base most of the remaining Renamo soldiers retreated to the south and were evacuated across the border with the help of South African forces. South African aircraft that violated Mozambican air space eleven times between 1 December 1981 and 8 January 1982 may have dropped supplies to Renamo forces in Gaza and Manica to aid their escape. Though few Renamo guerrillas were killed in the offensive against Chicarre, captured documents proved Renamo’s connection to South Africa and that their leaders had toured Portugal, France and West Germany. The passports of a number of South African instructors were found at the base, along with documents detailing four meetings in which Renamo leaders met Colonel Charles van Niekerk at Zoabostad, in the Transvaal, in October and November 1980. At these meetings Renamo was promised training in heavy weapons and sabotage, as well as South African participation in attacks on Mozambican forces. Orlando Cristina was recorded as suggesting that the Cabora Bassa powerlines be destroyed to cover

Renamo’s connections with South Africa. Colonel van Niekerk gave directions that Renamo forces should disrupt rail traffic, establish bases inside Mozambique adjacent to the South African border, and open a new military front in Maputo Province. He also emphasised that South Africa wanted to swap from airborne to sea-based supply, suggesting the mouth of the Buzi River in Sofala would be a good location to drop supplies. In the days following the destruction of the Chicarre base Afonso Dhlakama and Orlando Cristina, now at Phalaborwa in South Africa, were told by South African contacts that unless Renamo could prove they were a viable organisation South Africa would withdraw its support. Cristina responded quickly by outlining how Renamo would be reformed and would embark upon a new, pro-active strategy. The defeat at Chicarre would thus lead Renamo to adopt a more aggressive and expansionist strategy.

By this time the Renamo column led by Calisto Meque had reached the Mungári area in northern Manica, making a number of attacks on the highway near Guro, attacking the town of Mungári on 12 December and establishing bases near the south bank of the Zambezi River. Meanwhile, the Renamo column that had fled towards Gorongosa in early December crossed the Beira Corridor on 10 December and attacked Chitengo, a town within the Gorongosa National Park, on 17 December. In that attack British ecologist John Burlison and Chilean Roberto Carillo were taken hostage. They later reported that the Renamo forces they observed numbered about 1,000 and were armed with mortars, landmines and machine-guns. They were well disciplined, had good organisation, had free movement in the region during the daytime, and they held FPLM prisoners. These forces soon began to spread out towards the Zambezi River and established bases near Inhaminga, Caia and Chemba to the north of Beira. They sabotaged the Beira railway on 20 January 1982 and attacked Maringué a number of times in late January. On 30 January Renamo forces raided Inhaminga, destroying a locomotive, and seizing weapons and


51 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.


trucks. Renamo forces in Gaza spread even more quickly, reaching the Limpopo River by January 1982 and launching frequent attacks on the Limpopo railway. According to Cabrita the reason Renamo expanded southwards so rapidly was because the strength of FPLM forces in the region meant that it was too dangerous to remain at any particular site for too long. He claims that Renamo moved so far south that they were able to target the main highway along the coast between Xai-Xai and Manjacaze in southern Gaza. Renamo were less successful in February and March 1982 as government forces began to react to their new distribution of fighters. In February two battles in the Guro/Mungári region in northern Manica resulted in seventeen Renamo soldiers being killed and fourteen captured. While an attack on the town of Gorongosa on 25 February was repelled and fifteen rebels were killed, Renamo forces successfully attacked a train at Lamego, south of Gorongosa, killing five civilians and injuring 80, and launched an assault on Macossa to the north-west of Gorongosa. By March it was decided that villagers in Inhambane were to be armed because of the escalation of Renamo attacks in the region over the previous six months, and President Machel appointed provincial military commanders who had experience from the liberation war to direct the local militias. Meanwhile, it was reported that South African planes were overflying northern Inhambane on a weekly basis to drop supplies and conduct reconnaissance. Government operations in northern Inhambane did produced some results quickly as on 10 March a Renamo base was destroyed at Papa Tare, near Mabote.

By April 1982 Renamo was operating at a low level in five Mozambican provinces and had began to attack more developed settlements with larger groups of fighters. Their brutality was also increasing as they killed anyone they thought was connected to Frelimo. Mutilation of civilians was becoming a more commonly used method of instilling fear into local populations, and forced recruitment of civilians to fight or work as porters occurred regularly. While some Recce teams who trained Renamo guerrillas inside Mozambique in

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1982 as part of South Africa’s Operation Mila found that recruits were as young as twelve.\(^{59}\)
The northwards trajectory of Renamo forces in early 1982 had convinced some in Mozambique that Renamo’s raids during that period were aimed at capturing supplies so they could travel to Malawi to regroup.\(^{60}\) This was not quite the case, however, as after the destruction of Renamo’s Chicarre base it was decided to re-establish their headquarters in the Gorongosa Mountains. As part of this plan a column of 300 guerrillas left the sanctuary of the Zinave National Park in northern Inhambane in March 1982 and travelled north, reaching Gorongosa in April. Another column of approximately 150 men would follow in June.\(^{61}\) Meanwhile, the Beira railway was sabotaged twice in April, a local militia barracks near Gondola was attacked on 17 April, and sabotage of the railway continued in May with an attack on a train near Chimoio that resulted in the deaths of 40 civilians.\(^{62}\) Consolidating their control of the Gorongosa region, Renamo was reported to have destroyed seven villages, three co-operatives, 31 primary schools and health posts, a state farm and a sawmill in the second quarter of 1982. Many locals fled to the town of Gorongosa, which had been defended against a Renamo offensive in February.\(^{63}\) Those unlucky enough to be trapped within the zone controlled by Renamo may have been coerced into providing food and services for the guerrillas in a kind of plantation economy. The population of what the 1988 \textit{Gersony Report} labelled ‘Control Areas’ was predominantly captive and production was controlled through fear and force, often through an efficient system of surveillance by the Renamo fighters and the \textit{Mujeeba}, a civilian police force consisting of local collaborators.\(^{64}\)

Further south, in Gaza province, guerrilla forces were moving southwards along the Limpopo River valley to little more than 100 kilometres from Mozambique’s capital, Maputo. It seemed to observers at the time that Renamo aimed to cut Maputo off from the rest of the country.\(^{65}\) Thirty three air violations by South African planes between January and July 1982, mostly over Gaza province, may have involved dropping supplies to these advancing Renamo soldiers.\(^{66}\)

\(^{60}\) Hanlon, “Mozambique Rebels ’Regroup in Malawi’”.
\(^{61}\) Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, pp200-201; Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
\(^{64}\) Vines, \textit{RENAMO}, pp91-92.
Renamo Develops Politically

While Renamo expanded their territory inside Mozambique, Orlando Cristina’s more pro-active vision for the resistance also led him to make diplomatic contact with potential allies. Though claims had been circulating since July 1981 that Malawi had established camps for Renamo at Salima, Mangoche and Mount View, the force operating from Malawi at this time, the Partido Revolucionário Moçambicano (PRM), was still an independent organisation. And rather than aid these rebels, following a 1981 meeting between Presidents Machel and Banda, Malawi arrested PRM leader Amós Sumane and handed him and other PRM members over to Frelimo. However, in early 1982 Cristina made overtures towards PRM through Gilberto Fernandes, an Indian trader who was Renamo’s emissary in Malawi. Fernandes made contact with the former Frelimo guerrilla and subsequent leader of PRM, Gimo Phiri, and began negotiations to have his forces in Zambézia unite with Renamo.\(^{67}\) Cristina’s connections with the Malawian government were also made in early 1982 through the Malawian Police Force, to which the South African Military Attaché in Malawi delivered a letter of introduction. Renamo’s relations with Malawi would remain confined to that channel and connections with Malawian paramilitaries, whose support would later be critical for their operations in northern Mozambique. Meanwhile, Cristina had also decided to establish contact with Mozambican exiles in Kenya. A significant number of Makonde refugees had remained in Kenya after the liberation war or had fled there during the first years of independence, and they had maintained large caches of weapons in Mozambique’s north. An envoy was sent to Nairobi to speak to exiled Mozambicans there in early 1982, with the assistance of the Kenyan government. In May a meeting was held in Pretoria with delegates from Nairobi including: former Frelimo Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs and former COREMO Chief of Defence, Fanuel Mahluza; former COREMO Defence Secretary Vicente Ululu; and Francisco Nota Moisés.\(^{68}\) Around the same time a Provisional Accord of Unification was agreed between Cristina and PRM leader Gimo Phiri. According to the agreement,

> the National Council of [Renamo] and the leadership of the Revolutionary Party of Mozambique, through our representatives, agree to the integration of the two similar parties to constitute a common politico-military front in the struggle against the Frelimo government.\(^{69}\)

\(^{68}\) Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal; Cabrita, *Mozambique*, p187.  
Due to Renamo’s more developed infrastructure, their support inside Mozambique and internationally, and their political programme, PRM would be subsumed by Renamo, take on their name and accept the leadership of Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama.\(^70\) Renamo forces would soon move into Zambézia province and PRM’s commanders would pass control over to the new commander of the integrated forces, Mangwerende John.\(^71\) However, PRM would gain some authority within Renamo, as Gimo Phiri would become a member of the National Council and its sole representative in Malawi.\(^72\) A letter from Orlando Cristina dated 28 June 1982 confirms these arrangements, but notes that PRM’s former commanders would retain control over smaller units that would support Renamo forces. It also emphasises that PRM soldiers should act as guides and contacts with the population, and perform other tasks important for recruitment in the area.\(^73\) Interestingly, while Renamo had been negotiating with Makonde representatives from Kenya in previous months, and the organisation continued receiving support from South Africa, Cristina’s letter denies any connections with the groups MONAMO and FUMO (small Mozambican opposition groups with representation in Kenya) and says that any claims that Renamo was supported by Jorge Jardim or South Africa were propaganda disseminated by the Mozambican government.\(^74\)

\(^70\) “O Conselho Nacional da RNM e a Direcção do Partido Revolucionário Moçambicano considerando: - Que a RNM tem desenvolvido e contribuído com um maior esforço na luta político-militar contra o Governo Frelimo, possuindo mais amplas estruturas e apoios internos e externos, - Que o programa político e as estruturas da RNM constituem os desejos e as aspirações da maioria do Povo Moçambicano e a base partidária em que se devem integrar os dois Partidos, concordam que a integração dos dois Partidos virá reforçar os esforços de todos em patrões contra as forças comunistas da Frelimo, mantendo-se o nome de Resistência Nacional Moçambicana e sob a Presidência de Afonso Dhlakama”.

“Acordo Provisorio de Unificação”.

\(^71\) “Os comandantes do PRM passam a ser considerados comandantes da RNM, ficando integrados no Comando da Região Militar da Província da Zambézia logo que o Comandante Mangwerende John estabeleça na área as forças que estão destinadas aquela região, que serão integradas com as outras forças que já ali existem”. “Acordo Provisorio de Unificação”.

\(^72\) “O Presidente do PRM membro do Conselho Nacional da RNM o único representante da RNM no Malawi”. “Acordo Provisorio de Unificação”.

\(^73\) “Os comandantes operacionais da PRM mantém o seu comando sobre os pequenos grupos já por eles organizados e os quais vão ser reforçados com combatentes da RNM.... alguns combatentes do PRM que possam servir de guias, contactos com a população e outras missões importantes de recrutamento. Todos serão suportados pelo apoio logístico da RNM”. Letter from Renamo Secretary-General Orlando Cristina to the PRM in Zambézia, 28 June 1982.

\(^74\) “Uma outra recomendação que desejo fazer trata-se de as ligações com certos grupos tais como MONAMO e FUMO e outros que são grupos fantoches de pseudo-políticos os quais querem servir-se do esforço e do sacrificio das forças combatentes para tomarem conta do poder. Eles nunca prestaram qualquer ajuda real e nem aceitaram sacrifícios, pelo contrario, tem lançado campanhas difamatórias contra nós. Nós não temos quaisquer ligações com essa gente e nem trabalhamos para o Jardim ou sul-africanos como a propaganda machelista nos tem acusado”. Letter from Cristina to the PRM, 28 June 1982.
Thus Renamo’s National Council was formed in mid-1982, incorporating the existing Renamo leadership, politically experienced representatives of the Mozambican exile community in Kenya, and Gimo Phiri as a representative of the newly integrated forces of the Partido Revolucionário Moçambicano. Though Renamo claimed to have had a National Council since mid-1981, the new council seems to have been a larger and more representative political body. It consisted of twelve men with specific portfolios, above which were President Afonso Dhlakama and Secretary-General Orlando Cristina. However, some still asserted that Renamo’s real organisation was mostly military.

According to Margaret Hall and Tom Young, “[t]he formation of the National Council therefore represented a move in 1982 to graft a political superstructure on to an existing military organisation.” Renamo was still led by Commander and Chief Afonso Dhlakama. Below him were said to be fifteen Generals, three of whom were Chiefs of Staff who each oversaw one third of the country. For the most part, to be in the inner circle of the Renamo hierarchy some knowledge of the N’dau language was necessary, as Rhodesian recruitment along the Mozambican border region had led to a prevalence of that ethnicity in Renamo’s leadership. The National Council included: Orlando Cristina as Secretary-General; Fanuel Mahluza as Chief of Political and External Affairs; Raul Domingos as Chief of Defence; Evo Fernandes as Co-ordinator of the Political and Foreign Department; Antonio Juliane as Chief of Education and Social Affairs; Comandante Marquez as Chief of the Department of Operations; Khembo dos Santos; Comandante Zeco as Chief of Security; Adriano Bomba as head of Information and Youth Affairs; and his brother Boaventura Bomba as National Politics Commissioner. Cabrita claims that the Bomba brothers were connected to the REMO faction, the white Portuguese (or Renamo Branco) who had preceded Renamo in Rhodesia’s experiments with insurgency. Boaventura lived in Johannesburg and was in touch with REMO, and he helped to facilitate Adriano’s defection from Mozambique with his fighter jet. Thus, Cristina wanted them to be co-opted into the Renamo leadership to rob REMO of their political power. On the other hand this also gave the South African Portuguese a foothold of influence in Renamo. The new National Council quickly released a new and more detailed ‘Manifest and Programme’ that called for: the creation of a multi-party democratic state; a free economy based on

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75 Vines, RENAMO, pp80-83.
77 Vines, RENAMO, pp80-83.
78 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp187-192; Vines, RENAMO, pp151-156.
private enterprise; a state respecting the rights of man, where all citizens are equal before
the law; the existence of public and private health systems and education as a right of all
citizens; the state as a guarantor of economic infrastructure; submission of the military to
the political establishment, and the immediate dismantlement of instruments used to
suppress citizens’ rights; respect for international organisations, and international relations
based on mutual respect and non-interference; and a freely elected assembly to approve a
new constitution based on principles of political and economic democracy, and respect for
the rights of its citizens. The council also set about organising its international
representation, so Fanuel Mahluza left in July 1982 to travel to Germany, Canada and the
United States where he appointed Renamo representatives. Meanwhile, Cabrita claims that
turmoil had already erupted within the National Council as the Bomba brothers
manoeuvred to replace Cristina as Secretary-General. Cristina fought back, demoting
Adriano Bomba, moving Evo Fernandes from Co-ordinator of the Political and External
Relations Department to head of the Studies Department, and replacing Mahluza with
Artur Vilankulu in the external relations department.

Operation Cabana

The Mozambican government was not idle in its war against Renamo during this
time. Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe had begun providing military support to
Mozambique from March 1982. Tanzanian troops were positioned throughout the border
region of Manica province and near the Cabora Bassa dam, while Zimbabwe deployed up
to 1,000 troops and established helicopter patrols along the economically vital Beira
Corridor in response to frequent Renamo attacks on the railway and oil pipeline. Jorge de
Costa, a former director of Mozambique’s national security service, the Serviço Nacional de
Segurança Popular (SNASP), who had defected to South Africa following reforms to the
security services in late 1981, also revealed to South African authorities that Tanzanian
troops were stationed inside Mozambique along their common border to seal it from
potential Renamo infiltration. As part of an April 1982 agreement Portugal stepped up
supply of equipment to Mozambique and in May elite Mozambican military personnel went

No 2, 1983, pp130-134; “Zimbabwe, Mozambique Plan Defence Strategy”, *Daily Times (Tanz)*, 17
83 “Meeting with Mr Jorge Costa, 18 June 1982”, N.C. Schofield, 10 July 1982, South African Foreign
Affairs Archive, file 1/113/3, p7. Costa’s defection is mentioned in “Mozambique: A Parting of the
to Portugal for counter-insurgency training. De Costa informed South Africa in June 1982 that in an effort to build relations with Mozambique, Portugal had agreed,

to act as an intermediary between Mocambique and the USA, the EEC and Nordic countries. [and that] the Portuguese President and Prime Minister had spoken to Greece, … [Chancellor of West Germany] Helmut Schmidt, [former Chancellor of West Germany] Willy Brandt, [French President François] Mitterrand and possibly the USA. This Isolation Plan is also designed to prevent [South African]-European military co-operation. Dr Luis Santos Gomes, the diplomatic adviser to the Portuguese Prime Minister, also put forward the idea,

to try to influence liberal [South African] enterprises to invest in Mocambique and thus be in a position to bring pressure to bear on the [South African] government to stop supporting [Renamo].

In the short-term, as part of a Mozambique-Portugal military agreement, principally aimed at combating Renamo,

Sixty Mocambican trainees will be sent to Portugal to undergo Commando training. Thereafter they will return to Mocambique with some Portuguese instructors to continue training and to train their own troops. The Portuguese will also supply equipment and uniforms. [De Costa added that this] is a way of Portugal getting at South Africa by means of support for … Mozambican government forces against [Renamo] which is considered an extension of South Africa.

Meanwhile, 1,500 former guerrillas were called up for military service by the Mozambican government and Peoples’ Militias were established in Maputo province in June, and later in Sofala and Tete. And in late June President Machel cancelled a trip to Britain so he could take personal control over the planning of the war. The FPLM then began a major offensive Operation Cabana (Shack) focusing more than 10,000 soldiers on destroying Renamo bases in Mozambique’s south. The plan was to sweep northwards from the Limpopo River and southwards from the Beira Corridor to corral Renamo’s forces along the Save River and clear the rebels from most of Gaza, Inhambane, Manica and Sofala provinces. Mozambican soldiers deployed along the South African border in the west and the main north-south Highway in the east, while Zimbabwean troops sealed off the

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85 “Meeting with Mr Jorge Costa”, pp1-2.
86 “Meeting with Mr Jorge Costa”, p2.
87 “Meeting with Mr Jorge Costa”, p2.
88 Campbell, “Soviet Policy in Southern Africa: Angola and Mozambique”, p225; Botha, “Mozambique: the Democratic People’s Revolution Fails”, pp130-134; Michael Kavanagh, _The World Today (BBC World Service)_ , 22 June 1982. In relation to Machel’s cancelling of his trip Jorge de Costa believed that “[the Frelimo] government and party are not stable and it is likely that the visit was cancelled owing to security considerations”. “Meeting with Mr Jorge Costa”, p3.
western border between Pafuri and Espungabera. Other Zimbabwean units were deployed in Gaza and along the Beira Corridor. The second phase of the operation would be to push the rebels into a ‘killing zone’ around the Save River, near the Zimbabwean border, to be finished off in a final campaign. Thus from mid-year the FPLM began advancing northwards through Inhambane and southwards through Manica and Sofala. The Renamo-occupied towns of Dombe and Chibavabava appear to have been liberated at this time.89 In late July Renamo reported that the FPLM, backed by Zimbabwean and Tanzanian forces, had amassed up to 15,000 men near the towns of Panda, Morrumbene and Vilanculos along Inhambane’s southern coast in preparation for a massive assault against guerrilla bases. These coastal bases may have been especially important for their facilitation of supply drops by South African ships.90 However, as the offensive pushed northwards Renamo could see the FPLM’s intentions and avoided confrontation in order to slip through government lines. The push that Renamo columns would make into Tete and Zambézia provinces in August, though part of Renamo’s new expansionist strategy, may also have been an attempt to relieve the pressure in central Mozambique by forcing a re-deployment of government units.91

In August 1982 the Renamo column led by Calisto Meque, which had previously been responsible for attacks around the Mungári region in northern Manica, crossed the Zambezi River west of Tambara to enter Tete province. Moving north and west they began to launch attacks on the road and railway from the town of Moatize south to Mutarara, as well as on the road between the city of Tete and the Malawian border. This disrupted coal shipments from the mines at Moatize, as well as traffic to Malawi along the road and rail systems from Beira and Zimbabwe.92 Though previous attacks had been made in this area by South African commando teams, notably on the bridge at Mecito, this was the first time Renamo made their presence felt in this region along the Malawian border. This prompted some authors to claim Renamo was operating from Malawi. This is quite possible without co-operation by Malawian authorities as the mountainous border, adjoined for significant distances by national parks inside Malawi, would have made a useful and easily accessed safe-haven for the guerrillas. Nevertheless, mountains to the north and south of Moatize.

92 Cabrita, Mozambique, p199.
may also have provided refuge. Another Renamo column moved into Zambézia province during August. In preparation for the journey to the north-east a unit of Calisto Meque’s troops was sent to conduct reconnaissance in the south of Tete province. Then, on 11 August, almost 500 Renamo fighters crossed the Zambezi River near Caia using rubber boats dropped by South African aircraft, before being guided to Pinda on the Zambézian border by Meque’s forces. Renamo soon established a base in the mountainous Muandiua region north-east of Morrumbala. A few weeks later the column linked with Gimo Phiri’s rudimentary forces and formed the province’s central base at a PRM camp in the Namuli Mountains, near Gurué in Zambézia’s north. A South African Situation Report from October 1982 records that Renamo conducted seven actions in Zambézia province during August. These included attacks from 25-30 August against the town of Megaza near the Malawian border in the Muandiua region, on the Morrumbala-Mocuba road where six Bulgarians were kidnapped, and against Liciro and Tacuane in central Zambézia. The Situation Report records that a total of 75 Renamo attacks (under the categories of ‘contacts’, ‘sabotage’, ‘mining’, ‘ambush’ and ‘general’) occurred throughout Mozambique in August 1982: 24 in Gaza, seven in Inhambane, seventeen in Manica, fourteen in Sofala, three in Tete, seven in Zambézia, and surprisingly three in Maputo. Renamo was now active to varying degrees in seven Mozambican provinces. South African actions in the same month included the killing of anti-apartheid activist Ruth First by letter-bomb in Maputo on 17 August, and an attack by South African commandos on the border town of Namaacha on 22 August.

Renamo launched 95 attacks in September 1982, 20 more than in the previous month and the most during any month up to that time. In early September Renamo attacked the town of Milange on the Malawian-Zambézia border and battled FPLM soldiers for three hours before withdrawing. Some claimed that three white men had led

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93 The assertion that these forces were attacking from Malawi was made in Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours*, p146. Also see “MNR ‘Raiding from Malawi’”, *The Herald*, 11 September 1982, and “SA ‘Attacking from Malawi’”, *Star*, 6 October 1982.
96 Konsepsitusierappart No 197/82”, 15 October 1982, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 144/5/1/1, Vol 1, p6.
98 Konsepsitusierappart No 197/82”, p6.
99 Cronologia das Agressões”, pp33-36.
100 Konsepsitusierappart No 197/82”, p6.
the attack. In central Zambézia a bridge on the Mocuba-Tacuane road was sabotaged on 8 September and the Mocuba-Quelimane railway was sabotaged on 10 September, demonstrating that Renamo was now operating closer to the coast. Milange was raided again on 27 September.101 An article in the Economist in late September claimed that a secret Renamo document stated that the rebels had been trying to block the growing ties between Malawi and Mozambique since the November 1981 SADCC meeting in Malawi. To this end Renamo aimed to sever cross-border traffic without harming Malawi’s economy too much. In addition the article claimed that, “[t]he interruption of traffic between Malawi and Mozambique has helped [Renamo] to establish bases in Southern Malawi without much resistance.”102 With 21 attacks in September, Zambézia quickly became Renamo’s most active front. The October 1982 South African Situation Report also lists a number of these attacks as being amongst the most important for the month, including: assaults on FPLM bases at Mocuba and Milange; the ambush of an FPLM convoy; and the sabotage of the Mocuba-Quelimane railway. Gaza followed closely with 20 attacks, though proportionally these involved less passive actions (such as mining or sabotage) and more direct contact with government troops.103 In Gaza Renamo was especially active in the south around Chibuto, which had reported 20 incidents since June. People were killed, roads mined, and villages and shops looted. In one attack Renamo fired mortars at a military camp in Chibuto. In response the government provided basic military training to thousands of villagers in the area. Meanwhile, Mozambican sources claimed that hundreds of Renamo fighters were infiltrating across the South African border into Gaza, and that supply drops were being increased to assist their movement southwards.104 The Limpopo railway to Zimbabwe through Gaza was sabotaged four times during September, and despite the continuation of the FPLM’s Operation Cabana, the number of attacks in Manica, Sofala and Inhambane remained relatively high, with eighteen, seventeen and twelve attacks in those provinces respectively. These included two incidents of sabotage on the railway, oil pipeline and electricity cables to Beira.105 Cabrita claims that Renamo fighters in Inhambane and Sofala were reinforced in September with 100 personnel trained as commandos

102 “The Malawi Strategy”, The Economist: Foreign Report, 30 September 1982. Joseph Hanlon also claimed Renamo was operating from bases in southern Malawi at this time, and that sources had also identified South African and Israeli instructors at their camps. Hanlon, “Is the MNR using Malawi as Terror Raid Launch Pad?”, p29.
103 “Konsepsituasierappart No 197/82”, p7.
105 “Konsepsituasierappart No 197/82”, pp6-7.
parachuted into each of Renamo’s bases at Tomé in northern Inhambane and Búzi in Sofala by the South African Air Force. They had travelled to South Africa in March that year for training at a SADF facility near Phalaborwa. This accords with the claim of an Angolan in the South African special forces that South Africa took in 230 Mozambicans for specialist training in 1982, 90 of whom were sent to Namibia for paratrooper training. Renamo forces in Tete launched five attacks in September, including the ambush of vehicles on the Tete-Blantyre road, while some mines were laid inside Maputo province. In late September the Mozambican military claimed to have killed up to 40 Renamo fighters throughout the country’s most affected provinces, with particularly notable clashes at Mapai in western Gaza and in northern Sofala. They also claimed that 777 Renamo troops had been killed and almost 200 captured in 1982. Though the South African Situation Report claims these figures are “blatant propaganda”, it does mention that the FPLM may have also been conducting a major offensive in the Gorongosa area.

South African Divisions Deepen

According to Joseph Hanlon,

in 1982 talk of divisions and of ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ [in the South African political establishment] began to emerge. The hawks promoted destabilisation to keep neighbouring states weak and dependent, and even advocated overthrowing neighbouring governments. The doves put more stress on gains to be made from economic links, and were more concerned with South Africa’s foreign image.

These alternative strategies, which had existed since the formation of Renamo, continued to be vigorously debated between minimalists and maximalists within South Africa’s State Security Council during 1982. One South African document from July 1982 confirms that South Africa’s long-term strategy was to draw Mozambique into a closer economic relationship, and notes that South Africa had relaxed pressure on Mozambique over the previous six months, but says that they were considering renewing the squeeze strategy (“knypaksies”) because of Maputo’s continuing hostility. Though South Africa did not


108 Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, p33.

109 “Van die toepassing van knypaksies is voorlopig afgesien en die afgelope ses maande is ’n meer inskiklike strategie toegepas. Daar word nou weer na dié Mosambiek-strategie gekyk. Daar is blykbaar geen kentering nog te bespeur in die vyandige houding van die Mosambiek-bewind jeens die RSA nie”. “Heroorweging can die Finansiering en Versekering van ’n Kontrak tussen die SA Koöperatiewe
view Mozambique as a direct threat, the hostility perceived in Pretoria stemmed largely from Mozambique’s independent stance in the region, including its participation in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), and its connections to the Soviet Union, thought by South Africa to include the presence of more than 2,000 personnel from the USSR, East Germany, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and North Korea in its territory.\textsuperscript{110} Other information that would not endear South Africa to the Mozambican government included intelligence from sources such as defector Jorge de Costa that,

\begin{quote}
The Mozambican government is totally committed to the [African National Congress (ANC)]… Mozambique will never reduce its support for the ANC which is considered the only acceptable alternative government. No amount of change in [South Africa] internally will alter their support…. at the beginning of 1982 the Security Service received orders to improve relations between themselves and the ANC. This included joint planning of attacks on selected targets in [South Africa], reconnaissance of three infiltration points along the Kruger National Park Border for the purposes of placing weapons and infiltrating into South Africa, as well as the supplying of trucks, passports and travel documents…. The order for the Security Services to co-operate came from the President himself…. The Mozambican government is not serious about negotiating with South Africa as it believes that it is merely a matter of time before the ANC takes over.\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

A number of other interesting snippets of intelligence collected by South Africa over the following months included: the claim that guerrillas from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) were present in southern Africa and were planning to help the Frontline States to combat UNITA, Renamo and the Apartheid regime in South Africa; and excerpts from an address by President Machel to SNASP cadre in Maputo in which he says that,

\begin{quote}
the people who finance the armed gangsters [Renamo]…. are in South Africa…. That is why our vigilance should start in South Africa in order to keep a watch on them. South Africa has at its disposal billions of dollars…. This money is earmarked to destroy peoples’ power in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

Nevertheless, the State Security Council maintained its minimalist aim of drawing Mozambique into a southern African constellation of states with a common approach to

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{111} “Meeting with Mr Jorge Costa”, pp5-6, 9.
\end{footnotesize}
economic, military and international issues.\textsuperscript{113} This would not be an equal relationship, however; Mozambique would be made dependent on South African goods, services and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{114} Though the Department of Foreign Affairs was a bastion for minimalist elements in this debate, one document from August 1982 demonstrates that at least some sections of the department thought Renamo should be used to ensure Mozambican dependence on South Africa. The handwritten document argues that “a state of political and economic instability must be created in Mozambique. The possibility of continuing [Renamo] activities must be considered”.\textsuperscript{115} It recommends that Mozambique be made dependent on the Maputo-Komatipoort transport corridor, and that “[t]rade, loans and the use of electricity must be ‘sabotaged’”.\textsuperscript{116} One Foreign Affairs document from September that demonstrates the friction between South African departments over the strategy towards Mozambique, “Principles of Economic Warfare: Moçambique & Zimbabwe”, states,

The [State Security Council] instructed the C.E.C to undertake a study of the principles of economic warfare in order that the recent limited squeeze operation could be tested against them. The document … came to the conclusion that the operations had some effect on their targets, but failed in their overall purpose.… [The Department of Defence has reached] a position, if not diametrically opposed, at least reconcilable with considerable difficulty, if at all, with the CEC draft.… Defence while objecting to the overthrow of the [South African] regime, views as our primary task, the overthrow of the others and their replacement by friendly ones. This does not accord with the views as we have expressed them in our two submissions to the C.E.C.… [The Defence document] almost entirely omitted consideration of the fact that our relations with these two states [Mozambique and Zimbabwe] are complicated by the existence of other countries with an interest in the region.\textsuperscript{117}

This friction would break into the open in early 1983 when academic advisers to the South African government, including Deon Geldenhuys, complained in the national press about the military’s dominance of the Apartheid regime’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{118} Those interests in the region that the Foreign Affairs document claims Defence was ignoring may have included the United States, Britain and France, who wanted neither increased Soviet presence in southern Africa due to South African provocation, nor a second Angola-style

\textsuperscript{113} “Doelstelling: Om Mosambiek te betrek by ‘n Suider-Afrika konstellasie van state met ‘n gemeenskaplike benadering tot ekonomiese, militêre en internasionale vraagstukke sonder prysgawe van beginsels”. “SVR-Riglyne vir ‘n Totale Strategie vir Mosambiek: No 19”, p9.

\textsuperscript{114} “Om bestaande ekonomiese betrekkinge voort te sit en sover moontlik uit te bou ten einde Mosambiek se afhanglikheid van RSA-goedere en –dienste, insluitende die infrastruktuur, te verhoog met inagineming van die RSA se langtermyn belange”. “SVR-Riglyne vir ‘n Totale Strategie vir Mosambiek: No 19”, p11.


\textsuperscript{116} “Interstaatlike Verhoudings”, p10.

\textsuperscript{117} “Principles of Economic Warfare: Moçambique & Zimbabwe”, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs Africa Division P.R. Killen, 23 September 1982, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 144/5/7/5, Vol 1.

\textsuperscript{118} Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, p33.
confrontation in Mozambique. Corporations whose interests in Mozambique may have led to pressure on South Africa included London and Rhodesia Holdings Ltd (Lonrho), Anglo-American, Bosch, De Beers, IBM and Xerox. Many projects in Mozambique also involved other French, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese, Swedish and British companies. By mid-1982 new oil exploration laws were also encouraging other foreign businesses to consider investment.\(^\text{119}\)

Meanwhile, the security establishment was making decisions about its own relationship with Renamo. South Africa’s involvement with Renamo is again confirmed in a document from December 1982. Discussing “clandestine, non-traceable support to resistance movements favourable towards South Africa”, the document notes that,

> These actions consist of amongst others indirect operational involvement, and are confined to training, supplying of weapons and equipment, logistical support and intelligence about the common enemy to resistance movements favourable towards South Africa. With this type of military action the aim is to minimise the chance of discovery as much as possible to avoid international reaction… If non-traceable clandestine support does not improve the situation, or provide a solution, then further steps could be taken, including limited direct operational support for the resistance movements.\(^\text{120}\)

Though the position of the Department of Defence was certainly maximalist, aiming to completely destabilise the Mozambican government, it was not putschist. Responding in October 1982 to rumours that South Africa was preparing to invade Angola, Minister for Defence Magnus Malan said an invasion “would mean enormous economic expenses for this country and we would be going into a Vietnam situation… I would rather grant Russia that position than lead South Africa into that pothole”.\(^\text{121}\) While it was in Malan’s interest to deny South African involvement in Angola, there is certainly truth in his assessment. Propping up a puppet government against sustained insurgency would also be an expensive task. The maximalist’s unwillingness to support a take-over of Mozambique would also be revealed within the next few months. The example of South Africa’s relationship with UNITA weighed heavily on the minds of defence planners, who did not

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\(^\text{120}\) "Hierdie optrede behels onder andere dan nie-registreerk Sersonomiese betrokkenheid en is beperk tot die verlening van opleiding, verskaffing van wapens en uitrusting, logistieke steun en verder ook die verskaffing van inligting aan die goedgesinde weerstandsbevordering oor die gemeenskaplike vyand. Met hierdie tipe militêre optrede word gepoog om die kanse op openbaarmaking sover moontlik te beperk en die internasionale reaksie te vermy…. Indien nie-herleibare klandestiene hulp nie ‘n oplossing of verbetering in die situasie tot gevolg het nie, kan tot ‘n verdere stap, nl. Beperkte registreerk Sersonomiese hulpverlening aan die weerstandsbewegings, oorgegaan word”. “Wysigings Voorgestel deur die Departement van Buitelandse Sake en Inligting op ‘n Dokument Getiteld: Implikasies van die RSA se Militêre Optrede Buite sy Grense”, 10 December 1982, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 144/7, Vol 1, pp5-6.

want to develop an equivalent relationship with Renamo. According to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, by 1979 UNITA had become indispensable to South Africa:

The importance of UNITA and its leader, Mr Jonas Savimbi, to South African strategy at this time was stressed in a letter from the chief of the SADF, General Malan, to CSOPS (chief of staff operations) Major General Earp, dated 6 March 1979, in which he states that "Mario [SADF codename for Savimbi] se voortbestaan raak direk die toekoms van Suidelike Afrika. Hy het so belangrik geword dat ons sy veiligheid sal moet verseker". (His continued existence directly influences the future of Southern Africa. He has become so important that we will have to ensure his safety). 122

At a meeting held at the special forces headquarters in late 1982, a number of high-ranking military officials discussed the future of Renamo and their leader Dhlakama in the context of their relationship with UNITA and Jonas Savimbi. They realised that by helping Savimbi to develop such an independent public profile, he had expanded his channels of support (most notably from the United States) and they had lost control of him. They decided Renamo had to remain a subordinate force, and so Dhlakama’s own profile would be kept to a minimum. This would also affect their reactions to Orlando Cristina’s continuing attempts to diversify support for Renamo. 123

Renamo’s Southern Offensive

Renamo’s campaign was still expanding in late 1982. Their actions in early October including the destruction of a train bound for Zimbabwe, the cutting of Beira’s water supply and the destruction of the Beira oil pipeline. Seven Portuguese workers were also kidnapped from the Beira corridor. However, the Frelimo government was particularly worried about pressure from Renamo around the Limpopo River valley in Gaza. 124 Around this time Mozambican forces destroyed a Renamo camp in Guuija district, in Gaza’s fertile south, and another in Chicualacuala district near the South African border. In central Inhambane the FPLM destroyed a Renamo base near Tomé, and further north peasants near Mabote began training for self-defence. 125 The Mozambican government also launched a diplomatic offensive against Renamo. After a meeting with Central Committee member Joaquim Chissano, US Secretary of State George Schultz criticised the

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123 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
organisation. Chissano also travelled to see Malawi’s President Banda in late October to persuade him to stop support for Renamo, and meetings were held in Zimbabwe about the joint security of transport links. This was rapidly followed on 2 November 1982 by the capture of Renamo’s main northern base in Gurue district, Zambézia. The combination of these diplomatic efforts and military successes scuttled Renamo’s offensive in that province. Economic damage caused by the cutting of the Beira-Malawi railway and Tete-Blantyre road seems to have encouraged Malawi to take action against any Renamo presence on its territory. Some have claimed that this explains why, on 3 November, the Renamo radio station *Voz da África Livre* broadcast an assurance to Malawi that Renamo would “always avoid embarking on military activities proved to be prejudicial to the economic life of Malawi”, and thus would not attack the railways from Beira and Nacala to Malawi. Meanwhile, an offensive by the FPLM in the coal-rich Moatize region of Tete, from 13-18 November destroyed two Renamo camps in that area.

As drought made terrain more accessible for FPLM forces, and disrupted Renamo food supplies, in mid-November a rebel column from Inhambane merged with other units in Gaza before pushing south towards Maputo province. Renamo units were clearly already present in the Limpopo area as attacks had been common near Chibuto and Chokwe from mid-year. Locals then observed an increase in rebel movement across the South African border from October, and in November a series of attacks occurred in northern Maputo province. These forces subsequently joined with the units arriving from further north to form a massive southward offensive. The offensive seems to have been driven partly by desperation and partly by hope for a rapid victory. Government forces had significantly increased their presence along the Beira Corridor since mid-year and had been conducting operations in southern Manica and Sofala provinces. They had also pushed up the coast in Inhambane, possibly cutting seaborne supply, and were now striking inland past Tomé and Mabote. Thus the only escape route for Renamo units from Operation Cabana’s net was to head south-east through Gaza province. As noted by one article, this southward thrust was

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“almost suicidal” as it was made through a drought-stricken area and South Africa seems to have made virtually no attempt to resupply them during their journey. Some of the first signs of this push into Maputo province included attacks on FPLM positions near Mapulanguene on 6 and 7 December, ambushes on the Mapulanguene-Magude road on 12, 13 and 17 December, and later the sabotage of the Magude-Chokwe railway on 25 December. The government responded quickly by committing a large number of FPLM troops to the area north of the Incomati River in the Massingir-Chokwe-Magude triangle, though troops movements were hampered because the rebels had mined most of the roads in the area as they spread eastwards. Meanwhile, on 9 December 1982 a South African team from the Four Reconnaissance Commando carried out an attack on the Zimbabwean government’s oil depot at Beira, while targets in Lesotho’s capital Maseru were struck simultaneously. Renamo claimed responsibility for the attack, though this was obviously false. The attack plunged Zimbabwe into its worst fuel crisis since independence, and quickly resulted in a reduction of anti-South African rhetoric by Zimbabwean authorities.

With Renamo bearing down on the north bank of the Incomati River, less than 100 kilometres from the seat of government in Maputo, and South Africa demonstrating open aggression in its recent attack on facilities in Beira, the Mozambican government was extremely alarmed. Frelimo representatives Sergio Vieira and Jacinto Veloso quickly organised a ministerial-level meeting with South African Minister for Foreign Affairs Pik Botha in the border town of Komatipoort on 17 December to discuss a means of diffusing tensions. There was speculation following the talks in Komatipoort that Maputo had capitulated to pressure from Pretoria, making a deal in which they would restrict support to the ANC if South Africa ceased their assistance to Renamo. This seems to be confirmed to a degree by a Mozambican communication to South Africa in March 1983. The message from Sergio Vieira to Pik Botha claims that,

[South Africa’s] pretexts to postpone serious discussions to prevent a general war, have no foundation or consistency… the Government of the [People’s Republic of Mozambique] is disposed … to conduct dialogue at ministerial level in order to: A) eliminate the existing war, B) eliminate tensions, C) promote peaceful co-operation in the region, D) make détente and inter-regional co-operation a source of tranquillity, security and prosperity for all the peoples and

states of Southern Africa… Thus we appeal to the South African Government to implement the agreement of Komatipoort.  

This confirms that an agreement was made at Komatipoort and that, in signalling the willingness of both sides to come to a peaceful settlement of their differences, the meeting was the first of a series that would result in the Nkomati Accords in 1984. Renamo’s Limpopo campaign actually intensified following the meeting in mid-December, perhaps to emphasise the consequences of failing to follow the agreement, but in the following months Renamo’s offensive was successfully halted. The offensive seems to have been a pincer movement, with one prong of the attack moving through northern Maputo province, and the second pushing south-east along the Limpopo River valley in Gaza. By late December Renamo forces in Gaza were threatening to encircle the vital Chokwe Agricultural Complex and to sever to main north-south highway. On 31 December the road from Chokwe to the coast was cut and several vehicles were destroyed, while on 2 January 1983 there was a shooting at the road’s junction with the north-south highway near Macia. In response to the crisis the government began training local militias, while they also worked to create a specialised counter-insurgency force. Meanwhile, General Veloso moved to boost the air support for the government forces by purchasing Soviet-style helicopter parts from British Rolls Royce, which had “specialized in produce spare parts for military equipment manufactured in Eastern countries”. Renamo was then quickly engaged in a series of battles near Macia that inflicted substantial damage on their forces, before the FPLM pushed inland in an offensive against entrenched Renamo positions north of the Limpopo River. This seems to have been backed by up to 1,000 Zimbabwean troops. One news report stated that major military operations in Inhambane and Gaza provinces killed 180 Renamo guerrillas in first two weeks of 1983. Even Renamo’s own radio broadcasts over Voz da África Livre (VOFA) admitted that they had to withdraw from certain areas because of the Mozambican government’s offensive in the south. However, while fighting died down in southern Gaza and Inhambane following FPLM actions, battles continued in northern Maputo province and in the Limpopo valley north of Chokwe. The Indian Ocean Newsletter reported that,

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133 Translation of Telegram from Mozambican Minister for Agriculture Sergio Vieira to South African Minister for Foreign Affairs Pik Botha, from A. van Zyl to Mr T. Pienaar, 14 March 1983, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/113/3, pp2, 5-6.
134 “Mozambique: MNR’s Thrust in the South”, pp1, 5.
135 “Mozambique: MNR’s Thrust in the South”, pp1, 5.
the first brigade of the Mozambican army, in charge of defending the Maputo area, is hard pressed to control rebel infiltration in spite of increased patrols. There are too few roads on the Mozambican side of the border and the air force is too weak to defend the area on its own.\footnote{138}

The intensity of combat in this period is reflected by a South African Situation Report, which records that out of 66 incidents involving Renamo forces in January 1983, 23 occurred in Gaza province and over half of those were battles with government forces (the other incidents including mining and sabotage). Twelve incidents occurred in Maputo province during January, including four skirmishes with FPLM troops and four acts of sabotage, while Renamo forces in Inhambane were also involved in four clashes with government soldiers. The Situation Report notes that the government’s successful offensive was at least partially due to specially trained units.\footnote{139} Following FPLM operations in the south, traffic on the Limpopo railway line to Zimbabwe was increased. However, even though Zimbabwean troops and new local militias now protected many of the larger targets in the southern provinces, the number of incidents of conflict in February decreased only slightly in Gaza and Maputo provinces to nineteen and ten incidents respectively, while it increased to nine incidents in Inhambane.\footnote{140}

While Tete and Zambézia provinces recorded no rebel activities during January 1983, surprisingly the South African Situation Report claims that the Renamo had been involved in two incidents in Niassa province, hitherto untouched by their influence. These may have involved guerrillas who had fled from Zambézia province at the end of 1982. Renamo did remain quite active in Manica and Sofala, the Situation Report noting eleven and thirteen incidents respectively in these provinces. These activities decreased in February to five and ten incidents respectively, though the occurrences of direct combat in Sofala increased from three in January to six in February.\footnote{141} These events included the ambushing of two civilian vehicles near the Zimbabwean border in Manica, in which 31 people were killed, and FPLM attacks on Renamo camps in Tuca-Tuco region and near Encamboro. On 20 February the FPLM caused heavy casualties to a Renamo group on the road near Machaze in southern Manica.\footnote{142} Meanwhile, during early 1983, Renamo again

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{“Mozambique: MNR’s Thrust in the South”}, p1.
\item \textit{“Mozambique: Visit to USSR”}, pp2, 6; “Mozambique Security Operations”, \textit{BBC Summary of World Broadcasts}, 26 February 1983; “Anti-Bandit Operation in Mozambique”, \textit{BBC Summary of World Broadcasts}.
\end{itemize}
became active in Zambézia province. There were reports of light planes flying from Malawi to the Gurúe area in northern Zambézia, and the South African Situation Report records two incidents of combat and two mining incidents in February 1983.\footnote{143}

During this period the Frelimo government was also fighting a diplomatic offensive against Renamo. In January 1983 President Samora Machel informally approached representatives of Britain, France, China, the USSR and the United States for help fighting Renamo, and on 31 January Machel had dinner with the Ambassadors of the five Security Council countries, followed by three hours of discussion about the war in Mozambique. Though negotiations with some countries such as Britain were producing assistance in the form of uniforms, boots, jeeps and other non-lethal equipment, those countries remained unwilling to provide lethal aid. Sensing that a weakened Mozambique would be more open to compromise, US representative Chester Crocker travelled to Maputo for talks with Machel in mid-January, breaking a two-year freeze in relations between Mozambique and the US. He arranged for USAID members to visit to discuss issues of US assistance and later joined the representatives from Britain, France, China and the USSR in condemning South African assistance to Renamo.\footnote{144} Renamo’s kidnapping of two French engineers working on the Cabora Bassa powerlines in December 1982 would not have positively affected the Security Council’s disposition towards their cause.\footnote{145}

The Death of Orlando Cristina

Renamo’s Secretary-General Orlando Cristina was also on a diplomatic offensive in early 1983. In December 1982 Cristina visited the United States to recruit Mozambicans there, meeting with Artur Vilankulu, and continued his tour of the United States and

\footnote{143}{World Broadcasts, 6 March 1983. During this period eleven Portuguese citizens and one Briton were detained on charges of supplying weapons to Renamo after a cache of ammunition and gunpowder were found near the Beira airport. Dion Hamilton, a citizen of the United Kingdom involved in the shipping industry, was gaoled for 20 years for aiding Renamo. “Arms Discovered in Beira”, Daily News, 28 January 1983; “Mozambique: Arrests in Beira”, Indian Ocean Newsletter, No 67, 5 February 1983, pp5-6; “Mozambique: French Ambassador Congratulates Mozambican Army”, Indian Ocean Newsletter, No 68, 12 February 1983, p5; Richard Hall, “Ulsterman Died in ‘Secret War’ Raid on Mozambique”, Observer, 20 February 1983; “UK Shipper Jailed for Role in MNR” Star, 21 February 1983.}


Europe until March 1983. Then in mid-March Renamo representatives from around the world met in Germany, protected by the West German Intelligence (BND). Orlando Cristina, Afonso Dhlakama, Evo Fernandes, Antero Machado, Artur Vilankulu, Fanuel Mahluza, Vincente Ululu and Artur da Fonseca were among those present, as well as other members from France and the United States. Without doubt great dissatisfaction with South African assistance would have been voiced at this meeting, for Renamo’s leadership had seen the massive southwards offensive from December 1982 as the best opportunity yet to topple the Frelimo government and take power in Mozambique. The events of these months were a point of division between those with maximalist and putschist goals. Orlando Cristina certainly wanted to take power in Mozambique and was outraged by South Africa’s use of Renamo merely as an anti-ANC vehicle. A Zimbabwean Intelligence report from 1983 concluded that South Africa could topple Machel’s government within 48 hours by sending armoured columns across the border and seizing Maputo. South Africa had also previously proved that it could carry out commando raids against Maputo’s suburbs with ease, and later in 1983 they would launch air strikes on the capital without fear of retribution. It is obvious that if the South African security establishment had wanted a Renamo victory in Mozambique that they could easily have provided the necessary assistance during this offensive to ensure that Maputo fell to Renamo’s forces. The failure of that offensive demonstrated that South Africa did not support Renamo as a ‘liberation movement’, but only as a tool of their own regional policy. Former Renamo member Paulo Oliveira wrote that he got the impression during March 1983 that, even though Renamo were attacking targets near Maputo, South Africa was not fully backing their offensive. According to Oliveira,

> [t]he impression was reinforced after Colonel Groblar, of logistics at Zanza [House, Johannesburg], confessed to me that their objective was never to substitute the Mozambican government, but yes, ‘to bring Maputo to its knees’.

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147 Oliveira, Os Domos, p20. VOFA announced that the meeting of its political and military officials was held in Geneva, Switzerland, from 3-8 March. One source might be incorrect, or VOFA may have broadcast false details to cover their connections with West German intelligence. “In Brief”, Indian Ocean Newsletter, No 75, 2 April 1983, p7.
148 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
150 “A impressão seria reforçada após o coronel Groblar, da logistica do Zanza [House, Johannesburg], me confessar que o objective deles nunca foi o de substituir o governo Moçambicano, mas sim, ‘pôr Maputo de joelhos’”. Oliveira, Os Domos, p21.
Orlando Cristina had met with representatives of the CIA while in the United States and later said that they had come to a “mutual understanding” that a link would be developed. As South Africa had proved its unwillingness to back a Renamo take-over in Mozambique this source of support greatly increased in its importance to the Renamo leadership. After the betrayal of Renamo’s goals by their South African sponsors, Cristina now aimed to free the organisation from South African domination. In early April 1983, Cristina wrote to Renamo member Leo Milas complaining that South Africa dominated Renamo, and that their leaders were, “only playthings, or lackeys, in the hands of the South Africans”.

Shortly afterwards, on 17 April, Orlando Cristina was shot dead while asleep on his farm near Pretoria. The tight security surrounding Cristina immediately led to suspicion that Renamo insiders had assassinated him. Some have speculated that his death was the result of factional disputes within Renamo. Alex Vines advanced the theory that a faction of black, former Frelimo members led by Boaventura Bomba and his brother Adriano murdered Cristina because they resented Portuguese and ethnic N’dau dominance of the organisation. João Cabrita has also elaborated on this theme, claiming that people linked to the pre-Renamo organisation REMO and members of Renamo’s youth wing, Juventude Moçambicana (Jumo), were involved in the assassination. Cabrita claims that Boaventura Bomba was the leader of the plot against Cristina. Cristina had been involved in political conflict with the Bomba brothers since mid-1982 and he had previously wanted to politically disable Boaventura by having him lead the column of troops into Zambézia to merge with the PRM in August 1982. However, Cabrita also admits that it was likely that the South African security establishment was involved in the assassination. At least one contact from the Directorate of Military Intelligence that Cabrita spoke with felt, 

151 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal. Jack Wheeler, American “adventurer”, conservative commentator and director of the Freedom Research Foundation, claimed that he made contact with Renamo in 1983 while collaborating with the CIA and attempted to enter Renamo zones within Mozambique in 1983 and 1984, but was prevented from crossing into the country until 1985. Wheeler, “From Rovuma to Maputo”, p32. South African authorities later considered Renamo members Leo Milas and Artur Vilankulu to be CIA agents. Oliveira, Os Domos, p27.

152 “apenas in joguete, ou lacaio, nas mãos dos sul-africanos.” Oliveira, Os Domos, p27.


154 Vines, RENAMO, p21.
that the South Africans had grown concerned about Cristina’s connections with the United States. After their experience with UNITA, where the United States prevailed on Savimbi to the detriment of Pretoria, the South Africans feared that Renamo could follow the same course, thus jeopardizing their plans for Mozambique.¹⁵⁵

Thus it seems that the plot to kill Renamo Secretary-General Orlando Cristina originated in the South African intelligence hierarchy. South Africa had already demonstrated that its policy was not to allow a Renamo take-over in Mozambique, and it was decided that if they did not eliminate Cristina they would not be able to maintain control of Renamo. Therefore they assassinated him and created the myth that he was killed in a factional dispute with the Bombas.¹⁵⁶ Conveniently, Boaventura Bomba and four of his associates died soon afterwards during a police interrogation, and later in the year Adriano Bomba was executed at Renamo’s Gorongosa base, though it was claimed that he’d been killed in an ambush.¹⁵⁷ Former Renamo member Paulo Oliveira later claimed that, “Cristina was murdered by the white South African authorities because he had outlived his usefulness”, and he asserted that the South Africans saw Cristina’s death as a chance to kill the Bombas and blame them for the assassination.¹⁵⁸ Former South African Defence Force (SADF) Corporal Roland Hunter, who worked for the SADF’s covert operation’s unit and was gaoled for passing secret documents to the ANC, also claimed that within Operation Mila (South Africa’s Renamo-support operation), “a decision was taken to eliminate [Cristina]”.¹⁵⁹ And in 1988 pro-Renamo academic Luis Serapião printed the claim that, “Orlando Cristina, was murdered mysteriously at his home after refusing to compromise the nationalist character of RENAMO to South African and American negotiators.”¹⁶⁰ But the killing of Cristina was not enough to calm Renamo’s putschist supporters. Following the abandonment of the southern campaign and the death of Cristina conflict erupted within Operation Mila. At least one young officer advocated a Renamo take-over and was very vocal about his opinion. He was quickly transferred for training in the Caprivi Strip and died soon afterwards.¹⁶¹ Oliveira, referring to the young man as ‘the Volunteer’, says that,

¹⁵⁵ Cabrita, Mozambique, pp187-192.
¹⁵⁶ Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
¹⁵⁷ Cabrita, Mozambique, pp187-192.
¹⁵⁸ “Who Killed MNR’s Evo Fernandes?” The Sowetan, 26 April 1988; Oliveira, Os Domos, pp26, 28.
¹⁶¹ Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
the next year … the Volunteer ‘committed suicide’, by accident, demonstrating with a revolver in a café in Namibia, how to play Russian Roulette. The Volunteer insisted [in the days before his death that he would] abandon the South African army and join RENAMO full-time.162

Although the official story was that he had died playing Russian Roulette, he had actually been killed by the SADF to prevent him exerting any further influence over Renamo and encouraging them to work towards independence.163 With the assassinations of Orlando Cristina, the Bomba brothers and the SADF officer known as ‘the Volunteer’, the maximalist faction had neither wiped out the desire for independence within the Renamo leadership, nor the putschist elements with the SADF’s ranks, but they had for the meantime ensured their domination of Renamo would continue.

162 “um ano depois, … o Voluntário ‘suicidar-se-ia’, por acidente, ao demonstrar com um revólver num café da Namiba, como se brincava a roleta russa. O Voluntário insistia nos últimos tempos em abandonar o exército sul-africano e em juntar-se a tempo inteiro a RENAMO”. Oliveira, Os Domos, p52.

163 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
Chapter 6: To Nkomati and Beyond, 1983-1984.

Though Renamo’s military campaign continued undiminished after Orlando Cristina’s death, the diplomacy between Mozambique and South Africa that had commenced in late 1982 developed in 1983, and eventually led to the famous Nkomati Accord in March 1984. The Nkomati Accord was a victory for pro-negotiation elements in Mozambique and minimalists in South Africa, the former hoping the deal would ensure Renamo’s submission and the latter believing Renamo had now served its purpose of forcing concessions from the Frelimo government. But the Accord would only widen the split between Renamo’s South African supporters, with maximalists and putschists in the administration doing all they could to sustain the guerrilla force. The delivery of a stockpile of supplies to Renamo prior to the Accord and promises of future support also ensured that the war actually intensified in the subsequent months.

The Conflict Persists

Following the assassination of Orlando Cristina on his farm near Pretoria, and the subsequent death of Boaventura Bomba, there was some confusion in the ranks of the Renamo leadership. Renamo’s European representative Evo Fernandes went into hiding in Lisbon, as it was likely he would become Renamo’s new Secretary-General and he thought his life might be endangered by inter-factional conflict. Some speculated that Adriano Bomba would become the new Secretary-General, but this did not eventuate and Adriano himself was later killed at Renamo’s Gorongosa base. Meanwhile, Renamo’s radio station Voz da Àfrica Livre (VOFA) went off air for a number of months, possibly due to factional fighting. Evo Fernandes was eventually named as Secretary-General in December 1983, which led to resignations and expulsions of members of the pro-Bomba faction.1 Despite this disorder Renamo’s campaigns inside Mozambique continued unabated. Though South Africa had denied support to Renamo for their conquest of the Mozambican capital, they seem to have encouraged the expansion of Renamo’s offensive in the country’s north. In April 1983 Renamo again swept across Zambézia, and for the first time pushed northwards into Nampula province. Some commentators reported that Renamo’s actions in Zambézia

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had “closed the province”. A Zimbabwean intelligence report from May 1983 stated that most roads in Zambézia were heavily mined and that up to 2,000 Renamo fighters had spread southwards through the centre of the province and were reported near Namanjarrira, west of Mocuba, and the provincial capital Quelimane. Many suspected these forces had come from bases within Malawi. According to the Zimbabwean report, Mozambican intelligence (SNASP) agents in Niassa’s provincial capital, Lichinga, observed a South African aircraft arriving in Malawi and offloading Renamo soldiers and equipment. They also reported that up to 20 white South Africans had accompanied Renamo forces as they infiltrated into Zambézia from Malawi. Soon afterwards, in late April 1983, a Renamo contingent of approximately 350 fighters left their base in the Namului Mountains and entered Nampula province, establishing a camp near Metaveia and moving east along the Nacala railway towards the provincial capital of Nampula city.

Meanwhile, Renamo continued their operations in other areas of the country. A Renamo attack on the Beira railway on 18 April 1983 led the Mozambican government to begin giving rail workers military training, and a major Renamo assault on Mandie, Tete, on 27 April 1983 destroyed more than 900 houses. Renamo forces also remained close to the capital, Maputo, still threatening to cut it off from the countryside. The Zimbabwean intelligence report noted that Renamo was becoming more aggressive and was focusing more attacks on military and communications targets. They now had operations in nine of Mozambique’s ten provinces and in the month of April alone they had launched assaults on thirteen Mozambican army (FPLM) bases, five of which caused substantial damage.

According to the report, “[Renamo] in most areas appear to be enjoying considerable support from the locals making it difficult for [FPLM] operations”. It notes that Renamo camps, usually sited in thickly wooded areas near riverbanks, could be spread over areas up to sixteen square kilometres in size, with advance posts up to seven kilometres from the base for observation. There they could cultivate crops and share their South African supplies with the locals to garner support. Renamo fighters worked in platoon and

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company strength and could increase up to battalion strength for major attacks. Meanwhile, “[t]he morale of [FPLM] soldiers remains low… It is evident that most of the failure they encounter in destroying [Renamo] bases was due to lack of radio discipline”.

There was a sharp decline in Renamo activity in Gaza and Inhambane provinces between January and June 1983. Operation Cabana had disrupted Renamo’s network of bases, but Renamo’s forces had avoided confrontation and so their army remained mostly intact. Ironically, the campaign precipitated Renamo’s movement further south across the Limpopo River and into Maputo province. The Zimbabwean intelligence report from May 1983 noted that the traffic on the road between Chokwe and Massingir continued to suffer attacks and that Renamo forces had attempted to encircle the town of Massingir, possibly to isolate the FPLM unit there, which had been very effective at preventing infiltration through Kruger National Park. Renamo forces in the region were also making travel between Maputo and Inhambane provinces virtually impossible. The right-wing Portuguese newspaper O Dia claimed that during May Renamo attacked Morrumbala in Zambézia and Inharrime in Inhambane, cut Beira’s electricity and the Cabora Bassa powerlines, and continued attacks on the Beira and Limpopo railways. In addition a military convoy in Tete may have been attacked, resulting in the deaths of 28 Zimbabwean troops, the wounding of 22 and the capture of a large quantity of weaponry. While in Gaza the FPLM barracks at Chigubo, on the edge of the Banzhine National Park was also assaulted.

By June 1983 Operation Cabana had eased and Renamo were beginning to resume their activities in Gaza and Inhambane. In southern Inhambane Renamo fighters clashed with government forces in the coastal town of Jangamo, and they conducted ambushes on the Nalázi-Dindiza road in central Gaza. Renamo also remained entrenched in Maputo province. A South African intelligence summary from June reported that Mozambican soldiers had witnessed daily airspace violations over Maputo province since the South African air strike on Matola. These violations were possibly supply drops to Renamo soldiers in Maputo or southern Gaza. The summary also notes some Renamo activity in Manica province, with a tractor near Espungabera being ambushed on 21 June, and the town itself being attacked on the 22 June. An FPLM unit may also have been ambushed

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9 Cabrita, Mozambique, p209.
12 Cabrita, Mozambique, p220.
near Catandica in northern Manica. However, in June 1983 President Samora Machel singled out Zambézia as the province most affected by Renamo, and due to Zambézia’s agricultural potential attacks in the province were particularly detrimental to the economy. Pushing closer to the coast in Zambézia Renamo made their first attack on Manganja, north-east of Quelimane, in July 1983.

According to a South African security summary from October 1983 there were 85 incidents involving Renamo in July that year and 117 in August. In Gaza these incidents included ambushes on the Nalázi-Dindiza road in August, an attack on the FPLM barracks at Massangena, on the Gaza-Manica border, and on the town of Machaíla. Renamo also sabotaged the Limpopo railway five times in August. Meanwhile, the FPLM was prosecuting further operations in Manica and Sofala. News reports of the time noted that security in Manica and Sofala had improved dramatically, that the Beira railway and oil pipeline were working and sabotage around Beira was occurring less frequently, though the South African security summary did note three incidents of sabotage on the Beira railway during August. In the meantime, Renamo continued to expand their operations in the north. Cabrita claims that in August a column of 150 Renamo soldiers left the base near Milange and entered Niassa near the Molumbo region, establishing a new base south of Mecanhelas, an area traditionally hostile to Frelimo. From there Renamo began disrupting road traffic in Niassa. They disrupted the Cuamba-Lichinga railway on 23 August and later ambushed an FPLM vehicle on the Cuamba-Mandimba road. It has been rumoured, and now virtually confirmed, that a number of political leaders from the period of struggle against Portuguese colonialism that Frelimo had imprisoned in Niassa, including Uria Simango, Joana Simeão, Mateus Gwendjere and Lázaro N’Kavandame, were executed without trial in 1983 because Samora Machel feared that advances by Renamo’s forces would free them. In late August the FPLM launched another offensive against Renamo throughout Inhambane. Camps were destroyed in Mabote, Vilanculos and Mambane, in northern Inhambane and near Jangamo and Massinga in the south. By first assaulting

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16 Cabrita, Mozambique, p220.
19 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp218-220.
smaller camps the FPLM herded the rebel forces towards central Inhambane until they were concentrated around Renamo’s main regional base at Mambuli, seven kilometres from Tomé. This was considered to be Renamo’s biggest base south of the Save River. The FPLM then launched their final assault on the Mambuli base on 23 August. Though the number of Renamo fighters killed was not reported, hundreds were captured and nine tonnes of weaponry and supplies were recovered, possibly indicating recent resupply from South Africa. Renamo deserter Alexandre Zaqueu Maundze later told the press that six white South African instructors had trained Renamo forces at the Mambuli base.

Diplomatic Ties Strengthen

Meanwhile, on 5 May 1983 Mozambican and South African negotiators held a second ministerial level meeting in the town of Komatipoort. This occurred despite some tension that had arisen in March 1983 when South Africa had detected Mozambican activity within South Africa. According to a South African Defence Force (SADF) telegram from that month,

the SADF has ascertained by very sensitive methods that:
A. there has been a reconnaissance by members of the Mocambique armed forces on certain targets in the Phalaborwa area,
B. certain planning is being done by the Mocambique armed forces which indicate actions by them or the ANC against targets in the Phalaborwa area which could include the town of Phalaborwa,
C. the Mocambique forces are strengthening their conventional deployment in the areas adjacent to the eastern Transvaal and this includes the strengthening of their tank forces at Boanne and Magude.

The telegram then suggested that a protest note be sent to the Mozambican government saying that,

It has come to the knowledge of the government of the RSA [Republic of South Africa] that certain aggressive actions against the RSA from the territory of Mocambique have been (are being) planned. The government of the RSA strongly urges the government of Mocambique to desist from the continuation of such actions. Furthermore the government of the RSA reserves

the right to protect the lives and property of its citizens and will take whatever steps deemed necessary to achieve this.25

But Mozambique’s continuing willingness to negotiate and the United States’ new policy of ‘constructive engagement’ in southern Africa must have persuaded South Africa to take a more conciliatory stance.26 Later in May the pro-government, Johannesburg newspaper Die Vaderland reported that in the last six months two meetings had occurred between South African and Mozambican ministers at Komatipoort, and that talks were going so well that Frelimo was on the verge of forcing the ANC command to move to Mozambique’s north, cutting them off from South Africa.27 However, this more co-operative relationship was temporarily shaken on 20 May when the ANC set off a car bomb at the South African Air Force Headquarters on Church Street in Pretoria, which killed more than a dozen people and injured almost 200. In retaliation on 23 May 1983 South African Impala jets from the Hoedspruit air base launched an air strike on the suburb of Matola, in Maputo, killing six people and wounding 40. Though the South African government said that all the victims were ANC members, the Mozambican government claimed they were all Mozambican civilians. Maputo’s response remained moderate, as they knew the attack was intended mainly to appease the South African public and they wanted to preserve the diplomatic progress they had made with their neighbour. Then, in the last week of May, the FPLM shot down an unmanned South African spy plane over Maputo. The use of this Israeli-supplied technology fuelled fears that South Africa might follow the Israeli example in Beirut and attack Maputo.28

The Soviet Hostage Crisis

In late August 1983 a Renamo assault on a mine site in Zambézia province prompted months of international diplomacy. This incident is demonstrative of both South Africa’s willingness to act against Renamo when it was in their interest, and that Renamo maintained at least some autonomy from their backers after Cristina’s death. Renamo’s 21

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25 “Protest Note to Mocambique”, p1.
26 Vines, RENAMO, p20.
August attack on employees of the company Empresa de Minas de Moçambique at Murrua, in eastern Zambézia, killed four people, including two Soviet geologists, and resulted in the kidnapping of 24 Soviet citizens and four Mozambicans. A telegram from Malawi’s ambassador to Mozambique relating a discussion of these events with the Mozambican Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joaquim Chissano, described the incident thus:

It was in the morning of 21st August, 1983, … between 5 and 6 a.m. at Murruwa Mine in Zambezia Province a group of armed bandits [Renamo guerrillas] attacked an installation of Mozambique Mines. During the attack, two Geologists of Soviet nationality and two Mozambican workers were assassinated. However, during the course of the attack the bandits invaded the camp’s quarters where the Soviet geologists lived and kidnapped twenty-four of them, in addition the bandits kidnapped two Mozambican women and two youth. The rest of the experts at the Mine who included Germans, Portuguese technicians and others were left untouched…. [Chissano] went on to say that this was the first time that the bandits only selected to kidnap Russians as their hostages. It is a propaganda which the South African Government is showing the world that the Russians are being used in operations against [Renamo]…. According to his information, those kidnapped are still within Mozambique and the Security Forces are doing their best to retrieve them…. it is my view that no ordinary person can have the courage to operate in the way [Renamo] did. It is the work of very well trained Military personnel…. Whoever planned the killing and the kidnapping had very accurate information of the people and their location.

Immediately the Soviet Union entered into communications with South Africa at the United Nations. A telegram from the South African delegate to the UN from 23 August stated that,

Moscow knows (thus the message) that South Africa is able to influence [Renamo] and requests the South African government use this influence to ensure the immediate release of prisoners.

South Africa’s response consisted of claims it could not contact Renamo and thus the Soviets should contact Renamo representative Evo Fernandes or Antonio Felizardo in Portugal. Though the Soviet government’s diplomatic initiatives in the region had managed to free a number of the hostages by mid-September, a failure to achieve further results by October led them to request Mozambican permission to use their own forces to retrieve their nationals. The Mozambican government refused this request, as they feared such an intervention might be seen as provocative by South Africa. The Soviet ambassador

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also maintained contact with the Malawian government, telling them that the hostages were being held near the Malawi border, and requesting any assistance they could provide.  

Meanwhile, South Africa did secretly intervene on behalf of the Soviet Union and acted as a channel for negotiations with Renamo. These negotiations may have provided the impetus for the release of more of the hostages on 27 October and on 1 December near Malawian border, leaving sixteen hostages still captive. However, Renamo defector Paulo Oliveira claims that on 29 November, as part of South Africa’s secret agreement with the Soviet Union to release the hostages, South African commandos actually assaulted two Renamo camps in Zambézia to free a number of the hostages against the Renamo leadership’s will. By late December the remaining hostages were rumoured to be on Malawian soil, leading to further diplomatic advances towards their government. In early January the Soviet government sent a communiqué to Malawian President Banda, stating that,

The Soviet Ambassador has been instructed by his government to request personal indulgence of Life President in saving lives of Soviet technicians geologists kidnapped by [Renamo] in August 1983. Subject to proposal being accepted it is proposed to send urgently high level Soviet envoy to present the matter to the Life President. The Soviet government expresses the hope that the Malawi government will regard there (sic) guest with understanding.

This drama finally came to an end on 26 January. On that day a Malawian telegram relates that,

Foreign Minister P. Botha rang to say that the twelve Soviet nationals crossed Border into Malawi today at 14.30hrs stop According to Mozambique Authorities the number could have been fourteen (14) stop Malawi is being requested to assist in tracing the other two stop.

This confusion over the number of Russians released might be explained by South Africa’s secret military intervention. Mathematically this seems to be plausible as The Star newspaper claimed that eight Russians had been freed in the first three releases, twelve were eventually

37 “Kidnapped Russians Alleged to be in Malawi”, from Charge d’Affairs B.B. Mtemodi to the Malawian Secretary of External Affairs, 21 December 1983, Malawian National Archive, MAP/C/6/1/50, file EA/10/6/71, p1.
38 Decoded Malawian Telegram, from Malawian Ambassador to Mozambique Itimu to the Secretary for External Affairs, 9 January 1984, Malawian National Archive.
39 Telegram from Malawian Ambassador to Mozambique Itimu to the Malawian Secretary for External Affairs, 26 January 1984, Malawian National Archive.
released in January 1984, and that two may have died during captivity.\textsuperscript{40} The two Russians left unaccounted for may have been released by South African operations on 29 November 1983. However, the Gorongosa documents note on 25 February 1984 that two Russians remained in Renamo’s custody.\textsuperscript{41} Following the Murruwa incident in August 1983 most Soviet personnel were confined to Maputo.\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{Late 1983}

By late September 1983 the FPLM had made significant in-roads against Renamo forces, claiming that in the past three months 410 Renamo guerrillas had been killed and 155 captured in actions took place in Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Sofala, Tete and Zambézia provinces. Ninety-one guerrillas were killed and 53 captured in late September alone. The destruction of Renamo’s Mambuli base in August had been a major victory of these operations. After the destruction of Renamo’s base near Chibuto in southern Gaza 60 captured Renamo guerrillas were paraded in the town of Magul. The Chibuto base had been another important strategic launching pad for Renamo operations and was regularly resupplied by South African helicopters. By October Commander in Chief of the armed forces, General Mabote, was claiming that 2,000 Renamo fighters had surrendered or been captured, and that Mozambique’s military situation had improved because so many of Renamo’s supply lines had been cut.\textsuperscript{43} A South African telegram from September 1983 sheds some light on why Frelimo’s forces had experienced such success:

\begin{quote}
The department is aware of the fact that [Renamo] suffered many losses recently. An NID representative shared with me that he learned from a source that [Renamo’s] radio-communications were listened in on by the ZNA/ Frelimo troops which gave [Renamo’s] troops position away and allowed Frelimo to launch surprise attacks on [Renamo] bases. Mr Smit immediately informed his department this morning so that [Renamo] can be warned.\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{40}“Maputo Says it has Freed Soviet Hostages”, 3 February 1984.
\textsuperscript{41}The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary, (Maputo, 30 September 1985). Though some have dismissed the validity of the Gorongosa documents by reference to the possibility that they were planted by Mozambican intelligence, the detail and internal consistency of the documents make it unlikely they were forgeries. In addition, the visits to Gorongosa by South African officials that were revealed by the documents were admitted by the South African government, and former deputy leader of Renamo, Raul Domingos, confirmed the authenticity of the documents to me during a conversation at the Mozambican Assembly Building, Maputo, on 11 June 2003.
\textsuperscript{44}“Die departement is bewus daarvan dat die RNM onlangs redelik groot verliese gely het. NID verteenwoordiger deel my mee dat hy van n bron verneem het dat die RNM se radio-kommunikasie deur
Some of the FPLM’s success may also have been due to training given to elite, counter-insurgency troops by the private British security company Defence Systems Limited (DSL) and North Korean advisers during 1983. One success that Renamo did have during September was the recapture of Maringué, north of Gorongosa, which would later become a Renamo stronghold and eventually the site of their national headquarters. Following the government’s military gains Mozambican President Samora Machel toured Europe in October 1983, trying to convince western companies to invest in Mozambique and western governments to supply aid to counter-act a major famine that had set in since July. He made several pro-western statements and seemed to convince the US and European countries that Mozambique was turning towards the west. Following the tour desperately needed aid began to be provided. While Machel worked to repair Mozambique’s shattered economy, South Africa carried out a bomb attack on an ANC information office in Maputo’s diplomatic quarter on 17 October, which wounded a number of ANC members. Some commentators noted that the attack might have aimed to raise South African Prime Minister Botha’s popularity in the lead up to the vote on constitutional changes. Malawian diplomatic sources also thought the attack might be related to negotiations between Mozambique and South Africa, a Malawian diplomatic telegram from the time noting that,

According to diplomatic sources, there has been contracts between the two countries where it was agreed that A.N.C. members must be sent away from the borders of the two countries. Nampula or beyond was suggested.

Following the loss of their Mambuli base in central Inhambane, a fleeing Renamo column attempted to replace it with another in the largely unpopulated area south of Funhalouro, in Southern Inhambane. However, this base was destroyed during FPLM operations in November. At the time it was reported that these bases had been used to launch operations in which thousands of civilians were kidnapped and recruited into Renamo. With the beginning of the wet season in December 1983 it seems that Renamo

ZNA/Frelimo troepe afgeluister is en hulle posiesies daardeur gekompromitteer is wat Frelimo in staat gestel het om verassingsaanvalle op RNM basisse uit te voer. Mnr Smit het dadelik vanoggend sy departement ingelig sodat RNM gewaarsku kan word”. Telegram from Harare to Mr J.F. Wentzel, Pretoria, 30 September 1983, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/113/3.


was able to mount a counter-offensive. A South African State Security Council document from July 1984 states that Renamo averaged 123 attacks a month from December 1983 to February 1984. A number of reports also noted that Renamo claimed to have killed up to 300 FPLM troops, wounded 350 and captured 27 by the end of December 1983. Amongst these attacks was an assault on Maganja on 22 December by a 30-strong Renamo unit armed with light weaponry and a bazooka. During December Renamo forces in Niassa were also reinforced by about 230 more fighters, before spreading rapidly through the province, attacking many of the district capitals and the Metangula Naval Base. The town of Mavago was also occupied. Some Renamo actions undertaken on Christmas day, which they were not so keen to publicise, included the killing of five civilians at village of Marrangwe, east of Maputo, and the massacre of up to 60 bus passengers at Murrumpula in Nampula. Mozambican government forces claimed to have killed 55 Renamo fighters and captured 134 in attacks on seven Renamo bases in late December and early January. These included the destruction of two bases at Macaringue and Mandejela in northern Inhambane on 16 December, and an air strike on a base west of Maganja.

The Nkomati Accord

Meanwhile, in mid-December 1983 the secret negotiations between Mozambique and South Africa became publicly known. On 20 December Mozambican representatives Sergio Vieira and Jacinto Veloso again met South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha in Mbabane, Swaziland, to conduct further discussions on building a closer relationship between the two countries. These negotiations paved the way for more detailed sub-ministerial talks in mid-January 1984 about security, economics, tourism and hydroelectric power from the Cabora Bassa dam, and created the necessary conditions for the Nkomati

52 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp218-220.
Accord of March 1984. Though many would see any agreement by Mozambique to cease support for the ANC as a betrayal, President Machel tried to placate these elements by promising that Mozambique would continue to give the ANC “political, moral and diplomatic support”. These negotiations have variously been described as a sign that South Africa’s regional destabilisation was successful in subduing Mozambique or as a sign that it was a failure. In reality it seems that the negotiations arose from a context in which pro-co-operation factions within both countries had gained the upper-hand and were convinced their best strategy was to seek compromise. According to Joseph Hanlon,

Mozambique went to Mbabane knowing it was about to declare bankruptcy, and that a settlement with South Africa was a precondition for renegotiating its debts… [Also] the Mozambique army’s new tactics seemed to be working, and it was gaining ground on [Renamo] … with a deal, it was possible to beat the ‘bandits’.  

On South Africa’s side the minimalist elements within the administration were gaining influence as there was a growing view that destabilisation was not working. Incidents such as South Africa’s air raid on Maputo on 23 May 1983 had caused embarrassment for maximalists. South African Minister of Defence Magnus Malan claimed it destroyed an ANC base when media reports demonstrated it had actually destroyed a jam factory. Meanwhile, business leaders were abandoning the strategy of destabilisation as South Africa’s worsening economic situation created calls for more regional stability to attract investment. Mozambican President Samora Machel’s European tour in October had also helped to convince western countries to pressure South Africa towards a negotiated settlement. Then, in December 1983, South Africa launched a major offensive in Angola with 10,000 men invading to destroy SWAPO forces. Heavy resistance from Cuban and Angolan forces unexpectedly thwarted this offensive, prompting Pretoria to consider more diplomatic initiatives throughout the region. This in turn led to an accord between Pretoria and Luanda in February 1984. However, maximalist elements in South Africa continued to organise support for Renamo. The South African Reconnaissance Commandos (Recces) had trained 300 Renamo fighters as Special Forces operators during 1983, with 200

returned to Mozambique and 100 integrated into Five-Recce to enhance their Mozambique capability. According to the Gorongosa documents this continued into 1984. The Gorongosa Desk Diary records on 26 December 1983 that 600 Renamo fighters would be evacuated from Mozambique to take a “conventional forces course” in South Africa: 100 to be returned to Mozambique’s north, 250 to the country’s centre, and 250 to the south. Renamo forces in the south were also resupplied by sea on 30 December 1983, with 100 cases of AK47 ammunition being dropped at a number of locations in Maputo Bay, south of Maputo. Some of those Renamo fighters taken to South Africa would be destined to fight in Angola and Namibia during 1984, before being returned to Mozambique with experience in combat.

In January 1984 the head of South Africa’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), Lieutenant-General P.J. van der Westhuizen, ordered a secret resupply of Renamo forces in contradiction of the prevailing diplomatic détente with Mozambique. According to the Gorongosa documents in mid-January 1984 the head of DMI’s Directorate of Special Tasks, Colonel Charles van Niekerk, visited Renamo’s Gorongosa headquarters with the new Renamo Secretary-General Evo Fernandes. While Colonel van Niekerk’s trip was partially intended to finalise arrangements for the release of the Soviet citizens held by Renamo since August, he also updated the Renamo leadership on the changes in South Africa’s relations with the Frelimo government and pledged the continued assistance of the South African armed forces “until the total elimination of Machel”. Van Niekerk explained that the South African government, under pressure from the international community, and especially the United States, would ensure that negotiations between the Frelimo government and Renamo took place before November 1984. The maximalists within DMI aimed to counter Frelimo’s diplomatic efforts to stop South African support for Renamo, the Gorongosa documents noting that,

Owing to the undertaking that the South Africans will make to Machel in light of the talks under way, resupply for the first 6 months of 84 will come in the first months: 500 pallets in a total of 25 resupplies apart from the resupplies in January 84.

It was arranged that at the end of January a team of South African commandos would infiltrate into Zambézia to train 100 Renamo guerrillas as instructors, and 200 in conventional warfare. Supplies would also be dropped near Gurué and Maganja in

60 *The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary*.
63 *The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary*.
64 *The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary*. 
Zambézia to aid Renamo’s northern offensive, and at three locations in Inhambane.\footnote{The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary.} When it became clear that the Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique would be signed in March 1984 Renamo’s staff in South Africa were separated into three units and infiltrated into Mozambique. Mobile regional headquarters were established for the southern and northern regions of the country, while the national headquarters remained at Gorongosa.\footnote{William Minter, “The MNR, (Renamo) as Described by Ex-participants”, Development Dialogue, No 1, 1989, p118.} Bases for infiltration by Renamo may also have been established inside Swaziland along its border with Mozambique.\footnote{Hanlon, Apartheid’s Second Front, p95.} Renamo remained very active during this period, being involved in around 120 incidents. Renamo’s attacks during January included the ambush of a bus between Inhambane and Maputo in which 27 civilians were killed and 23 wounded, and the cutting of water and power supplies to the city of Beira.\footnote{“Machel Offers South Africa 3500 Prisoners”, Pretoria News, 25 January 1984; “Mozambique Claims Heavy MNR Losses”, Pretoria News, 26 January 1984; “Mozambique Claims Major Successes Over MNR”, Citizen, 26 January 1984.} Undoubtedly Renamo was also involved in many skirmishes with government troops during this period. Renamo’s encroachment on the capital continued and by the end of January 1984 a 60-strong Renamo unit had crossed the Incomati River in Maputo province and split into three groups, one operating near the border south of Ressano Garcia, the second to the north-east of Maputo city, and the third near the Moamba area. However, the heaviest fighting was still in Zambézia province, where the government had deployed helicopters as part of its counter-insurgency efforts.\footnote{Cabrita, Mozambique, pp227-228; Sakaie, “Rebels Still With a Cause”.}

By February Frelimo had won a number of victories against Renamo, reopening a number of major roads in Zambézia, the Beira Corridor, the Malawi to Zimbabwe road through Tete province, and the main highway from Maputo to Beira. Nevertheless heavy fighting with Renamo forces continued in northern Manica and Sofala, in Maputo and on the Zambézia-Nampula border. The railway from Beira to Malawi also remained closed. Though the FPLM was gradually encircling the Renamo headquarters in Gorongosa, Renamo remained heavily entrenched there, with up to 3,000 fighters based in the area. Meanwhile, Renamo continued to expand their northern offensive into Nampula province. Apparently Renamo had established a base west of Nampula city at Chinga, from which they could harass traffic on the main road from Nampula to Zambézia. From there columns of Renamo fighters began moving to the north and south in an effort to encircle
Nampula. A South African Situation Report from February 1984 notes that Renamo was also still very active in the south. According to the report,

The Renamo Resistance movement still puts a high priority on direct action against [FPLM] forces as well as logistics supply routes. A Renamo group that infiltrated Mozambique 50 kms from Maputo (the furthest south confirmed), from the Komati River, is currently busy with sabotage and intimidation in this area. Renamo claimed to have killed 132 FPLM troops in the month of February. During February the SADF also began its intensive supply effort in preparation for the Nkomati Accord. The Gorongosa documents record more than 20 South African supply drops by sea and air in the provinces of Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala and Zambézia. These supplies consisted mainly of guns, ammunition, RPG rockets, explosives, medicine and land mines, though they also facilitated the movement of Renamo fighters into and out of the country so they could attend South African-run courses in areas such as communications, parachuting and heavy weaponry. One hundred guerrillas still inside South Africa at the time of the Accord would be infiltrated back in Maputo province via the Libombo Mountains between Mozambique and Swaziland. Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama travelled to Pretoria with Evo Fernandes in early February to discuss the future with the SADF leadership. Notes about these talks in the Gorongosa documents convey the feeling amongst those present that, “Pik Botha the foreign minister is pressuring the South African politicians to abandon Renamo. He is functioning as if he was a nark for the Soviet Union”. A later note from 13 February records that “Colonel Charles [van Niekerk] guarantees Renamo that for all that they sign an agreement with Machel they will continue to send planes now and again”, and at a further meeting in Pretoria on 23 February the SADF leadership made it clear that, “we soldiers will continue to give support without the consent of our politicians in massive numbers so as to win the war”. The SADF Generals convinced the Renamo leadership that “Machel can only fall immediately through a cut in the economy and communications routes”, and they formulated principles for Renamo to follow in their guerrilla war (recorded on 27 October 1984 as “The General Plan of 24 February 1984”):

73 The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary.
74 The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary.
75 The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary.
1. Destroy the Mozambican economy in the rural zones.
2. Destroy the communications routes to prevent exports and imports… and the movement of domestic produce.
3. Prevent the activities of foreigners (cooperantes) because they are the most dangerous in the recovery of the economy.  

The pointlessly destructive nature of this plan is clear. The maximalists had presented Renamo with a plan to cripple Mozambique’s economy, without presenting any plausible route for a Renamo take-over of power, thus ensuring a drawn-out internecine conflict.

Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord (also known as the Agreement on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness Between the Government of the People’s Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of South Africa) on 16 March 1984. Though the Accord does not mention the ANC or Renamo, it was implicit that the agreement was aimed at removing support for these organisations. Article Three of the Accord, the most detailed, stated that:

The High Contracting Parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, organisation or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants.

2) The High Contracting Parties … undertake in particular to –

a) forbid and prevent in their respective territories the organisation of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, whose objective is to carry out acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

b) eliminate from their respective territories bases, training centres, places of shelter, accommodation and transit for elements who intend to carry out the acts…

c) eliminate from their respective territories centres or depots containing armaments of whatever nature, destined to be used by the elements…

d) eliminate from their respective territories command posts or other places for the command, direction and co-ordination of the elements…

i) take appropriate steps in the respective territories to prevent the recruitment of elements of whatever nationality for the purpose of carrying out the acts…

3) The High Contracting Parties will not use the territory of third states to carry out or support the acts…

President Machel was thus sacrificing his principled support of the ANC against the Apartheid regime in the hope of cutting off South African support for Renamo. Though the Accord would lay in ruins before long, it should be remembered that without the

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76 The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary.
benefit of hindsight those working for peace within Frelimo could honestly envision that, if the agreement could end international support for Renamo, then Mozambique could force the rebels into negotiation or destroy them militarily. Considering that by June 1984 the Renamo leadership was appealing to the SADF for further supplies, Machel’s belief seems to have been correct. Furthermore, the agreement was a sign to the West that Mozambique was taking a more conciliatory stance in the region and was thus worthy of further support.

Renamo Defies Nkomati

With the signing of the Nkomati Accord the intensity of Renamo attacks increased, averaging 165 a month between March and May 1984. Renamo’s activities especially escalated near the capital and around Malawi in Niassa, Nampula, and Tete provinces. During May these attacks included the ambush of a convoy carrying tobacco from Malawi through Tete province on 19 March and the destruction of a train transporting maize from Malawi on the Nacala line on 29 March. In the south Moamba, on the road between the capital and South Africa, was raided in March and more than 30 houses were destroyed. Travelling outside the capital was becoming increasingly hazardous. Trains on the Maputo railway were also coming under attack, with one such incident north of Maputo in April resulting in one civilian being killed and 31 wounded. Renamo also ambushed a bus travelling on the main highway between Gaza and Maputo on 29 April killing two civilians and wounding ten. Sabotage of powerlines by Renamo fighters meant that electricity supplies to Maputo also became erratic. Elsewhere in the country Renamo attacked Inhaiminga in Sofala and ambushed another convoy in Tete province on 25 April, killing 37 people. In Nampula the Nacala railway was targeted four times in April and May. Between 30 and 40 train passengers were killed in one attack on April 26, and rail traffic

78 The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary.
subsequently ceased. The city of Nampula itself was under siege. Renamo ambushes around
the city had ceased temporarily after the implementation of military escorts for convoys
earlier in the year, but on 27 April Renamo began attacking even those armed convoys.
Meanwhile, Frelimo forces near Nampula began implementing the same type of strategy
the Portuguese had used to counter insurgency, forcing people into protected compounds
by burning their huts.  
By May Renamo Secretary-General Evo Fernandes was claiming
that Renamo forces were within 25 kilometres of the capital and Mozambican President
Samora Machel was said to have requested that South Africa send troops to defend
Maputo.  A Malawian diplomatic report from May 1984 documents how Mozambique’s
security situation had continued to deteriorate:

It would appear that the South African Government before going to sign the Nkomati Accord
had carefully planned with [Renamo] all important strategies which could paralyse the Frelimo
Government. She gave sufficient food and arms. It is also alleged that a large number of
[Renamo guerrillas] were pushed across the border from South Africa into Mozambique
immediately before the signing of the Nkomati Accord and they were given instructions to
harass the capital…. recently attacks on transport and communication infrastructure have very
much intensified especially in the North and the surrounding areas of Maputo City…. In
Nampula [Renamo] is attacking roads and rail lines. The Nampula/Malawi line has come under
attack recently, threatening our access to the coast. It is understood that as a result if this,
Nampula Province is completely at a standstill. Road traffic is by convoy under tight security
escort…. the situation in the South, in particular, around Maputo has deteriorated abruptly;
with some attacks taking place only a few kilometres from the Capital.

The Malawian report also notes that, “attacks within Maputo and other cities are an inside
job. It is further alleged that the so called bandits live and work amidst the citizens in the
big cities”.  By the end of May about 20 Renamo saboteurs were arrested inside Maputo
itself.

From May Renamo also established a presence in Cabo Delgado, the only province
so far left unaffected by the war. Cabrita claims that reports of subversive activity in Cabo
Delgado’s Mueda highlands preceded Renamo entry into the province from January 1984,
probably perpetrated by former MANU members. Makonde Chief Muikho endorsed
Renamo’s presence amongst his people, and with his help they gradually spread from Muico in the south of the province, to Namuno in the south-west, Meluco in central Cabo
Delgado, and Muidumbe on the Mueda plateau in the north. The FPLM resisted their

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84 Hanlon, “Mozambique Guerrillas Bring War into the Cities”; David Rabkin, “MNR Still Active in
86 “Situation in Mozambique”, from Malawian Ambassador to Mozambique Itimu to the Malawian
Secretary of External Affairs, 15 May 1984, Malawi National Archives, file MAP/C/6, pp1-3.
88 Benjamin Pogrund, “MNR Turns Screws on Embattled Mozambique”, Rand Daily Mail, 22 May 1984,
p9.

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northwards advance, but Renamo diverted them to the south by launching attacks close to the port of Nacala in Nampula province. From mid-1984 allegations began appearing in the international press that supplies for Renamo were being transported from Saudi Arabia and Oman to the Comoros Islands, situated in the Indian Ocean to the north-east of Mozambique, then flown into northern Mozambique. According to Phyllis Johnson and David Martin the Comoros Islands were “virtually a South African satellite and ideally situated for access to northern Mozambique and southern Tanzania”. If true this may have been connected to Renamo’s advance into Cabo Delgado province.

By June 1984 the city of Maputo was almost isolated, and there was speculation that if the situation became dire the government might transfer to Nampula. Renamo attacks had come within fifteen kilometres of Maputo and the main roads from the food production areas in the Limpopo Valley were being threatened. One attack on 6 June killed ten civilians and injured nineteen others who were travelling between Namaacha and Maputo, though Alex Vines has suggested that attacks on civilian convoys on the Swaziland road between February 1984 and March 1985 may actually have been carried out by government troops. Bombing of high-tension powerlines near Moamba also continued to interrupt Maputo’s power supply. By early June the FPLM was claiming to have killed 297 Renamo guerrillas and to have destroyed seven camps in 81 actions in Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane provinces since the beginning of May. They also claimed to have freed 1,573 peasants being held at these sites. These actions included the destruction of a major camp north of Magude district, Maputo province, on 2 June. Later a Renamo base in Homoíne district, Inhambane, was attacked and 800 people freed, and the FPLM claimed to have killed 160 Renamo fighters and to have destroyed fifteen camps in Gaza during June. The FPLM also killed 30 Renamo fighters at Maganja, Zambézia. Meanwhile, in mid-June Renamo claimed to have killed 79 FPLM troops in an attack on a garrison at the Pungwé Bridge, near Beira. They also attacked: a military column between Maúa and Marrupa in Niassa on 25 June; a military column in northern Sofala on 26 June, killing 25

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89 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp226-227.
soldiers and capturing seven; the Limpopo railway in Gaza on 26, 27 and 28 June; and the Nacala and Beira railways on 28 June. In total Renamo reported that from 22-30 June they had conducted 30 operations, which killed 143 FPLM troops and wounded 119. By this time, however, Renamo was becoming desperate for equipment. In the entry of 16 June 1984 in the Gorongosa Notebooks, entitled “From the President of Renamo to Friend Commandant Charles”, Renamo President Dhlakama makes a plea to Colonel Charles van Niekerk for the SADF to replenish their supplies. Dhlakama writes,

My friend Commandant Charles, we no longer have war materiel, mainly in the central and southern areas of our country. We appreciate that we received the last consignment but was soon as we unloaded, we had to relieve all the regions in the central area, including Tete, as they already lacked materiel to respond to the massive offensive that Frelimo had just announced would be launched after the signing of the Nkomati Accord…. Here in the centre our friends could slip in a ship with a bigger load than we received before, and that would allow us to sustain the war for the whole of 1984…. we no longer have the war materiel to go on squeezing Machel as we were squeezing just after the signing of the Nkomati Accord both in the centre and in Maputo, towards his final defeat. For as we are now without war materiel to fight him he will recover and that will force us to shift our bases…. This could cause a bad situation to occur for us identical to that of 1980 when we were so badly hit by Rhodesia abandoning us…. Our Secretary-General and our other politicians are not aware of the bad results that could follow, since they follow only our victories and not the possibilities Machel has of wiping us out.  

Obviously the amount of material that Renamo captured from government forces was not enough to sustain their war effort, contrary to claims by many Renamo supporters. A few days later the Gorongosa Desk Diary records that an air drop of 26 tonnes of material, along with the Secretary-General Evo Fernandes and two South Africans, would be carried out on 18 August at a drop zone east of Inhaminga.  

The diplomacy that had eventually led to the Nkomati Accord had thus failed to secure peace in Mozambique. Though minimalists had won their way in South Africa’s State Security Council, it was now clear that Renamo’s maximalist and putschist supporters would subvert their own government if it served their interests. But their assistance to Renamo would now operate in a changed environment, in which they would have to hide their support from elements in the South African administration, and actually encourage Renamo to diversify their sources of support. Renamo would also have a greater level of autonomy thrust upon them by these circumstances, increasing the importance of the competing agendas within their own leadership.

97 The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary.

The Mozambican Civil War raged unabated in the period from mid-1984 until late 1986, and included large-scale government offensives against Renamo’s Gorongosa headquarters in 1985 and 1986, and a major Renamo offensive in Zambézia in late 1986. Nevertheless minimalist and maximalists in South Africa and various factions within Renamo were also engaged in a complex struggle during this time. While the minimalists facilitated direct negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo in October 1984, the maximalists worked to sabotage them and continuing efforts for compromise by elements of the Renamo Branco. With maximalist encouragement the Renamo leadership would also forge greater connections with supporters in Europe and the United States, increasing Renamo’s ability to operate autonomously from South Africa. Though minimalists would use their influence in the State Security Council to crack down on Renamo’s South African supporters when possible, not even the discovery of the Gorongosa documents in late 1985 could expel their high-level supporters from power. In the meantime, betrayed in their attempts at negotiation, Machel’s government continued its counter-insurgency strategy and by 1986 had scattered Renamo’s forces in central Mozambique. However, the fluid nature of guerrilla war, and the re-emergence of South African maximalists to power during a State of Emergency in mid-1986, ensured that Renamo would quickly transform the defeat of their forces in Sofala province into a major offensive in Zambézia.

Post-Nkomati Negotiations

By July 1984 the Nkomati Accord had been in place for four months, but Renamo’s campaign in Mozambique had only intensified. A July 1984 document from South Africa’s State Security Council noted that the intensity of Renamo operations since March 1984 had demoralised the Mozambican armed forces (FPLM) and that their offensive against Renamo had lost momentum. The document observed that Mozambique’s overall security situation had continued to deteriorate, which led Frelimo to increase the mobilisation of militia forces from May 1984, and predicted that the maintenance of pressure by Renamo would force the Frelimo government (and especially “the nationalist group in Frelimo”) into negotiations with the rebels.¹ The Frelimo

¹ “Die hoë intensiteit van Renamo-operasies na Maart 1984 teenoor Frelimo/FAM se verwagting dat optrede na die ondertekenings van die Nkomati-verdrag skerp sal afneem, het ’n lae veglus binne die FAM tot gevolg. Op enkele uitsonderings na is daar ’n merkbare insinking in die momentum van FAM.
government had been in unofficial contact with Renamo since January 1984, and in July
Frelimo representative Jacinto Veloso held low-level talks with Renamo representatives in
Europe. A June report from the Malawian Ambassador to the United Nations also noted
that,

> two significant proposals jointly being considered by South African and Mozambique are: (i)
> the possibility and feasibility of affording amnesty to the anti-Machel Government rebels; (ii)
> the possibility of establishing new projects in Mozambique into which the said rebels might be
> absorbed.

However, some elements within Frelimo, including Armando Guebuza, remained against
negotiations with Renamo and the promise of an amnesty for their fighters. Meanwhile,
the FPLM continued operations against Renamo forces in July and August. Various
sources state that the FPLM launched anywhere up to 140 operations in these months,
killing between 50 and 360 Renamo guerrillas and capturing up to 90. These operations
were carried out particularly in Maputo, Inhambane, Sofala and Nampula provinces, where
Renamo forces were most heavily concentrated. Overall Frelimo claimed that they held
almost 4,000 Renamo prisoners, but were not sure what to do with them.

As it seems that the Renamo Branco (white and mestizo Portuguese such as Renamo
Secretary-General Evo Fernandes) dominated Renamo’s external political apparatus,
Frelimo had been negotiating with only with one interest group within Renamo. By early
August these negotiations were intensifying, requiring communications between Renamo’s
internal and external leadership, the South African Defence Forces (SADF), the South
African government and the Frelimo leadership. The Gorongosa Documents, and other
that Evo Fernandes was flown into Mozambique on 2 August with two SADF personnel
and sixteen tonnes of ammunition, blankets, clothes, radio equipment, medicine and seed.
Navy Strike Craft withdrew Fernandes and a Renamo delegation from the coast north of Beira on 9 August, while six Renamo members who were in hospital were put ashore. During this time Fernandes no doubt discussed Renamo’s bargaining position with President Afonso Dhlakama in preparation for the meetings he then held in Durban on 12 August with the Chief of secret operations for the Navy, Commodore Morisson; Chief of Intelligence Operations for South African Military Intelligence (DMI), Brigadier van Tonder; South African Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha; and South African Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan. On the same day Prime Minister P.W. Botha met with Mozambican representatives Jacinto Veloso and Sergio Vieira to discuss accusations of continued South African interference in Mozambique and to continue negotiations.

Renamo member Constantino Reis defected to Maputo at around this time and claims he made that South African support for Renamo had continued until at least June provoked high-level protests from the Mozambican leadership. In December 1984 a communication from Mozambique’s Agencia de Informação de Moçambique intercepted by the South African National Intelligence Service, referring to an important Renamo defector which is almost certainly Reis, claimed that he had,

revealed all the bases of [Renamo] in the Republic of South Africa, the circumstances surrounding the death of Orlando Cristina, the involvement of Portuguese nationals with [Renamo], scholarships for [Renamo] in West Germany and France and delivery of weapons to [Renamo] in Mozambique territory after the Nkomati accord.

A later National Intelligence Service document quotes Reis as saying that,

A very important fact is that of the pillage of ivory in the interior of Mozambique, especially in the area of Gorongoza. [Renamo] have special people to kill the elephants in order to get ivory, which is taken to South Africa, and of course with all that ivory they can get funds to purchase materials. Besides this business, the armed bandits also deal with precious stones in Zambezia lake. They also kill lions and zebras for the skins.

In the following days the Gorongosa Diary records a communication from South Africa to the Renamo headquarters claiming that Pik Botha was trying to supplant the SADF as the key negotiator between Frelimo and Renamo. Another message notes that the SADF would no longer be able to use C-130 aircraft and naval vessels to supply Renamo.

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forces, so it would be necessary to use civilian aircraft for those purposes. The minimalist faction within the South African administration was thus able to curb, but not prevent, the actions of the maximalists within the SADF. Following the Nkomati Accord the South African Reconnaissance Commandos (Recces) ceased their co-operation with Renamo, and members who had operated in Mozambique were even placed under surveillance to ensure their compliance. Peter Stiff claims that assistance to Renamo following the Nkomati Accord would thus have been organised directly by Lieutenant-General Pieter van der Westhuizen, the head of Military Intelligence. Deon Geldenhuys, an academic close to the security establishment at the time, wrote that for realists within the administration the Nkomati Accord, “rekindled the hopes of establishing a so-called constellation of states in southern Africa”. This meant that for the minimalists continued support for Renamo at this point would endanger their regional goals.

Pretoria seemed concerned that the on-going armed conflict could seriously jeopardise the Nkomati Accord. President Machel could conceivably renounce the agreement and call in Soviet military support if he feared for his regime because of Renamo advances. It was also pointed out in South Africa that the mutual economic benefits (for South Africa and Mozambique) held out by Nkomati could not be fully realised before Mozambique resolves its domestic conflict through some accommodation between Frelimo and Renamo.

Pik Botha thus met with the American, British, French and Italian Ambassadors on 26 August and promised that South Africa would do all it could to ensure peace talks between Renamo and Frelimo within 45 days. As part of these arrangements Renamo planned to gather their Generals in Gorongosa and to transport them to South Africa for negotiations. The Mozambican government had begun to offer the return of confiscated assets to pre-independence owners in a clear attempt to influence Renamo’s Portuguese backers. 80-year old industrialist Manuel Bulhosa, a major non-South African Renamo supporter who employed the Renamo leaders Evo Fernandes and Jorge Correia in his own publishing house, ‘Bertranel’, spoke with President Machel and Jacinto Veloso around this time and seemed to support the new peace process. Bulhosa had partly owned an oil

12 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
13 Stiff, The Silent War, pp377-378.
16 The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary.
refinery in Maputo before independence, and like some other Portuguese businessmen, viewed Renamo’s primary aim as the regaining of these assets.17

Meanwhile, barred from using military vehicles to resupply Renamo, SADF personnel were parachuted into Gorongosa in late August to build a landing strip for civilian aircraft to ferry in supplies. Plans were also made to build a landing strip in Zambézia in September.18 Paulo de Oliviera later wrote that a Portuguese pilot, João Quental, became involved in flying the South African Dakota aircraft from Waterkloof Air Base to various areas of Mozambique.19 In addition, on 26 August four Portuguese citizens were arrested in central Tanzania, apparently while working to create a civilian support network for Renamo by building rear bases and an airstrip. The four, who were eventually released due to the personal intervention of Portuguese Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Mota Pinto, had all at some time been connected to the late Jorge Jardim or the Rhodesian armed forces.20 Ammunition and non-military supplies were also dropped to Renamo forces at Gorongosa by the SADF in late August, though the South African document cited in Hamman’s Days of the Generals claims that,

The military support given to Renamo after the Nkomati Accord … can be explained as follows: Where members of the SADF and/or Department of Foreign Affairs visited Mozambique to promote the peace initiative sufficient ammunition was supplied to equip a protection force. Where the SADF convinced Afonso Dhlakama to visit the southern regions of Mozambique to promote the peace initiative sufficient ammunition was supplied to equip a protection force. To further the peace initiative relatively large quantities of communications equipment were supplied to Renamo so that it could effectively communicate with all its regions particularly with regard to a cease-fire…. Two anti-aircraft crews were trained and deployed in Mozambique with obsolete aircraft cannons to protect Renamo’s headquarters from Frelimo air attacks so that Renamo would continue with the negotiations and not withdraw as it had threatened to do…. The SADF is convinced that its involvement in contact and support for Renamo after the Nkomati Accord made a large contribution to maintaining Renamo’s participation in the peace process in Mozambique…”21

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21 Hamann, Days of the Generals, pp110-111, 113. These facts damage the credibility of Renamo spokesman who denied South African assistance after the Nkomati Accord, including Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama, who as late as 1990 declared that, “from 1980 to 1984 we had some material support from South Africa in the form of weapons, radios, uniforms, and medicines. This support ended in March 1984. The Pretoria government and Frelimo signed the Nkomati Accord, and we haven’t received any assistance since then”. President Afonso Dhlakama in Interview 1988-1990, (London: Mozambique Institute, 1991), p12.
This can scarcely be believed considering a record of comments in the Gorongosa Diary made in early September 1984 by the Chief of Staff of the South African Armed Forces, General Viljoen, which stated that,

1. General [Viljoen] agreed to send us ‘humanitarian aid’ in Air Force C130 planes….
4. He recommended us not to lose military strength and control, in the face of these negotiations.
5. He said that the ceasefire mustn’t be effective, he agreed with the plan of two to three months maximum.
7. He recommended us not to accept the amnesty.
8. He suggested that the ceasefire should not enable economic agreements between [South Africa] and Machel, these should be suspended until the conclusion of the Final Peace Agreement in Mozambique.
11. He also said that he would facilitate our contacts with foreign countries especially African countries.
12. The General recommended us not to be fooled by the schemes of [Pik] Botha because he is a traitor, he even agreed with Chester Crocker’s idea of Frelimo offering an amnesty to Renamo members.

General [Viljoen] went on to say: I agree with a joint strategy for putting Machel out…. We want Renamo to win the war to remove the communists from the area.22

By September the Frelimo government was strengthening its relationship with the West, signing the Lomé Convention with the European Economic Community, preparing to join the IMF and World Bank, and considering a takeover of state farms in the Limpopo Valley by the multinational company Lonrho.23 Inside Mozambique the FPLM conducted large-scale operations against Renamo forces in Inhambane and Gaza, and South African troops were deployed in Tete province to protect the Cabora Bassa powerlines and the dam itself.24 It was also reported that former colonial soldiers were recruited from Portugal to help fight Renamo and work as military instructors for the FPLM.25 With Renamo’s maximalist and putschist supporters within the South African government marginalised, an increasingly close relationship with the West, and progress in a preliminary dialogue with important elements of the Renamo Branco, by September 1984 it seemed that Samora Machel’s deal with the Apartheid devil might finally force Renamo into a negotiated settlement. However, dramatic developments within South Africa would begin the re-ascendance of maximalist elements with the South African administration. On 3 September 1984 workers and students in Vaal townships participated in stay-away and street protests against rent increases. Fuelled by political discontent over the omission of blacks from the new tricameral parliament they also attacked apartheid institutions like schools and

22 The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary.
24 “Mozambique: Machel’s Dilemmas”, pp4-6; Azevedo, “Mozambique and the West”, p41.
municipal offices. Fierce battles raged between police and residents over the next few months, and the projection of footage of this unrest internationally led to large-scale private dis-investment from South Africa. States of Emergency declared by the Apartheid government would deepen the economic impact of the instability by discouraging foreign bankers from lending to South African businesses. According to Laurie Nathan,

Entire communities were involved in struggles around their economic conditions and lack of political rights. National political organisations like the United Democratic Front (UDF), together with trade unions and the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC), mounted the most serious challenge to the apartheid state since 1948. The South African Police were unable to handle the situation alone, and at the end of 1984 the SADF was sent into the townships to assist them. As the crisis deepened, the government imposed a series of states of emergency. It virtually outlawed extra-parliamentary opposition and detained without trial tens of thousands of people. It banned community organisations and newspapers, and repeatedly introduced new press restrictions. It also equipped the police and army with extraordinary powers to suppress the uprising.

Along with increasing intensity of the war in Angola these developments strengthened the hand of the SADF within South Africa’s State Security Council and reaffirmed their conviction in the necessity of support for Renamo.

Meanwhile, in Mozambique the stage was set for negotiations between Frelimo and the Renamo leadership. During mid-September a number of Renamo commanders were transported to South Africa for preliminary discussion with the South African government, before being returned to their Gorongosa base with tonnes of radio equipment and ‘humanitarian’ supplies. At the same time the Gorongosa Documents record that the head of DMI’s Directorate of Special Tasks, Colonel Charles van Niekerk, assured the Renamo leadership that when negotiations began with Frelimo DMI would,

install microphones in the negotiating room to listen in on the talks between [Pik] Botha and the Mozambican delegation; it will be very advantageous for us. In this way we will know [Pik] Botha’s plan and Frelimo’s…

Though Pik Botha and the minimalists were making a genuine effort to facilitate these negotiations, maximalists in the SADF were doing all they could to undermine the process. Afonso Dhlakama spent a week in South Africa in late September, meeting with Pik Botha, Minister of Defence Magnus Malan, and the Chief of the Armed Forces, General Viljoen. According to the Gorongosa Documents Brigadier van Tonder warned Dhlakama what

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29 The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary.
questions he would be asked, and DMI’s Major Dubry provided him with a briefing on the military situation in Mozambique and the locations of Zimbabwean, Tanzanian and Eastern Bloc soldiers. Only a few days later, on 3 October 1984, official delegations from Frelimo and Renamo met for the first time to negotiate an end to Mozambique’s civil war. The delegation representing the Mozambican government was led by Jacinto Veloso, Minister of Economic Affairs in the President's Office, and included Sergio Vieira, Minister of Security; Teodato Hunguana, Vice-Minister of the Interior; Major-General Hama Thai, Chief of the Air Force; and President Machel’s advisor Fernando Honwana. Renamo’s delegation was led by Secretary-General Evo Fernandes and included the National Council members Joaquim Vaz, Fanuel Malhuza and Artur da Fonseca; Mateus Ngonhamo, a member of the ‘Military Council’; and Jorge Correia, Renamo’s representative in Portugal. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs D. J. Louis Nel represented the Republic of South Africa. The meeting of these delegations on 3 October established the technical framework for the negotiations, including South Africa’s provision of secretarial services for the talks, the right of the Chairman to conduct bilateral discussions with either delegation, and the resolution that “decisions of the Commission and undertakings by each delegation will be binding on the Government or movement it represents”. The meeting’s minutes also included a draft ceasefire declaration stating that all armed activities and conflict would cease for an agreed number of months and that “none of the parties shall take advantage of the cessation of armed activities and conflict to gain any military advantage”. A ‘Monitoring Committee’ would be formed with an equal representation of the two parties and a South African Chairman, and this committee’s role would be,

- to monitor the implementation of these resolutions, to formulate and implement practical arrangements for the proper conduct and safety of the armed personnel involved, to investigate and report … on progress made and any alleged or suspected violations and to bring to attention any matter they think proper.

Armed activities would be immediately de-escalated by,

- Refraining from attacking soft targets *inter alia* members of the civilian population and their property and social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, shops, buses, trains and power lines….
- Requesting and allowing the provision of humanitarian aid to assist victims of the conflict…

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31 The Gorongosa Documents: Desk Diary.
34 “Commission Established in Terms of Para 4 of the Declaration of 3 October 1984”.
35 “Commission Established in Terms of Para 4 of the Declaration of 3 October 1984”.

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iv. Guaranteeing the free movement of all private citizens.  

The next meeting of the commission took place from 8-11 October and produced the working document “Agreement on the Cessation of Armed Activities and Conflict in Mozambique”. This reproduced the draft ceasefire agreement from their previous meeting, specified that the initial ceasefire duration would be three months, and added an article stating that,

i. The Government of the [People's Republic of Mozambique] shall continue to allow representatives of international organisations such as the International Red Cross and Amnesty International to visit prisoners and detainees in its custody either by invitation or at the request of such organisations.

ii. That representatives of such international organisations shall similarly be allowed to visit other prisoners held against their will in Mozambique.

The documents also record the request by the Renamo delegation that negotiations continue on 17 October, but that meeting never took place because their delegation abruptly withdrew from the talks. It has not been conclusively established why this occurred, but it seems that a last minute phone call on 11 October convinced Fernandes to terminate discussions. While unravelling what led to the break-down in dialogue, it is useful to note that the period of negotiations was a point at which the various and incompatible agendas of those supporting Renamo could be outwardly perceived. The minimalists in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs had always viewed Renamo as a tool to subordinate Maputo to South Africa’s regional goals, and having to some extent achieved this in the Nkomati Accord were willing to facilitate an end to the conflict. In contrast to this the maximalists within the SADF rejected accommodation with Apartheid’s enemies and had from the beginning undermined the negotiations by providing weapons, supplies and intelligence to Renamo and advising them to reject the ceasefire. Meanwhile, within Renamo divisions existed between the wealthy, Portuguese supporters whose principal aim was to regain their assets in Mozambique; the mainly black leadership who aspired to positions of power in the national government; and putschist elements with a primarily ideological desire to overthrow Mozambique’s communist government. While the maximalists’ aim of indefinite destabilisation was incompatible with the goals of every other faction, fulfilling the aims of only one group at negotiations would also set them at odds with the others. Thus Frelimo’s concessions to South Africa’s minimalists through the Nkomati Accord did not placate the Renamo leadership, and offers to return possessions

36 “Commission Established in Terms of Para 4 of the Declaration of 3 October 1984”.
37 “First Plenary Session of the Commission Established in Terms of the Pretoria Declaration of 3 October 1984”.

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to the Renamo Branco would not satisfy those who sought positions within the government. While João Cabrita claims that the October negotiations failed because Frelimo would not publicly declare their intentions to negotiate directly with Renamo, this seems unlikely.  

One factor that may have been important was that, while the Renamo leadership maintained the demand that they were given positions in the army, civil service and government, Frelimo insisted that their government was recognised as legitimate and refused to consider integrating Renamo into a united administration. Also of importance was that during 1984 South African Military Intelligence encouraged Portuguese elements, including industrialist Manuel Bulhosa, Deputy Portuguese Prime Minister Carlos Mota Pinto and Portuguese Minister of State Almerda Santos, to assume a greater role in assisting the guerrillas as part of their strategy to internationalise Renamo’s support network. Members of the South African Portuguese community could provide Renamo with financial and logistical support, while Portuguese citizens in Malawi were said to have contacts with that country’s security forces and would thus have been well placed to operate a private support network from across the border. According to a number of sources the phone call ordering Fernandes to withdraw from the talks was from Portugal’s Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Mota Pinto. Thus by November diplomatic sources were suggesting that Frelimo would prefer to deal directly with Renamo’s black leadership, and Jacinto Veloso would also later claim that Renamo’s Portuguese and other international supporters were the main block to peace.

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41 “Mozambique: An Infamous Accord”, pp4-7.
the Pretoria talks have had a major impact on the Portuguese community living in South Africa, in effect a large number of ex-supporters of Renamo are ‘withdrawing from this dirty game’ and making accusations against Evo Fernandes such as ‘profiteering’... 

Meanwhile, the same document records how opponents of the negotiations seem to have acted to further hamper moves towards peace, noting that on 1 November the body of Arnaldo Santos, “the go-between between South Africa and Maputo... was found incinerated in his car” in Mozambique.

**Military Clashes in Late 1984**

During these months conflict continued in Mozambique. A South African Situation Report stated that Renamo made 226 attacks in September 1984 and 203 attacks in October, fifty percent of which were in Maputo province. Another South African document notes that Renamo’s operations were increasingly focusing on transport infrastructure around the cities of Maputo and Nacala. Central Mozambique remained relatively calm, while an ongoing FPLM offensive in Zambézia was succeeding in driving most of Renamo’s forces out of the province. In the provinces of Manica and Sofala Renamo’s limited attacks included the destruction of an agro-livestock complex in the Beira Corridor on 8 September; an attack on the communal village of Mugerenge, 20 kilometres from Chimoio, that killed seventeen civilians and wounded five on 15 October; and the ambush of a train in the Beira Corridor on 28 October. Meanwhile, FPLM operations in the provinces included the destruction of a number of rebel camps near Chibabava in Sofala, and the ambush of a Renamo unit at Catandica in Manica, which killed seventeen guerrillas. In Zambézia the FPLM destroyed a number of Renamo bases on 7 and 12 September, while Renamo killed 73 FPLM troops in an attack on Marromeu in southern Zambézia on 8 September; killed 24 civilians and injured 20 in an assault the Sena sugar estates at Luabo on 11 September; and later attacked a communal village near Gurué in northern Zambézia on 29 October. Conflict continued in the northern provinces as

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Renamo had a strong position in Nampula, which they were using to expand into Cabo Delgado. Deep disaffection amongst the Makonde population in the country’s north-east also raised fears that resistance in the north could develop into secessionism. In Niassa Renamo attacked communal villages and state farms in Lichinga district, near the Malawi border, while government forces destroyed four rebel camps and killed 20 Renamo fighters. In the country’s south the FPLM worked to counter Renamo activities through an intensification of their actions near Maputo. The FPLM’s Eighth Brigade was deployed from Gaza and conducted sweeps in Magude and Moamba districts of Maputo province. Helicopters were used for swift attacks after rebel radio signals were intercepted. Nevertheless Renamo continued operating close to Maputo, sabotaging electricity supplies at least three times, and mounting a number of ambushes against road and rail traffic near the capital. On 18 October a Renamo attack on Manhiça, to the north of Maputo, killed 27 people. It was thought that these attacks aimed to create panic in Maputo and create pressure on the government’s negotiators. Government forces also had some successes in Inhambane and in Gaza, killing 150 Renamo guerrillas in the latter in 70 operations between September and November 1984.

Following the break-down of negotiations in Pretoria, on 2 November 1984 Renamo announced the beginning of an offensive in all ten provinces called Operation Thunder, though this seems to have merely been propaganda. Between 12 and 21 November low-intensity operations by the FPLM killed around 50 Renamo fighters throughout the provinces of Inhambane, Manica, Sofala, Tete and Zambézia. While the same number were killed in Maputo Province at Magude, Moamba, Manhiça, Marracuene, and Boane in late October and early November, and two Renamo bases were destroyed north of Magude and east of Manhiça. In further operations in early December government forces killed 22 Renamo fighters in Maputo province, while fourteen Renamo...
fighters were killed in Gaza in mid-November and two rebel camps were destroyed in Homoíne district of Inhambane in early December. Around 90 Renamo fighters were also killed during December in Panda district of Inhambane and Bárne District of Sofala. Meanwhile, some of Renamo’s actions included an ambush that killed seven civilians outside Maputo on 21 November; an attack on Manjacaze in Gaza on 1 December that killed seventeen civilians and wounded two; the killing of eleven civilians travelling between Namaacha and Maputo; and the sabotage of powerlines to Maputo from the border. Further north government forces killed 150 guerrillas and captured 27 in the districts of Mocuba, Morrumbala and Alto Molocué in Zambézia, and in December an important Renamo camp was destroyed in the locality of Niscoadala in Zambézia, killing 27 fighters and releasing 200 peasants. Government soldiers also clashed with Renamo forces in Nampula and Niassa during November and December. Mozambican military sources informed journalists that South Africa continued using civilian Dakota aircraft to provide arms and supplies to Renamo (which was later confirmed by the Gorongosa Documents), and it was thought that supplies were also being delivered from Malawi and the Comoros Islands. Journalist Joseph Hanlon claimed that in December 1984 there were only two confirmed air drops of supplies to Renamo from South Africa, compared to eight from Malawi and two from the Comoros Islands, though regular border crossings and beach-landings of supplies from South Africa continued. South African documents reveal that conversely the South African government believed that Maputo continued to violate the Nkomati Accord as there were up to 100 ANC operatives still stationed in Maputo, 30-40 of whom had been given militarily training. The documents claimed they had close

associations with the Mozambican police and military, and that they travelled south from 
Tanzania, through Mozambique and into Swaziland and Natal, from where they could 
launch attacks in South Africa. Analysts writing at the time noted that the war seemed to 
have broken into components in the north and south with relative calm in the centre, 
which for some raised the fear that South Africa might create a peace settlement in the 
south while Renamo remained operational in the north. Unbeknownst to them operations 
by government forces in central Mozambique were stepped up during this month as, “[t]he 
first comprehensive intelligence on the importance of Renamo bases along the Gorongoza 
Mountains in Mozambique came from some elements that had been captured near Katiyo 
in North-eastern Zimbabwe”. Operation Lemon was the first offensive launched from 5-9 December 1984, spearheaded by the Zimbabwean Defence Force. Though it only 
succeeded in capturing two abandoned Renamo bases, the operation revealed that 
Renamo’s main bases included those at Messinse, Chito, Nyazonia, and Bretoni, and that 
their headquarters consisted of the Gorongosa Base, the Central Base and Casa Banana in 
the Gorongosa Mountains. Captured Renamo gave coordinates of Casa Banana and also 
revealed that Zimbabwean dissidents were being trained at the base.

Factional Manoeuvring in Renamo and South Africa

By the end of January 1985 the assessment of some news reports was that the 
situation in Mozambique had not improved since the Nkomati Accord, that President 
Machel was becoming increasingly desperate, and that he might turn to the Soviet bloc for 
further military assistance. The fear of a communist ground-force intervention seems to 
have been great enough in Pretoria that they sent some South African soldiers into 
Mozambique to defend infrastructure against Renamo. Renamo’s attacks on power 
infrastructure in late 1984 and early 1985 included the destruction of 530 Cabora Bassa 
powerline pylons, which were simultaneously sabotaged over a 100 kilometres distance 
from the Buzi to Save Rivers. Some analysts claimed that the method used in the attack

59 “Spesiale Situasierapport 12/85: Ontleding van die Veiligheidsituasie in Mosambiek”, 28 February 
1985, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/113/3; “Mosambiek: Inligtingsoorsig Januarie-Maart 
60 Hanlon, “Portugal ‘Block to Peace’ in Africa”; Gomes, “Airstrip Threat”; “Mozambique: An Infamous 
61 Norman Mlambo, Raids on Gorongoza: Zimbabwe’s Military Involvement in Mozambique, 1982-1992, 
Defence Digest Working Paper Number 3, Southern African Centre for Defence Information, p6, 
(available at http://crweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/defencedigest/defdigest_index.html, accessed 26 February 
2006).
62 Mlambo, Raids on Gorongoza, p6.
was too sophisticated for Renamo’s guerrillas. The powerlines from the South African border to Maputo were also sabotaged on 2, 14 and 22 January 1985, resulting in energy restrictions being imposed in Maputo. While Pik Botha had appeared on television in mid-January to acknowledge South Africa’s former support for Renamo, the rebels were obviously still operating from South African territory, as could be seen by attacks very close to the border. Though Renamo seemed to lack an overall strategy, which might have been symptomatic of internal factionalisation and disorganisation, their forces did remain pervasive and even launched low-level operations inside the capital itself. Meanwhile, Frelimo’s own forces also had low morale, were ill-fed, unpaid and under-supervised.

Renamo’s attacks during January included a number of ambushes of buses in the Manhiça region of Maputo province, killing 27 passengers and wounding dozens, as well as the killing of two British citizens near the South African border at Ressano Garcia on 13 January. Further south Renamo assaulted a rural co-operative at Catembe, and rail traffic to Swaziland ceased due to a Renamo ambush on 28 January. Reports indicated that a large new contingent of Renamo guerrillas was being committed to Maputo province to topple or pressure the Mozambican government. Meanwhile, government forces were having some successes in offensives in Niassa and Inhambane provinces.

Though it was the opinion of Mozambican government representatives that Renamo’s Portuguese component was responsible for blocking negotiations with Frelimo, and some reports from late 1984 suggested that the South African government was attempting to marginalise the Renamo Branco for that reason, at least some members of Renamo’s external leadership were still co-operating with the South African minimalists in their quest for a settlement. The Gorongosa Documents record that in the weeks after negotiations stalled in October 1984 Evo Fernandes travelled to Renamo’s Gorongosa base and returned to Pretoria with a contingent of the Renamo leadership, including Jorge

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While a press report reproduced in a South African National Intelligence Service document notes that the industrialist Manuel Bulhosa had travelled to Maputo a number of times to engage in talks with the Mozambican authorities. In the South African State Security Council discussion of the negotiations between Renamo and Frelimo continued in November, though Renamo continued their boycott of the talks. A State Security Council document, reflecting a minimalist line, states that the purpose of South Africa’s regional strategy was the encouragement of regional co-operation, and in the case of Mozambique the growth of economic and security co-operation that would persuade their administration to change to more non-Marxist policies. Thus South Africa’s specific aims for the negotiations were:

- The maintenance of the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique.
- Promotion of economic and political stability in Mozambique.
- Persuade Frelimo to adopt a more moderate ideological posture.
- Prevent the escalation of Soviet/Eastern Bloc involvement in Mozambique.
- Persuade Renamo to change to a responsible political organisation.
- To not alienate Renamo from South Africa while retaining a bond with Frelimo.

The document continues that since successful negotiations are in South Africa’s interest the possibility of shuttle diplomacy must be considered, and that Foreign Minister Pik Botha might speak personally with Mozambican President Machel and Renamo’s President Afonso Dhlakama. To place further pressure on Renamo to negotiate the State Security Council requested, “that the [South African] Police warns the people and organisations in [South Africa] that support Renamo, that the government takes exception to this…” Meanwhile, Manuel Bulhosa continued his efforts to restart negotiations. A message from

71 “Die RSA se oogmerke met die Suidelike Afrika strategie is om ‘n streeksamewerkingsgemeenskap van state tot stand te bring, om die revolusionêre bedreiging vanuit Suidelike Afrika die hoof te bied en om Marxisme uit die streek te weer. Die doel tot Mozambiek, naamlik om die houding van die regering na ‘n nie-Marxistiese benadering te verander en tot samenwerking op ekonomiese en veiligheidsgebied te beweeg, is van die Suidelike Afrika strategie afgelei en dit veronderstel die beginsel dat RSA-belange vooropgestel moet word’”. “Voorstelle vir RSA Doelwitte en Standpunte mbt Samesprekings Tussen die RSA, Frelimo en Renamo”, from the Secretary of the South African State Security Council to Head of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs Africa Division P.R. Killen, 13 November 1984, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/113/3, p1.
Colonel Charles van Niekerk recorded in Gorongosa Notebooks on 12 January 1985 states that,

i. … [Pik] Botha instructed me to advise the President of Renamo that the Portuguese capitalist Bulhosa from Brazil is in Pretoria and wishes to talk to the President of Renamo.

ii. [Pik] Botha asks the President … to leave for [South Africa] to talk to the capitalist Bulhosa…

iii. He asks the President to allow the capitalist Bulhosa to visit … Gorongosa; but it will be very difficult because Bulhosa is already 86 years old.

iv. It appears that Secretary-General Evo Fernandes is not aware of this. It is part of the [Pik] Botha plan to eliminate the Secretary-General from the talks.75

Whether or not this meeting eventually occurred, a letter from Bulhosa to Pik Botha on 18 January 1985 states that Bulhosa arrived in Johannesburg that day and met with Evo Fernandes to discuss a new draft ceasefire agreement. Bulhosa wrote that,

Contrary to what I expected I found in Mr Fernandes a good understanding and a frank collaboration in regard to the draft…. The cessation of hostilities was clearly accepted, the respective forces maintaining the positions in which they find themselves on the date of the signing of the treaty…. Renamo would like the signing of the peace treaty and of the final draft to take place on [South African] territory under the aegis of His Excellency the President of the South African Republic…. Mr Fernandes is going to submit to his National Committee the direction now defined and will return as soon as conclusions are reached. I think that the Maputo authorities conversant with draft no 7 will be in agreement and will shortly confirm this.76

The new draft proposed that an international commission, comprised of the United States, Portugal, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, West Germany, South Africa and Brazil would monitor the implementation of the peace accord. A ‘Commission of Implementation’, chaired by a neutral individual and with equal representation from Renamo and Frelimo, would “formulate and implement practical solutions to bring about peace in Mozambique”.77 Some major differences to the original ceasefire draft included a clause stating that, “political prisoners and prisoners of war will be liberated after the signing of this peace accord”, and that,

Parliamentary elections will take place within 60 days after the entering into force of this peace accord, with the participation of Renamo and Frelimo, on the basis of electoral constituencies formed by the actual Provinces, in the ratio of one deputy for each group of 100,000 voters and according to the system of constituency. These elections will be monitored by the international monitoring commission.78

Though well-intentioned, Bulhosa should have realised that these demands would be too great for the administration in Maputo. Releasing the thousands of Renamo prisoners of

75 The Gorongosa Documents: Notebooks.
war held in Mozambique might have given Renamo’s forces a massive boost if they chose to break the peace agreement and return to hostilities; while Frelimo’s entry into negotiations had been predicated on the recognition of their legitimacy as a government, so it is doubtful they would have accepted the dissolution of that government to hold elections. An April 1985 SADF document that describes a conversation between Mozambican Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano and Tanzanian President Nyerere demonstrates that this was far from the intentions in Maputo, Chissano saying that,

The international climate was now favourable to Mozambique and [so] the aim should not be to try and reconcile Mozambique with the bandits but to pressure [South Africa] to implement the Nkomati Accord.79

Conversely in February 1985 Jorge Correia, Renamo’s representative in Lisbon, had announced that the possibility of a ceasefire would be rejected until Frelimo agreed to hold elections and allow a Free Market in Mozambique.80

Meanwhile, the South African minimalists considered how to encourage the opposing parties to recommence peace talks. While South Africa would do its best to convince the Mozambican government that they had withdrawn support to Renamo, and that it was in Mozambique’s economic and security interests to pursue peace, South Africa would take a tougher line with Renamo. A Foreign Affairs document from February 1985 stated that,

Renamo has to be shown that their military operations in Mozambique hurt South Africa’s economic and political interests and that it will not be taken indefinitely: this is an implicit warning of the withdrawal of our good disposition. For the time being we have to maintain our neutral position.81

The document also suggested that pressure could be placed on Renamo by approaching the Brazilian government and suggesting that the presence of the pro-Renamo businessmen Bulhosa and Champulimão was inimical to Mozambique’s interests and by leaking the connection to the press.82 Pik Botha had leveraged pressure on Renamo the previous year by requesting that Malawi expel their delegate Gimo Phiri, while it was thought Portugal and West Germany might also be convinced to place pressure on Renamo delegations in those countries.83 Renamo had internationalised some their support by this time, with

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82 “Renamo/Frelimo Onderhandelingsdockument”, pp8-9.
assistance being provided by elements in the CSU and CDU parties who were part of the coalition governments in West Germany and Portugal respectively. Kenya had also become involved with Renamo from 1984, providing passports and allowing transit for some Renamo officials, a fact confirmed in the Gorongosa Documents.\textsuperscript{84} By early 1985 more independent elements with connections to American far-right organisations, which would later assist Renamo with putschist intent, also began making contact with the Renamo leadership. In January 1985 Christian missionaries connected to the Shekinah Ministries, based in Zimbabwe, entered Mozambique from Malawi. Letters by those missionaries indicate they were involved in preaching in Tete province and eventually made contact with Renamo forces, who gave them permission to preach in their territory. Though initially this contact only resulted in the missionaries requesting a supply of Bibles to distribute from some of their sister organisations in the United States, the relationship would be one of many that would make Renamo a worthy cause in America’s far-right circles. The description of the situation in Mozambique by one letter stated that,

2. The Renamo Forces are fighting communism, nothing else. We saw some of their material and documents stating that they wanted freedom of worship in [Mozambique].
3. There are truly 2 governments in one nation. The Renamo are a real army with efficient military structure….
4. We believe that it won’t be long before the Renamo are in full control of [Mozambique]. 2 years at the most.\textsuperscript{85}

Accounts like this would make Renamo appealing to aggressive anti-communists. Later in 1985 Jack Wheeler, an American ‘adventurer’, conservative commentator and director of the Freedom Research Foundation, would cross into Mozambique to report Renamo’s progress. He claimed that this was done in collaboration with the CIA.\textsuperscript{86} In the meantime Renamo still had putschist supporters in South Africa and within the SADF, and in March 1985 Pik Botha exposed and shut down an operation in Johannesburg run by these elements that was printing forged banknotes and anti-Frelimo propaganda. At least five SADF members were involved in the operation and Botha ensured they were dismissed or transferred. One report described the group as,


\textsuperscript{85} Letter to the Zngeltal family from Rod, Ellie and Mike, January 1985. Also see Letter to Jill and Phil and Family from Michael, 14 January 1985; and Letter to Phil Freeman of the Evangelistic Association of California from the Secretary of the Shekinah Ministries L. Odendaal, 20 January 1985.

a Mafia-like criminal and political syndicate, involving financiers on three continents, who provided funds for [Renamo] and who used ‘sympathizers’ in the SADF to collaborate with the bandits. They used millions of counterfeit US dollars and 50 Rand notes to buy arms for [Renamo].

Though some commentators were sceptical about the incident, claiming it was merely an attempt to draw attention away from the SADF’s continuing assistance to Renamo, it seems plausible that this was an actual clash between the minimalists and putschists elements who were working independently of maximalists within the South African administration.

Conflict continued throughout the country in early 1985. Though Renamo was mostly active in the southern provinces and in Tete and Nampula provinces to the north, some activity did continue in the region of southern Zambézia and north-eastern Sofala around Luabo and Marromeu. Renamo representatives claimed that from mid-February to mid-March they carried out 87 military operations and inflicted over 500 casualties on the FPLM. A South African document noted that in early 1985 Renamo maintained the initiative in the countryside, though neither Renamo nor the government effectively controlled all their men due to their geographical spread and logistical problems. By April Renamo claimed they were launching more than 250 operations a month, and that 450 Renamo troops had recently infiltrated into Maputo province. Their communiqués also stated that they had attacked Zimbabwean troops in Manica province, leading the Zimbabwean CIO to advise the Zimbabwean armed forces to withdraw to the Beira corridor, and a SADF document from April 1985 confirmed that the Frontline States were militarily assisting Mozambique through the deployment of Zimbabwean and Tanzanian soldiers in central and northern Mozambique. Renamo activities in Maputo province at this time included attacks near Manhiça and Boane, an attack on the Maputo-Swaziland

railway, and the destruction of a bridge near the South African border. A SADF document also reported that Renamo attacked four FPLM bases in Maputo and Gaza provinces during April, as well as the Maputo-South African and Limpopo railway lines. In the far north it reported that Renamo had attacked the towns of Micuane, near Alto Molócu in eastern Zambézia; Angoche, on the Nampulan coast; Namapa, on the Nampua-Cabo Delgado border; and Mucujo, on the Cabo Delgado coast. The Mozambican government had also claimed that six whites were observed operating with Renamo forces in Cabo Delgado. Commanders of the government forces in Nampula later claimed that in April and May they had killed 37 Renamo fighters and 60 ‘collaborators’, destroyed three rebel camps, and freed thousands of peasants to the west and south of Nampula city at Ribaué and Corrane.

By May 1985 rumours were circulating that South Africa would provide direct military support to the Mozambican government. Spokesmen for Renamo claimed that their forces encircled the cities of Nampula and Maputo, and that recently four convoys had been attacked when leaving Maputo and a train was destroyed near Nampula. Renamo attacks also continued throughout Maputo province and there was heavy conflict in the Caia district of Sofala throughout May as government forces hunted Renamo units in the area. In response to the rumour that South Africa had prepared 4,000 black soldiers from the Buffalo Regiment to enter Mozambique and break any encirclement of Maputo, Renamo’s Secretary-General Evo Fernandes warned that the rebels would make Mozambique South Africa’s Vietnam. The threat of South African intervention may have been a tactic to put further pressure on Renamo to negotiate. Meanwhile, Pik Botha had approached the governments of Malawi, the Comoros Islands, Somalia and Kenya to ask them to cease supporting Renamo. One Foreign Affairs document notes that he had already contacted these governments regarding this issue in the last week of December 1984. Unbeknownst to Pik Botha in late May the Deputy South African Foreign Minister


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Louis Nel, who had chaired the negotiations between Renamo and Frelimo in October 1984, began moves to personally travel to Renamo’s Gorongosa base to lobby for a recommencement of peace talks. The Gorongosa Documents recorded that Colonel Charles van Niekerk travelled to Gorongosa on 26 May to request permission for Nel’s visit, assuring Renamo President Dhlakama that “a visit by him here is highly feasible and desirable for Renamo”. Niekerk also delivered a message from the Chief of the Armed Forces General Viljoen, which assured Dhlakama that,

Renamo still has friends in the South African military. I hope that Mr. President understands the difficulties that we South Africa soldiers have with our politicians.
ii. I also promise the President of Renamo that as for involvement of South African troops in Mozambique’s internal conflict … as soon as we receive orders from my government for my troops to go and fight in Mozambique against Renamo, all the generals my colleagues and I myself will resign from the armed forces.
6. We the South African Military guarantee the passage of Renamo men in SA or transit, in case of need.

Thus it was clear that the maximalists within the SADF had no intention of complying with the Nkomati Accord. Visiting Gorongosa again on 5 June, two days prior to Nel’s arrival, Colonel Niekerk advised Dhlakama that “Nel must leave here with the guarantee and hope of a peaceful solution in Mozambique…” He also informed Dhlakama that the Deputy Foreign Minister would be accompanied by the head of the army,

or the deputy-minister of defence and police who is 100% in favour of Renamo. The objective of the company is to help Louis Nel to reflect on the problem when he is resting. But the basic idea is for the military to get influence over Louis Nel.

Nel’s meeting with Dhlakama on 8 June did convince him the Renamo was willing to recommence negotiations if Frelimo could also be persuaded, and he thus condoned the supply of some materials to Renamo by the SADF that would not violate the Nkomati Accord.

On 12 June 1985 Presidents Machel, Mugabe and Nyerere discussed increasing military support for Mozambique while attending a Heads of Government meeting in Harare, and decided that Zimbabwean troops should go on the offensive against Renamo rather than just protecting the Beira corridor. Reports from Renamo confirmed that thousands of foreign troops from Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia were on the offensive

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98 “Message from Commandant Charles to President of Renamo”, The Gorongosa Documents: Notebooks.
99 “Message from Commandant Charles to President of Renamo”, The Gorongosa Documents: Notebooks.
in central Mozambique. The next few months saw intensive military activity from both sides of the conflict. Efforts by the FPLM in June and July included the destruction of two Renamo camps in Nampula killing 45 Renamo fighters and capturing 90 collaborators, and the capture of a major Renamo bases in Panda district, Inhambane, which may have been strategically important for Renamo’s operations in Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo provinces. 100 guerrillas were killed in the operation and 550 families freed from the area surrounding the base. Meanwhile, one South African document analysing military developments in Mozambique through July and August claimed that Renamo has been taking the initiative in attacks on FPLM bases and convoys, and noted that although government forces had been conducting offensives to protect major transport routes, they lacked sufficient manpower to operate effectively. Renamo maintained their pressure around Maputo in the south, where their greatest concentration of fighters remained, and attacked FPLM bases in Gaza, including the Gaza provincial headquarters and a battalion base south-east of Chokwe. As well as attacking up to ten military convoys throughout the country, Renamo forces also launched a large-scale assault to seize the town of Luabo in southern Zambézia on 31 July. Witnesses said that up to a thousand Renamo fighters were involved in the attack, confirming the large numbers of guerrillas present in northern Sofala. In the meantime by mid-1985 the internal crisis in South Africa had deepened and rebellion had spread to rural areas. In November 1984 South Africa had experienced its largest ever political strike, and from January 1985 the ANC had called on black South

Africans to make the country ungovernable.\textsuperscript{104} State Security Council minutes reveal that responding to the crisis in January 1985 the Council approved a significant programme of propaganda called Strategic Communication (Stratcom), which often embraced “blackmail, libel and manipulation of such a mischievous type that, in situations of acute unrest, they could lead to murder and other bloodshed”, and by March the President had approved a plan for the selective arrest of revolutionary leaders.\textsuperscript{105} On 21 July President Botha declared a partial state of emergency giving the South African Police and SADF officers far-reaching powers of arrest and detention. More than 35,000 soldiers were deployed in 96 South African townships by the end of 1985 to quell the revolt.\textsuperscript{106} However, the crisis did not prevent conflict between minimalists and pro-Renamo elements in the South African administration. An investigation into the South African Police in Eastern Transvaal concluded that they had been recruiting fighters for Renamo from Mozambican refugees, and twelve SADF members were found to have connections to Renamo and thus dismissed or transferred, possibly demonstrating further putschist activity was occurring outside of the maximalists’ control.\textsuperscript{107} The minimalists subsequently advocated further measures to prevent external support for Renamo in mid-July, specifying that the South African Broadcasting Corporation should transmit anti-Renamo propaganda in Portuguese; that South African radar should be used to detect supply flights into southern Mozambique; that the South African security services should investigate smuggling activities from Swaziland to Renamo forces in Maputo province; and that patrols should be intensified in the Kruger National Park.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{Assault on Gorongosa}


\textsuperscript{108} “Adjunk-minister Nel het daarop gereageer deur te sê dat Suid-Afrika sy kant bring om Renamo hok te slaan. Hy het veral op die volgende klem gelê: Anti-Renamo-propaganda war deur die SAUK se Portugese diens uitgesaai word; Suid-Afrika oefen radarbeheer uit oor alle vlugte in Suidelike Mosambiek; Ondersoekte geolds deur SA Veiligheidsdiens het getoon dat persone wat in Suid-Afrika betrokke was met smokkelhandel met Mosambiek, hul aktiwiteite verskuif het na Swaziland; Die Nasionale Parkeraad in kennis gestel is om die Krugerwildtuinrens met Mosambiek deeglik te patroller”. “Intligtingsketsinset: Departement van Buitelandse Sake”, 19 July 1985, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 144/8/19/2, p3.
In central Mozambique the military forces of Mozambique and its allies were
organising for a campaign against Renamo bases in the region. From July 1985 preparations
began for an offensive called Operation Grape Fruit, and a large number of soldiers were
concentrated near Chimoio. Intelligence revealed that Renamo’s main regional base was at
Muxamba, 70 kms south of Chimoio, which was believed to house more than 400
guerrillas. Initially Renamo bases along the border were attacked, including one at Mavonde
on 10 August, possibly to herd the rebel forces towards the main regional base. Additional
forces were simultaneously sweeping westwards from Beira towards Gorongosa, while
further formations converged from the north and south. The Muxamba base in the south
was then attacked on 20 August, though a four-day operation in the area only resulted in
the deaths of 40 Renamo fighters. Intelligence gained from the assault revealed that
Renamo’s headquarters at Casa Banana held about 400 fighters, and that combined with
their string of smaller bases around 1,000 guerrillas were based in the region. In the north
Renamo’s base at Maringué was then captured on 23 August.109 A Malawian diplomatic
communiqué from 27 August reveals the significance placed on the offensive by the
Mozambican government, noting that, “President Machel is in Sofala province supervising
military operations against dissidents…”110 The climax of this operation was a massive
assault on Renamo’s headquarters in the Gorongosa Mountains on 28 August by
Mozambican and Zimbabwean troops. The headquarters consisted of the main base of
Casa Banana, itself invisible from the air except for an aircraft landing strip, which was
surrounded by several smaller satellite bases. Casa Banana covered several square
kilometres and access by land was very difficult. In order to soften the targets and knock
out anti-aircraft defences the bases were assaulted at 5 am by attack helicopters. Though
the joint government forces were initially unsure which base was the headquarters, the
sighting of the landing strip from the air confirmed Casa Banana’s position and was quickly
followed by the landing of Zimbabwean paratroopers. Contingents of Mozambican and
Zimbabwean troops had meanwhile been marching northwards from Gorongosa town to
join the battle.111 The Zimbabwean forces involved in the raids used tactics similar to the

109 Mlambo, “Raids on Gorongoza”, p7-10; “Mozambicans Trap MNR Mercenaries”, Herald, 10
September 1985.
110 Decoded Malawian Telegram, from the Malawian Embassy in Maputo to External Affairs, 27 August
1985; Malawian National Archive.
111 “Account of Zimbabwean Troops part in Military Operations in Mozambique”, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasting, 3 September 1985; “Armed Forces Capture MNR Headquarters”, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasting, 6 September 1985; “Top MNR Base is Overrun”, Sunday Mail, 8 September 1985;
Paul Fauvet, “Inside the Bandits’ Base HQ”, Herald, 10 September 1985; Andrew Meldrum,
“Zimbabwe’s Troops Bolster Hard-Pressed Maputo Army: Allied Force Surrounds Rebel Camp”,
Guardian, 10 September 1985; “MNR Admits Capture of Headquarters”, AKP, 11 September 1985; Jon
Fire Force style of counter-insurgency carried out by Rhodesia in the 1970s. This technique used helicopters to drop highly-trained ground troops to attack the enemy, while the helicopters supplied heavy fire from the air. Cabrita suggests that, in order to find Renamo’s bases and be able to effectively ambush fleeing guerrillas, the attack may have also used pseudo-units that included Renamo guerrillas who had been captured in previous operations and ‘turned’. He also suggests that Renamo had previously intercepted communications about the attack and had thus vacated the base. Though Renamo’s forces may have evacuated during the early stages of the attack it is clear that at least some intense fighting did occur. The base on the Gogogo peak was particularly hard to assault as the camp was heavily fortified and the peak itself rises to over 1800 metres in altitude. It was believed that Europeans were present at the camp and that at one stage they called for an air evacuation. The fall of Gorongosa to government forces was a heavy blow against Renamo. Though only 200 Renamo guerrillas were killed in the offensive, the base held hundreds of tonnes of equipment, weapons and supplies that could have sustained operations for two or three years. Gorongosa was Renamo’s central communications centre and possessed a long airstrip that could land Dakota supply planes. The capture of the base also led to the discovery of the Gorongosa Documents, though many other documents were burnt by the retreating Renamo command. Later a Renamo spokesman claimed that 366 Mozambican and 102 Zimbabwean troops were killed in the attack and five helicopters and were shot down. The mobility of Renamo’s forces and the strategic weakness of the Mozambican forces seem to have allowed most of the guerrillas to successfully withdraw from the area. Following the fall of Gorongosa up to 8,000 refugees flooded into Gorongosa town after being freed from the Renamo-controlled zone. This created a humanitarian crisis in the area that required large amounts of food and medical supplies that the Mozambican government seemed unable or unwilling to provide.


112 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp236-237.


Following the assault on Gorongosa further operations against the scattered rebel forces continued in central Mozambique. In early September the capture of a Renamo base at Mandié, on the Manica-Tete border, killed nine Renamo members and freed 114 peasants from their territory. Subsequently Renamo camps were over-run at Tica and Nhamatanda, on the Beira-Chimoio road south of Gorongosa, and a base was destroyed at Ndoro, between Gorongosa and Inhaminga.115 Fleeing this offensive, Renamo’s forces in central Mozambique now seemed to be withdrawing en masse into Zambézia province. Guerrillas in Nampula may also have been falling back into the province due to a government offensive there during August and September 1985 that destroyed eight Renamo camps, killed up to 220 rebels, and may also have driven Renamo from their base in southern Cabo Delgado and forced them to move northwards to Namecala, west of Pemba.116 Bolstered by reinforcements from Gorongosa, Renamo forces on the Sofala-Zambézia border attacked the government’s Marromeu district headquarters on 2 September but were repelled at the cost of 30 of their men.117 Within a short period Renamo controlled the towns of Caia, Morrumbala, Mopeia, Luabo and Chinde, and they would later capture Mutarara and Sena near the Malawian border, effectively cutting the country in half. Mozambican government sources claimed that frequent airspace violations occurred in this area, probably to resupply Renamo’s forces. This influx of Renamo forces into Zambézia during September also led to clashes with government forces near Gurué in the province’s north and at Namacurra and Maganja, near the coast in central Zambézia.118 While Renamo’s forces retreated into Zambézia, a Malawian diplomatic telegram from October 1985 notes that following the fall of Gorongosa, “[i]t is understood that most of the top Mozambican leaders believe that the [Renamo] leader Dhlakama and some of his followers fled into Malawi.”119

119 Decoded Malawian Telegram, from the Malawian Embassy in Maputo to External Affairs, 16 October 1985, Malawian National Archive.
In tandem with the operations in central Mozambique, the military activity of both Renamo and the FPLM escalated in the south. Through August and September Renamo’s forces killed almost 200 civilians in the Manhica and Magude districts north of Maputo. An attack on a train near Manhiça on 1 October also killed thirteen passengers. Renamo also managed to carry out a number of attacks very close to or inside the capital, including the sabotage of factories in the outer-Maputo suburb of Matola, and the destruction of an explosives depot in Maputo, which killed four people and injured 68. The explosion of a booby-trapped radio found in the capital, which killed one person and injured two, was also attributed to Renamo. Renamo spokesman Jorge Correia claimed that 270 rebel agents had infiltrated Maputo in several groups to carry out covert activities. The FPLM responded with a series of operations in August and September that killed over 100 guerrillas in Maputo province, particularly in the Manhiça area. Further Fire Force-style actions by government forces at Mapulanguene near the South African border killed 40 Renamo fighters on 11-12 October, and crossed the border in hot pursuit of the survivors. But Renamo actions continued to the south-west of the capital, including an attack on the Olsa Citrus complex in Boane which killed sixteen people and the ambush of a train at Tsalala, fifteen kilometres from Maputo, in which six people were killed and 80 kidnapped. Inhabitants of Manhiça also continued to report airspace violations by aircraft, apparently from South Africa. Meanwhile, FPLM operations in Inhambane province destroyed a number of coastal camps in late September and early October that may have held up to 400 Renamo fighters and been important sites for receiving supplies via submarine. It was reported that Renamo suffered ‘heavy losses’ during this campaign, including 74 fighters killed in Morrumbene and Jangamo districts in southern Inhambane. Following the offensive there were signs that rebel forces in the province seemed to be

120 “MNR Strongholds Captured”, AED, 14 September 1985.
running out of ammunition, while the FPLM was also trying to cut their access to water sources in that dry province.  

The Gorongosa Documents

During the capture of Renamo’s Casa Banana headquarters various manuscripts were recovered from the site and became collectively known as the Gorongosa Documents. A dossier of these documents, consisting of the diaries of Renamo National Council Member Joaquim Vaz and a number of notebooks, were released to the press in September 1985 and subsequently caused a political and diplomatic crisis for South Africa. These documents described how the South African military leadership had continued to support Renamo even though the government had ordered the cessation of support, arranging for a stockpile of weapons to be delivered to Renamo prior to the Nkomati Accord in order to give them operational autonomy for six months and directing them to increase their focus on economic targets. Beyond the smaller rings of putschist elements that earlier investigations had punished for their support of Renamo, the Gorongosa Documents exposed the scale of organised support from the SADF, up to and including the Chief of the Armed Forces General Constand Viljoen. Following an internal investigation Pik Botha was forced to confirm that there had been violations of the Nkomati Accord, including assistance to construct landing strips and communications networks, the provision of supplies, and repeated visits to Renamo’s Gorongosa headquarters by important South African officials. However, he maintained they were ‘technical violations’ and they had occurred while trying to bring Renamo into negotiations. Minister of Defence Magnus Malan accepted responsibility for the activities of the SADF, General Viljoen resigned, and a number of those involved were moved out of their jobs, with General van der Westhuizen moved to the position of Secretary to the State Security Council, and Brigadier van Tonder and Colonel van Niekerk promoted within the Directorate of Military Intelligence. South African documents note that the Gorongosa Documents damaged the relationship the two governments had developed since the


Nkomati Accords, and that President Machel had renewed his public denunciations of South African support for Renamo and the Apartheid system. South African and Mozambican representatives subsequently met on 20 November and 20 December 1985 at Komatipoort to discuss relations. At the first of these meetings South Africa had presented its own dossier, entitled “Evidence of Direct and Indirect Violations of the Nkomati Accord by the Government of Mozambique”, which detailed the post-Nkomati activities of the African National Congress in Mozambique.125

Renamo’s American Supporters

While Renamo’s forces within Mozambique had been shaken and temporarily scattered by Operation Grape Fruit’s capture of their Gorongosa headquarters and the subsequent exposure of their South African support network, Renamo’s external leadership was already working to forge relationships with new sponsors. In the same week of September 1985 that Samora Machel was received by US President Ronald Reagan at the White House, a Renamo delegation attended the World Anti-Communist League meeting in Dallas and began to mobilise support amongst American conservatives. Though the CIA seems to have made initial contact with Renamo through Jack Wheeler, members of the Defense Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense were also very sympathetic to Renamo. A former US General John Singlaub ran the American branch of the World Anti-Communist League, the US Council for World Freedom, which donated thousands of dollars to Renamo between 1986 and 1988, while former director of the DIA General Daniel Graham channelled his commitment to Renamo through the far-right organisation Freedom Inc. Freedom Inc was directed by Robert MacKenzie who had served in the Rhodesian, South African, and Transkei Defence Forces, and later wrote pro-Renamo articles for the magazine Soldier of Fortune. He also personally led the 1979 attack on Beira’s oil facilities by a joint Rhodesian-South African commando team, which was falsely attributed to Renamo. MacKenzie was married to Sibyl Cline, who published a number of pro-Renamo articles and pamphlets and whose father was Ray Cline, a former Deputy Director of the CIA who was also involved in a right-wing think-tank called the United States Global Strategy Council and thought to have been involved in channelling funds to Renamo. Through their diplomatic efforts at the World Anti-Communist League Renamo would eventually receive support of various levels from American conservative

organisations such as the Heritage Foundation, the Conservative Caucus, the American African Public Affairs Council, the Conservative Action Foundation, the Free Congress Foundation, the Council for National Policy and Free the Eagle. These groups and influential Renamo supporters such as Louisiana businessman James Blanchard III would lobby the Reagan administration and win the support of a number of Republican politicians who included: Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina; Senator Steven Symms of Idaho; former Senator Paul Trible of Virginia; Congressman Dan Burton of Indiana; Congressman Robert Dornan of California; former Congressman Jack Kemp of New York; and Governor of Delaware and candidate for the 1988 Republican Presidential nomination, Pete du Pont.

Subsequently in 1986 Renamo opened their Mozambique Information Office and American conservatives opened the Mozambique Research Center in Washington D.C.

No Pause in Combat

In the meantime conflict inevitably continued in Mozambique, the FPLM killing 43 Renamo guerrillas in Tete and 23 in Zambézia, and destroying seven Renamo camps in Niassa province during November 1985. In Nampula 129 guerrillas were killed and eight rebel camps destroyed in late 1985. In the country’s south Renamo killed a number of civilians near Massingir, Gaza, and clashed with government forces near Moamba and Machatuine in November, all locations very close to the South African border. Renamo fighters also attacked Machava, an outer-suburb of Maputo, killing three civilians and destroying a petrol station. By December 1985 Renamo units were regularly mounting ambushes close to the capital and Maputo was frequently plunged into darkness by the sabotage of powerlines or rolling blackouts to conserve electricity. In central Mozambique the Zimbabwean Defence Forces (ZDF) maintained control of Renamo’s bases at Gorongosa and a clean-up campaign continued throughout the region in late 1985.


While it seems unlikely that government forces suffered the losses Renamo claimed they did during this period, 250 FPLM and 80 Zimbabwean troops killed in Sofala between 25 October and 12 November, undoubtedly a number of intense skirmishes with Renamo’s scattered forces did occur during this period, including incidents at Sussundenga, Mavonde and Guro in Manica, and at Cavalo (Vanduzi) in Sofala.\(^{128}\) In early November one significant search and destroy operation by the ZDF around Samacueza, north of Beira, failed when a jammed machine gun on a helicopter gave the assembled Renamo fighters below time to escape and two Zimbabwean Allouette helicopters crashed during the subsequent pursuit.\(^{129}\) By December Renamo’s forces seem to have regrouped and focused significant effort on the destruction of pylons supporting the Cabora Bassa powerlines, destroying up to 300 during that month. More significantly Renamo claimed to have attacked and captured the three government-held towns of Sena in northern Sofala, Tica in central Sofala, and Dombe in southern Manica, killing 124 FPLM soldiers. Additionally in mid-December a major two-day battle was fought between government forces and up to 600 Renamo fighters in the swampy and sparsely-populated between the Beira Corridor and the Buzi river in central Sofala.\(^{130}\)

In January 1986 a Zimbabwean plan to launch an operation codenamed Octopus in the Zambezi river valley from the FPLM controlled town of Marromeu was forestalled when a Zimbabwean SAS reconnaissance team discovered Renamo had already captured the town on 9 January, the 260 FPLM personnel abandoning the town without resistance and leaving all their equipment in Renamo’s hands. This left every major town along the lower Zambezi River in Renamo’s hands. A new joint offensive was thus planned to recapture Marromeu, with 24 January as the target date. On that day a Zimbabwean transport plane and two Mozambican helicopters were deployed to Marromeu with the aim of recapturing the landing strip and conducting reconnaissance on Renamo’s positions. During the mission the aircraft came under fire and one helicopter crashed, killing the ZDF

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129 Mlambo, “Raids on Gorongosa”, p7-10.


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Special Task Force (STF) commander at Chimoio who had been personally overseeing the operation, Colonel Magama, and five other personnel. Though an urgent rescue was obviously necessary no Zimbabwean aircraft were serviceable at the time and Mozambican aircraft were not obtained for that purpose for a number of days. Finally on 26 January troops under the command of Colonel Dyck were assembled at Inhaminga and the next day paratroopers dropped from two Dakota transport aircraft secured the landing strip and recaptured the town. 150 Renamo fighters out of an estimated 1,300 in the area were killed in the operation. Zimbabwean forces in central Mozambique subsequently handed control of their positions over to the Mozambican army, withdrawing back to the Beira corridor from Marromeu, Inhaminga and the captured Renamo bases at Gorongosa by 31 January.131 Shortly afterwards on 10 February a large contingent of Renamo fighters, probably number about 500, assaulted the now FPLM-held bases around Gorongosa and routed the FPLM troops guarding them. It was reported at the time that military sources admitted those troops had been without supplies for more than three weeks and were completely demoralised.132 Meanwhile, in January and February 1986 attacks around Maputo continued with trains and road convoys ambushed, powerlines cut and landmines laid. An ambush by Renamo on a train near Moamba on 14 January left 25 people wounded, while the Maputo-Swaziland railway line was sabotaged on 8 January and a goods train entering Swaziland was ambushed in February, killing the driver. Seven civilians were killed and 20 wounded in an attack on a bus between Maputo and Swaziland in February and a landmine wounded visitors to Maputo beach. On 4 February a Renamo team that destroyed three power pylons near the South African border were surprised by FPLM and six saboteurs were killed before the rest fled to South Africa. One clash in Maputo’s outer suburbs in March resulted in the death of 29 Renamo fighters.133 Another clash occurred between government and Renamo forces north of Maputo on 16-17 April. Meanwhile in the north a Renamo offensive killed a number of civilians near Angoche in south-west Nampula, and rebel forces seized the towns of Gilé, Pebane, Mucubela and

131 Mlambo, “Raids on Gorongosa”, pp10-12.
Bajone near the coast in central Zambézia, killing up to 120 government soldiers. By April Zimbabwean forces had assembled a sufficient force to attempt the recapture of Renamo’s Gorongosa headquarters. On 12 April a Zimbabwean strike force assaulted the Gorongosa bases from the north and south, capturing Casa Banana with the aid of air support. The Cavalo base to the south-east of Gorongosa was then captured with greater difficulty of 14-15 April. Neither side seems to have taken many casualties in the battle.

The Apartheid Government Divided

On 21 April a car bomb exploded at 5 am in the centre of Maputo city, on Avienda Agostinho Neto, injuring 50 people. Another bomb failed to explode nearby. These bombs were almost certainly built by a covert network that was emerging within the South African security establishment and would eventually take the form of the organisation known as the Civil Co-operation Bureau. The publication of the Gorongosa Documents had exposed the South African military’s involvement in Mozambique and brought them under the close scrutiny of rival departments within the South African government that wanted to enforce the Nkomati Accord. The attitude of these departments is demonstrated by a telegram from the South African Department of Foreign Affairs’ Trade Mission in Maputo, from January 1986, suggests doing everything possible to bring peace to Mozambique. The author of the document claims that,

The USSR is hesitant to get more involved in Mozambique militarily, but friendship and co-operation treaties with the USSR, Cuba and the German Democratic Republic give Machel the assurance that Mozambique can rely on military support from these countries. This means that Renamo cannot be a threat to the Frelimo leadership, because this would necessitate the USSR and other partners to give military assistance. This means the opening of an eastern front in a conflict much like that of UNITA against the MPLA.

135 Mlambo, “Raids on Gorongoza”, pp10-12
137 “Die USSR is egter huiwerig om op groter skaal as voorheen militer in Mosambiek betrokke te raak dog vriendskaps en samewerkingsverdrag me die USSR, Kuba en die [German Democratic Republic] gee Machel die verzekering in dat Mosambiek op militere bystand van hierdie state kan reken. Dit bring mee dat Renamo sonder wesenlike buitelandse steun nie kan verwag om sy suksesne so ver te bring dat Frelimo se leierskapsposisie in gevaar gestel word nie, want daardeur sal die USSR en ander verplig word om hul bondgenoot met militere mag by te staan. Dit beteken op sy beur die opening van n oosfrond in n stryd soortgelyk aan die stryd van UNITA teen die MPLA”. Telegram from the South African Trade Mission in Maputo to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 7 January 1986, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 144/8/19, Vol 1, p1.
It suggested was then that helping Frelimo to neutralise Renamo and to integrate their soldiers back into society should be a major South African security objective.138 These pro-peace elements were thus maintaining a closer watch over defence force activities, but in the context of popular uprising against the Apartheid state the security establishment, and hence the maximalists within the regime, were becoming increasingly dominant in the State Security Council. By August 1985 the State Security Council had reached the conclusion that the upheaval in South Africa had reached the intensity of a revolutionary war and from November the creation of a ‘third force’ devoted to internal security began to be considered. Though the South African Police and SADF never came to an agreement on the details of this force, both organisations would eventually create paramilitary units to deploy against domestic unrest.139 By the beginning of 1986 the South African government was faced by a seemingly intractable crisis and the State Security Council had become bitterly divided between reformist elements and securocrats who differed over how to face the revolutionary challenge.140 President P.W. Botha urged the South African security forces to quell domestic unrest, and in response Stephen Ellis claims that, some time in 1985 or 1986, a high-level intelligence committee known from its Afrikaans acronym as Trewits was established to coordinate intelligence and to designate targets for action: in effect, to sentence them to death.141

In April 1986 the State Security Council also endorsed strategy guidelines that advocated the use of “anti-revolutionary groups such as [the Zulu political organisation] Inkatha” to combat revolutionary elements alongside the security services.142 Then in May 1986 senior military personnel, including Minister for Defence General Magnus Malan and the Chief of Military Intelligence General Pieter ‘Tienie’ Groenewald, ordered the creation of the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) as a front for Special Forces activity. Former Military Intelligence officer Nico Basson described the CCB as “a vast and intricate network of connections between the South African intelligence services, other individuals and certain ‘organisations’”.143 The CCB drew together operatives from the SADF, intelligence services, police and various freelancers left over from the wars in Rhodesia and the former Portuguese colonies, and allowed them to finance their work through a sophisticated web

138 Telegram from the South African Trade Mission in Maputo to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 7 January 1986, pp2-3.
139 Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force”, pp273-274.
140 O’Meara, Forty Lost Years, pp334-335.
141 Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force”, p274.
142 Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force”, p274.
of front companies that evaded taxes through falsification of records and fraud. Frama Inter-trading was one such Johannesburg-based firm that gave cover to SADF activities by supplying civilian planes used to ferry supplies to UNITA and Renamo. While the Renamo Branco had always cooperated closely with the Reconnaissance Commandos that supported Renamo they also became entwined in this new network, providing assistance for CCB projects such as the training of Inkatha paramilitaries. A site in Namibia’s Caprivi Strip known as Fort Doppies, where members of South Africa’s Reconnaissance Commandos and UNITA rebels were trained, was used to provide at least 200 Inkatha supporters with paramilitary training in 1986, and further training took place on a land owned by an agricultural firm connected to the Renamo Branco. Connections with UNITA and Renamo were also important because the covert trafficking of ivory, hardwood and gemstones from the Lusophone territories helped to finance CCB operations. During 1986 Renamo guerrillas training in South Africa were also drafted into the suppression of domestic unrest on at least one occasion, being deployed to fight members of the Northern Transvaal Youth Congress in Venda. Conversely the CCB seem to have been involved in the murder of the academic David Webster in 1990 after he discovered that Renamo Branco were trafficking arms to Renamo in the Kosi Bay region of Natal. Meanwhile by mid-1986 reformists in the government were making moves to negotiate with ANC leaders and a Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was dispatched to South Africa to help broker peace, but a narrow group of the South African leadership deliberately sabotaged the EPG initiative. With the collapse of local black urban authorities due to the popular unrest, the growth of embryonic structures of alternative power in the form of civic organisations and street committees, and plans for a three-day general strike to be held to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising on 16 June, the Apartheid state acted to regain control, declaring a state of emergency on 12 June 1976. With that action


146 Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force”, p276.


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the security establishment seized the balance of power within the State Security Council and prepared for a dramatic crackdown to eliminate revolutionary elements from the South African townships.  

Renamo’s Zambézia Offensive

The Mozambican government and its allies had pushed Renamo onto the military back-foot by mid-1986. After their successes in capturing and recapturing Renamo’s Gorongosa headquarters further operations had forced the rebels into a defensive position in Nampula province and had broken the virtual siege of Maputo in the south. Transport routes were reopened and calm had been restored in the Limpopo valley. In northern Manica province Zimbabwean troops had been effectively deployed against guerrilla strongholds in Tambara and Guro. In June 1986 government forces also destroyed a number of Renamo camps in southern Manica near Dombe and Sussundenga, and in southern Sofala near Gorongosa, Chibabava and Machanga. The FPLM prevailed in a number of skirmishes in Zambézia province near Manganja and Namacurra, near the provincial capital Quelimane, and at Alto Molocue and Gilé in Zambézia’s north-east. Very significant clashes also occurred near Milange during June resulting in up to 92 Renamo fighters being killed. The concentration of these Renamo units so close to the Malawian border only fuelled speculation that Renamo was using bases in Malawi and that the country had become a major transit route for their supplies. Despite these successes by the Frelimo government Renamo was by no means close to defeat. Following the withdrawal of government forces from the Gorongosa Mountains in April Renamo’s forces quietly re-established their headquarters there by May 1986. In an interview in that location Afonso Dhlakama gave the believable estimate that his forces numbered 18,000 men, of which 2,000 were part of conventional units trained to attack towns and the rest operated

along guerrilla lines.\textsuperscript{152} Between June and August these forces killed hundreds of FPLM troops in attacks on military convoys in Tete province, a goods train in Maputo province, and towns as close to the capital as Boane, Machava and Matola-Rio. Renamo seems to have constructed a regional base north of Maputo near Manhiça in August. Rebel fighters also continued to harass traffic in Inhambane province as far south as Jangamo and Inharrime, in the far north of the country at Montepuez and Namuno in Cabo Delgado province and around the Nacala railway in Nampula. Most significantly, however, Renamo forces launched a major offensive in Zambézia during July and August 1986, seemingly from the safety of Malawian territory, which initially captured the towns of Gurué, Gilé and Maganja in north-east Zambézia, and Malema and Mutuali which are just across the provincial border in Nampula. Later in August and September the towns of Morrumbala and Chire, near the Malawian border in southern Zambézia, and the town of Vila Nova in southern Tete province were captured.\textsuperscript{153} Renamo defector Paulo Oliviera later wrote that Renamo representative in Malawi Gilberto Fernandes related to him that South African arms transferred through Malawi fuelled the offensive.\textsuperscript{154} While the morale and capabilities of Renamo forces in that region were obviously at a high, the conditions of many government soldiers they engaged in the north was so bad that one military meeting discussed the need for soldiers to cultivate crops in order to feed themselves.\textsuperscript{155}

Renamo’s ability to launch this new offensive in Zambézia may have been enhanced by the re-ascendance of maximalists within the South African administration. South African forces thus again became involved in not only supplying Renamo, but also fighting alongside them. In June 1986 there were reports of two English-speaking whites present amongst Renamo forces fighting near Manhiça in Maputo province, and members of South Africa’s black 32 Battalion were said to be part of the rebel offensive in Zambézia. Mozambican Intelligence (SNASP) reported in August that planes had been

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\textsuperscript{154} Oliveira, \textit{Os Domos}, p83.

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landing people and material in Manica province, and South African documents reproduced by Hilton Hamann note that in early September Evo Fernandes, a number of SADF members and twelve tons of ammunition and medicine were landed at Renamo’s main airstrip at Maringué, north of Gorongosa in Sofala province. In September South African soldiers were seen with Renamo forces at Mutarara, near the Malawian border in southern Tete, and near Inchope to the south of Gorongosa. A Mozambican spokesman also claimed that a South African helicopter had landed near Ressano Garcia on 12 September and disembarked men who subsequently sabotaged the Maputo-South Africa railway line six kilometres from the border.\(^{156}\) Meanwhile, South African maximalists may also have influenced an internal political change in the structure of the Renamo leadership. In mid-1986 the position of Secretary-General, officially the second-highest rank in the Renamo hierarchy though in practice often the most powerful, was abolished and Evo Fernandes was demoted to the position of Head of the Studies Department. João da Silva Ataíde, the former Mozambican Ambassador to Portugal who had defected to Renamo, was named as head of Renamo’s Lisbon office and former SNASP agent José Francisco Mascarenhas was made his deputy. Apparently Dhlakama was acting to Africanise Renamo’s external representation and to cut links with their white Portuguese supporters, which had been long advised by Renamo’s backers in South Africa and the United States.\(^{157}\) According to Alex Vines,

"Fernandes’ close Portuguese and South African connections increasingly caused Renamo problems both with internal discontent and with its external image. It confirmed the image diffused by Maputo of Renamo being a movement comprised of disgruntled Portuguese settlers funded by South Africa. This led to the USA from 1986 refusing Fernandes an entry visa.\(^{158}\)

Another explanation for South African opposition to Renamo’s Portuguese backers may be that when the Renamo Branco assumed a greater role directing Renamo after the Nkomati Accord they were far more willing to co-operate with Pik Botha and to negotiate with the Frelimo government than the maximalists had hoped. With the re-ascendance of the maximalists within the State Security Council they now sought to re-establish their dominance over the Renamo leadership.

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\(^{158}\) Vines, \textit{RENAPO}, p35.
Simultaneously Renamo’s black leadership was developing contacts with far-right organisations in the United States, which not only shared the South African maximalists’ unwavering hatred of Communism, but also wielded some influence in the Washington political circles that had already opened the floodgates of military aid to groups such as the Nicaraguan Contras and Afghanistan’s Mujaheddin. After some conflict between the two American groups Free the Eagle and the Conservative Action Foundation over which candidate would be Renamo’s Washington representative, academic Luis Serapião was appointed to the position over Artur Vilankulu.159 Vilankulu had previously been the leader of a Renamo faction called CONIMO and remained a member of its successor CUNIMO, which was funded by the Conservative Action Foundation and West German intelligence and sought to portray itself as a moderate wing of Renamo.160 Once selected in August 1986 Serapião, along with Renamo Secretary for Foreign Affairs Artur da Fonseca and former Western European spokesman Jorge Correia met with White House Director of Communications Patrick Buchanan, Africa Advisor of the National Security Council John Philip, Senators Jack Kemp and Malcolm Wallop, Louisiana Businessman James Blanchard III, and CIA Chief William Casey to lobby for support.161 This lobbying would continue from the Heritage Foundation-funded Mozambique Information Office, in which Serapião co-operated with Thomas Schaaf, a white American who had worked in Rhodesia’s Ministry of Agriculture and with Christian missionaries in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Serapião gave one press conference at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee room on 28 October 1986 in which he read a message from Renamo President Dhlakama claiming that Renamo operated a civilian government within ‘liberated’ areas of Mozambique, with functioning health and education services and a free market economy. The message attacked the American State Department and invited President Reagan to send a special envoy to travel through Renamo controlled territory in Mozambique.162

Meanwhile, another development in Washington on 17 August 1986 was the signing of a “Friendship and Co-operation Agreement Between ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and RENAMO (Mozambique Resistance National Movement)”. This

CONIMO: Mozambique National Independent Committee; CUNIMO: Committee for Mozambican Union.
agreement stated that Renamo and ZANU would both establish democratic, multi-party democracies based on free enterprise, and that,

ZANU undertakes to co-operate with RENAMO in any ways that shall mutually be agreed upon by the two parties during the present period when the two parties are seriously fighting to gain power in order to implement the principles for the benefit of their respective countries.  

Luis Serapião and Artur da Fonseca signed the agreement on behalf of Renamo President Dhlakama, and a representative of ZANU President Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole whose last name was Sakala and a Bruce Anderson signed for that organisation. According to Renamo defector Paulo Oliveira,

A South African Brigadier, confessed to me … that they had already given the green light for the provision of military support by Renamo to the rebels in the east of Zimbabwe…. [However] in the end Ndabaningi Sithole had no possibility or interest in launching an armed struggle. He did not even have the people for that. He intended that a commitment with RENAMO would raise the expectations of potential financial supporters…. Days afterwards Dhlakama ordered the denunciation of all and any commitment with Sithole….

Another organisation that was forging ties with Renamo was the Frontline Fellowship, an extreme right-wing Christian group opposed to the Frelimo government and the ANC. The Fellowship was founded within the SADF at a Namibian military base by Peter Hammond and specifically focused on recruiting soldiers and ex-military personnel for evangelism. He travelled within Mozambique a number of times accompanied by groups of these soldier-missionaries and in August 1986 released a report through the International Society for Human Rights called “Mozambique Report: Eyewitness Testimonies of Persecution and Atrocities”. In the report he condemned the Mozambican government, compared the situation in Mozambique to that in Nicaragua (the implication being that Renamo should be funded in a similar fashion to the Nicaraguan Contras), and cites specific instances of

164 “Um brigadeiro sul-africano, confessa-me … ja deu luz verde para a operação de apoio militar da RENAMO aos rebeldes do leste do Zimbabwe…. Ndabaningi Sithole afinal, não tinha quaisquer possibilidades ou interesse em lançar uma luta armada. Não tinha sequer gente para isso. Pretendia sim um compromisso com a RENAMO que levantasse expectativas entre potenciais apoiantes financeiros…. Dias depois Dhlakama dava ordem para se denunciar todo e qualquer compromisso com Sithole…” Oliveira, OS Domos, pp81-82.
government attacks on Christian civilians in Tete and Zambézia provinces. Following the severing of official support to Renamo by the Nkomati Accord at least a few of Renamo’s putschist supporters within South Africa’s Reconnaissance Commandos joined Hammond’s organisation. These former Special Forces soldiers provided Renamo with what assistance they could independently of the Apartheid state, and even personally advised Dhlakama at his Gorongosa headquarters on a number of occasions. Some of the reports of whites operating alongside Renamo fighters might be accounted for by these putschist elements.

Renamo’s offensive in Zambézia only expanded in September 1986. A number of clashes between Renamo and government forces occurred at Marrromeu in the south of the province and at Milange and Socone in the north during early September. By October Renamo controlled the territory along the Malawian border from the Zambezi River to Mount Namuli in north-eastern Zambézia, including the towns: Caia and Sena in Sofala province; Mutarara and Vila Nova in Tete province; and Morrumbala, Milange, Gurúé, Gilé and Maganja in Zambézia. These towns had apparently been captured by a highly-trained conventional unit within Renamo called the Grupa Limpa (pure group). The geography of the offensive alone pointed to the obvious conclusion that Renamo’s forces were operating within Malawi or had a supply line that crossed the border. The offensive killed hundreds of FPLM soldiers and thousands deserted and fled into Malawi.

In the midst of this crisis a major meeting of the leaders of the Frontline States occurred in Malawi on 11 September at which Samora Machel presented Malawian President Hastings Banda with a dossier of evidence that demonstrated Renamo received support from his country. At a press conference Machel held in Maputo upon his return he condemned Malawi, claiming that the South African military used Malawian territory and the Malawian


167 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.

security services to destabilise Mozambique, and he threatened to position missiles on the Malawian border and to block their transport routes through Mozambique. Following these strong statements a series of stories hostile to Mozambique began circulating in the South African media, some advocating military action against them, and South African Minister of Defence General Magnus Malan publicly threatened Machel on 7 October. Meanwhile frantic diplomacy took place as Pik Botha visited Malawi for discussions with President Banda, and Malawian representative John Tembo led delegations to Maputo, Harare and Lusaka in an effort to defuse the crisis. A sudden increase in Renamo activity along the Malawian border at this point suggests that rebel forces, perhaps numbering in the thousands, were expelled from Malawi as a consequence of Mozambique’s threats. On Sunday 19 October President Machel flew to Mbala, Zambia, where a number of Frontline leaders were meeting to confront Zairean President Mobutu Sésé Seko over his country’s support for UNITA. The apparent success of their united position against Malawi emboldened the Frontline leaders to target Mobutu over his own co-operation with Pretoria. However, while flying back to Maputo that evening Machel’s Russian-built and piloted Tu-134A-3 airplane crashed just inside the South African border near Komatipoort at 9.21pm. The President and 33 others passengers were killed. This event would have grave consequences for the future of Mozambique.

By late 1986 Renamo was again on the offensive in Zambézia province. Though South African minimalists and various elements within Renamo had sought peace with the Frelimo government in 1984, including Renamo Branco such as Evo Fernandes, sabotage by maximalists and the failure of Frelimo to meet the demands of Renamo’s black leadership had scuttled the negotiations. While minimalists did all they could to block assistance to Renamo from their maximalist and putschist supporters throughout 1985, Renamo’s war effort thrived and the leadership forged new contacts with international supporters. This period was thus wrought with factionalism amongst Renamo and its supporters not recognised by many authors. The re-ascendance of maximalists in 1986 increased South African assistance to Renamo once again, but could not undo the new autonomy that the Renamo leadership exercised. Ironically, the death of Mozambican President in October 1986, almost certainly the work of South African maximalists, would work against Renamo’s interests in the long-term.

Chapter 8: The Assassination of Samora Machel.

The Death of Samora Machel

On Sunday 19 October Mozambican President Samora Machel’s plane crashed near Komatipoort, South Africa, killing the President and 33 other passengers. An investigation of the incident revealed that when returning from a meeting of the Frontline States in Mbala, Zambia, Machel’s plane had turned eight minutes too early and thus missed Maputo airport’s guidance signals. Upon receiving abnormal instrument readings the crew reported that their system was faulty and were cleared for a visual landing. The plane thus began to descend at 470 feet per minute in an attempt to gain visual contact with the airport, and while the pilot held a confused conversation with the air-traffic controller they crashed into the mountains along the border with South Africa. An international inquiry into the incident reported that the crew was qualified to fly the aircraft, the craft was properly maintained, the radio navigational aids were operating satisfactorily, the weather was not a factor, runway lights at Maputo airport were operating normally, and the crew had not suffered disability prior to landing. However, the board found that procedures were not followed correctly during the descent and thus placed blame for the accident on the Russian crew. According to the report,

the flight crew failed to follow procedural requirements for an instrument let-down approach, but continued to descend under visual flight rules in darkness and some cloud, i.e. without having visual contact with the ground, below minimum safe altitude and minimum assigned altitude, and in addition ignored the [Ground Proximity Warning System] alarm.1

Nevertheless, many influential Mozambique observers were deeply suspicious that the crash was not an accident and a theory quickly developed that the plane had been lured off-course by a VOR (Very-high-frequency Omni-directional Radio) transmitter other than the Maputo airport beacon. A rumour began to circulate that a large tent had been situated 150 metres south-east of the plane’s crash site and was removed on the day of the accident, the implication being that it had housed a VOR transmitter positioned there by the South African military. The board dismissed these allegations, claiming that the principle reason for rejecting the possibility of a false beacon was that a VOR transmitter’s sole function is to indicate direction in the horizontal plane and is not a guide to descent. Only an

instrument landing system could offer such guidance and as there was no suggestion of interference with that system the actions of the crew in ignoring its readings were the cause of the crash. Though the board did suggest that the confusion might have been caused by the accidental or inadvertent selection of the VOR transmitter at Matsapa, Swaziland, as the destination.\textsuperscript{2} While the finding of the inquiry was technically true, that the failure of the crew to heed their instrument’s warnings led to the crash, it deals only fleetingly with the more important and politically contentious question of why the plane initially veered off-course. Journalist Paul Fauvet recently articulated the theory that the original plan of Machel’s assassins was to lure the plane over Swaziland where it was to be shot down by a missile and attributed to Renamo. This scheme failed, though achieved the desired results, when the crew’s own mistakes caused the plane to crash into the mountains.\textsuperscript{3} The board’s findings are thus virtually irrelevant to the question of whether a conspiracy to kill Machel existed.

The theory that Samora Machel’s death was the result of an assassination plot could be dismissed as speculation if there were not so many unanswered questions about the incident, if it hadn’t occurred during a period of such heightened political tension, and if there didn’t exist such a convincing circumstantial case for conspirators’ motives. Some unresolved issues surrounding the crash include the questions of why, considering that South Africa’s own reports of their radar capabilities divulged that they could track the position and altitude of planes in southern Mozambique, did they not warn Machel’s plane of the impending accident? Why were Mozambican authorities not notified of the accident for ten hours, even though South African police had arrived at the scene six hours earlier? Why did South African authorities initially report that the plane had crashed in Natal province? What is the explanation for a heightened military alert in Transvaal province on the day of the crash? What is the explanation of mystery incisions in the necks of the two Soviet pilots that suggest they may have been killed at the scene? Why was Renamo’s Lisbon office alerted on that evening that they should be prepared to release a press statement about an important event? And why did South Africa claim that the pilots had been drinking and release false meteorological charts showing that weather conditions were bad, even though the board of inquiry dismissed both of these claims?\textsuperscript{4} In addition there

\textsuperscript{2} Chalmers, “Machel Crash Enquiry”, pp2-4, 40.
\textsuperscript{3} Fauvet and Mosse, Carlos Cardoso, pp166-171.
were the reports that a military tent was seen in the area of the crash and removed after the incident, including an anonymous call to the Johannesburg office of United Press International from a man who demonstrated substantial technical knowledge and claimed to be a South African Air Force officer.\(^5\) Deepening suspicion about the timing of the crash were the additional facts that only two weeks before Machel’s death he revealed that there had been a recent attempt on his life, and that before Machel left Lusaka he accused South Africa of planning to kill him and left instructions for what to do if he died.\(^6\)

Nevertheless, unanswered questions, anonymous information and the coinciding of Machel’s death with a period of diplomatic confrontation and threats against his person do not prove that the plane crash resulted from an assassination plot. If this had remained the extent of the case that a plot had existed then the circumstances of Machel’s death might have become just another African mystery. However, in the post-Apartheid period a number of interesting reports revived speculation about Machel’s death. An article on 14 July 1998 by Mail and Guardian journalist Debora Patta produced new claims that the crashed plane’s black box had been tampered with and that a Mozambican airport official was paid a large sum of money to switch off the Maputo radar system. Far more startling and significant, however, was Patta’s assertion that she had interviewed a Mozambican spy who had been one of Machel’s confidants and was, at the time of the article, in hiding in Italy. The man, known in the article as Casadei, claimed that he had stumbled on a plot by South African and Mozambican agents to kill the President. Those on the Mozambican side had offered their support for the plot in exchange for assistance in gaining power, while the South Africans would oversee the technical aspects of the operation. Casadei claimed that he informed Machel of the identities of two Mozambican Generals who were involved in the plot, but the President refused to take action against them. Patta also maintained that she had viewed an intelligence document that named South African, Mozambican and Malawian agents involved in the plot.\(^7\) Then in January 2003 it was reported by the Sowetan Sunday World that a former Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) agent serving a 28-year term in Baviaanspoort Prison near Pretoria, a Namibian national named Hans Louw, claimed he was involved in Samora Machel’s death. According to Louw, military intelligence operatives positioned a false airport beacon to lure the plane off course and he was part of a clean-up team that would ensure the President had died. As it

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\(^5\) Fauvet and Mosse, *Carlos Cardoso*, pp166-171.


\(^7\) Hamann, *Days of the Generals*, pp116-118.
turned out his team was never activated. A former Rhodesian Selous Scout operative,
Edwin Mudingi, claimed to have been part of the same operation and confirmed Louw’s
involvement. Louw also confessed to a number of other crimes, including a similar
operation that used a VOR beacon to lure an Angolan military plane off course in 1989
and killed a number of key Angolan military figures. 8 Only a few months later, on 6 April
2003, the Sowetan Sunday World reported that former Chief of South African Military
Intelligence, General Pieter ‘Tienie’ Groenewald, admitted in an interview with journalist
Mpikelani Duma that Samora Machel’s plane had been brought down by a false
navigational beacon. According to Joseph Hanlon, the article disclosed that,

    Groenewald also claimed that senior Frelimo officials were involved in the killing, and that
senior ‘individuals and [then Foreign Minister Joaquim] Chissano were apprised of the
details of the plot to kill Machel’. 9

Though the article provoked furious denials from members of the Frelimo leadership,
veteran Mozambique analyst Hanlon’s assessment was that the allegations could not be so
easily dismissed, especially since,

    Groenewald only said that Chissano knew of the plan, not that he organised it or was in
contact with South Africa…. [and] Samora Machel’s widow, Graca Machel, now the wife of
Nelson Mandela, has publicly accused Mozambican ‘generals’ of being involved in the
assassination. 10

General Groenewald quickly organised a press conference in Maputo at which he denied
that he had made the comments to the paper and announced that he planned to launch a
lawsuit. However, the press conference only raised the suspicions of some sections of the
South African media because,

    when a reporter asked him if he had any business deals with Mozambican generals,
Groenewald flatly denied this. But … [the weekly paper ‘Zambeze’ subsequently discovered
that in 1999 he invested in demining in Mozambique, and his partner was the late Col-Gen
Sebastiao Mabote, a former Chief of Staff of the Mozambican armed forces. 11

Later in the year a biography of the late Mozambican investigative journalist and editor
Carlos Cardoso, written by fellow journalists Paul Fauvet and Marcelo Mosse, added
further weight to the theory of Mozambican involvement in Machel’s assassination.

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8 “Former CCB Killer Confesses Part in Machel Death”, South African Press Association
(Johannesburg), 12 January 2003; “Samora Was Murdered, Says Former Apartheid Operative”, Agencia
de Informação de Moçambique, 13 January 2003.
9 Joseph Hanlon, “South Africans Admit They Killed Samora, but Say Mozambicans Helped”, Southern
Africa Documentation and Co-operation Centre, 8 May 2003.
10 Hanlon, “South Africans Admit They Killed Samora”. Hanlon points out that the term ‘generals’ can
also refer to political leaders, as most of the Frelimo leadership also held a military rank.
11 “General Sul-Africano diz que é Tudo Cabala”, Notícias, 29 May 2003; “Apartheid General Lied
Entitled *Carlos Cardoso: Telling the Truth in Mozambique* in its English version, in sections the book details why Cardoso always suspected that Mozambicans were involved in a plot to kill Machel, primarily because of his tough stance against entrenched corruption in the military hierarchy. This will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter.

With suspicious circumstances and a tense political context surrounding Samora Machel’s death, the recent confessions of involvement in a plot by a number of former Apartheid operatives, and the publicly expressed belief by some prominent Mozambique analysts that not only was Machel assassinated but that important Mozambican figures were involved, it is worth examining whether a coherent argument for the theory can be constructed. For those whose knowledge of Mozambique’s post-independence history is based on key secondary texts that examine the period, claims that Machel’s death resulted from a major rift in the Frelimo hierarchy might seem surprising. After the frequent splits within Frelimo during the 1960s, and the confrontation between Samora Machel’s radical faction and conservatives such as Lázaro N’kavandame and Uria Simango that followed Eduardo Mondlane’s death and led to the expulsion of those dubbed ‘the new exploiters’, it is assumed in most of the literature that Frelimo emerged with an extremely tight-knit and unified leadership. Writing in the wake of Frelimo’s 1983 Fourth Party Congress Hanlon notes that a ‘state group’ was involved in a class struggle within the Congress against emerging capitalist interests, but he nevertheless asserts that Frelimo’s leadership remained exceptionally unified, partly due to consensus decision-making and the tendency to institutionalise conflicts within the party and ministries by employing opposing elements in positions of close collaboration.\(^\text{12}\) Writing more than a decade later Margaret Hall and Tom Young confirm this image in their history of the period, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*. According to Hall and Young,

> The Frelimo regime was completely dominated by the leadership group (essentially the party politburo and some of Machel’s close associates), among whom there was a remarkable capacity for consensus and who, over a long period, rotated all the key offices of party and state between themselves. The longevity of the core Frelimo leadership (hardly changed until the late 1980s) is notable by any standards. Within the leadership group Machel was the central figure and the voice of the regime. His prestige with the army and the central positions held by [Alberto] Chipande and [Sebastião] Mabote secured the loyalty of the armed forces.\(^\text{13}\)


\(^{13}\) Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*, (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), p73.
However, a closer examination of Mozambique’s post-independence history reveals that after only a few years in government latent tensions within the Frelimo party and the military began to surface. Though ‘radicals’ had won the ideological battle for control of Frelimo in the early 1970s, there was no widespread purging of the elements within the organisation and its military forces that looked forward to the rise of a black bourgeoisie after independence. Frelimo’s ‘Marxist’ ideology was vague enough in its detail to allow those driven by self-interest as well as principle to believe there would be opportunities for enrichment following Portugal’s defeat.

Divisions within Frelimo

Following independence there were a number of years in which the Frelimo leadership began the implementation of state control over economics, though they held only loose control over the state itself. Hans Abrahamsson and Andres Nilsson note that a portion of the Frelimo membership had capitalist aspirations so,

> when political decisions held back private entrepreneurs, many began to seek positions in the public sector in order to accumulate public resources by making a career in state enterprises, cooperatives, the state apparatus and the party. Their arena was transferred from private activity to the political apparatus. Becoming a director of a state enterprise came to be a coveted alternative to being a private entrepreneur.\(^{14}\)

During this uncertain transitional period, throughout which the new government was diverting significant attention to its war with Rhodesia and support for Zimbabwean freedom fighters, the newly victorious military and security forces were also allowed free reign to deal with opponents of the new regime. According to a report by Amnesty International, “between 1975 and 1978, inmates of ‘re-education’ camps reported that torture, beatings and corporal punishment were used extensively, in particular against suspected opponents of the FRELIMO”, and SNASP were able to hold suspects indefinitely, incommunicado, without charge or trial. The worse excesses of detention came to an end in 1978 when the government took more direct control over the camps and by the early 1980’s many camps had closed.\(^{15}\) From 1979 President Machel started trying to impose greater order over the state and military by advocating the authority of managers to make decisions as the representative of peoples’ power, and the creation of a


clearer hierarchy in the military. However, rank within the party also began to bring benefits such as access to better quality consumer goods and health facilities, while the creation of a secretive and centralised National Planning Commission prevented sectors of industry from communicating directly and gave tremendous power to technocrats, which they could leverage for personal gain. With Zimbabwe’s imminent independence Machel decided the Mozambican state could afford to turn its attention inwards and launched a series of surprise visits to factories, warehouses, ports, shops and social service centres from March 1980. According to Marcelino Komba,

the President came across instances of gross inefficiency, corruption and deliberate sabotage. In the event, he let his axe fall on a number of people who were believed to be responsible for the bureaucratic rot. The first casualties included three cabinet ministers, one of whom was a ranking member of Frelimo’s Central Committee.

Then, after South Africa’s January 1981 commando raid against ANC safe-houses in Maputo, Machel admitted that the raid “had been possible because of army corruption and incompetence. … Eight traitors were subsequently identified, one being the head of General Mabote’s own office”. Machel thus began an offensive against corruption in the military, admitting a few months later that there had been many complaints about the army’s involvement in intimidation, repression, armed robbery, rape, torture and bribery. By mid-1981 92 members of the Ministry of Defence’s own workshops had been tried for corruption. Needless to say, Machel’s personal campaign against corruption in the state apparatus and military made him many enemies amongst those who enjoyed the power and privilege of office.

President Machel’s crusade against corruption had already begun to split the Frelimo party and military into factions for and against his tough stance, but the offensive was far from over. At a rally in Maputo on 5 November 1981 Machel admitted the abuses that had occurred in the re-education camps after independence and promised to bring the perpetrators to justice. He also charged that, “many commanders [had] acquired a taste for comfort, for the easy life, and even for luxury”. According to Fauvet and Mosse, Machel targeted abuses by the defence and security forces and police, pledging,

to wage a ‘legality offensive’ which would ‘dislodge the traitors and kidnappers, the corrupt, the arrogant, the power-hungry, the negligent, the incompetent, the abusers, the thieves, the

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rapists, the murderers, those who want to ride on the backs of the people.’… Diplomats from
the Soviet bloc states were amazed. No leader of any other socialist country had ever castigated
his own security forces in this way. Were such statements not the height of recklessness? Was
Machel not inviting a coup d’état? But there was no coup.21

Some took Machel’s threats very seriously, however, and the National Director of Security
(head of SNASp) Jorge de Costa fled justice by defecting to South Africa in early 1982. In
the wake of his defection around 100 SNASp officers were detained for several months.22
By mid-1982 elements within the leadership itself were being criticised for becoming too
used to luxury and allowing the solidification of a technocratic elite who lacked political
conviction and technical capacity. In the year-long build-up to the Frelimo Fourth Party
Congress of April 1983 the Frelimo leadership really became aware of their isolation from
their supporters. “It was made clear that people were free to speak at the Congress
preparatory meetings, and bottled-up complaints came flowing out, showing that peasants
thought they had been forgotten”, and that there was widespread disaffection with
overcentralisation in the state and the Frelimo Party.23 A South African situation report
from July 1984 notes that in November 1982 Machel singled out Politburo members
Mariano Matsinhe and Armando Guebuza in particular for criticism due to the abuse of
power by civil servants under their authority, especially the unnecessary detention of
individuals.24 One Malawian report implies that this conflict between Machel and Guebuza
may have had roots in Machel’s efforts to impose order in the late 1970s, noting that
Guebuza,

was one of the most feared and hated men. He was guilty of terrorising both civilians and
members of FRELIMO. To reduce his power, he was demoted from Minister of Interior
[1975-1977] to Deputy Minister of Defence [1980] and finally to Governor of Sofala Province
[1981-1983].25

João Cabrita claims that in early 1983, shortly after Mariano Matsinhe and Armando
Guebuza were censured, the two Politburo members and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Joaquim Chissano conspired to overthrow the President. According to Cabrita, Security
Minister Jacinto Veloso warned Machel of the plot and Machel attempted to expel

21 Fauvet and Mosse, Carlos Cardoso, p81.
22 “Mozambique: A Parting of the Ranks”, Africa Confidential, Vol 25, No 16, 1 August 1984, pp1-4;
“Mozambique: What is the MNR?”, pp5-6.
24 “MACHEL het reeds in November 1982 ‘n veldtog teen magsmisbruik van stapel gestuur waartydens
MATSINHE en GUEBUZA ook om dieselfde rede gekritiseer is”. “Situasierapport 99/84: Aktuele
Aspekte van die Bedreiging Teen die RSA soos op 29 Junie 1984”, 2 July 1984, South African Foreign
Affairs Archive, file 1/113/3, p4.
25 “Situation in Mozambique: Reconciliation Talks”, from Malawian Ambassador to Mozambique Itimu
to the Malawian Secretary for External Affairs, 14 March 1984, Malawian National Archive, file
MAP/C/6/68, p6.
Guebuza and Matsinhe in a showdown in the Politburo. However, Machel was defeated when Chissano and Alberto Chipande united to support them.\textsuperscript{26} By this time the Frelimo leadership was clearly factionalised and the split would be carried into their Fourth Party Congress. The major issues which may have inspired Machel’s enemies to attempt a takeover of the leadership were those major challenges that faced the nation: the civil war and national economics. Machel had already targeted Guebuza and Matsinhe and the security services under them as part of his offensive against corruption and abuse of power, and new initiatives in the war-effort may have alarmed them even further. On 17 December Machel’s supporters Sergio Vieira and Jacinto Veloso met with South African representatives at Komatipoort to lessen tensions between the countries. This would not have pleased elements that opposed negotiated peace for ideological or financial reasons. In addition Machel had approached the British government for an expansion of aid, which would be channelled through the private defence company Defence Systems Limited. According to Cabrita,

\begin{quote}
Initiated in 1983, the program had met veiled opposition from various FAM quarters, particularly the old and ill-trained members of the Mozambican military establishment. Committed to a conventional approach to the Renamo problem, some of them felt threatened by the likelihood of a new elite emerging in the country. Others, for whom the war had become a profitable venture, feared that their schemes would be undermined with the introduction of new blood.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

In regards to the other issue of economics, before the Fourth Congress the massive growth of the black market was seen as potentially as important as the war, as the leadership felt it threatened state control over the economy. Meanwhile, many of those who had wanted to become part of a black bourgeoisie, but had been forced to channel their efforts into the bureaucracy, saw that the largely Asian commercial community that was involved in trading lived very well. This led to a growth in racism amongst the nationalists in Frelimo, who also resented Machel’s promotion of non-blacks to key political positions. The economic crisis and resentment against traders led to the introduction of harsh penalties such as flogging and the death penalty for economic crimes. Hanlon thus noted that the Fourth Congress encompassed a class struggle, with the ‘State Group’ under assault by those who wanted to expand the market in Mozambique, but that no group was strong enough to defeat the other. The struggle led to a massive expansion of the Central Committee from the 54 mostly high-ranking party members to 128, the majority of whom were peasants.

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\textsuperscript{26} João M. Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy}, (Basingstroke, Palgrave, 2000), p222.
\textsuperscript{27} Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}, p249.
\end{flushright}
workers and guerrilla veterans. This greater representation was also an attempt to reduce the alienation of the population from the government, which was further addressed through the introduction of secret and more democratic elections within party cells, and greater decentralisation of power in the factories. The Fourth Congress also made concessions to the private sector, with a suspension of state domination for three years.\(^{28}\)

Following the Fourth Party Congress, on 21 May 1983, President Machel addressed a rally in Maputo announcing a number of changes in the Frelimo cabinet and the ministries. The *Indian Ocean Newsletter* reported that, in response to the heavy criticism levelled at the state during the Frelimo Fourth Party Congress, “Machel placed much of the blame on the ministries responsible for ‘maintaining discipline’ – defence, security, interior and justice”.\(^{29}\) Machel’s political opponents Chipande and Matsinhe had occupied the portfolios of Defence and Interior respectively, though Machel’s ally Jacinto Veloso had been Minister for Security. A cabinet reshuffle after the Congress moved Matsinhe into the Security portfolio; Armando Guebuza became Minister for the Interior; Sergio Vieira was made the Governor of Niassa Province; Marcelino dos Santos replaced Guebuza as Governor of Sofala; and Jacinto Veloso was brought into the new Ministry of Economic Affairs in the President’s Office. Taking into account that the role of provincial governor was a powerful position and that, “[t]hese changes reflect[ed] the president’s desire to strengthen the administrative power of the provinces, decentralize the state bodies and ensure better communication between the districts and the capital”\(^{30}\), an analysis of these changes can be made which argues that Machel was reasserting some degree of control. Machel had moved his trusted allies dos Santos and Vieira into the provinces though Matsinhe and Guebuza continued to hold two quite powerful portfolios based in the capital. Chipande kept his title as Minister for Defence, but Machel himself effectively took over the position and began major reforms within the Ministry, while Chipande was made the Governor of Cabo Delgado, the only province as yet unaffected by the war. The movement of Jacinto Veloso into Economics demonstrated that, even though the Fourth Congress had approved limited free market reforms, Machel wanted to maintain a steady hand on the process. Veterans of the liberation war were integrated into all ministries, in the hope that their personal loyalty to the Frelimo leadership and Party

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might assist in the eradication of corruption in the ranks. Machel also pushed ahead with rapprochement with South Africa, with Ministers Vieira and Veloso again meeting South African representatives at Komatipoort on 5 May 1983. A far less fortunate outcome of the Congress was the implementation of the notorious ‘Operation Production’, a programme born out of the sheer desperation caused by the war and economic crisis which would be, a massive campaign to rid the cities of ‘parasites’ – those who produce nothing but continue to consume scarce resources. The army, police and militia groups are to carry out house-to-house investigations, evicting the unemployed and those who do not pay their rent, and sending them to the rural areas to produce food. The programme’s implementation from July to September 1983, which must undoubtedly be seen as one of the Frelimo government’s greatest mistakes, transferred up to 50,000 urban unemployed to the countryside. Though the move seems to have been quite popular with many people living in the capital, the programme failed to produce any positive economic effect, was extremely traumatic for those involved, and provided Renamo with a potential recruitment pool of thousands of now displaced urban poor. While it appears Operation Production had support from throughout the cabinet, the South African Situation Report from July 1984 suggests that Armando Guebuza, the Minister of the Interior at the time who oversaw the programme, later experienced severe criticism from his cabinet colleagues for his handling of the project.

Opposition to Nkomati

In the meantime, as the war with Renamo continued to rage throughout the country, Machel proceeded with moves to reach an understanding with South Africa. This was not popular in the Central Committee, Fauvet and Mosse noting that, “plenty of people in the leadership had their doubts about the strategy outlined by Machel…” However, Machel outflanked his own government by making public the talks Vieira and Veloso held with South African representatives in Swaziland on 20 December 1983.

31 “Mozambique: Government Reshuffle”, pp1, 3; “Mozambique: Reshuffle and Decentralization”, pp1, 5.
32 “Mozambique: Government Reshuffle”, pp1, 3
33 Vines, RENAMO, p101.
34 “Skerp kritiek is in die verlede deur van sy kabinetkollegas uitgespreek oor sy omstrede hantering van ‘Operasie Produksie’ ingevolge waarvan duisende werkloes uit die stede verwyder is om produktief op die platteland aangewend te word”. “Situasierapport 99/84: Aktuele Aspekte van die Bedreiging Teen die RSA soos op 29 Junie 1984”, p4.
35 Fauvet and Mosse, Carlos Cardoso, p124.
36 Fauvet and Mosse, Carlos Cardoso, p122.
More detailed sub-ministerial talks followed in mid-January 1984, which created the necessary conditions for the Nkomati Accord. But Machel’s opponents would not let him win the debate so easily. Though negotiations between Mozambique and South Africa were reaching an advanced stage, a Malawian diplomatic report from March 1984 claimed that, while some welcomed the talks, others are against it. Those who are against are presently enjoying themselves. They do not feel the pinch of poverty and shortages. They think that if things changed they might be replaced by more efficient personnel. As a result of this, it is alleged that an attempted military takeover in Maputo was foiled in its embryonic stage. It is understood that the security officers loyal to the President Machel when discovered of the plot (sic), acted promptly. The coup was scheduled to take place between 16th and 23rd February, 1984. Following the defusion of the plot, President Machel sent for all top military personnel on 24th February, 1984 for questioning. Major General Fombe who is based in Inhambane was one of them and he confirmed of the plot to one of our source (sic). It is alleged that three Ministers were behind the coup or had prior knowledge of it. They are Joaquim Chissano, Alberto Chipande and Armando Guebuza.37

The report continues,

You may wish to know a little background of these officers who are reported to be one of the sinister men in Mozambique (sic):

(a) Joaquim Alberto Chissano…. Mr Chissano is said to be a brightly intelligent and well educated man as well as being the most dangerous of all Machel collaborators…. When he is abroad, it is alleged that Mr Chissano changes his closely guarded front of formality to one of immorality and big lavish spending and fast women are his style. Although Mr Chissano deliberately tries to create a fatherly image in public but others see him sinister man with no friends…. Clever and sinister, Mr Chissano wants power so badly.

(b) General Alberto Joaquim Chipande. Minister of Defence of Maconde tribe from Cabo Delgado…. General Chipande is said to have never been more than a ceremonial defence Minister to (sic) keeping the title and his post on the politburo because of the respect he earned as FRELIMO Military Commander during the struggle. General Chipande was a war hero and owes his position to his close ties with the FRELIMO freedom fighters now integrated into the Mozambique Army. His opponents say he is more loyal to Maconde interests than to President Machel.38

Thus by early 1984 the split between Machel and elements of the Freliimo leadership and military, which had emerged because of the President’s crusade against corruption and abuse of power in the late 1970s and early 1980s, had reached the point where Machel’s Presidency was threatened by a military coup d’état backed by members of his own cabinet. The success of negotiations between Machel’s representatives and the South African government was seemingly the catalyst for the abortive rebellion. The motives of those involved in the coup plot were undoubtedly varied, but some of the most likely can be suggested here. Ideologically some may have opposed negotiations because the Nkomati Accord would require the sacrifice of support for the ANC. Guebuza was known to have strong ties with the ANC, and the South African freedom fighters worked closely

38 “Situation in Mozambique: Reconciliation Talks”, 14 March 1984, pp4-6.
with the Mozambican military and police. Stephen Chan and Moisés Venâncio claim that, “the hard-liner and then interior minister Armando Guebuza, viewed the signing of Nkomati as a capitulation by the regime”, though they also assert that, “moderates such as the then foreign minister, Joaquim Chissano, saw Nkomati as a means of preventing the total destruction of Mozambique”. Another motivation for aspirant capitalists in the administration may have been Machel’s continuing reluctance to fast-track free market reforms for the Mozambican economy. There are indications that a significant bloc within the Frelimo party and military was nationalist in perspective rather than socialist, and they had little interest in Machel’s ideological agenda. Writing in 1985 US-based Renamo supporter Luis Serapião noted that,

The comrades, in almost twelve years of control, have failed to realize that the military section of FRELIMO has been predominantly a nationalist group. The nationalists, most of them black, constitute the bulk of FRELIMO’s army.

However, perhaps the most potent motivation for members of the military and political leadership may have been naked self-interest. Corruption was widespread in the military at all levels. Along with the simple theft of money destined for military projects, corruption also took the form of members of the military hierarchy using military equipment for private business activities, such as transport planes that were used to fly private passengers and building materials while troops starved without rations in isolated areas. Fuel was also stolen by the tonne from air bases and sold privately. At the end of the war the process of decommissioning exposed another long-practiced money-making venture, when the Mozambican armed forces were found to have 12,000 soldiers less than previously thought. The most likely explanation is that military officers would not declare deaths in order to receive more rations than necessary, and corrupt officials kept dead or discharged soldiers on the payroll so they could embezzle the money. At the Second Conference of Mozambican Youth in March 1986 some made public allegations that military officers were siphoning off supplies and selling them on the black market, while others spoke of officers selling uniforms to their own men. The profit of war may thus have been enough reason to oppose negotiations that could bring peace. Chipande and Guebuza were closely

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41 Conversation with a Former Mozambican Intelligence Agent, Maputo, 19 June 2003.
connected to the armed forces, one article stating that the more modern and Soviet-orientated forces within the military may have been more loyal to Guebuza than Machel.\footnote{“Mozambique: A Parting of the Ranks”, pp1–4.} For Joaquim Chissano the possibility that he would be Machel’s successor may have been interest enough.

By May 1984 the possibility of a coup d’état had not subsided. A Malawian diplomatic report states that,

\begin{quote}
The officials in the Embassies of the socialist countries are among the people who are spreading quite disturbing rumours about a coup d’état or [a Renamo] take-over of the Government. They believe that [Renamo] would not stop the war until the Government surrenders and see no good prospects for President Machel whom they regard as having failed to provide food, clothes, and security to the people. The Soviet Ambassador, for example, was recently overheard at King Moshoeshoe’s birthday party in Lesotho as saying that there would be a coup d’état in Mozambique…. On the basis of the rumours … the Russians are suspected of trying to ferment trouble within the Government. The Minister of Interior, Honourable Guebuza (sic), for example, is suspected of planning to overthrow the Government at the instigation of the Russians.\footnote{“Situation in Mozambique”, from Malawian Ambassador to Mozambique Itimu to the Malawian Secretary for External Affairs, May or June 1984, Malawian National Archive, pp1–3. Though the document is not dated a draft notes that it is written after the Nkomati Accord, and the references to King Moshoeshoe’s birthday (2 May) and Armando Guebuza’s position as Minister of Interior place the document in May or early June 1984.}
\end{quote}

Meanwhile, on 12 May Machel publicly criticised Armando Guebuza, Mariano Matsinhe and Chief of the Armed Forces Sebastião Mabote at a neighbourhood council meeting, which foreshadowed a cabinet reshuffle on 15 June. Apparently deciding that it was more important to have allies controlling the security services than administering the provinces, Machel brought Sergio Vieira back to Maputo as security minister and sent Matsinhe to be Governor of Niassa. Guebuza was removed from the Interior portfolio and made Governor of Nampula, though he refused the position, and José Carlos Lobo was demoted from Minister for Mineral Resources to Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Oscar Monteiro replaced Guebuza as Minister of the Interior, and Abdul Magid Osman occupied Lobo’s portfolio. At least one report noted that Guebuza, Matsinhe, and Lobo were all pro-Soviet ‘hard-liners’, which might connect Machel’s actions to the rumours mentioned by the Malawian Ambassador. General Mabote was not affected by the reshuffle.\footnote{“Situasierapport 99/84: Aktuele Aspekte van die Bedreiging Teen die RSA soos op 29 Junie 1984”, pp3–4; “Mozambique: A Parting of the Ranks”, pp1–4; Phil Cohen, “On the Trail of the MNR”, New African, October 1984, pp12–15; Cabrita, Mozambique, pp223, 225.} A South African Situation Report also noted that 90 senior civil servants were shifted from their positions at the same time.\footnote{“Situasierapport 99/84: Aktuele Aspekte van die Bedreiging Teen die RSA soos op 29 Junie 1984”, p3.} The Situation Report observes that the reason for the
removal of these politicians might be similar to why they were criticised in November 1982, and comments that,

Guebuza is a controversial politician who has already been named in connection with several rows and division in the Politburo of Frelimo on account of the discontent caused by certain policies. According to an unconfirmed report, he was one of the opponents of Machel's decision to sign the Nkomati Accord with [South Africa]. In January 1984 Guebuza was deprived of an influential post on the political commission of the Mozambique armed forces (which he had long occupied). Thus South Africa was well aware of the split within the Mozambican Politburo and saw it as a potential point of weakness. A report on the Total Strategy for Mozambique from July 1984 noted that Machel had strengthened his government through the replacement of Guebuza and Matsinhe with his 'loyal supporters' Colonels Vieira and Monteiro. The report further predicted that,

The high intensity of Renamo operations since March 1984 is in opposition to Frelimo/FAM expectations that the severity of actions would subside after the signing of the Nkomati Accord, has had the effect of lowering the fighting spirit within the FAM…. In the case that Renamo can maintain the present pressure on Frelimo, this may strengthen the hand of the Nationalist group in Frelimo, as well as other moderate pressure groups like the Roman Catholic Church, in compelling Frelimo to arrive at a compromise with Renamo.

However, it was Machel who dragged the Frelimo government into negotiations with Renamo, allowing the Mozambican Christian Council to establish contact with Renamo during early 1984, authorising Jacinto Veloso to hold low-level talks with Renamo representatives in Europe during July, and sending a delegation of his trusted allies to South Africa in October for face-to-face negotiations with members of the Renamo
leadership.\textsuperscript{51} Even around the time of the ceasefire talks in South Africa some observers noted that Frelimo remained politically split, and that the army seemed divided between those training in conventional warfare and those with a guerrilla past. Machel also seemed to lack confidence in his own security forces to accurately inform him about the progress of the war.\textsuperscript{52} In late 1984 Machel appointed Guebuza as Minister of State in the Presidency as part of efforts to reforge unity, (though one report noted that it was “probably to allow … Machel to keep an eye on him”).\textsuperscript{53}

1985: Return to the Military Solution

Following the failure of the October negotiations and Mozambique’s loss of faith in South Africa’s commitment to the Nkomati Accord, though President Machel maintained communication with some elements within Renamo such as Manuel Bulhosa, he seems to have shifted a greater emphasis to a military resolution to the war. This may have reduced tension within Frelimo and the military during 1985. The focus on a military solution resulted in the series of joint operations with Zimbabwean forces from the middle of the year and climax in the capture of Renamo’s Gorongosa headquarters in September. However, the victory at Gorongosa had a very contrary effect on Machel, who personally toured the base after its capture and inspected Renamo’s massive stockpile of weapons, most of which appeared to be Mozambican-issue. The army had informed Machel that the war was going well, but upon seeing the hoard of weapons and equipment he was again convinced that Mozambique could not defeat Renamo and that a negotiated settlement was the only solution.\textsuperscript{54} Only a fortnight later, on 13 September, journalist Carlos Cardoso witnessed Machel’s disaffection with the military itself when he spoke publicly about his concerns in front of Politburo members and about a hundred people involved in organising the tenth anniversary of independence celebrations. Fauvet and Mosse relate Cardoso’s recollection that,

Machel bitterly regretted the relaxation of 1980. ‘We were drunk of the victory over Smith. We gave no importance to training the army,’ he admitted. They had fallen into ‘populist’ errors. ‘There are officers without quality, but we promote them. Now we don’t demote anybody. During the armed struggle, a commander who lost more than five men was demoted’…. Machel wanted new blood in the army: ‘Generals aged 58 or 63 should retire.’ Such remarks in

\textsuperscript{54} Conversation with a Former Mozambican Intelligence Agent, Maputo, 19 June 2003.
front of an audience of over a hundred were bound to find their way to the generals concerned, who might not be enthusiastic about the idea of forced retirement…. Cardoso would later recall this meeting as a sign of malaise within the armed forces, and of Machel’s increasing isolation.\(^55\)

Thus, from late 1985 Machel again began working towards negotiated settlement, which displeased many inside Frelimo.\(^56\) The \textit{Indian Ocean Newsletter} reported that an attempt by the Italian Catholic group \textit{Centro Internazionale d’Assisi} to organise a meeting between Frelimo and Renamo representatives in Rome in 1986, an initiative supported by Machel, was scuttled by opposition within Frelimo.\(^57\) And according to Fauvet and Mosse,

In 1986 Cardoso was called several times to the presidential palace for off-the-record briefings with Machel. During these talks he received the distinct impression that the president was an increasingly lonely figure. Years later Cardoso recalled one occasion when Machel called him and Alves Gomes to the palace…. Cardoso recalled two startling phrases used by the president. He told the journalists, ‘I have no strategy’ and ‘I am lost.’ Later Cardoso would reflect that this conversation was ‘a further indication that behind the staged unity of the Frelimo leadership, Samora Machel was almost completely isolated at the top’\(^58\).

Nevertheless Machel continued to manoeuvre for peace. Having learnt from the failure of the Nkomati Accord Machel decided that effective negotiations could only occur outside of South African influence, and he chose to make contact with Evo Fernandes, who he saw as an independent and trustworthy representative of Renamo.\(^59\) Machel had a covert communication channel to Fernandes, as it seems that SNASP had achieved a significant level of infiltration of Renamo’s external representation, and the SNASP agent Mateus Lopes, whose real name was José Alfredo da Costa, had maintained contact with Fernandes in Lisbon since 1985.\(^60\) Lopes seems to have approached Evo Fernandes and Gimo Phiri in Malawi during 1986 and offered to facilitate negotiations with Frelimo as “an envoy of ‘the old fighters’, a ‘negrophile’ strain within FRELIMO which favoured negotiations between FRELIMO blacks and RENAMO, to the exclusion of whites, Indians and coloureds”\(^61\).

This may not have seemed unusual since there is evidence that various black military officers had been in contact with Renamo during previous years. In 1985 Roberto Frequera, the Frelimo Political Secretary for Gorongosa district, admitted to passing military information to Renamo, and Chief of the Armed Forces Sebastião Mabote was said to have met with Renamo, eventually leading to his removal from the position on

\(^{55}\) Fauvet and Mosse, \textit{Carlos Cardoso}, pp143-144.  
\(^{56}\) Conversation with a Former Mozambican Intelligence Agent, Maputo, 19 June 2003.  
\(^{58}\) Fauvet and Mosse, \textit{Carlos Cardoso}, p154.  
\(^{59}\) Conversation with a Former Mozambican Intelligence Agent, Maputo, 19 June 2003.  
Zimbabwean advice that he was too close to the rebels. Lopes gained Fernandes’ trust and was allowed to work with Renamo operatives near the Malawi-Zambézia border, including Gilberto Fernandes (known as Magid) and Gimo Phiri, and witnessed the support network of Portuguese, South Africans and American Evangelical Christians at work. He was also able to travel to Renamo’s Gorongosa headquarters and meet Afonso Dhlakama there. Meanwhile, Fernandes seems to have taken up the invitation and met with Machel’s representative Fernando Honwana in Geneva. Machel aimed to have negotiations only involving African mediators and to achieve a peace deal by the end of 1986. In addition, while in Washington during June 1986 the Machel loyalist Abdul Magid Osman visited the Heritage Foundation, known supporters of Renamo, to seek advice on what measures would be necessary to secure peace. Joaquim Chissano, on the other hand, continued to publicly emphasise his unwillingness to negotiate with Renamo.

In the meantime a Politburo meeting from 18 February to 3 March 1986 resulted in Alberto Chipande being brought back to the Defence portfolio and Armando Guebuza being appointed as Minister for Agriculture. Exactly what led to these reappointments is unknown, though a statement released following the meeting announced that “within the framework of the war economy, existing economic and financial resources (must) be channelled as a priority to the war effort”. By this time it was recognised that the war was not progressing well. Though Renamo’s Gorongosa headquarters had been captured in late 1985, the rebel forces had merely moved their offensive into Zambézia province, and had in fact recaptured Gorongosa from government forces in February 1986. There was great discontent within the army as FPLM units lacked supplies of food, ammunition and pay, creating low morale and forcing soldiers to turn to theft. A Zimbabwean intelligence report leaked in 1987, stressed the ineffectual state of the government forces, the low morale, and the sympathies which existed amongst government forces for RENAMO…. the government forces were characterised by a severe lack of discipline, bad treatment of ordinary soldiers by officers, low pay (which more often than not arrived late), and a general lack of planning and logistics.

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63 Oliveira, Os Domos, pp99.
64 Conversation with Former Mozambican Intelligence Agent, Maputo, 19 June 2003.
67 “Mozambique: In Desperation”, pp7-8; Chan and Venâncio, War and Peace in Mozambique, pp10-11.
Though the diversion of resources to the war effort may have pleased militarists in the administration, it also seems that the Politburo may have agreed to a retreat from free market economics, as central planning advocates Mario Machungo and Abdul Magid Osman were appointed as Planning Minister and Finance Minister respectively, and together with Guebuza they were given the mission to increase production and to “struggle against racketeering and speculation”. Machel loyalist Jacinto Veloso was also appointed as head of the Ministry of Co-operation, which would deal with all of Mozambique’s foreign economic relations, including negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.68

**Machel’s Final Year of Struggle**

In this context President Machel continued with his secret bid for peace. However, from the Gorongosa base recaptured by Renamo in May 1986, Renamo President Dhlakama declared that,

> The solution to the problem of war will no longer come with an agreement with Machel. Now we will accept only negotiation with Frelimo’s operational soldiers … we have our sources and we know that, inside Maputo, not everybody agrees with Machel. We believe there could be a coup at any moment.69

Pro-Renamo journalist Peter Younghusband claimed that diplomats in Maputo also shared Dhlakama’s assessment that a coup was imminent.70 This could be dismissed as mere Renamo rhetoric if Machel had not been killed only a few months later. It is possible Dhlakama’s source may have been SNASP agent Mateus Lopes himself, who could have made the claim to bolster his own standing in Renamo’s inner circle. Lopes seems to have become quite close to Gimo Phiri and Dhlakama, and to have been involved in lobbying for Evo Fernandes’ demotion from Secretary-General in mid-1986, perhaps due to a failure of negotiations between Fernandes and Mozambican representatives.71 However, there were ever-growing connections between the Renamo leadership and members of the Mozambican military that could equally have been a direct source of the rumour. The overwhelming corruption within the armed forces and even political sympathy for Renamo by nationalist elements led to the development of covert communications between the sides. Cabrita claims that in the late 1980s elements within the armed forces “began collaborating with the guerrillas. Government soldiers are said to have given information to

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Renamo through the latter’s network of informers, the *mujiba*. As these relationships developed,

government soldiers radioed Renamo to warn the guerrillas of military plans or of attacks in the offing. Renamo says it was kept informed of changes in FAM’s telecommunications codebooks. Air traffic controllers at the Beira Air Force Base are said to have informed the Renamo Headquarters at Maringúe of pending air raids.

Even more significantly a commercial relationship developed between Renamo and corrupt elements within the military. Cabrita states that,

Renamo has also claimed that FAM units failed to carry through their operations, deliberately abandoning war materiel, which they knew would end up in rebel hands, or actually making it reach guerrilla bases. After the war, the official Mozambique news agency (AIM) reported that FAM had regularly supplied military equipment to a Renamo base in Sofala. According to AIM, ‘Mozambican air force helicopters often landed at Renamo bases in Gorongosa, apparently to unload supplies’.

Former member of the Renamo leadership Raul Domingos confirmed this, claiming that Renamo’s urban agents contacted members of the military who subsequently began providing information and ammunition to the rebels, mainly from 1987. Loot from Renamo’s raids on villages would be sold and the money used to buy materials from the FPLM. Supplies would be dropped off for pick-up under the pretence of a battle, and it would later be claimed that Renamo had captured them. This relationship continued to progress to such a point that a South African report from June 1987 observed that,

Limited cooperation between FAM members and RENAMO already puts the latter in a position to continue its actions against the Beira corridor and also hamper the operational effectiveness of the ZNA [Zimbabwean National Army].

Under the Chissano presidency this corruption grew unabated, the *Indian Ocean Newsletter* claiming that at an armed forces meeting in early June 1989,

One lieutenant rose and declared before the delegates that RENAMO had two command posts - one in South Africa and one in Maputo…. [Young officers] accuse the old generals of profiting from the war. They cite recent cases of Cuban rations destined for the army turning up in captured RENAMO camps.
But the Mozambican armed forces were not the only bastion of corruption. Elements within the Zimbabwean security forces were also profiting from the war. The personnel of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) did not change radically with the 1980 transition to majority rule, and ties with South African military intelligence were never truly severed. Members of the CIO, probably in collaboration with South African operatives, arranged for arms transfers to Renamo forces and made a commission from their activities. Elements in the CIO also worked with members of the Zimbabwean armed forces to create a trafficking network for ivory poached from elephants and rhinos in Mozambique, as well as narcotics. The murders of ZNA Captain Edwin Nleya and ZNA Lieutenant Shepard Chisango seem to have been connected to this network. Whether Renamo was directly linked to this smuggling network is unknown, but the rebels did have a history of smuggling ivory and gems to fund the war effort. Peter Stiff claims that when the Rhodesian SAS transferred to South Africa during the transition to majority rule, they also took two tons of elephant ivory that had originated from Renamo and brought out of Mozambique in Rhodesian Air Force helicopters. Throughout the 1980s various reports continued to emerge that Renamo was involved in large-scale smuggling of precious gems, ivory, lion and zebra skins, hardwood and narcotics, including a statement in 1984 from Renamo defector Constantino Reis. In 1986 68 kilograms of narcotics were recovered from a Renamo base in Zambézia, and in 1987 19,700 elephant tusks were found in central Mozambique, apparently waiting to be picked up for transfer by plane to South Africa. Poaching mainly took place around Gorongosa and in the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe, and the smuggling network used routes through South Africa, Zimbabwe and Malawi. Though at the time of Machel’s death the relationship between Renamo and elements in the FPLM had not reached yet reached its peak, these were certainly the type of corrupt connections that were being forged.

79 Conversation with a Former Mozambican Intelligence Agent, Maputo, 19 June 2003.
By September 1986 Machel and his fellow Frontline leaders Robert Mugabe and Kenneth Kuanda were taking a much more hardline stance against Malawian support to Renamo, threatening to block Malawi's trade routes and even to place missiles on the Malawian border. The success of these threats and the apparent plan to subject Zaire to the same type of pressure were amongst the factors that increased tension with South Africa in the days prior to Machel's death. Following the fatal air-crash documents South Africa claimed to have recovered from the scene indicated that while in Lusaka Machel, had discussed plans with Kuanda and Mugabe to overthrow Banda's government by organizing a 'liberation army' from among Malawian exiles…. The authenticity of the documents has never been established, although Kuanda was reported to have confirmed its accuracy and said he had refused to take part in the plan when it was put to him.\textsuperscript{83}

Meanwhile, on 11 October 1986 Machel held his last informal meeting with selected sections of the Mozambican media. According to Fauvet and Mosse, journalist Mota Lopes had the impression that Machel had, “great concern, not only with the external and regional situation, but also (perhaps above all) with the internal situation, particularly at the highest levels of the Frelimo leadership”.\textsuperscript{84} He also spoke of the ongoing negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, expressing his displeasure by saying, “[p]rivatisation of the railways and ports, of the schools, of the hospitals. That’s what the IMF is saying in the negotiations. They’ve attacked our revolutionary gains and our life.”\textsuperscript{85} In addition, only a few days before his death Machel held a dinner at which he announced the new civilian administrator of the military, replacing Chief of the Armed Forces Sebastião Mabote who was being sent to Cuba to study.\textsuperscript{86} Fauvet and Mosse claim that Machel had long wanted to change the FPLM’s military strategy and to deploy former colonial commandos, as shock units in the war against Renamo. These highly trained soldiers had caused problems for Frelimo in the 1970s, and Machel respected their military skills…. Machel wanted new units, headed by these men, to wage counter-guerrilla warfare – and they would be under his command, independent of the general staff. But the rest of the military hierarchy objected, and the idea never got off the ground. Similarly, attempts to promote rapidly young officers trained in the Soviet Union met with obstacles…. By 1986 Machel had decided on a thorough reorganisation of the military, and he was honest enough to announce it in advance.\textsuperscript{87}


\textsuperscript{84} Fauvet and Mosse, \textit{Carlos Cardoso}, pp158-159.

\textsuperscript{85} Fauvet and Mosse, \textit{Carlos Cardoso}, pp158-159.

\textsuperscript{86} Conversation with a Former Mozambican Intelligence Agent, Maputo, 19 June 2003. Anecdotally, a number of sources have maintained to this author that Mabote would not have been involved in a coup against the President because he was far too loyal and obedient to Machel.

\textsuperscript{87} Fauvet and Mosse, \textit{Carlos Cardoso}, p176.
Mabote’s transfer to Cuba was the first step in a major restructure of the military hierarchy that Machel planned to carry out in October 1986. Journalist Carlos Cardoso later wrote that Machel,

told his adversaries within the armed forces general staff and … the party leadership … what he intended to do: dismiss almost the entire general staff, replacing them with the young officers trained in the USSR. And he even told them the date of the changes: 20 October 1986. A meeting to change the leading figures in the armed forces was set for 07.00 that morning. But on the night of the 19th, that meeting with the general staff was postponed sine die because the presidential aircraft crashed at Mbuzini.88

Thus by the time of President Machel’s death he had been engaged in a struggle with elements within the leadership of the Frelimo Party and armed forces for more than half a decade over the issues of corruption, peace negotiations with Renamo and the maintenance of state control over the Mozambican economy. The Frelimo leadership had become factionalised over these issues and on at least two occasions Machel’s enemies had attempted to remove him from the Presidency through political manoeuvring and a military coup. In the months prior to the fatal plane crash Machel had intensified his efforts against corruption and incompetence in the Mozambican state, re-initiated peace negotiations with elements in Renamo and backed away from free market reforms. Then in the week of the crash Machel made comments that he was unhappy about demands for economic reform by the International Monetary Fund, and began implementing plans for a major restructure of the military hierarchy. Hence at the time of Machel’s death there was no shortage of individuals in Mozambique who may have benefited from his demise and would thus have had motives to collaborate with South Africa in his assassination.

88 Fauvet and Mosse, Carlos Cardoso, pp177-178.
Chapter 9: The Rise of Chissano.

Following Samora Machel’s death Mozambican Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano assumed the position of President, supported by a number of factions with competing agendas. Chissano subsequently marginalised pro-Machel elements in Mozambique’s political and military leadership, accelerated economic liberalisation, and rejected the possibility of a negotiated end to the civil war. A successful government counter-offensive against Renamo’s forces in Zambézia during late 1986 and early 1987 led to a redeployment of guerrillas to Mozambique’s south and a horrific series of massacres, the most infamous of which occurred at Homoíne. The international outcry over these atrocities, combined with Mozambique’s growing relationship with the West, led to many of Renamo’s American supporters abandoning hope that the United States would officially back Renamo. During 1987 minimalist supporters in the US thus began to promote a negotiated end to the conflict, aided by Mozambican intelligence agents who had penetrated the Renamo leadership.

Chissano Attains the Presidency

By the time of President Samora Machel’s death in October 1986 Renamo’s military offensive in Zambézia province was well under way. Renamo had attacked the border-town of Milange on 29 September 1986, stripping the town of loot and precipitating the flight of locals into Malawi. By November up to 200,000 Mozambican civilians had fled into Malawi to escape Renamo’s advance and large areas in the north became too dangerous for government forces as the rebels maintained control of towns and stretches of bush for hundreds of kilometres along the Malawian border. These areas were secure enough that witnesses reported Renamo’s President Afonso Dhlakama had personally flown into Milange from Malawi, accompanied by a phalanx of white bodyguards. The presence of Renamo’s forces along the lower Zambezi River valley convinced some analysts that they were planning to capture a strategic corridor along the Zambezi River to the ocean so they could receive supplies near the port of Chinde, and perhaps with the strategic aim of cutting the country in half and forming a provisional Renamo government in the north.¹

Though some have speculated that South Africa had hoped Samora Machel’s death would create chaos within the Frelimo government and thus undermine counter-insurgency efforts in Zambézia, this did not occur. Following the President’s demise a ten-member council of Politburo members quickly took the role of a ‘collective head of state’ until Joaquim Chissano was appointed to the position of President on 6 November 1986. A committee that was meanwhile investigating Samora Machel’s death on behalf of the Politburo, led by Armando Guebuza, failed to reach any firm conclusions about the circumstances of the President’s death. Forty seven year-old Chissano was the natural successor to Machel, having for a long-time been a central figure in the Frelimo leadership and, according to *Africa Confidential*, maintaining “a significant personal following in the armed forces, despite the fact he never became a guerrilla leader”. Chissano’s influential colleagues Marcelino dos Santos and Alberto Chipande were both too old to be considered for the presidency. Though perhaps more importantly Chissano may have been the only candidate who could successfully placate or suppress each of the factions within the Frelimo government. Under Machel’s rule the various blocs of free marketeers, statists who opposed negotiations with Renamo, black nationalists, and corrupt war-profiteers were united in their aim of toppling the President, but after his death the widely divergent nature of their aims could not help but become apparent. Though a more detailed analysis might one day trace the precise lines of factional division within the Frelimo party, it can be broadly stated that the main points of difference between the factions were: free market advocates saw structural adjustment and an end to the war as preconditions for the implementation of their programme; those who supported state-control for ideological reasons or because it was the site of their power opposed transformation of bureaucratic structures and feared that a negotiated end to conflict might induce change; and corrupt elements who were profiting directly from the conflict sought to prolong the war. Meanwhile, Cabrita notes that even before Chissano became President black nationalist elements were mobilising within the armed forces, with veterans of the anti-colonial war releasing a manifesto addressed to Joaquim Chissano, Alberto Chipande, Armando Guebuza and Mariano Matsinhe, which called for the exclusion of non-black Mozambicans

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2 Hilton Hamann, *Days of the Generals*, (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2001), pp116-118. On the same day, 6 November, the South African government released documents from the crash site of Samora Machel’s plane that allegedly detailed a plot to topple Malawian President Hastings Banda. This may have been deliberately timed to pressure or embarrass the new Mozambican President. Paul Fauvet and Marcelo Mosse, *Carlos Cardoso: Telling the Truth in Mozambique*, (Cape Town: Double Storey Books, 2003), pp166-171.


from positions of power and for a negotiated settlement with Renamo’s black leadership. The manifesto called for Chissano to be named President and Guebuza as Prime Minister, perhaps fuelling Cabrita’s suspicions that Chissano was in some way connected to the authors. The black nationalist’s goals were thus somewhat aligned with the free marketeers, except for the nationalists’ specific desire to exclude non-blacks from positions of power. Of course the exact divisions between these blocs may have often been ambiguous.

While Chissano’s strategy for balancing the interests of these factions certainly evolved during the years of his Presidency, his speech upon investiture as President somewhat foreshadowed the programme he intended to implement. Adopting a rhetorical hardline against South Africa and Renamo, Chissano proclaimed that,

Today more than ever, armed banditry is an integral part of the South African apartheid system’s policy of regional destabilisation. It is one of the means through which the Pretoria regime and its most backward and belligerent forces seek to maintain domination over the countries of southern Africa. This policy is characterised by direct and indirect military aggression… aimed not only at preventing our institutions and economy from functioning, thus blocking economic and social development, but also at destroying our state and revolution…. Its objective is to guarantee the continuance of our countries’ historical dependence on the South African economy and to bring them into a constellation of states which would institutionalise Pretoria’s hegemony at the political, economic, financial and strategic levels…. Therefore, continuing this relentless struggle against armed banditry in our country is the most sacred and fundamental of tasks in this stage in our history. There can be no compromises whatsoever in this struggle. The conditions under which this fight must continue on all fronts, political, military and diplomatic, its tactics and strategy, are all part of the great legacy left to us by President Samora Machel. They show the paths to follow now and in the future…. Fighting and eliminating armed banditry in our country means defending and consolidating our national independence and sovereignty, safeguarding our gains so that we may bring our deep desires for peace and tranquillity to reality…

Thus, ironically, Chissano called on Samora Machel’s legacy to justify the continuation of the military struggle to end the war against Renamo, rather than attempting to secure a negotiated peace. To this author Chissano’s promise that there would be ‘no compromises’ appears to be a signal to pro-statists, war profiteers and others opposed to negotiation that the conflict would continue unabated. From mid-1987 Chissano did give his blessing to the Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) to forge contacts with Renamo in order to lobby for negotiations, though the use of the church as medium of communication still avoided conferring any political legitimacy onto the rebels. Nevertheless, this was little more than a

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token to satisfy pro-negotiation elements within Frelimo and in the international community, as throughout 1987 Chissano consistently maintained that there would be no talks with Renamo.\(^8\) According to Cabrita, this was at least partly because the leadership of the armed forces, “encouraged by the results achieved since [the Zimbabwe National Army’s] intervention, assured Chissano that a Renamo defeat was possible”.\(^9\)

Meanwhile, Chissano’s government also began implementing the free market economic reforms that Machel had long opposed. Chissano comments on this in the same speech, declaring that,

> Producing in order to wipe out hunger and lack of clothes is a need that remains crucial…. We must make the best of the land, realising its potential and distributing it to those who really work it…. Support for the state cooperative, family and private sectors must be correctly balanced so that each of them contributes towards fulfilling our plans and towards creating the common wealth for our development…. Industrial units must be characterised by increasing productivity and profitability…. We cannot go on paying wages to unproductive workers…. The most rigorous austerity must be the touchstone of society… Austerity, the more rational and productive use of our resources, and the search for alternative economic methods and processes of production demand that we always seek solutions among the people, to become mainly self-reliant, and constantly to develop our capabilities, creativity and initiative. We must apply a rigorous wages policy which rewards and encourages competent workers, which promotes and rewards dedication and professional pride and takes account of the quality of work done.\(^{10}\)

In a speech to Frelimo’s Central Committee Chissano further stated that, “We guarantee security of property, return on invested capital and satisfactory conditions for business activity to private investors”.\(^{11}\) Though initial contacts with the IMF and World Bank had been made during Samora Machel’s reign, it was not until 1987 under Chissano’s administration that Frelimo launched their ‘Economic Recovery Plan’ of increased liberalisation with the sponsorship of those organisations. This roll-back of Socialist ideology and central planning would later culminate in Frelimo’s official shift away from Marxism-Leninism at the Fifth Party Congress and a wave of public discontent, protests and strikes against the country’s rising food prices and devaluing currency.\(^{12}\) As part of the new emphasis placed on economic liberalisation Chissano appointed Mario Machungo, the only trained economist in the Frelimo leadership, to the position of Prime Minister. Though Machungo had been an advocate of central planning under Machel, he had also

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\(^11\) Chissano, *Turn Sorrow into Strength*, p 40.

\(^12\) Chan and Venâncio, *War and Peace in Mozambique*, p23; Fauvet and Mosse, *Carlos Cardoso*, p247.
experimented with economic liberalisation and partial free markets while he was Governor of Zambézia. From his new position he effectively controlled the entire economy. This was far from the only change that would be made in personnel of the Frelimo leadership. Over the months following Chissano’s appointment as President Machel-supporters were purged from Mozambique’s political and military leadership and replaced by Chissano’s factional allies. By January 1987 Pascal Mocumbi was transferred into the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs; Armando Guebuza was brought into the transport ministry, being replaced as Minister to the Presidency by Feliciano Gundana; and Mariano Matsinhe was appointed to the position of Security Minister, ousting the Machel-loyalist Sergio Vieira. Chissano also heeded the demands that black nationalist elements had made in their manifesto and, according to Cabrita, “effectively removed most non-black Mozambicans from senior positions”. The reappointment of Guebuza and Matsinhe to senior ministerial positions may have been of particular interest to black nationalist elements as they seemed to have nationalist tendencies. This was earlier demonstrated by the reputation Guebuza earned for his hardline against Portuguese settlers after independence (for which he received the nickname 24/20 for ordering all Portuguese citizens to leave Mozambique within 24 hours with only 20 kilograms of luggage), and was visible in debates within the Central Committee in late 1990 over a tightening of the criteria for nationality. By this time Guebuza and Matsinhe were clearly part of the nationalist bloc within the Politburo, which also included Antonio Thai, retired General Americo Pfumo and Teodato Hunguana. Chissano’s new cabinet thus represented each of the factions whose interests were served by Machel’s death, and marginalised the former President’s sympathisers.

**Frelimo Regains the Military Initiative**

Meanwhile, the military conflict between the Frelimo government and Renamo rebels continued, especially along the Malawian border in central Mozambique. By November 1986 the threats and diplomatic overtures Mozambique and its allies had made towards Malawi seem to have convinced Malawian authorities to expel Renamo’s forces from their territory, forcing up to 5,000 Renamo fighters into central Mozambique and

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intensifying the conflict in the area. However, Renamo fighters clearly did continue to transit through Malawian territory. The Mozambican armed forces (FPLM) were severely challenged by the growing offensive, and began to employ tactics such as arming local civilians. Many poorly-armed government units in Tete and Zambézia provinces were routed. In early October Renamo’s forces attacked the town of Namarrói in north-east Zambézia, besieging the FPLM garrison there for three days before withdrawing and leaving much of the town in ruins. The Zambézia offensive coincided with the region’s agricultural planting season, and this combined with Renamo’s subsequent attacks on the road from Quelimane blocks to deprive up to 600,000 Mozambican civilians of food supplies. The destruction of farmland by government forces during counter-offensives also certainly contributed to the 1987 famine. Elsewhere in the country Renamo continued much more limited operations in October and November attacking two trains near Maputo, and massacring 44 civilians in attacks on two villages in southern Inhambane on 24 October and 9 November. At the time it was thought that submarine movements detected along Inhambane’s coast might have been connected to the massacres. Counter-insurgency operations in the wake of the massacres destroyed three Renamo camps in Massinga district. Later reports claimed that Renamo leaders had met South African Defence Force (SADF) representatives at the Sun City resort in the bantustan of Bophutatswana from 21-25 November, during which it was decided to resupply Renamo forces in the central Mozambique by submarine. Maximalists within the Apartheid regime, who had gained greater freedom to operate following the declaration of the state of emergency in South Africa, may have moved to increase aid at this time because the smooth transition following Samora Machel’s assassination and the subsequent expulsion of rebel forces from Malawi had been to Renamo’s detriment. Reports from December also claimed that Renamo was running low on ammunition, which might have resulted

from the severing of their supply-lines through Malawi. Naturally Renamo representatives denied this, a subsequent issue of the US-based Mozambique Information Department Newsletter stating, “RENAMO has captured from Frelimo arms worth millions of dollars so much so that we have become self-sufficient in material means”. The Sun City meeting may also have aimed to calm tension between different factions within Renamo. These divisions, which were possibly stoked by Mozambican Intelligence (SNASP) operatives, had led to the demotion of Secretary-General Evo Fernandes in September 1986. By February 1987 internal squabbles resulted in Fernandes and Renamo’s European Spokesman Jorge Correia being stripped of his post and denounced for “scheming, petty corruption and self-promotion”. They were variously accused of accused of embezzlement, unauthorized contacts with foreign governments and wasting a million dollars meant for weapons and medicine, the last straw apparently being a deal made with British Intelligence (MI6) in December 1986 to hand back British and German hostages. Replacing Correia was twenty-seven old Paulo Oliveira, a white Mozambican who had worked as a journalist for the conservative Portuguese newspaper O Dia, became the new European Spokesman. He was assisted in the Lisbon delegation by former Mozambican ambassador to Portugal João da Silva Ataíde, and former head of SNASP’s financial and administrative department José Mascarenhas (who fled from Mozambique to Lisbon in 1983).

During December government forces began to regain the advantage in Zambézia province. Along the Zambezi River valley in south-western Zambézia the FPLM drove Renamo’s forces from the towns of Micaune, Mopeia and Luabo, and away from the coast, though the sparsely-populated and swampy region on the Zambézia-Sofala border remained a refuge for rebel fighters. Meanwhile, a number of important bases were destroyed and 130 Renamo fighters killed in central Zambézia around Mocuba and Maganja at Namajavira, Nampevo and Diba, and further north rebel camps were overrun near Ile, Alto Molocue, Gurué and Milange. Renamo’s offensive thus seemed to have

22 The Mozambique Information Department Newsletter, No 8, 20 February 1987, pp1-6.  
23 “Mozambique on Planned Resupply of MNR by South Africa”.  
ground to a halt, though travel in the province remained dangerous.\textsuperscript{25} The rest of the northern Mozambique remained relatively calm, with only scattered rebel activity in Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado, and only pockets of Renamo activity continued in the south. Renamo did maintain control of northern Sofala, including the Gorongosa Mountains, though the Beira corridor remained open. Pro-Renamo reports claimed that only five of Sofala’s twelve districts were not seriously affected by rebel activity and that the Beira railway line was often sabotaged and its traffic destroyed, including a 60-car train in December. Renamo also claimed to have killed over 100 FPLM troops in Sofala, and more than 200 in Nampula, Tete and Maputo during the month. A train carrying military provisions between Nacala and Nampula was also seized.\textsuperscript{26} Following on from their progress in Zambézia, and perhaps in response to recent Renamo victories in the area, on 29 December the FPLM and Zimbabwean forces launched a large-scale offensive against Maringué and Gorongosa, again endangering Renamo’s headquarters in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{27} According to Minter supplies were dropped at Maringué regularly between 1985 and 1988, and at a rate of once every two months during Renamo’s Zambézia Offensive in 1986. One witness involved in collecting supplies from Maringué also claimed to have received supplies by sea near Maganja in Zambézia.\textsuperscript{28} As Mozambican authorities claimed earlier in December that South African Military Intelligence (DMI) was to begin resupplying Renamo in what it called ‘Operation Blockade’, and Maringué had become a major base and centre for resupply by air due to its dense bush terrain, it is possible the offensive aimed to sever the supply route or capture newly-delivered equipment.\textsuperscript{29} The death of Samora Machel a few months earlier had convinced the Zimbabwean military high


\textsuperscript{27} “Mozambique: Further Fighting”, Indian Ocean Newsletter, No 264, 10 January 1987, p4.

\textsuperscript{28} William Minter, “The MNR, (Renamo) as Described by Ex-participants”, Development Dialogue, No 1, 1989, pp113-114, 117.

\textsuperscript{29} “Mozambique on Planned Resupply of MNR by South Africa”, BBC Summary of World Broadcasting, 22 December 1986; Private Communications with Former Member of the South African National Intelligence Service (NIS), 2004.
command to take a more aggressive posture in Mozambique and to send troops deeper into hostile territory, thus encouraging these more offensive operations.  

From early 1987 up to 3,000 Tanzanian troops were based at Mocuba, Zambézia, where they had a central location from which they could strike at rebel forces throughout the province. Over a number of months these troops began reclaiming areas along the Malawian border such as Namanjavira, Megaza, Chire, Pinda and Milange, though Cabrita claims that once the towns were handed over to the FPLM Renamo often recaptured this territory. In early 1987 these Tanzanian soldiers assisted Mozambican government forces in an offensive along the Zambezi River valley, around towns such as Luabo and Marromeu, while Zimbabwean paratroopers supported the operations in Manica and Sofala. These dual campaigns seem to have pushed Renamo onto the defensive, though the conflict continued to force thousands of refugees out of Mozambique into Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In January and February joint operations in the region from Tambara district in northern Manica, across northern Sofala to the southern tip of Tete province led to the destruction of fifteen Renamo camps and the deaths of 300 Renamo fighters. In the Zambezi valley the towns of Sena, Vila Nova, Mutarara and Caia were captured by joint Zimbabwean-Mozambican operations, killing more than 100 guerrillas and capturing equipment that included South African radios. William Minter claims that the Renamo group occupying the town of Caia received advance notice of an attack by Zimbabwean and Mozambican forces and thus pre-emptively burnt the town down, confirming later claims by Renamo defector Paulo Oliveira that South Africa monitored Mozambican communications and passed information on to Renamo. Fleeing guerrillas also destroyed the five kilometre-long bridge connecting Mutarara and Sena, which had been important for access to the mines at Moatize and for exporting to Malawi. An assault on Renamo’s Gorongosa headquarters by Zimbabwean troops in early February seems to have been unsuccessful and up to 120 soldiers were lost. In the midst of this offensive Renamo claimed to have sabotaged the Beira pipeline a number of times in January and February,

31 Cabrita, Mozambique, p248.
32 Conspicuous Destruction, p33.
and to have captured the town of Semacueza, on the Beira-Malawi railway line, killing 86 FPLM soldiers.\(^{34}\)

During February and March 1987 the major government offensive, aided by Tanzanian and Zimbabwean troops, had great success in recapturing most of Zambézia and Sofala provinces, and official sources claimed to have killed up to 2,000 Renamo fighters in the campaign. Some areas of fierce conflict included around Namarrói in north-eastern Zambézia, Derre in the centre of the province, and Micaune and Luabo to the south-west of Quelimane. Renamo did maintain some strongholds in northern Zambézia, Tete and Sofala, however, and in one particularly vicious attack on 12 February Renamo fighters in north-eastern Zambézia destroyed five tea-processing factories in Gurué district, massacring 50 workers and ruining machinery and tonnes of tea. Some witness accounts also claimed three whites were part of the attack.\(^{35}\) Further north in Nampula Renamo attacked Monapo on the Nacala line, killing eight civilians and destroying 30 tonnes of cashew nuts during January, while government forces won a number of skirmishes against rebels further west at Murrupula, near the Zambézia border. The FPLM reported eighteen Renamo fighters and 26 ‘collaborators’ killed in the region.\(^{36}\) Meanwhile in the south, following the destruction of a number of rebel camps at Mapulanguene and Magude in northern Maputo province, in January and February a number of large Renamo contingents from Phalaborwa infiltrated into Mozambique around the areas of Chicualacualoa and Massingir in Gaza. Renamo claimed these forces launched several successful ambushes in Maputo province and attacked government bases around Magude, downing a helicopter and killing 116 FPLM troops. Pro-Renamo sources also declared that rebel forces routed a Frelimo unit at Manhiça, north of the capital, on 13 February 1987; while pro-government sources blamed Renamo for an ambush of a bus near the capital at Machava, in which one civilian was killed and nine injured, and for the massacre of eighteen civilians in Mafuiane, Inhambane, in mid-February.\(^{37}\)


By March 1987 Renamo spokesmen and sympathetic journalists continued to declare that government forces had abandoned most population centres in Zambézia and that Renamo held secure ‘liberated zones’ throughout the province, perhaps due to their isolation from the ever-changing situation in Mozambique. In reality, even though units of Renamo’s highly-trained *Grupo Limpa* soldiers were operating in Zambézia at battalion strength, the rebel campaign in the region had been decimated by the severing of its supply-line through Malawi and a massive counter-offensive by the Mozambican armed forces and their allies. In early March government counter-insurgency forces, spearheaded by British- and Portuguese-trained ‘Red Berets’ and backed by Zimbabwean and Tanzanian soldiers, regained control of the lower Zambezi River and captured Renamo’s major supply depot near Luabo, which had been significant for rebel operations in the area since mid-1985. Renamo units evacuating southern Zambézia may have been responsible for a number of assaults on government garrisons in Sofala and Manica during March, as well as for the recapture of a number of centres in Tete province by bolstered rebel forces, after the FPLM had previously driven them from their strongholds at Fingoe, Chifunde and Furancungo, along the Zambian and Malawian borders. The displacement of rebel forces in northern Tete province may also have led to the first Renamo incursion into Zambia in March 1987. Meanwhile, in April the FPLM continued to close in on Gorongosa, recapturing Maringué to its north and Muanza to the east, while further north Malawi deployed 400-500 men along the Nacala railway to protect its operations, prompting a warning from Renamo spokesman Oliviera that the line would be shutdown if Malawi interfered.
Renamo Shifts to the South

With the collapse of their previously successful operations in Zambézia province Renamo seems to have switched their offensive to the south, with the increasingly obvious assistance of maximalists within the Apartheid administration. By early 1987 the security apparatus in South Africa had contained the internal rebellion that had imperilled the regime for a number of years and were beginning to focus more on suppressing individual activists and organisations. Increasingly South Africa’s security forces were moving into the background and leaving conservative black vigilantes, municipal police and special constables to bear the brunt of the resistance. Empowered by the crisis in South Africa, maximalists now escaped some of the restrictions on their activities that South African minimalists had previously ensured. Thus reports of land and sea infiltration into Gaza and Inhambane provinces that began in January continued in April, with captured insurgents admitting to having been trained at camps at Nelspruit, Phalaborwa and Pafuri in along the Transvaal-Mozambique border. Some sources also reported large numbers of Renamo fighters crossing the Beira corridor on the way southwards. Gaza in particular was heavily infiltrated, with up to 1,500 guerrillas moving into the province in early 1987. Following their strategy from earlier in the war Renamo again seemed to focus on isolating the food production areas in the Limpopo valley and to prevent the reopening of the Limpopo railway. Thus heavy clashes with government forces occurred around Guija, near Chokwe in Gaza. Homoíne and Panda in southern Inhambane were also raided during March and April, which may have been connected to reports of South African airdrops of supplies in the area. During early 1987 there were also reports of weaponry and ammunition delivered by South African boats to Vilanculo district, Inhambane, and that Air Swazi cargo planes were helping to transport equipment to Renamo.43 Hilton Hamaan also claims South African documents note that during 1987 Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama was escorted across the border through the Kruger National Park along with sixteen tonnes of cargo, and was extracted via the same route at a different time. Thus proximity to South Africa obviously increased the ease of resupply by land, sea and air, though the documents

also noted that later in 1987 two crews of Renamo fighters trained in anti-aircraft gunning were deployed with six tonnes of cargo east of Inhaminga accompanied by three SADF members who created a landing strip for a DC-3 plane. The intensity of fighting in southern Gaza and Inhambane during early 1987 is reflected by government estimates that more than 300 Renamo fighters were killed around Guija, Chibuto and Chokwe in Gaza, and 330 killed in Inhambane. Meanwhile, Renamo continued conducting ambushes on the main north-south highway, and as close to Maputo as Manhiça, Matola and Marracuene, between the capital and Swaziland on the railway and at Namaacha, and as far south as Bela Vista. A bomb blast in the Maputo suburb of Matola that killed two people on 17 March was blamed on South African agents, and Mozambican Intelligence (SNASP) later produced a captured Angolan national, George Olimpio Nunes Alerson, who confessed to being a South African commando responsible for the blast and claimed his unit consisted of South Africans, Mozambicans, Angolans, Zaireans and Portuguese.

**SNASP Infiltration of Renamo**

By February 1987 black nationalist elements had placed further pressure on the Frelimo government to pursue negotiations with Renamo, including a letter from war veterans advocating that a power-sharing arrangement be made with the rebels. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe may also have begun to advise Maputo to seek a peace settlement. The *Indian Ocean Newsletter* noted that “an increasing proportion of the Mozambican military favour talks with the ‘African’ members of Renamo...” and that some war veterans had threatened to join Renamo if living conditions in the country did not improve. Meanwhile, Renamo spokesmen also began openly talking about the resumption of negotiations. These tensions within the Frelimo hierarchy were highlighted in a South African Monitoring Report on Mozambique from June 1987, which notes that,

On the internal political level the Mozambican government has found no solutions for the serious state of their security and socio-economic problems, and are continually under intense pressure. Signs of this pressure are manifested in the discontent of a group of senior military officers (primarily provincial commanders) and veterans of the colonial war, with the involvement of non-blacks in the government and party leadership, as well as their

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unwillingness to negotiate with Renamo. Although there also exists underlying disagreements in the Frelimo Politburo over other policies, such as the continuation of the Nkomati agreement in Mozambique, and overtures towards the West...\(^{49}\)

These pressures from all sides may have led Chissano to allow the Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) to establish contact with Renamo, while he played to other factions within his government with his ‘no compromises’ stance. Ironically, it may have been Mozambican Intelligence (SNASP) agents who were facilitating peace signals between black nationalist elements and the Renamo leadership. SNASP seems to have infiltrated Renamo’s highest echelons, the agent Mateus Lopes (whose real name was José Alfredo da Costa) having made contact with Evo Fernandes and Gimo Phiri while Samora Machel was President and agitating for negotiations under the banner of Frelimo’s black war veterans. Since then he had become a special envoy for Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama and seems to have been involved in Fernandes’ demotion from the position of Secretary-General in mid-1986. Senior SNASP officials confirmed that Lopes was working for Mozambican Intelligence a year after his November 1987 assassination.\(^{50}\) Another likely SNASP agent within the Renamo hierarchy was Mozambique’s former ambassador to Portugal, João Ataíde, who was killed in the same incident as Lopes. Ataíde defected to Renamo in June 1982 amid a number of other high-ranking defections, including SNASP Director Jorge de Costa; First Secretary of the Mozambique Embassy in Zimbabwe, António Rocha; and Zulficar Tricamegy, a member of President Machel’s own staff.\(^{51}\)

Thus, what seemed like a minor political crisis for Frelimo may have been an effort to seed SNASP agents into Renamo under the cover of a number of real defections. According to Paulo Oliveira, Ataíde operated as part of a nucleus within Renamo who opposed the influence of the Renamo Branco, which included his fellow defector António Rocha, as well as Willy Abreu and Miguel Murupa. Oliveira notes that these men met regularly in Lisbon, and that Ataíde travelled regularly between Lisbon and Paris.\(^{52}\) Mateus Lopes seems to have

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\(^{49}\)“Op interne politieke vlak slaag die Mosambiek regering steeds nie daarin om oplossings vir die staat se ernstige veiligheids- en sosio-ekonomiese probleme te vind nie, en verkeer steeds onder groot druk. Tekens van hierdie drik is gemanifesteer in die ontvredenheid onder ‘n groep senior militêre offisiere (hoofsaaklik provinsiale bevelvoerders) en veterane van die koloniale oorlog, met die invloed van nie-swartes in hœ regerings-en party topstrukture, asook die regering se onwilligheid om met RENAMO te onderhandel. Alhoewel daar ook onderliggende meningsverskille in die Frelimo Politiburo bestaan oor ander beleidsaspekte, soos die voortsetting van die Nkomati-verdrag en Mosambiek se toenadering tot die Weste…”. “Mosambiek: Monitorverslag”, for Mr D Vosloo, 15 June 1987, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 144/8/192/1, p1.


\(^{52}\)Oliveira, *Os Domos*, p80.
acted to help Ataíde increase his influence in early 1987. In February Lopes and Artur de Fonseca were sent to Lisbon by Dhlakama to assess the situation and put an end to factional fighting. Lopes sided with Oliviera’s faction, while Fonseca sided with Fernandes, but by 27 February Lopes reappeared in Lisbon with orders from Dhlakama for the expulsion of Fernandes and Correia, and Correia’s replacement by João Ataíde. Ataíde was vulnerable in Lisbon because he did not possess a Portuguese passport, and thus he moved to Paris to establish a Renamo office there. Ataíde and Lopes were also collaborating closely to assist support from the United States that was reaching Renamo forces through refugee camps in Malawi, an operation that will be discussed in more detail below. It has been suggested that Ataíde was carrying orders for his appointment to Paris, or even for his promotion to the position of Secretary-General, when he and Lopes were killed.53 The promotion of a Renamo moderate to such a high-ranking position within the organisation, with the assistance of the Mozambican agent Lopes, would have been a coup for SNASP whether or not Ataíde was actually working for them.

A third highly-placed Renamo member who may have been a SNASP agent is Paulo Oliviera himself. Oliviera was a friend of Mateus Lopes and had benefited from the faction fight against Evo Fernandes and Jorge Correia, in which Lopes had some involvement. After Fernandes and Correia were demoted in late 1986 Oliveira rose to the position of Renamo’s European Spokesman.54 Lopes again sided with Oliveira in factional disputes during February 1987, though in August 1987 Oliviera was dismissed as European representative and returned to being editor of the Renamo publication A Luta Continua.55 Oliveira’s history makes it quite plausible that he was recruited by SNASP early in Mozambique’s civil war. Oliveira himself writes that he was detained by SNASP in 1979 after they became suspicious of his socialising with US embassy officials at the Aeroclub in Maputo. Once Oliviera convinced SNASP that he was not a spy they asked that he work for the organisation, to which he agreed, and he said he was given the code-name “collaborator Alcino”. However, in his account he claims that he had no sympathy with the government and warned the US embassy’s communications officer, Anthony Becker, about SNASP’s interest in him. Anthony Becker left Maputo for Jamaica on 10 July 1979 and Oliveira left for a vacation with his family in Lisbon soon afterwards. In Lisbon he met FUMO leader Domingos Arouca, who advised him not to return to Maputo, and also

54 “Mozambique: Negotiations?”, p3.
55 Vines, RENAMO, p36.
learnt about the then Rhodesian-controlled Renamo organisation and Orlando Cristina. Oliveira joined Renamo through Evo Fernandes in 1981 and began writing for the far-right Portuguese newspaper *O Dia* and editing Renamo’s irregular magazine *A Luta Continua* in 1982. Subsequently in February 1983 Oliveira travelled to South Africa to take up a place in Renamo’s radio station *Voz da África Livre*, and returned to Lisbon after the Nkomati Accord to work with Jorge Correia co-ordinating Renamo publicity. If Oliveira actually was recruited by SNASP in 1979 then he may have worked for them within the opposition movement in Lisbon and South Africa for almost a decade.

One tantalising piece of evidence from 1984 pointing towards Oliveira’s involvement with SNASP is a South African National Intelligence Service document that seems to be a transcript of a taped phone call in which two individuals, one of whom is named Rebelo and is involved with Frelimo party in Mozambique, discuss Mozambique’s worsening relations with Portugal and the difficulties that would be experienced reintegrating Renamo fighters into Mozambican society. In the transcript the comment is made, “Hey, Rebelo leave those crazies, Paulo de Oliveira was already a SNASP agent…”. Later Oliviera would be part of a major propaganda victory for the Frelimo government when he became the first high-ranking Renamo officer to defect to Maputo on 14 March 1988, after receiving assurances of amnesty. When interviewed Oliviera reported that there was much internal discontent in Renamo’s Lisbon office and that South Africa retained a strong influence over the organisation. Specifically he detailed that Brigadier van Niekerk, Brigadier van Tonder and Colonel Groebbler, were deeply involved in Renamo, that Niekerk had met Evo Fernandes in Lisbon on 24-25 June 1987, and that Colonel du Preez of South African Military Intelligence ran Renamo operations in Malawi. He also claimed that the United States was trying to gain influence over Renamo, that support for Renamo came from the West German intelligence sources, and that the rebels still received assistance from Portuguese Military Intelligence and Chief of Staff General Lemos Ferreira. In addition, he said that in 1983 Colonel Groebbler had informed him that South Africa was only interested in destabilising Mozambique and not in creating a Renamo government, that the Frelimo-Renamo negotiations in 1984 had broken down because of the intervention of the South African military leadership, and that he had been told anecdotally “that hundreds of Mozambicans were to be sent to Israel for military

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Thus Oliveira seemed to have great insight into Renamo’s internal workings and SNASP representatives publicly said they hoped to receive important information from him, but it was later reported that Oliveira’s defection did not seem to reveal any new information to D-13 (the SNASP department responsible for Renamo), a scenario congruent with the hypothesis that Oliveira was already an active SNASP agent. One story of Oliveira’s defection that circulated following these events was that he had originally approached the Mozambican embassy in Lisbon trying to sell documents. The embassy had previously been warned of Oliveira’s financial difficulties by SNASP and though the documents were not of interest they organised his defection. However, Renamo representative Manuel Frank informed reporters that Oliveira had been under investigation for some time and that he resigned, when a commission set up by President Afonso Dhlakama was investigating his connections with the political police of the Maputo Dictatorship… [and] his attempts to infiltrate certain newspapers and to recruit informers among the Mozambicans living [in Lisbon].

Considering Paulo Oliveira’s contact with SNASP early in the war; his close relations and factional alliance with SNASP agent Mateus Lopes; his defection from Renamo in 1988 following the death of his allies Lopes and Ataíde, and the subsequent allegations by Renamo he was a SNASP agent; and the reference to him being such in a 1984 South African intelligence document, the hypothesis that he was working for Mozambican Intelligence cannot be easily dismissed.

All agents who had previously infiltrated Renamo had done so under Samora Machel’s presidency, thus it is unclear to what degree they may still have been carrying on Machel’s peace agenda, even though Chissano had taken a more hardline stance. Mateus Lopes had previously agitated within Renamo for the recommencement of peace talks, and may still have been doing so. Other SNASP operations within Renamo seem to have involved encouraging splits within the leadership and promoting more moderate wings


61 “Oliviera’s Road to Maputo”, Informafrica, Vol 1, No 8, April 1988, p5.

within the movement. The South African Monitoring Report from June 1987 recognised
the danger that Mozambican Intelligence would exploit pre-existing divisions within
Renamo.

Renamo continues to experience problems of unity within the membership of the international
organisation in that there exist increasing indications of friction between the Black and
White/Mulatto group within RENAMO. The founding of the CUNIMO organisation in July
1986 in West Germany, the character of which is opposed to both FRELIMO and RENAMO,
is a further sign of the wide spectrum of problems with which Renamo is struggling. This
aspect is one of the weaknesses of RENAMO that the security services of Zimbabwe (CIO)
and Mozambique (SNASP) have identified as a factor that must be exploited to neutralise the
Renamo threat.63

Thus the faction fight that led to the marginalisation of Evo Fernandes and Jorge Correia
was probably a result of existing tensions stoked by SNASP infiltrators such as Mateus
Lopes and João Ataíde, who was involved with a nucleus of anti-white agitators. The aim
appears to have been to split away the support from the Renamo Branco and maximalists
within the South African military whose contradictory goals had complicated previous
peace efforts. Splits within Renamo would also weaken the organisation. Internal tensions
fuelled by SNASP intervention also led to another major split in which Gimo Phiri’s União
Nacional de Moçambique (UNAMO) broke away from Renamo.64 Gimo Phiri previously led
the military wing of the Partido Revolucionário Moçambicano (PRM), which operated in
Zambézia province from Malawian territory and united with Renamo in 1982, Phiri joining
Renamo’s National Council. Originally the new commander of the integrated forces was
Mangwerende John, though control was handed to General Henrique in 1983 when a
united northern command was formed.65 General Henrique was then killed in an attack on
Manganja in November 1986, and President Dhlakama subsequently selected Calisto
Meque to be head of Renamo’s forces in the north without consulting Phiri. The
appointment of Meque, who was ethnically N’dau, further centralised Dhlakama’s control
and caused some ethnic tension. During the government’s northern offensives in early
1987 N’dau fighters suffered far more casualties than their counterparts, probably due to a
lack of familiarity with the territory. However, Meque suspected a plot and purged the

63 “RENAMO ondervind steeds probleme om eenheid onder die beweging se buitelandse lede te
bewerkstellig en daar bestaan tonemende aanduidings van wrywing tussen die Swart en Blank/Mulatte-
groepe binne RENAMO. Die stigting van die CUNIMO-organisasie in Julie 1986 in Wes-Duitsland, wat
uit persoonlikheid bestaan war teen beide FRELIMO en RENAMO gekant is, is verder tekenend van die
wye spectrum van probleme waarmee RENAMO steeds te kampe het. Bg aspek is een van die swakpunte
van RENAMO wat deur die veiligheidsdienste van Zimbabwe (CIO) en Mosambiek (SNASP)
geïdentifiseer is as aspekte wat uit gebuig moet word om die RENAMO-bedreiging te neutraliseer”.
64 UNAMO: National Union of Mozambique
65 “Acordo Provisorio de Unificação”, Orlando Cristina and Gimo Phiri, Resistência Nacional
Moçambicana, 1982.
leadership, having a number of local commanders executed. Under Meque the number of atrocities against civilians in Renamo controlled territory in Zambézia also increased. This ethnic conflict, combined with Phiri’s decreasing influence in the leadership due to the marginalisation of his ally Evo Fernandes, led to the deterioration of relations between Phiri and Dhlakama. Gimo Phiri thus split with 500 men in late 1987 to form UNAMO, probably with the assistance of SNASP agents. UNAMO was subsequently known to have attacked Renamo bases, and it is thought that they attacked Renamo’s Zambézia Headquarters in spring 1988 and killed Calisto Meque. The split also gave government forces an advantage during counter-insurgency offensives in 1988. Official contacts between Frelimo and UNAMO later began in November 1988 and the group would eventually be recognised as a legitimate opposition party before Renamo. At the end of 1987 there were also rumours of the re-establishment of the group COREMO in Tete province, which may have been part of another SNASP operation.66

**SNASP and the CIA**

Further SNASP activities focused on encouraging the influence of more moderate forces over the Renamo leadership, which predominantly took the form of assisting the CIA to forge connections with Renamo. Though this may initially seem contradictory, it makes sense in the context of competition between minimalist and maximalist elements within both the South African and American administrations. By mid-1987 Renamo had again transferred their main campaign to southern Mozambique and was clearly receiving assistance from South African maximalists, while minimalists were working to make the most out of Mozambique’s shift towards the West. The *Indian Ocean Newsletter* noted that by July the South African Department of Foreign Affairs was “locked in a fierce row with the defence ministry” after indications in statements made by Defence Minister General Magnus Malan that the SADF wanted to re-implement full support for Renamo. Minimalists in Foreign Affairs were meanwhile attempting to forge a beneficial commercial relationship with Mozambique, and had just given a three million rand grant to assist in the repair of the Maputo port.67 This division was mirrored in the Reagan Administration, which by April 1987 was beginning to shift its support from South Africa to the regime in Maputo. The US State Department and CIA shared the minimalist position that Chissano could be dealt with, while Renamo had limited popular support, a poor human rights

record and little chance of military victory; whereas the Pentagon and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) maintained hope for a Renamo victory. These agencies’ differences were accordingly reflected in their relations with South Africa, the DIA working closely with South African Military Intelligence (DMI) and the CIA liaising primarily with Foreign Affairs. The DIA shared the DMI’s desire to increase support for Renamo, while the CIA aimed to break Renamo’s dependency on South African assistance and encourage a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Part of the CIA’s strategy in this area was the support of moderate Renamo splinter groups such as PADELIMO and CUNIMO, which were established in Kenya and West Germany respectively during 1986 and received support from the secret services of those two countries. The precise relationship of these organisations with Renamo is unknown, but PADELIMO was an important source of passports for Renamo. Renamo itself also maintained a West German office, run from 1983 by João Rajabo da Costa, and from June 1987 by Artur Janeiro da Fonseca. This office also maintained relations with West German intelligence. The CIA may have had direct relations with these organisations, as well as working through its ally agencies. Private letters between Renamo representative Francisco Nota Moisés and Louisiana businessman James U. Blanchard III confirm that Renamo carried out minor clandestine operations in Kenya, with the knowledge of high-ranking government officials, and mention Renamo members in Germany, “a country which has already given us some material support and has pledged further such assistance”. A December 1987 letter from Moisés to “Renamo’s Friends and Sympathisers” requests donations to help provide Renamo with material assistance and weapons, and asks that finances be passed through Blanchard. Blanchard supplied up to US$3000 worth of resources to Renamo monthly and was part of a private support network for Renamo in the United States, seemingly influenced by both the DIA and CIA. Blanchard was a colleague of Harry Schultz, a member of Robert MacKenzie’s organisation Freedom Inc, and the letters he traded with Moisés were copied to David Galland, Jack Wheeler and Thomas Schaff. David Galland is

70 “Mozambique: What is the MNR?”, pp5-6; “Another MNR Spokesman Turns Himself In”, Mozambiquefile, No 149, December 1988, pp4-5; Vines, RENAMO, pp39-41, 68; Oliveira, Os Domos, pp73-74, 80.
a former US Military Intelligence operative, while Jack Wheeler is a conservative commentator and activist who claimed to have made contact with Renamo on behalf of the CIA in 1985. Schaff was Renamo’s main contact in the United States and had worked with the organisation since 1979. Various sources also suggested that Schaff was working on behalf of the CIA in opposition to South African Military Intelligence, and that he had organised an independent communications network to Renamo through Malawi, with a transmitter based within Mozambique at Chire, Zambézia. The Australian missionary Ian Grey also later admitted to assisting Schaff pass messages into Mozambique. Schaff maintained good relations with the British company Lonrho, which had attempted to deal with Renamo since the early 1980s and in whose commercial interest it was to rapidly bring peace in Mozambique. SNASP agents Ataíde and Lopes collaborated with this network to form an alternative supply-line to that controlled by maximalists in South Africa. Ataíde also maintained close contacts with US embassy staff and was reported to have connections to the American anti-communist lobbyist General John Singlaub. The functioning of SNASP operatives as double agents within the CIA is not without precedent, the white Mozambican Air Force Officer Carneiro Gonçalves having infiltrated a CIA network in Maputo during 1981, exposing the head of personnel in the Mozambican Foreign Ministry, José Massinga, and six US citizens as spies. Schaff, working on behalf of the CIA, might thus be seen as a minimalist within Renamo’s US support network who was having some success in creating an alternative support network for Renamo. Meanwhile, maximalist supporters in the US were losing strength, especially in their efforts to lobby the Reagan administration. The exposure of US support for the Contras in Nicaragua had damaged the pro-Renamo lobby in the US, and although a bloc of US senators did have minor success in blocking the appointment of State Department candidate Melissa Wells as Ambassador to Mozambique, by late 1987 many of Renamo’s most powerful advocates on the National Security council had left the administration.


75 Fauvet and Mosse, Carlos Cardoso, p80.

Chissano Purges the Military

By mid-1987 the lobbying of black nationalist war veterans and the continuing pro-negotiation SNASP operations within Renamo were threatening to upset the equilibrium that President Chissano had established between free market, pro-statist and war profiteering factions within his administration. With threats of defection from war veterans if the President did not waver from his no-negotiation stance, Chissano made a firm move to purge opposition from the armed forces from 20 June, only days after the South African Monitoring Report had identified discontent amongst the military hierarchy. In the restructure most of the provincial military commanders were replaced and 122 officers, mostly veterans of the war against Portugal, were retired. There were also changes in the military’s upper echelons. Machel-loyalist Colonel-General Mabote, though still technically Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, had been training in Cuba since late 1986 while Lieutenant-General Armando Panguene was acting in his position. In Chissano’s reshuffle of the military hierarchy Mabote was replaced by the former Chief of the Air Force and close Chissano ally Lieutenant-General Antonio Hama Thai, who also took the position of Deputy Minister of Defence (Panguene remained in control of the armed forces within the Poliburo). Thai had distinguished himself in the recent offensive against Renamo in Zambézia. Major-General Tobías Dai was given a deputy position to Thai in the new position of Commander of the Armed Forces, while Manuel Gimo Caetano was promoted to Commander of the Navy; Major-General Domingos Dondo became Commander of the Frontier Guards; and Colonel João Bernado Honwana became Commander of the air force. The reshuffle seems to have addressed concerns of the Zimbabwean military leadership, but also served to purge pro-negotiation Machel-loyalists and black nationalist elements, in a continuation of the political restructuring that had followed Machel’s death. Publicly Chissano maintained that the streamlining of the armed forces aimed to increase their efficiency and that the concept had originally been approved under Machel’s leadership in mid-1986. Superficially this was probably true, though the plan was implemented with a different political agenda.

Meanwhile, during May 1987 some counter-insurgency activities continued in the country’s north, where Renamo remained active in north-west Zambézia, north-east Tete, Central Niassa, Nampula and northern Sofala. In the first week of May government forces captured Renamo’s main northern base in the Morrumbala district of Zambézia on the
Malawian border, which had the capacity to accommodate up to 5,000 fighters. This offensive seems to have been led by British-trained commandos. Further north recently contributed troops and rail workers from Malawi came under attack from 100 Renamo fighters at Matema on the Nacala railway. In Mozambique’s south the Indian navy maintained a small presence in Mozambican waters to discourage resupply of Renamo by sea. This was not completely effective, however, as during May and June up to 1,000 Renamo fighters infiltrated into Gaza province to join forces already present, some travelling across northern Maputo province after crossing the border near Mapulanguene and Macaene, while others were landed by sea along the Gaza coastline. These guerrillas conducted actions in the important agricultural region around Chokwe, Guuia and Chibuto in the Limpopo River valley, resulting in heavy fighting in the first weeks of June. The FPLM launched some effective operations against Renamo forces throughout Mozambique’s southern provinces during that time. One prominent rebel attack during that period was the ambush of a 20-vehicle convoy north of Inharrime, in southern Inhambane, in which eighteen people were killed. The obvious South African support for the offensive renewed strains on Mozambique-South African relations, as did a raid by South African commandos on 30 May, which attacked ANC offices and houses in Maputo after the ANC claimed responsibility for a car bomb in Johannesburg.

The Homoíne Massacre

In July 1987 the increased intensity of Renamo campaign in southern Mozambique led to what is often called the worst atrocity of the Mozambican Civil War. At 5.45 am on 18 July a heavily-armed contingent of several hundred Renamo fighters stormed the small town of Homoíne in southern Inhambane, looting and engaging in a slaughter the eventual death toll of which stood at 424, including 44 children. Survivors claimed many of the

attackers were poorly dressed and carrying adornments connected with witchcraft, while
their leaders wore new uniforms and boots, and spoke the N’dau dialect. Officials noted
that those troops might have been rearmed in a South African supply drop near Vilanculos
on 8 May, the parachutes used in the drop having been recovered in late June. The attack
itself may have been provoked by an FPLM victory two days earlier in which Renamo
fighters had been forced to abandon a large camp at Nhangele, south of Homoíne.82 Alex
Vines has suggested that Renamo’s feared commandos the *Grupa Limpa* may have
themselves been involved in the massacres, due to the contingent’s size, discipline and
firepower. Whether this was the case or not, such a large attack must have involved co-
ordination from a higher level of authority and was thus a planned atrocity.83 The
immediate uproar caused by the Homoíne massacre helped cement Renamo’s international
image as brutal and ruthless, and would foil any chances of the organisation gaining the
official support of western governments. It would also set the stage for the important 1988
Gersony report for the US State Department, which blamed Renamo for 95% of civilian
abuses in Mozambique, including the murder of up to 100,000 civilians. Renamo denied
responsibility for the massacre and attempted to argue a scenario in which FPLM troops
and militiamen had committed the massacre following a breakdown of discipline amongst
government forces in the province. A number of pro-Renamo journalists also published
reports stating that Frelimo had planted evidence of rebel involvement at the scene.84
These claims remain unconvincing. Though it is true indiscipline was rife in the FPLM, and
civilians could often have trouble distinguishing roving bands of Renamo and FPLM
soldiers, the involvement of such large numbers of government forces in such a large-scale
massacre, in their own province, could not have been covered up. In addition, Mark Van
Koerering, a Christian Aid worker who witnessed the Homoíne attack later testified that,

Some of you may be asking how I am so certain that the attack was from [Renamo]. I am
relying on three pieces of evidence. First, the soldiers who attacked Homoíne were much better
equipped than government troops in the area and they spoke a northern dialect not common to

82 “MNR Parachutes Found”, *Herald*, 30 June 1987; “Bloodbath at Homoíne”, pp1-3; “MNR Massacres
Massacre- An Eyewitness Talks”, *Herald*, 25 July 1987; “Film Makers Record Homoíne”, *Herald*, 28
July 1987; “US Citizen Testifies to MNR Terror”, *Mozambique Information Office News Review*, No 110,
30 July 1987; “Massacre Toll”, *Herald*, 13 August 1987; Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, *Frontline
83 Vines, RENAMO, p85.
84 Fauvet, “Pretoria’s MNR Surrogates Massacre 386 Civilians”, p14; “Mozambique: Renamo Denies
Homoine; second, government troops and militia defended the town against attack and thirdly, people of the area had no doubt about the source of the attack.  

For Renamo southern Mozambique was designated to be what Gersony later termed a ‘destruction zone’. As the southern population was and still is predominantly pro-Frelimo, Renamo forces had little chance of establishing ‘liberated zones’ in which locals would willingly co-operate with rebel forces. Thus their strategy in the south was mainly to make ordinary existence impossible by destroying social and economic infrastructure. The massacre was also clearly within the scope of Renamo’s normal pattern of behaviour. As recorded elsewhere in this work Renamo forces regularly conducted attacks on civilian settlements and traffic in which dozens of people were killed, Homoine only differing in its scale. Renamo would demonstrate that such mass murder was still a standard part of their military strategy by conducting a number of other brutal attacks on civilians throughout 1987. These included the massacres of: 92 inhabitants of Manjacaze, southern Gaza, on 10 August; 28 civilians at a Methodist mission in Camine, Inhambane, and 25 peasants at a communal village at Michafutene, 20 kilometres north of Maputo, in September; and two ambushes on convoys at Taninga, Maputo province, in which 53 people were killed on 16 October, and 278 people were killed and 80 vehicles destroyed on 29 October. Up to 300 Renamo fighters were involved in the latter example of this nihilistic destruction.  

In the wake of the Homoine massacre Renamo’s international image was substantially damaged and the Frelimo government gained widespread sympathy. The incident put an end to the hope of many of Renamo’s American supporters that their government would ever officially support the group, stifling the activities of pro-Renamo politicians and making the aim of negotiations the dominant strategy promoted by CIA-backed minimalists within the US office. President Chissano pragmatically embraced this opportunity for diplomatic advancement. The massacre was almost certainly the key catalyst for the revival of Mozambican-South African diplomatic talks in August 1987, for the first time since Samora Machel’s death. A meeting in Cape Town on 6 August and

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86 Austin, Invisible Crimes, p9.
subsequent press releases indicated that both sides would attempt to reinvigorate the Nkomati Agreement and establish a ‘joint liaison committee’ to discuss any issues that arose. This gesture by South Africa probably indicates that minimalist forces within the Apartheid administration increased their influence because of Homoïne’s negative diplomatic effects. The presence of police and military representatives at the meetings convinced some observers, perhaps too optimistically, that South African maximalists had now been brought under control. Meanwhile, Chissano cleverly distanced himself from the process by leaving Machel-loyalist Jacinto Veloso as Minister for Co-operation and thus the main negotiator. South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha noted at the time that Chissano “[did] not want [South Africa] to be seen as too close to him”. Though these talks may be seen as a victory for pro-negotiation forces within South Africa, a Department of Foreign Affairs document from late August reminds us that the minimalist position was not a benevolent one, but merely advocated the tactical use of force in combination with economic and diplomatic measures, rather than total destabilisation. According to the document the department’s goal was to draw Mozambique into regional co-operation in order to promote South Africa’s interests. Foreign Affairs would work towards “conciliation between RENAMO and FRELIMO with involvement in order to bring about the end of the civil war and to ensure a sympathetic government”. Some of Mozambique’s infrastructure could be improved, though only with consideration of South Africa’s long-term interests, and with the aim of increasing Mozambican dependency on South African goods and services. Thus the department sought to,

decrease the efficiency of the Beira corridor, and any other alternative transport routes to those of [South Africa], with the exception of the route between [South Africa] and Maputo and the Salima/Nacala line…”

92 “Om Mosambiek se afhanklikheid van RSA goedere en dienste, insluitend die infrastruktuur, te verhoog met inagmennig van die RSA se langtermyn belange”. “Departement Buitelandse Sake: Strategie Insake Mosambiek”, p5.
93 “Om die doeltreffendheid van die Beira korridor, en enige ander alternatiewe vervoerroetes tot die van die RSA, met die uitsondering van die roete tussen die RSA en Maputo en van die Salima/Nacala lyn…”. “Departement Buitelandse Sake: Strategie Insake Mosambiek”, p7.
And in terms of security issues they would, “after thorough consultation with all members of the security community decided whether it is in the interest of [South Africa], to provide support for pro-western groups in Mozambique”.

By mid-1987 Chissano had thus solidified his position in the Mozambican leadership, scored massive military and political victories over Renamo, and accelerated the process of détente with South Africa and the West. Renamo had been defeated in Zambézia and had resorted to a politically disastrous strategy of massacres in Mozambique’s south, while South Africa had recommenced diplomatic talks with the aim of ending the Mozambican conflict. However, Chissano’s control of Frelimo’s various factions remained dependent on his precarious strategy of rapprochement without peace, and the mounting pressure on Renamo to submit to negotiations endangered this approach. SNASP’s particularly successful penetration of the Renamo leadership was thus becoming increasingly detrimental to Chissano’s aims, a fact that would lead to a number of assassinations in late 1987 and early 1988.

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94 “Om, na deeglike konsultasie tussen alle lede van die veiligheidgemeenskap wat besluit dat dit in belang van die RSA sal wees, steun te lever aan pro-westerse groepe in Mosambiek”. “Departement Buitelandse Sake: Strategie Insake Mosambiek”, p11.
Chapter 10: Three Deaths to Prevent Peace.

While Renamo continued their campaign of atrocities in late 1987, pressure from their supporters and Mozambique’s growing relationship with the West was creating an atmosphere conducive to peace talks. This remained the aim of Mozambican intelligence operatives who had penetrated Renamo during Samora Machel’s presidency, but was detrimental to President Chissano’s strategy of placating anti-negotiation elements within his own government. Chissano also discerned that Frelimo’s position would continue to strengthen as long as peace was delayed. The result was the assassinations of SNASP agents Mateus Lopes and João Ataíde in November 1987, and of high-ranking Renamo official Evo Fernandes in April 1988. Though it has been suggested that these Renamo figures were killed as part of factional conflict within the organisation, Malawi’s relationship with Mozambique will be examined in some detail to argue this was not the case for Lopes and Ataíde, as will the circumstances of Fernandes’ death.

Combat in Late 1987

Although the Homoíne Massacre had damaged Renamo’s international image and led to a rebuilding of diplomatic relations between Mozambique and South Africa, massive Renamo infiltration into southern Mozambique continued in late 1987, seemingly from bases in South Africa’s Transvaal province. From mid to late 1987 up to 2,000 Renamo fighters moved into Gaza and Inhambane province, causing a marked deterioration in the security situation. In August combat remained especially heavy around the important food production areas of Chokwe and Xilembene, and in the Chidenguene zone in southern Gaza. Renamo also attacked the Maputo-Komatipoort railway line a number of times in late August killing two engine drivers and several miners. The FPLM claimed to have killed 100 guerrillas during this period. Meanwhile in the country’s north Renamo claimed to have killed an equivalent number of Mozambican and Zimbabwean troops when they repulsed a government attack on their Gorongosa base, and more than 100 Mozambican and Tanzanian troops in separate attacks Lapala in Nampula and Mecula in north-east


Attacks in the north may have been aided by the recommencement of supply shipments to Renamo via the Comoros Islands. In August 1987 Renamo also undertook their first assault on military targets in Zimbabwe when a force of 50 guerrillas attacked Zimbabwean soldiers at a tea estate close to the border in south-east Zimbabwe, killing five. Renamo had always operated across the Zimbabwean border, intimidating locals, poaching from the Gonarezhou National Park, and attempting to abduct Mozambican refugees, though from May 1987 Renamo began to strike into Zimbabwe in an attempt to divert their military resources from Mozambique. Renamo then declared war against Zimbabwe on 20 June 1987, attacking a village near Rushinga and killing eleven Zimbabwean civilians. Seven Zimbabwean citizens abducted during the operation were later killed inside Mozambique. Following this Renamo widened their campaign in Zimbabwe, causing up to 450 deaths in attacks on tea estates, schools, health clinics, shops, farms and peasant communities.

While Renamo’s campaign continued and even intensified in its indiscriminate killing in late 1987, the massacres at Manjacaze and Taninga exemplifying this trend, the Frelimo government strengthen its diplomatic ties with the West. During October President Chissano met with representatives of the Reagan Administration, who voiced their willingness to help broker peace in Mozambique, while most other western governments (including Britain, France and West Germany) were already professing their support for the Frelimo government. This may have been influenced in part by the Mozambican assembly’s drafting of a new constitution that would separate the Frelimo party from the state and open the way for democratic elections. Meanwhile, despair within Renamo at Frelimo’s success seems to have aggravated divisions, and on 28 October led Paulo Oliveira to announce he and four other members were forming a separate

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information office in Lisbon.\(^6\) From this position of diplomatic strength President Chissano continued to deny his willingness to negotiate with Renamo, a stance that may have been strengthened by fresh victories against rebel forces in northern Zambézia; in Maputo province near the Swaziland border; and in Inhambane, where 200 Renamo fighters had been captured over a number of weeks near Jangamo, Panda, Homoíne and Funhalouro in the province’s south.\(^7\) Though Renamo activities did continue, with six civilians killed when a goods-train hit a landmine north-west of Maputo, and fourteen killed in an attack on Mucodza, fifteen kilometres from the town of Gorongosa in Sofala. Rebel fighters also attacked the town of Lionda, near Chokwe in southern Gaza, on 17 November, though ended with defeat when the starving guerrillas clamoured to eat captured provisions rather than defending against an FPLM counter-attack. This kind of desperation amongst Renamo’s fighters may have been a factor in the increasing frequency of their atrocities, which in late November included the massacre of 71 civilians and the destruction of 32 vehicles in the ambush of a convoy at Maluana, north of Maputo.\(^8\)

### The Deaths of Mateus Lopes and João Ataíde

Mateus Lopes and João Ataíde, SNASP infiltrators within Renamo, were assassinated while travelling through Malawi on 30 November 1987. Malawian officials claimed that they had been involved in a car accident in which they had “collided with a petrol tanker”, though most commentators believed that the two were murdered and their car bulldozed and burnt to simulate an accident. It seems that when Lopes and Ataíde were killed they had just attended a meeting inside Mozambique and were carrying orders from Renamo President Dhlakama for the reorganization of Renamo’s external operations. It has variously been said that these orders were for Ataíde’s appointment as head of Renamo’s Paris office, that they contained instructions for reform in Renamo’s Lisbon office, or that Dhlakama had just promoted Ataíde to the position of Secretary-General within the organisation. In any of these cases the directives that Lopes and Ataíde carried would

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strengthen the hand of Renamo’s moderate and CIA-backed pro-negotiation wing. This has led a number of observers to speculate that Lopes and Ataíde were killed by South African Military Intelligence (DMI) to maintain a South African monopoly over Renamo’s support channels, in the same way that Secretary-General Orlando Cristina had been killed in 1983 to prevent the CIA from gaining influence. However, João Cabrita situates the assassination within the context of President Chissano’s no-negotiation stance towards Renamo and blames the Frelimo government for the killings, saying that,

Chissano’s military option was also reflected in external operations conducted by the Mozambican security services. The assassinations of Renamo officials João Ataíde and Mateus Lopes while in transit through Malawi in November 1987, and of former Renamo Secretary General Evo Fernandes in Portugal in April 1988 were examples of that. As it is apparent from the elaborate nature of the deaths and the subsequent cover-up that Malawian authorities were probably involved in the assassination, in collaboration with other parties, it is necessary to understand the complexities of Malawi’s interaction with Renamo if the instigators of the killings are to be determined.

**Malawi and Frelimo**

The post-independence Malawian government was always on good terms with southern Africa’s white regimes, having established relations with them during the process of decolonisation. During Nyasaland’s constitutional transition to independence the long-time Nyasaland African Congress member Hastings Kamuzu Banda had been brought back from overseas to lead the new Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in 1958. He rapidly consolidated his personal power over the party apparatus and subsequently becoming the national leader following the MCP’s victory in the 1961 general elections. In the same year Portuguese authorities first made contact with President Banda through Jorge Jardim to discuss the economic benefits of collaboration. Prior to Malawi’s independence Banda had also signalled his willingness to deal with the South African government. After independence on 6 July 1964 the authoritarian nature of Banda’s regime quickly became apparent as the President forced a number of dissident ministers into exile and embedded his personal power through changes to Malawi’s constitution in October 1965. Banda also demonstrated that he was no ally of southern Africa’s liberation movements by imposing

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tight restrictions on Frelimo activities within the country. From 1965 the Portuguese secret
services used Malawi as a base for operations against Frelimo and co-operated with South
African agents in the training of Malawi’s police, army, special branch and the pro-
government paramilitary force the Malawi Young Pioneers.\textsuperscript{11} The Malawi Young Pioneers
ensured that villagers bought MCP membership cards, attended political meetings and paid
taxes. Defiant villagers would be intimidated by the Pioneers, who were, “notorious for
their readiness to use violence”.\textsuperscript{12} One aspect of this relationship that later featured
prominently in theories explaining Malawian support for Renamo was that during the
1960s the Portuguese seem to have promised Banda territory in Mozambique’s
underdeveloped north, then Malawian foreign minister Kanyama Chiume claiming in his
autobiography that,

both Salazar and the Portuguese settlers convinced Banda that they would give him the
northern portion of Mozambique in return for not allowing freedom fighters to pass through
Malawi and for the recognition of Mozambique’s Independence after the death of Salazar.\textsuperscript{13}

Malawi and South Africa formalised diplomatic relations in 1967 and subsequently held
more than 20 high-level government meetings between 1967 and 1976. South Africa gave
financial assistance to Malawi in the form of soft loans for the construction of the new
Malawian capital, Lilongwe, and the Nacala railway through northern Mozambique. They
also lent millions of rand directly to President Banda’s personal company Press Holdings
Ltd which, together with its sister company the Agricultural Development and Marketing
Corporation (Admarc) controlled Malawi’s banks, most agricultural estates, and apparently
most ‘private’ companies. Through these companies Banda owned up to half of Malawi’s

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Thus South Africa had developed significant influence with President Banda and lasting contacts with Malawi’s security services. Though the Malawian government had opposed Frelimo’s war of liberation, and remained highly suspicious of the Mozambican government after independence, President Banda’s essentially pragmatic approach to regional affairs helped lead to rapprochement between the two nations. In the late 1970s representatives Joaquim Chissano and Malawian Reserve Bank governor and political powerbroker John Tembo, met on a number of occasions to voice grievances and investigate potential avenues for co-operation. Frelimo’s criticism of the Malawian government generally focused on their attitude and actions towards Frelimo in the pre-independence period, their collaboration with South Africa, and contact between Malawi and anti-Frelimo groups such as FUMO, the PRM and Renamo. Malawian representatives were in turn very concerned that Malawians were training in Mozambique for attacks on Malawi in organisations such as the Malawian Young Pioneers during 1976, while one South African document reports that in 1977 a ‘circle of friends’ from South Africa donated R18,000 to the paramilitary group. Other documents note that dialogue with Banda in 1977 indicated that he was opposed to communism and would oppose sanctions against South Africa, though Malawi’s relationship with South Africa was based on pragmatic access to trade, aid, and research projects. In 1977 and 1978 there was also some discussion of training Malawian Young Pioneers at South African facilities in Namibia’s (then South-West Africa’s) Caprivi Strip. “Versoek om Geldelike Bystand: Malawi Young Pioneers”, 13 August 1976, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/158/3, p2; “Bydrae tot Jeugweek Projekte”, to South Africa Ambassador to Malawi C.A. Bastiaanse, Lilongwe, 2 February 1977, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 7/158/3; Letter, 10 March 1977, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/158/3; Telegram from the South African Ambassador to Malawi to the South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 26 March 1977, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/158/3, pp1-2; “Beplanning van ’n Jeugbeweging/Naskoolse Jeugaksie in Caprivi: Voorgesteld toer na Malawi”, from the South African Secretary of Bantu Administration and Development, 13 July 1977, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/158/3; “Beplanning van ’n Jeugbeweging/Naskoolse Jeugaksie in Caprivi: Voorgesteld toer na Malawi”, from the South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the South African Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, 27 July 1977, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/158/3; “Beplanning van ’n Jeugbeweging/Naskoolse Jeugaksie in Caprivi: Malawi Young Pioneers”, from South African Ambassador to Malawi Bastiaanse to the South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 7 February 1978, South African Foreign Affairs Archive, file 1/158/3; Document on relations with Malawi, 1977-78, p3.

In one Malawian Department of External Affairs document from 1976 the Secretary for External Affairs Joe Kachingwe wrote that, “it is an open secret that Tanzanian troops are still in Lourenco Marques… [and that] Diplomatic opinion… was that the present Government in Mozambique is a puppet of Tanzania”. It was thought that after winning in Rhodesia, “efforts will be made to try and change the existing Governments in Malawi and Zambia. Which Nyerere and Machel regard as reactionary, and help install socialist regimes (sic)”. The creation of a socialist Zimbabwe’s “immediate effect will be to encircle Malawi and Zambia”, and they might try to make Malawi “bleed economically”. Kachingwe suggested that Malawi could challenge Tanzanian plans of encirclement through diplomatic relations with Mozambique, isolating Mozambique, or by counter-encircling Tanzania. “The Situation in Mozambique”, from the Malawian Secretary for External Affairs Joe Kachingwe to all Heads of Mission, Malawian National Archive, 27 February 1976, Malawi National Archive file EA/10/6/25, pp1-9.
Socialist League of Malawi (LESOMA), the Malawian Freedom Movement (MAFREMO) and the Congress for the Second Republic. Meetings in 1978 and 1979 also made some progress towards co-operation between the countries, focusing on: increasing the flow of oil to Malawi by rail from Beira and Nacala; rehabilitating the Nacala railway line; the building of a new Petromoc oil refinery at Nacala; developing a connection to the Tazara rail system through Tanzania and Zambia; and the creation of a joint commission to prevent “sinister activities, such as espionage”. Meanwhile, from 1978 Malawi was entering an economic crisis, due to internal mismanagement and global economic changes, which was later compounded by the loss of sanctions-breaking earnings from Rhodesia with the advent of majority rule in Zimbabwe. The sense of crisis only heightened the paranoid atmosphere in Malawi and many opponents of the regime were accused of plotting the overthrow of President Banda, with a number sentenced to death. During 1980 Banda’s increasing paranoia had led to the replacement of a series of public figures, as well as the leaders of the armed forces and the Malawi Young Pioneers.


discourage co-operation with its neighbours and participation in the 1980 Southern African Development Community Conference (SADCC), South African Foreign Affairs documents from the time recognised that Malawi intended to remain in South Africa’s orbit and that their participation in SADCC must be understood in the context of their dependence on their neighbours’ transport routes. Rather than attempting to exert leverage on Malawi from the fuel crisis, when approached for assistance by Malawian representatives in late 1979 South African Foreign Affairs documents demonstrate that minimalists in the Apartheid government did all they could to placate President Banda, assuring him that the problems had resulted from anti-Frelimo activity and not actions directed at Malawi. Oil tankers from Johannesburg were arranged to provide emergency fuel by road, while an airlift was organised with West German financial assistance. Repair of the Beira railway was also discussed. The crisis led to internal discussions in South Africa that expressed concern about the potential effects of Renamo attacks on the Nacala railway and noted that Renamo contacts should be warned that attacks on the Nacala line might disrupt South Africa-Malawi trade.

Malawi and the Mozambican Civil War

While the Mozambican government had remained suspicious of Malawian connections to anti-Frelimo groups after independence, serious speculation about Malawian support for Renamo only began in early 1982 after the destruction of Renamo’s base at Garagua. A few months later Renamo merged with Gimo Phiri’s Malawi-based PRM and began operations in Zambézia and Tete provinces, their targets including the Beira-Malawi railway and the Tete-Malawi road, which were both important Malawian trade


arteries. In considering theories of why Renamo may have received support from within Malawi it is important to understand that from the beginning Renamo’s operations had a similar effect as South Africa’s commando actions of the late 1970s: inflicting serious damage on the Malawian economy. Malawi’s economy was highly dependent on importing fertiliser, fuel and spare parts, and exporting tea and tobacco, the expensive alternative to transit through Mozambique being a 3,000 kilometre road route through Zambia. Though the Nacala railway remained open, its poor condition placed heavy limitations on traffic. Thus, due to Renamo actions by October 1982 Malawi was reliant on 8,500 tonnes of fertiliser being transported on road and rail routes through Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia to fulfil its needs. In turn economic crisis began to create discontent amongst the peasant population, perhaps the greatest fear of Banda’s paranoid regime. The obviously detrimental effects of Renamo’s activities on Malawi led some sources to speculate that they were a warning to Banda’s government not to get too close to SADCC. The negative impact of the Mozambican Civil War on Malawi continued throughout the 1980s, with the estimated costs incurred due to Renamo’s disruption of Mozambique’s transport corridors ranging from US$60 million to US$140 million annually, more than one third of Malawi’s export earnings. In addition the influx of Mozambican refugees into Malawi from the mid-1980s, reaching almost one million displaced persons by the war’s end, placed an extra burden on the already poor country and led to an increase in internal discontent.

The key effects of the Mozambican Civil War on Malawi were significant harm to the economy and a corresponding increase in political instability. Considering that President Banda had a massive personal stake in Malawi’s economy and that the greatest fear of Banda’s paranoid regime was internal unrest, the overwhelmingly negative impact of

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Renamo’s actions on the country strikes a blow at theories that President Banda supported Renamo because he wanted to. These theories are primarily that he did so because he dreamt of claiming the northern sections of Mozambique promised to him by the Portuguese, in a strange attempt to return to borders reminiscent of the Maravi Empire; or that Banda thought that it was impossible to peacefully co-exist with Malawi’s communist neighbour due to the inevitability that Mozambique would support his overthrow by subversives, and thus he sought to replace the Frelimo regime.\textsuperscript{24} The lack of any evidence and the immutable-border stance held by the Organisation of African Unity cast doubt on the first theory, while the continuing efforts of the two countries to work for their mutual benefit are also a blow to the second. An example of that co-operation being that, despite tensions over the war, Malawian documents reveal how by October 1984 relations had warmed to the point that Malawi was suggesting: co-operation of their Central Banks; co-operation in customs matters; trade co-operation and industrial development; joint tourism promotion; joint disease research; joint training of agricultural personnel and agricultural research; and collaboration in areas as diverse as natural resource development, education, health, community services, sports, cultural matters, and transport issues. President Machel thus visited Malawi from 19-23 October 1984 to sign an agreement of co-operation; hardly indicative of two nations that consider their differences irreconcilable.\textsuperscript{25}


A third theory of why Malawi may have supported Renamo is that South Africa was threatening them with a campaign of destabilisation similar to that being suffered by Mozambique. This argument is initially weakened by the fact that the effect of Renamo’s war was already creating such massive problems for the small nation that the threat would be almost redundant, thus President Banda asking in reply to Mozambican accusations, “Can the Malawi government really be said to be supporting and encouraging its own destabilisation?” In addition, documents from the South African Department of Foreign Affairs not only contain no evidence that South Africa was forcing the Malawian government to support Renamo, but also clearly demonstrate that at least minimalists within the Apartheid regime were doing all they could to assure Malawi that this was not occurring and to ameliorate the negative effects of Renamo’s actions. Foreign Affairs worried that Malawi would be driven away from South Africa, somewhat justifiably as some intelligence from individuals with contacts in the Malawian government’s upper echelons revealed that there was widespread dissatisfaction among senior government officials over the sabotaging of the rail links with Mozambique and the resulting suffering and inconvenience caused to Malawi. They blame South Africa for their plight as story has it we are supporting the [Renamo] guerrillas.

The general feeling of the department was that it would be detrimental to South African interests for Malawi to believe pressure was being applied on them, and all efforts were made through diplomatic and even intelligence connections to assure them this was not the case. It was in South Africa’s interest for Malawi to remain stable, and documents note that Renamo’s activities could damage Banda’s popularity and ability to govern, while radical elements might benefit from any crisis and come to power with an anti-South African platform. South Africa’s western allies also agreed with this assessment and it is recorded that representatives of Britain, France and the United States had already warned South Africa that Malawi’s stability and connection to the west were being undermined. To help
lessen the impact of the crisis South Africa gave Malawi a R4.9 million soft loan to buy fertilizer in December 1982, a second R1.5 million soft loan for construction of a seed storage facility, and technical aid worth R500,000 in 1983-84.\(^2\) Thus, there does not seem to have been any coordinated attempt by South Africa to force Banda’s government to support Renamo, and if there had been the extreme impact of the Mozambican war on Malawi would surely have convinced Banda to act otherwise.

However, the weight of evidence from various reports, eyewitness testimony, the confessions of Renamo prisoners, and the sheer geographical logic of Renamo’s campaign in northern Mozambique makes it undeniable that Renamo must not only have operated from Malawian territory, but at some level had co-operation from the country’s authorities. Even Cabrita, who argues that Renamo forces did not use Malawian territory, admits,

Renamo officials, foreign correspondents and an array of other individuals enjoyed transit facilities in Malawi whenever they wanted to visit the guerrillas’ territory in Mozambique…. [and that] South African Air Force planes are known to have flown from Malawi to drop logistical supplies over Renamo bases in northern Mozambique.\(^3\)

This seems contradictory if it is believed that Banda maintained total political authority in Malawi, and as reporter David Ward asserted that “nothing of note happens in Malawi without the knowledge or participation of Dr Banda”.\(^3\) However, an *Economist* article from September 1982, based around a secret Renamo document, reported that “President Banda is said to be unaware of what is going on”, while southern Africa analysts Phyllis Johnson

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\(^3\) Cabrita, *Mozambique*, p239. A South African Department of Foreign Affairs document from January 1983 notes that although Malawi’s armed forces were very loyal to Banda, their weak logistical system and lack of sophisticated weaponry, combined with the terrain, distances and low population in the border region hampered their ability to control the frontier. This affords Renamo the opportunity to operate from Malawi territory. “Dit blyk dat die Malawiese weermag nie in staat is om effektiewe grensbeheer toe te pas nie wat dus tog aan die RNM die geleentheid bied om vanaf Malawiese grondgebied te opeereer”. “Inligtingsverslag: Malawi”, 18 January 1983, pp2-3.

and David Martin noted in the mid-1980s that some Mozambican officials thought the Malawian security services were aiding Renamo without Banda’s knowledge”. Indeed, upon closer inspection it becomes clear that under the surface of Malawian politics various factions were acting independently in preparation for the succession struggle that would follow the death of the elderly President. As early as March 1980 South African Foreign Affairs documents were advising that,

> [South Africa] should perhaps be careful of getting too involved in the military field in Malawi at this stage. There were signs that President Banda was losing his grip and that there was a jockeying for position for the succession.

By December 1982 the expectation was that President Banda would not live much longer, and thus the South African embassy in Lilongwe compiled a document entitled “Malawi after the Demise of Banda”. According to the document though Banda was in good health, estimates of his age were between 78 and 84 years old. Possible candidates for the Presidency after his death included John Tembo, Governor of the Reserve Bank; Dick Matenje, Secretary-General of the Malawi Congress Party; Miss C Kadzamira, Official Government Hostess and niece of John Tembo; and Tim Mangwaza, Ambassador to South Africa, amongst others. Tembo was considered an especially strong candidate, and he personally assured the South African Ambassador that there would not be a change in Malawi’s attitude to South Africa after Banda’s death. However, the true intensity of the internal power struggle in Malawi only became clear in mid-1983, also demonstrating that the President was losing his grip on power. In May 1983 a group of government ministers who rivalled John Tembo for the succession, Dick Matenje, Aaron Gadama, J. Twaibu Sangala and David Chiwanga, were killed in what appeared to be a car crash. Popular consensus was that the four ministers were murdered: “cold-bloodedly killed to remove any competition for Ms Kadzamira and Mr Tembo, if the presidency would become available”. An elaborate story was released to explain why the four political enemies were found in the same car, but South African sources concluded that Tembo probably had

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33 Joseph Hanlon suggests this briefly in Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, p241.
them murdered. In addition to those ministers killed in the car crash reports were that fifteen other people disappeared following their deaths, including Matenje’s younger brother, and Tembo rivals Chirwa, Bwanali and Demba. In 1995, following the advent of multi-party democracy in Malawi, the thirteen-member Mwanza Commission chaired by Justice Mtegha eventually found that the ministers were clubbed to death before being put into the car and pushed into a ravine. John Tembo and three former top police officials were implicated in the murders.37

Thus, in considering Renamo’s relationship with Malawi it is plausible that elements within the government were providing support to the rebels without the authorisation of President Banda and the hierarchy of the Malawi Congress Party. In fact, it seems much more probable, as Vines suggests, that support for Renamo came from John Tembo, who had less reason to fear the damage that Mozambique’s war was inflicting on Malawi’s economy and internal stability, and was trying to “strengthen his hand by wooing support from Renamo groups as a ‘third force’ to improve his position in the event of some type of armed struggle over the Presidentship”.38 Tembo’s main support base was thought to have been within the Malawi Young Pioneers as well as in the police force, headed by Inspector-General Mac Kamwana, which operated its own paramilitary Police Mobile Force and the feared Special Branch.39 This corresponds with the claim of a former South African Reconnaissance Commando member that Orlando Cristina first made contact with Malawian elements through the police force and that Renamo’s relationship with Malawi remained within that well-defined channel; and Cabrita’s assertion that, “Liaison between Renamo and Malawi was through that country’s police force, not the Armed Forces”.40 Further weight was added to this theory when up to 4,000 Malawi Young Pioneers, who violently resisted the army’s attempts to demobilise them after the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1993, fled into Mozambique and sought refuge at Renamo camps in Tete, Sofala and Zambézia provinces. Meanwhile, ‘Renamo-style’ uniforms were found

38 Vines, RENAMO, p57.
40 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal; Cabrita, Mozambique, p239.
stored at a Pioneers base in Lilongwe. However, while Tembo could undoubtedly call upon a strong support network in the event of a succession struggle he remained opposed by the military, whose leaders Armed Forces Chief Major-General Melvin Maluda Khanga, Deputy Commander Major-General Yohane and Head of Military Intelligence Major-General Limbani, remained uncorrupted by involvement in politics and had poor relations with the police. It was also though he might encounter significant resistance within the civil service. This may have motivated his cultivation of an alliance with Renamo and their supporters within the South African government. Tembo did seem to be the most likely candidate to succeed Banda for most of the 1980s, though towards the end of the decade his influence appeared to be declining. Renamo’s connections to Tembo had led to the crisis in which President Machel and his allies had threatened action against Malawi in late 1986, and it may have been a politically savvy move by Banda to appoint Tembo as representative to a high-level border security commission to ease tensions between Mozambique and its neighbour. However, the dedication of Malawian troops to protecting the Nacala railway that resulted from this commission would not have displeased Tembo, as it removed a not insignificant portion of his rivals’ forces from the


42 “Malawi Playing with Fire”, pp 3-5.

country and exposed them to attack by Renamo.\textsuperscript{44} The army was not pleased by this deployment, and as Tembo’s power continued to wane with the premature retirement of Police Commissioner Kamwana in February 1987 Tembo’s opponents struck out at him with several attempts on his life, the most serious being in October 1986 and on 17 July 1987. This struggle continued to simmer throughout the year, as Armed Forces Chief Khanga appeared to be growing in President Banda’s esteem and was thought to be approaching a position from which he could challenge Tembo.\textsuperscript{45} Banda’s October 1987 comments that the Malawi Congress Party would decide his successor, rather than merely confirming his choice, was also an indication to observers that the Tembo-Kadzamira alliance may have lost his support.\textsuperscript{46}

**Who Killed Lopes and Ataïde?**

It was in this context that Mateus Lopes and João Ataïde were assassinated in Malawi. Though most observers argued that their deaths were organised by South Africa as part of a factional struggle within Renamo, perversely it seems more likely that these SNASP infiltrators were killed on the orders of the Chissano government in order to stall moves towards peace. While it is plausible that South African maximalists had Lopes and Ataïde killed by John Tembo in an attempt to maintain South African dominance over Renamo, the maximalists having previously assassinated Orlando Cristina to achieve the same goal and Tembo having arranged the murder of his rivals in a similar fashion, such an action seems incongruent with the prevailing situation of the time. In 1983 Cristina’s assassination had effectively prevented diversification of Renamo’s support because he was the only connection to the Americans, but since then South Africa had encouraged the creation of multiple sources of assistance and these were so entrenched that the deaths of Lopes and Ataïde alone would not sever them. If Tembo, and presumably South Africa, were aware of American aid to Renamo through Malawi, why was no action taken to cut those links before deciding to assassinate two high-ranking Renamo officials, and why would the maximalists not make use of the leverage that must have accompanied their continued provision of materials and Renamo’s use of South African territory? In addition, at a time at which Renamo was already endangered by internal factionalisation, why would


South Africa conduct an action that would so obviously threaten to inflame factional conflict? On the other hand President Chissano was involved in carefully balancing the interests of factions within Mozambique and had been facing pressure from war veterans to negotiate with Renamo. Chissano initially came to power on the back of Samora Machel’s assassination, which was motivated in part by Machel’s attempts to bring peace to Mozambique, and the President had already purged pro-peace elements from the government and armed forces. However, SNASP agents within Renamo continued to cause Chissano trouble, as they were exceedingly effective at promoting the interests of Renamo’s moderate wing and thus bringing the rebels closer to negotiated peace. Assassination would be an effective means of stopping these rogue agents. At the time SNASP was also active in the region encouraging the UNAMO-Renamo split, and the Mozambican and Malawian militaries had also recently improved relations after the commitment of Malawian troops to duties in northern Mozambique. In addition, some sources claim that Frelimo had already infiltrated the Malawian military and were actively agitating for government change within Malawi’s young officer corps. Meanwhile, Armed Forces Chief Khanga’s military was becoming increasingly willing to challenge Tembo, sometimes violently. In this context they may have been aware that Tembo was strengthened by his connections to Renamo and thus convinced to strike when provided a target by Mozambican sources, in this case Lopes and Ataíde.

**The Death of Evo Fernandes**

The assassination of Mateus Lopes and João Ataíde fits perfectly into the pattern set by the Chissano government of marginalising or eliminating those seeking peace, which continued with the murder of Evo Fernandes in April 1988. Former Renamo Secretary-General Evo Fernandes went missing on 17 April 1988 and his body was found at Malveira da Serra, in the countryside near Lisbon, on 21 April. He had died from a gunshot to the head. Three men were eventually tried for Fernandes’ murder: Alexandre Xavier Chagas and Joaquim de Conceição Messias were both convicted and sentenced to eighteen years and eight and a half years prison respectively, while Manuel Pinto da Costa was cleared of the crime. The court ruled that while the murder was premeditated, it did not involve

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47 Conversation with a former member of the Rhodesian SAS and a SADF Reconnaissance Commando, April 2003, KwaZulu-Natal.
Mozambican intelligence. The number of stories and interpretations surrounding Fernandes’ death has created confusion about the motives for the murder, nevertheless there is much that points towards it being a SNASP operation. Reports of new peace talks had been circulating for a number of weeks before Fernandes’ death. It seems that since the beginning of 1988 Fernandes had been preparing to negotiate a political compromise with the Frelimo government without South African involvement. Fernandes visited Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama at Gorongosa in January, where it is believed he outlined a strategy for peace negotiations. It is unclear whether he aimed to compliment or counterpose approaches to Frelimo by Renamo’s Washington office, but Dhlakama approved of the plan and ordered him to prepare talks. In March 1988 Frelimo’s Polithuro also seems to have made the concession of exploring possibilities for negotiation, though South Africa and Portugal would remain as mediators. Thus it has been reported that Fernandes helped organise high-level talks in the United States during April. Then, two weeks before Fernandes’ death the head of SNASP’s anti-Renamo branch, D-13, was sighted in Lisbon with the two agents Chagas and Messias. During the colonial period Chagas was an informer for the Portuguese PIDE, but at some stage became an ‘unofficial’ SNASP agent. Chagas seems to have been preparing talks with Fernandes and used Lisbon businessman Manuel Sacramento Gaudencio, a friend of Fernandes, to set up a meeting with him. Fernandes then met the two Frelimo envoys for dinner on 17 April, at which it is thought Chagas produced credentials to show his authorisation to negotiate. It seems Fernandes was kidnapped and it is then unclear whether he was immediately executed; tortured and administered the ‘truth drug’ Sodiumpentathol before being killed; or whether an argument developed and he was killed during a fight. Following the discovery of Fernandes’ body Chagas and Messias were arrested in Casablanca en route to Maputo on 29 April, while Pinto, who was thought to have been involved in arranging the meeting and was identified by French Intelligence as being a SNASP agent, was captured in Paris on 30

April.  The story became no clearer after their arrest. Chagas initially confessed to having killed Fernandes on the order of SNASP. *Expresso* revealed that Chagas received a large sum of money from SNASP while in Mozambique and more money once in Portugal, while other sources related that Chagas had maintained contact with the Mozambican embassies in Lisbon and Paris, and received an escape plan from a Mozambican diplomat. The *Tribunal de Instrução Criminal* thus accused Rafael Custódio Marques, third secretary of the Mozambican Embassy in Lisbon, of being the principal instigator of the plot, and implicated Américo Mathewe at the Paris embassy in providing support to the operation. However, Maputo refused to lift Marques’ diplomatic immunity and he was flown home from Lisbon. As diplomatic hostilities escalated Maputo expelled Portuguese Commercial Consul José Marcelino da Silva Pereira and the Portuguese withdrew the normal diplomatic protection from Mozambique’s embassy. Chagas then claimed that his earlier confession implicating Marques was fabricated and that he killed Fernandes without any instructions from Maputo.  

To add further confusion to events, soon after the suspects were arrested Paulo Oliveira claimed that Chagas was actually an anti-Frelimo activist and had previously contacted him wanting to set up a terrorist cell in Maputo. However, since Oliveira was probably himself a SNASP agent, this seems to be a classic case of disinformation designed to discredit testimonies that might implicate the Mozambican intelligence agency. Chagas’ final account of why he killed Evo Fernandes, reported in *Sabado* in July 1989, was that South African secret service agents he met while making shady import-export deals recruited him into Renamo, but that he chose to quit after the spate of Renamo massacres during 1987. He contacted Mozambican intelligence, who arrested the South African agents, and left Maputo for Lisbon “with the knowledge of the authorities”, stealing an amount of South African Intelligence money. Chagas said he was convinced Fernandes was

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an obstacle to peace so he approached him on his own initiative, and shot him after an argument about a recording of a meeting with Renamo spokesman Fonseca.\textsuperscript{55}

The confusion surrounding the death of Evo Fernandes meant that a number of theories circulated regarding his killers. The assumption of most pro-Frelimo commentators was that either South African agents had killed Fernandes because he was trying to reduce their influence on Renamo, or that he was killed as part of a faction fight between Renamo’s Washington and Lisbon offices. This second theory may have also been boosted by the conflict that was erupting between Renamo and UNAMO in Zambézia province around that time.\textsuperscript{56} However, with the conviction of Chagas and Messias it seems clear that these two men, and probably Pinto, had all been involved with SNASP and were carrying out a plot to disrupt the possibility of new peace talks by assassinating Fernandes. Fernandes had been involved negotiations in 1984 and secretly in 1986, and was again attempting to broker peace in Mozambique. Refusing direct talks with Renamo would damage Chissano’s emerging reputation in the West, while accepting might disrupt the factional balance within the Frelimo government and force unacceptable concessions from his government. Therefore Fernandes had to be silenced.\textsuperscript{57} By April 1988 the ‘Renamo Department of Information’ claimed that, “Chissano faces serious opposition from nationalists within his government notably from the military”, which was probably a catalyst for his moves towards negotiations through South Africa.\textsuperscript{58} This included a goodwill message from Chissano to South African President Botha that indicated a meeting might be imminent. However, by choosing to move towards talks through South Africa rather than directly with Renamo the process would be much slower, still deprive Renamo of political recognition, but seem diplomatically pro-active enough to allow progress with a series of deals such as the development of the Cabora Bassa hydroelectricity facilities and Mozambique’s gas reserves.\textsuperscript{59}

Considering that Malawian involvement in the deaths of Mateus Lopes and João Ataide is likely, but Renamo-backer John Tembo was facilitating the moderate support the Renamo that the assassination was designed to hamper, it seems possible that elements within the Malawian military conducted the killings at the behest of the Chissano

\textsuperscript{57} Conversation with a Former Mozambican Intelligence Agent, Maputo, 19 June 2003.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{The Voice of Free Mozambique}, Francisco Nota Moisés, RENAMO Department of Information, No 16, April 1988, p3.
government. This was done to terminate the operations of these agents that were strengthening the influence of moderate elements in Renamo and thus bringing them closer to negotiations. Evo Fernandes’ death at the hands of SNASP operatives followed in April 1988 as he was again manoeuvring within Renamo to bring them into negotiations with the Mozambican government. This again supports the startling conclusion that throughout the 1980s factions within the Frelimo party, including President Chissano, struggled to prevent a negotiated end to the Mozambican Civil War, even killing Mozambican President Samora Machel and Mozambican intelligence agents to achieve their goals. Though by the late 1980s political changes within the region had greatly increased the likelihood of a negotiated end to the conflict, Chissano would continue to block progress at each opportunity.
Chapter 11: The Road to Peace.

January-September 1988

In early 1988 Renamo continued to exert pressure in Mozambique’s south and around the capital, sabotaging powerlines, launching ambushes and assaulting towns. In Maputo province these operations included Renamo attacks on and around Manhiça, Maluana and Pessene to the north of the capital, and Namaacha and Bela Vista to the west and south. Renamo and Frelimo soldiers engaged in significant clashes at Moamba, Mapulangue and Maceno, near the South African border, and at Palmeira. Government and rebel forces also clashed in southern Inhambane province, including near Morrumbene, Pande and Funhalouro. Following the FPLM’s capture of Renamo’s principle base in central Gaza on 24 December 1987, intense battles erupted in early 1988 as a force of 200 Renamo fighters attacked Guuija in the Limpopo river valley during January, massacring 70 civilians; and a joint operation between Mozambican and Zimbabwean forces destroyed three Renamo bases near the Zimbabwean border during March. FPLM reports later claimed that 600 rebels were killed in Gaza during the first half of 1988. Meanwhile, in the central Mozambican provinces of Manica and Sofala, the FPLM reported victories against Renamo near Gondola and Nhamatanda in the Beira corridor, and around Sussendenga to the south of Chimoio, amongst others. They also claimed to have defended the town of Macossa, north-west of Gorongosa, from attack in.


mid-January. Renamo later claimed to have attacked military outposts in the Beira corridor in mid-February, including a Zimbabwean position at Bandula, and to have captured the Pungwe bridge base on the Chimoio-Tete road for a week in mid-March. Reports from captured Renamo fighters and peasants freed from their custody were that supplies had been landed for Renamo on the sparsely inhabited coast between Beira and the Zambezi river in early 1988, and later dropped by South African planes near and at Gorongosa. In the country’s north the FPLM enjoyed successes in Tete provinces, killing more than 100 Renamo fighters while storming four rebel bases in January and February; while Renamo advanced in Niassa province, attacking Mandimba and the naval base at Metangula, near the Malawian border. In Nampula forces clashed around the seaside towns of Angoche, Moma and Mogincual, and Marrupula on the main Nampula-Zambézia road.

Renamo also remained active throughout Zambézia province, attacking Lioma and Gurué in the northeast, and engaging in combat with government forces around Namarroí, Lugela, Mocuba and Pebane in central Zambézia, and Morrumbala near the Malawian border. Then in April and May, combat in Zambézia continued at Nicuadala near Quelimane, as well as around Morrumbala, Mocuba and Milange, while the FPLM also destroyed a major Renamo base at Matenge, Tete province, inflicting heavy losses. Meanwhile, in the second

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week of March 1988 Renamo fighters attacked railway workers 20 kilometres inside Zimbabwe, killing four, leading to speculation that South Africa had directed them to attack Zimbabwean targets; while they also increasingly crossed into Zambia from Tete.\footnote{9 “‘Armed Bandits’ Cross Zimbabwean Border; Kill 4”, \textit{BBC Summary of World Broadcasting}, 18 March 1988; “MNR Zimbabwe Attacks ‘Got South Africa Nod’”, \textit{Herald}, 25 March 1988; “Zambia Captures MNR Bandits”, \textit{Herald}, 29 April 1988.}


From late 1987 the Mozambican government had become unhappy about Red Cross (ICRC) food aid to Renamo territory, which they viewed as covert right-wing support for the rebels. By June 1988 allegations had arisen that government forces were attacking ICRC landing zones to prevent relief supplies, killing civilians in the process. Renamo press releases claimed that up to 220 civilians had been killed by the FPLM while collecting relief supplies at sites in Zambézia, Manica and Sofala during June, and that Mozambican and Zimbabwean paratroopers conducted a scorched earth campaign in
north-western Zambézia. Vines later wrote that in the late 1980s the FPLM perpetrated serious human rights abuses in the country’s north, and that “towns occupied by Renamo were not destroyed exclusively by the rebels; aerial bombing and looting by the government contributed to the damage. Napalm was also occasionally used against Renamo”. During June reports also continued that South African Dakota planes were parachuting supplies into Sofala province. Human Rights Watch later noted that former Renamo soldiers testified to having received training by South African instructors until at least 1988 in both South Africa and Mozambique, and Hamann claims South African documents record that during 1988 Renamo President Dhlakama met SADF members in Malawi and Tete province for discussions. Meanwhile rapprochement continued between South Africa and Mozambique, with the establishment of a joint security commission in July 1988 to focus on developing the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric grid. Mozambique’s continuing shift towards the West, promises not to impose sanctions, and reorganisation within its armed forces probably helped bolster relations with South African minimalists, though elements in the SADF continued to aid Renamo. As an agreement between South Africa, Angola and Cuba at the beginning of the August further raised hopes of major political developments in southern Africa, President Chissano gave his official blessing to independent Catholic peace talks with Renamo. The Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) met with Renamo representatives in Washington D.C. in February 1988, and held further talks in Kenya during the year, as that nation’s President Moi became interested in being a mediator. However, Renamo’s displeasure at being locked out of the peace process between Mozambique and South Africa was displayed through the destruction of 891 Cabora Bassa powerline-pylons in late 1988, perhaps using Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou national park as a rear base and source of water supplies for these attacks. Alternatively,


16 Vines, RENAMO, pp121-122.
South African commandos may have conducted these attacks and Renamo merely claimed responsibility.  

From June 1988 the FPLM’s Soviet-trained Red Berets spearheaded an assault on Renamo forces in Zambézia, backed by 3,000 Tanzanian troops. During June and July they claimed to have killed 350 rebel fighters in the province, their victories included the recapture of Milange in June, which Renamo had effectively held since September 1986, and Gilé in eastern Zambézia on 10 July. 70 Renamo soldiers were killed in the battle and the remainder were believed to have fled into Malawi, leaving Milange decimated. Government forces also placed significant pressure on Renamo forces in the mountains around Namarrói, in central Zambézia. By August Renamo representatives were counter-claiming to have isolated the province capital Quelimane and to have recently killed 49 FPLM soldiers. However, the Frelimo government’s military successes in Zambézia also forced large numbers of Renamo fighters to retreat into Nampula province. There they regrouped and, from their main base between Cunle and Chinga to the east of Nampula city, they made travel outside the provincial capital impossible without armed escort and ensured that the Nacala railway remained closed. Renamo also operated from a secondary base to the north of Nampula city, between Mecuburi and Muetecate, which was also used to launch strikes into Cabo Delgado province. Attacks initiated from this base may have included the destruction of an FPLM convoy between Pemba and Montepuez in southern Cabo Delgado, during June, and an attack on the FPLM’s Mecufi base near the Nampula border on 10 August. Government forces claim their operations killed over 500 Renamo fighters in Nampula during July and August. Meanwhile, Renamo claimed to have launched ‘Operation Tigre’ in Mozambique’s three southern provinces. During July and
August 1988 Renamo forces attacked Chinhanguanini, Namaacha and Boane, to the north, west and south of Maputo city respectively; while particularly large rebel units of between 150 and 400 guerrillas were operational near Xai-Xai in Gaza, and attacked an FPLM base at Morrumbene in Inhambane province, and a sugar refinery at Maragra, Maputo.  

**Rapprochement Continues**

In September 1988 the first meeting of Joaquim Chissano and South African State President P.W. Botha confirmed the improvement of Mozambique-South Africa relations, with Botha restating South Africa’s commitment to the Nkomati Accord and assuring Chissano that he had ordered a stop to all South African support for Renamo. Defence Minister General Malan’s presence at the talks demonstrated some acquiescence on behalf of the SADF leadership. South Africa would soon invite the United States to participate in the Mozambican peace process, though Chissano still refused to negotiate with Renamo directly. Perhaps sensing the seriousness of President Botha’s crack-down on South African support for Renamo and the inevitability of a negotiated settlement to the Mozambican conflict, in late 1988 maximalist and putschist elements in South Africa embarked on a strategy of rebuilding Renamo’s international support and profile. It was reported that under the supervision of Major-General C. J. van Tonder Renamo President Dhlakama underwent public relations training in the Transvaal, with the intention of organising a world tour. A series of interviews inside Mozambique in late 1988 may also have been part of this strategy. Dhlakama met with Renamo delegates from Kenya, Portugal and the United States in West Germany during September 1988, deciding to expand Renamo’s external political representation, give prominent posts to militants abroad and to give the organisation a more independent image. Towards the end of the year SADF Colonel Rosa de Oliviera, a close ally of General Van Niekerk, was transferred to Lisbon to help rebuild the Renamo office there, while putschists in Renamo’s US lobby, including Robert MacKenzie, Sibyl Cline and John Singlaub, launched a campaign calling on US Presidential candidate George Bush to support Renamo. Meanwhile, in Frelimo many were beginning to see the advantages of Mozambique’s transition to capitalism, with self-interest and corruption becoming ever more rampant within the party. Chissano also

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continued to marginalise armed forces veterans, replacing them with younger and better-trained individuals. With the intention of eventually holding multi-party elections in Mozambique, Chissano continued to foster good relations elements of the non-Renamo opposition that would eventually help split Renamo’s support base, having the Professor of Law Emilio Ricardo meet with UNAMO representative Carlos Reis in November 1988. This paved the way for further meetings between Frelimo Central Committee Member Alvaro Casimiro and Reis in January 1989, and Gimo Phiri and Defence Minister Alberto Chipande in April 1990.22

Renamo Fights On

By October 1988 Renamo were regrouping in Zambézia and were beginning to retake lost territory, despite the fact they faced elite government troops and UNAMO fighters in the province, and their regional commander Calisto Meque had been killed while leading an attack on Gilé on 11 September. Throughout 1988 operations against Renamo in Zambézia had used elite Red Beret forces to capture towns and left Tanzanian soldiers to defend them, but Renamo’s resurgence and the financial and personnel costs associated with Tanzania’s deployment led to Tanzania’s withdrawal by December 1988. Meanwhile, Renamo consolidated their elite forces in Zambézia, including three units codenamed ‘Tiger’, ‘Wolf’ and ‘Thunder’, which consisted of approximately 300 fighters each. On 27 November these units raided the town of Gurué at 4 am and occupied it for four days, having quickly routed the resident FPLM garrison. Though no civilians were killed in the assault, the town was looted and 60 residents were kidnapped to porter stolen goods to a Renamo camp. Some witnesses at Gurué claimed to have seen at least one white man fighting with Renamo during the attack, controlling a truck-mounted anti-aircraft gun. The central Zambézian town of Lugela was then captured from government forces in early December, as Renamo continued to reassert their presence throughout the province, and a force of more than 500 Renamo fighters attacked Namarrói on 31 December. By early January 1989 Renamo had also assaulted Ile and Alto Molocue in north-eastern Zambézia, the outskirts of Quelimane and Mocuba in the province’s centre, and Chire and Mopeia in

Elsewhere in the north Renamo continued operations in late 1988, including: attacks on Membia, Murrupula and the Nacala railway in Nampula; and on Malanga in central Niassa and the Maponda naval base on Lake Nyassa. Renamo fighters captured at Malanga divulged that they had operated throughout Niassa over the previous four years, at locations such as Majune, Mpepe, Metarica, Maúa, Marrupa, Mavago, Mecula, Mandimba, Ngauma and Lichinga districts. Meanwhile in central Mozambique, though government forces did achieve a number of victories against Renamo near their Gorongosa headquarters, Renamo fighters were involved in frequent sabotage of the Beira railway and oil pipeline, and staged major assaults on Chibabava, Buzi and Inhambinga in Sofala, capturing the latter two. Additionally, Renamo claimed that an attempt by the FPLM to re-capture Inhambinga on 2 December was successfully repelled. In the south Maputo province experienced an ebb in Renamo activity, with attacks mainly restricted to the border region with South Africa. The powerlines between South African and Mozambique were sabotaged up to fourteen times between Ressano Garcia and Moamba in late 1988, disrupting supply to Maputo city; while trains on the Maputo-Swaziland and Maputo-Komatipoort railway lines suffered a series of ambushes whose civilian victims totalled 33 dead and 154 injured. Apparently cross-border attacks by large Renamo units struck at border guards near Macuacua in mid-October and Mapulanguene in December, while the town of Xinavane near the Limpopo valley in north-east Maputo was attacked three times in December 1988 and January 1989, killing at least 26 people. The testimonies of refugees and former Renamo fighters continued to implicate South African maximalists in the


support of Renamo, reporting a Renamo base in Kruger National Park and a collection point of South African supplies near Goba on the Swaziland border. In Gaza the areas surrounding Chibuto and Manjacaze experienced some rebel attacks, while clashes continued along Inhambane’s coastline at Inharrime, Jangamo, Malova, Massinga and Mapinhane. 

During early 1989 Renamo actions in Maputo province continued near the border with a number of ambushes on passenger trains at Movene during February, killing 19 civilians and wounding up to 60, and an attack on Changalane, Namaacha district, on 21 February in which two people were killed and 76 houses destroyed. In the province’s north residents of Mapulanguene claimed that Renamo was freely crossing the border and that some locals had witnessed co-operation between rebels and South African soldiers in the region. Mapulanguene itself had been attacked about once a month since April 1988. Renamo groups crossing the border may also have been responsible for an attack on Magude that killed eleven and wounded 39 on 16 February. Another Renamo group based in north-east Maputo province was probably responsible for: an attack on Maragra in which 27 locals were killed and 40 kidnapped on 3 February; the killing of two civilians on Josina Machel Island on 11 February; and possibly for attacks on Macia in Gaza province, which killed up to 20 peasants and destroyed 23 vehicles on 19 February, and a subsequent attack on 22 February that was repelled. Manjacaze in Gaza was also attacked in mid-


February, resulting in the deaths of eight residents and the destruction of eighteen houses, twelve shops and 300 tonnes of cashew nuts. 39 locals were kidnapped to transport loot from the scene.\textsuperscript{29} Up to 500 Renamo fighters were reported to have infiltrated into Inhambane province during this period, and government sources claimed that in the resulting heavy clashes up to 150 guerrillas were killed and a number of camps destroyed.\textsuperscript{30} Equally heavy fighting was said to have killed 166 Renamo and destroyed thirteen rebel camps in north-west Cabo Delgado during February.\textsuperscript{31}

**Negotiations Draw Closer**

While the Catholic Church continued to communicate with Renamo into 1989, the Frelimo government itself opened talks with non-Renamo opposition groups such as UNAMO and CUNIMO, and hinted at the possibility of meeting with Renamo if they agreed to a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{32} Under Chissano’s leadership support for Frelimo in the international community was increasing continuously, by 1989 encompassing both the western and Soviet blocs and southern Africa’s Frontline States. Combined with Frelimo’s growing relationship with South Africa, this ensured that the longer Chissano could avoid a settlement with Renamo the stronger the government’s negotiating position would be and the weaker and more isolated their opponent would become. Renamo now had little chance of receiving official support from western governments, their international image following the 1988 Gersony Report being echoed in an 1989 study by Amnesty International, which stated, 

the armed opposition Resistência Nacional Moçambicana … has perpetrated gross abuses on civilians, including torturing and killing captives… RENAMO has captured thousands of civilians… People who fail to obey orders, are caught attempting to escape or are physically


\textsuperscript{31} “Destabilisation Calendar”, \textit{Mozambiquefile}, March 1989, p23.

unable to complete the march are often killed. Young men, and even children, are said to be forced to commit acts of extreme barbarity...33

Lonrho director ‘Tiny’ Rowland, who had a major financial interest in securing peace in Mozambique and whose influence was felt in both Europe and southern Africa, placed further pressure on all parties to advance the peace process. Rowland had intermittently been in contact with Dhlakama since 1982 as he attempted to protect his assets in Mozambique, which included the Beira oil pipeline.34 Meanwhile, with P.W. Botha’s shift towards détente with Mozambique minimalist within the Apartheid government regained the initiative in South Africa’s State Security Council (SSC). A SSC document from early 1989 details changes to South Africa’s strategy towards Mozambique, initially establishing that South Africa’s main security goals were: to improve the nation’s domestic security and well-being; to increase peace, stability and co-operation throughout the region; and to limit the influence of great powers in the region. It then states that tension between South Africa and Mozambique had primarily arisen from the perception that elements in each state support enemies of the other (Renamo and the ANC) and Mozambique’s support for majority black rule in South Africa, and notes that the conflict between Renamo and the Frelimo government had allowed outside forces to project influence into the region. By this stage in the Mozambican conflict, however, Frelimo had managed to secure the majority of international political, economic and military support.35 Examining the Mozambican war’s effect on South Africa, the document asserts that South Africa has an interest in the use of transport infrastructure in Mozambique’s south, and that instability in the region would become even more detrimental to South Africa as their economic relations with Mozambique increased. It also specifies that: the conflict prevents the operations of the Cabora Bassa powerlines; reduces Mozambican imports from South Africa; fuels anti-South African propaganda; galvanises opposition to South Africa from the Frontline States; and creates an influx of illegal immigrants and refugees into South Africa.36 The option still

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36 “RENAMO-aktiviteite dra by tot hierdie probleem en bedreig die belange van die RSA deur onder andere: a. die beskadiging van die Cahora Bassakraglyn en die belemmering van die verkeersvloei op die Maputo-Komatipoortpad en -spoorverbinding, wat die RSA se uitvoere nadelig tref; b. Mosambiek se invoere vanaf die RSA te verminder, wat ‘n kwynende effek op ‘n natuurlike mark vir Suid-Afrikanse produkte het; c. die propaganda van destabilisasie te versterk en die geloofwaardigheid van die Staatspresident en die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering in die gedrang te bring; d. te dien as ‘n ekonomiese en militêre saambindende factor vir die sogenaamde frontliniestate; en e. veroorsaak die onderbreking van
existed for South Africa to support Renamo to place pressure on the Frelimo government, however this could: impact negatively on the Nkomati Accord; encourage Mozambique to actively support the ANC; escalate foreign, and especially Soviet, intervention in the region; harm South Africa’s economic interests; damage South Africa’s international credibility; and bring increased pressure from the western states. Thus, along with strengthening economic and political ties between the two nations, the document resolves that South Africa should give no support to Renamo, and that military support should be given to the Mozambican government, but not in a manner that would strengthen Frelimo’s forces or that would involve the SADF in Mozambique’s internal conflict. This shift in policy was reinforced as F.W. de Klerk gained power throughout 1989, Botha initially surrendering the leadership of the National Party to de Klerk in February after suffering a stroke, and stepping down from the position of State President in August. De Klerk was then elected for a five-year term in September.

Renamo actions continued during March with attacks on Maragra and Magude in the north of Maputo province and Boane in the south. The town of Matutuine near the South African border was also overrun on 22 March and 55 houses burnt to the ground, while in late March Renamo attacked Massangena in Gaza’s far north, killing five and destroying ten houses. In Nampula province Renamo continued to sabotage the Nacala railway, and attacked the coastal town of Memba on 1 March killing seventeen people, kidnapping 99 and looting warehouses of Red Cross aid. Though up to 5,000 civilians had already died of starvation in Memba, Renamo attacked again on 16 March. Meanwhile, a large number of Renamo fighters attacked and destroyed the railway town of Lapala near the Zambézian border, stealing large quantities of food aid and kidnapping 220 locals to transport it. Renamo announced a month-long truce from 1 April, ostensibly to allow aid to reach needy areas, though possibly as a pre-requisite for the advancement of talks with...
Frelimo, was largely ignored by both sides. Government forces actually intensified operations from 1-15 April, especially around Magude, north of Maputo, Bala-Bala in Gaza’s Limpopo valley, Ile in central Zambézia, and southern Sofala. A 4 April attack by Renamo on Nacaroa in eastern Nampula province initially violated the unilateral cease-fire, and was followed by further attacks on Marracuene, north of Maputo, and Salamanga in the country’s far south. Towards the end of April Manhiça, Ressano Garcia and Xinavane were attacked in Maputo, as well as: Chibuto in Gaza; Gondola in Manica; Vila Nova da Fronteira in southern Tete; and Inhassunge, Namacurra and Mocuba in Zambézia.40

In the wake of the April cease-fire Renamo held their First Congress at Gorongosa from 5-9 June 1989 as part of a build-up to important talks scheduled to take place in Nairobi with Mozambican bishops. By June the Frelimo government had begun circulating a document outlining peace initiatives, which vaguely resembled the proposals put forward in their 1984 negotiations. Messages from Renamo representatives signalled they were ready to embrace peace in exchange for ministerial positions in a government of national unity, though Chissano maintained the hard-line position that Renamo must recognise the current Mozambican President and government, disarm, and assimilate their guerrillas into the general population. Nevertheless, Renamo’s Congress responded positively to the continuation of the peace process. Chissano also aimed to have the Frelimo party approve the new peace initiatives at the Fifth Party Congress at the end of July 1989, and it was reported he was working in coalition with ministers Armando Guebuza, Mariano Matsinhe

and Pascal Mocumbi to influence the Congress on this and other issues, such as plans to drastically reduce SNASP’s powers. The agreement of each of these political leaders to move towards negotiations revealed some transformation in Frelimo’s internal factional divisions, as former opponents to negotiation embraced Chissano’s settlement strategy. In the meantime President Chissano was facing growing popular discontent as the IMF and World Bank-sponsored Economic Recovery Plan of increased liberalisation led to rising food prices, devaluation of the currency and the reduction of funds to public services. This would lead to a wave of unprecedented protests and strikes by the end of the year, which had the support of some elements within the government itself. Parallel to this corruption and criminal activity were spreading at an ever-greater rate through the state apparatus and armed forces, sometimes for profit and sometimes for survival. While war-profiteers had long existed in the armed forces’ upper echelons, by mid-1989 rank-and-file soldiers were virtually on strike due to lack of pay and supplies, thus some turned to banditry as a survival strategy. Only Mozambique’s elite troops and allied force were operating near full capacity, and many towns were left at Renamo’s mercy. Meanwhile, at Renamo’s own Congress the organisation underwent some internal reconfiguration. Raul Domingos replaced Artur da Fonseca as External Secretary and Vincente Ululu replaced Francisco Nota Moisés (who was residing in Canada) as Secretary of Information, while the position of Secretary-General was absorbed into the Presidency. These moves focused more power in the Renamo headquarters within Mozambique, and in Dhlakama’s own position as President. The Congress also expanded the National Council to include representatives from all ten provinces, by which it was hoped to counter the appearance of Renamo being an N’dau-controlled organisation. This may also have worked to dilute the power of any opposition Dhlakama faced within the National Council. A West German arrest warrant issued for Artur da Fonseca shortly after the Congress on the charges of trying to illegally purchase arms was potentially a political move to prevent him interfering in the peace process, as he had formerly featured prominently in the talks in Kenya. However, the peace process was set back slightly when planned talks in Kenya were aborted after a joint FPLM-Zimbabwean offensive near Gorongosa on 12 July narrowly missed capturing President Dhlakama and his delegation. Chissano later claimed the attack was a mistake made due to a failure to notify those units of the peace process, though it seems likely that the attack was a tactic to stall or sabotage negotiations.41 Subsequently, on 17 July Chissano

officially unveiled Frelimo’s ‘Twelve Principles for Peace’, which were later endorsed by the Fifth Party Congress on 30 July, along with the involvement of Presidents Moi and Mugabe of Kenya and Zimbabwe as mediators. Though the cautious principles did guarantee ‘individual and social liberties’, they denied Renamo any recognition as a legitimate organisation and required a cessation of hostilities as a pre-condition for negotiations, stating that,

1. We are faced with an operation of destabilisation which should not be confused with a struggle between two parties.

3. … The first action should be to stop all terrorist and bandit actions.

11. The normalisation of life and the integration of those until now involved in violent actions of destabilisation implies, in a general way, their participation in economic and social life through suitable ways agreed by them, and agreed by the government.

12. The acceptance of these principles could lead to a dialogue about the modalities for ending violence, establishing peace and normalising life for all the country.42

In the meantime the conflict continued unabated, with the main battlefronts remaining in the southern provinces, Zambézia and Nampula, with exception of the FPLM’s July offensive on Gorongosa. In Nampula significant clashes continued to occur around Ribaué, as the FPLM claimed to have killed up to 90 Renamo fighters in the area during May and June, and Renamo sabotaged the Nacala railway between Ribaué and Lapala in late June; while in north-east Nampula Renamo attacked Muculuone in early June, destroying 105 houses, and attacked Namapa in late June and Nacala Velha in late July. Further south in Zambézia during June Renamo launched attacks on the coastal towns Maganja and Pebane, and Lioma in the north-east, each exacting a cost on the rebel forces. Government forces achieved victories along the Zambezi River at Chinde, Marromeu and Caia, as well as at Ile and Namacurra in central Zambézia.43 Meanwhile in


42 Vines, RENAMO, pp158-159.


the south, Renamo continued to operate close to Maputo, variously attacking towns such as Marracuene, Pessene, Magude, Ressano Garcia, Namaacha and Bela Vista, and ambushing vehicles travelling between them. In the days leading up to the Frelimo Fifth Party Congress Renamo even attacked and shelled the outer suburbs of the capital, perhaps to place pressure on decision-makers. In Gaza large units of Renamo fighters were involved in a number of attacks around Manjacaze, killing more than 100 locals over a few months, as well as around Massingir and Mabalane near the South African border.44

Negotiations between Renamo and Frelimo deepened in their intensity in August 1989, as a Renamo delegation consisting of President Dhlakama, Vincente Ululu, Raul domingos, João Almirante, Faustino Adriano and Cristovão Soares travelled to Nairobi to meet Mozambican Church leaders. Presidents Mugabe and Moi were involved in settling the guidelines for the meeting, and Frelimo’s Armando Guebuza and Teodato Hunguana remained in Nairobi. ‘Tiny’ Rowland was also present in Nairobi, and played some role in the negotiations. The talks ran reasonably successfully, with Renamo issuing a sixteen-point reply to Frelimo, though Frelimo’s refusal to recognise Renamo as a legitimate political party remained a major block to progress. The Renamo leadership used their time in Kenya to meet with diplomats representing the major powers, and courted media attention by declaring a halt to attacks on the Nacala railway.45 However, relations soured in the aftermath of the talks, with Chissano dismissing Renamo’s sixteen-points as ‘meaningless’,

and no progress was made at a further meeting on 29 August.\textsuperscript{46} Parallel to those negotiations smaller political parties were mobilising and requesting their own place in the peace process. By September Máximo Dias’ \textit{Movimento Nacionalista Moçambicano} (MONAMO) merged with CUNIMO to form the new \textit{União Política Moçambicana} (UPOMO), and Domingos Arouca’s old \textit{Frente Unida de Moçambique} (FUMO) again became active. Gimo Phiri’s UNAMO was also still an active military entity in Zambézia.\textsuperscript{47} Dhlakama remained in Kenya during September and October, meeting with Kenyan and Zimbabwean officials, though no progress was made. A South African representative also visited Dhlakama in mid-October to pressure him, though this may have only deepened Renamo suspicions that their former South African backers were now collaborating against them. Dhlakama returned to Mozambique in October, announcing that Renamo would isolate Mozambique’s cities, while the FPLM in turn intensified military activity near Renamo’s headquarters in Sofala.\textsuperscript{48} Meanwhile, the rise of F.W. de Klerk to the South African presidency ensured that Renamo’s support in that country would continue to fade, with a crackdown on maximalists within the SADF and the severing of support to Renamo’s Lisbon office. De Klerk aimed to resolve the Mozambican conflict within six months, while in the meantime he continued to negotiate over the economic spoils of peace, including the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric facilities. The peace process continued slowly as international representatives increasingly intervened to encourage and cajole the parties into negotiations. South African, Kenyan and Renamo representatives met in November to try and lay foundations for negotiations, though Renamo argued they would not publicly accept Frelimo’s principles for peace. On 7 December US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen presented Dhlakama, Mugabe and Moi with their own seven-point peace plan, prompting Mugabe to immediately fly to Nairobi to lobby for direct Frelimo-Renamo talks, and de Klerk visited Maputo a week later. However, Chissano was becoming wary of Moi’s participation in negotiations and feared he was influencing Mugabe. Chissano continued to hope that the international community would pressure Renamo to accept a resolution on Frelimo’s terms. In the meantime the Mozambican President continued to cleverly manoeuvre through the peace process by

\textsuperscript{46} Vines, \textit{RENAMO}, p125.
announcing in January 1990 that multi-party elections would occur in 1991 following a liberalisation of the Mozambican constitution, but that Renamo members would only be able to run ‘as individuals’. This pleased the international community by demonstrating Frelimo’s willingness to undergo democratic transition, but rebuffed Renamo’s central demand that they be allowed to operate as a legitimate political party.49

**Discontent Within Frelimo**

By January 1990 Chissano’s careful strategy of balancing interests within the Frelimo party was beginning to falter, as his shift towards negotiations and internal reforms passed the level acceptable to pro-war elements. The requirement of the IMF Structural Adjustment programme that military spending be cut in particular created much tension between Mozambican Prime Minister Machungo and Defence Minister Alberto Chipande. Under international guidance the government was pressuring the Defence Department to reduce military personnel numbers from 50,000 to 30,000 and to decrease military salaries. The Central Committee was also signalling that it might take action against rampant corruption in the armed forces, and Chissano established a special military commission to inquire into the low level of army morale. The failure of the military leadership to provide food and pay to many soldiers for months at a time now threatened to provoke a widespread strike by rank and file soldiers, similar to the public sector strikes that had troubled the government for a number of weeks. It thus seemed that a reshuffle of the military leadership was imminent, and the government’s fear of a military backlash led to an emergency meeting at the Defence Department on 10 January, chaired by Politburo member Major-General da Silva Nihia and attended by the armed forces leadership. At the meeting everyone present signed a document reiterating their loyalty to the President. However, the sense of crisis far from dissipated and even as Chissano triumphantly made his first official visit to the United States, securing a rise in American aid from $100 million in 1989 to $110 million in 1990, war veterans continued to petition the government over living conditions, the conflict within Frelimo and pervasive corruption. One prominent demand was for a public inquiry into corruption and the Minister for Transport and

Communication, Chissano-ally Armando Guebuza, was frequently suggested as a target. The factions now advocating settlement to the war, which now included corrupt elements that had decided that the conversion to free market capitalism would only increase their opportunities for enrichment, continued to manoeuvre for General Chipande’s replacement. It was rumoured the civilian Feliciano Gundana might take the position as he was ethnically N’dau, from Sofala province, and might consequently have an advantage in facilitating Renamo guerrilla’s integration into the national armed forces.\textsuperscript{50}

The desire to reconfirm the loyalty of the armed forces’ leadership may have prompted a renewed joint military offensive in Manica and Sofala provinces, around Renamo’s Mozambican headquarters, from mid-January 1990. This large-scale operation, spread over 8,000 square kilometres of territory, included the deployment of specialist commandos in the area near Gorongosa and Maringué, backed by the Zimbabwean Air Force and paratroopers. Renamo attacks on an aid convoy in early February and on the town of Dondo on 21 February, which killed twelve and eleven civilians respectively, also preceded the stationing of a thousand heavily-armed Mozambican soldiers at Dondo on 28 February, probably to help counteract Renamo withdrawal into the sparsely populated area north of the Zambezi River. However, it did not prevent a Renamo attack on the Inhamizua suburb of Beira in April in which ten people were kidnapped and ten homes destroyed. By May the offensive on Gorongosa increased its intensity, perhaps having progressed through a series of actions to channel guerrilla units back towards their headquarters. It was reported that an additional 1,000 Zimbabwean and 700 Mozambican soldiers were flown into the combat zone on 9 May and it was expected that up to 6,000 soldiers might take part in the campaign. Renamo representatives publicised the offensive, pointing out that the government was trying to weaken Renamo’s negotiating position, and threatening to intensify attacks inside Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{51} In addition to placating the military, this


offensive was probably intended to place pressure on Renamo prior to the face-to-face talks that would occur within a few months. President Chissano may have genuinely preferred a military victory over Renamo, though this had proved impossible for more than a decade. Meanwhile, Renamo maintained military pressure on the government in the south during the first months of the year with attacks on villages and traffic around Macia, in Gaza’s Limpopo valley, and elsewhere in Gaza including Manjacaze, Xai-Xai and Chokwe in the south and Chichualacuala near the South African border. 52 While much of Renamo’s activity in Maputo province focused on sabotaging the powerlines from South Africa to Maputo and ambushing road and rail traffic between Maputo and the Mozambican border, one particularly well-publicised attack in early 1990 was the killing of 77 civilians near Ressano Garcia on the South African border. The massacre followed the derailing of a goods-carrying passenger train on 14 February, in which the train was also looted and kidnapped passengers were forced to porter the stolen goods back to a Renamo base. In previous years, during war’s peak, such an attack may have only attracted limited external attention, but with Mozambique in the spotlight of international diplomacy the incident received international condemnation and sparked calls for South African State President de Klerk to create an inquiry into the SADF, backed by the recently released ANC leader Nelson Mandela. 53 Some revelations regarding SADF involvement in Mozambique that did emerge soon afterwards included a report in March 1990 by the Weekly Mail that claimed bases along the South African border are still used to deploy funds and weapons to Renamo. Journalist Eddie Koch maintained that Portuguese and Shona-speaking black soldiers were housed in townships near Phalaborwa, Skietog being an example. A network of insurgents also existed at Kosi Bay, near Mozambique’s southern-most tip, and a mobile...
base was situated in the Ndumu Game Reserve that straddles the Mozambique-South Africa border. Koch claimed a unit operating from Pafuri, in northern Transvaal, was sabotaging the Cabora Bassa power pylons, and a farmer and bartender in Komatipoort were revealed as recruiting agents for Renamo. A few months later the former Civil Co-operation Bureau regional manager for Mozambique and Swaziland Pieter Botes also admitted that he had previously been given R40,000 to buy arms for Mozambique, and that a plan had even been suggested to buy an island off Mozambique to assist operations. The nefarious activities of South Africa’s Military Intelligence were far from over, however, as they focused on disrupting South Africa’s own transition to majority rule by supporting ‘Third Force’ actions. During 1990 and 1991 there were numerous clashes between Inkatha and ANC supporters, in part instigated by the training and arming of Inkatha thugs by intelligence agents. These included Inkatha attacks on the ANC around Pietermaritzburg and in Sebokeng township near Johannesburg in March and June 1990; violence at Zonkizizwe squatter camp near Johannesburg in August; and the Inkatha assault on Alexandra township, near Johannesburg, in March 1991. Though the Inkathagate scandal broke in July 1991, revealing Government funding of Inkatha, the violence would continue into 1992.

During April 1990, President Chissano travelled to Lisbon and personally addressed about a thousand Mozambican dissidents, inviting them to return to Mozambique and contribute to debate over a new constitution. This action was a positive move towards democratisation, though was also shrewd from a tactical stand-point as it placed pressure on Renamo to return to negotiations, and began to foster non-Renamo opposition which could split any anti-Frelimo vote. Opposition leaders Máximo Dias and Domingos Arouca in particular were encouraged to become active in Mozambique, while Renamo activist Artur Vilankulu returned to Mozambique in May 1990 and supported the Frelimo government’s peace initiatives. The Frelimo party itself remained divided, however, and in May 1990 splits within the Politburo and the armed forces prevented Chissano from replacing Defence Minister General Chipande. Chissano seemed to have lost the credibility that he maintained with anti-negotiation hard-liners, and his defeat over Chipande’s replacement signalled danger. Chipande had recently defended Generals who

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55 “Documented Incidents of Destabilisation in Mozambique Since the Capture of Casa Banana, Gorongosa, Part 8”, pp1-10.
had been accused of embezzling international aid, and it was thought Chipande’s replacement would precede sweeping changes in the military leadership. A struggle was thus taking place between the alliance of Chissano, Guebuza and Matsinhe, and those with entrenched interests in the Mozambican conflict. Corrupt elements within the state were also rallying to protect their position, and had the Vice-Minister of Agriculture Alfredo Gamito appointed to the position of Governor of Nampula as punishment for writing a secret report on corruption.

The Rome Talks Begin

Though Renamo aborted peace talks to be held in Malawi in mid-June, representatives of Frelimo and Renamo finally met for a first round of direct negotiations in Rome during July 1990. These negotiations, which were sponsored by the Catholic community of Sant’Egidio with the backing of the Vatican and the Italian government, would eventually lead to the final peace agreement between the two sides. A conference held in Cologne from 22-24 June facilitated the commencement of negotiations, and the first round of meetings between Renamo’s Raul Domingos and Frelimo’s Armando Guebuza took place from 8-10 July 1990. In the meantime President Dhlakama appointed a new envoy to Lisbon, who was protected by Portuguese Military Intelligence and helped to facilitate negotiations by regularly travelling between Lisbon, Nairobi and Gorongosa. Later the Portuguese installed a communications system linking Gorongosa, Lisbon and Maputo. The first round of the Rome talks ended with few results, but allowed the parties to accustom themselves to the process and each other. Soon afterwards, on 31 July, the Frelimo Politburo announced their formal approval of moves to introduce a multi-party democracy in Mozambique. The optimism generated by these moves was slightly dampened, however, after the second round of talks from 11-14 August ended in deadlock, as Renamo demanded the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops before they would discuss an agenda for the negotiations. Meanwhile, within the Frelimo party there were increasingly signs of rising tension between radical nationalists and moderates as some elements, including war veterans and their representatives, began to lobby for strict restrictions on

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nationality that would restrict most white, Mestiço and Indian Mozambicans from the upper echelons of government.\(^{62}\)

**Naprama Challenge Renamo**

While the military activity of both parties was greatly reduced during the negotiation period in July and August, a new military dynamic was being established in the north through the growth of the peasant resistance movement called Naprama. Led by 28-year-old mystic Manuel Antonio, from Alto Molocue in north-eastern Zambézia, Naprama had begun recruiting fighters from the peasantry in Zambézia and Nampula provinces in March 1990 and organised to challenge Renamo using traditional weapons and a magical immunity to bullets. The superstition surrounding Naprama was the movement’s greatest asset as the belief in traditional religion and magic was widespread within Renamo, so Renamo units would often flee if confronted by Naprama fighters. By June the movement was beginning to make its presence felt, having captured at least one Renamo base in Nampula and freed thousands of peasants from Renamo’s control. They would capture a number of other bases before the end of the year, aided by the movement of many Renamo fighters back into central Mozambique during this period. At the time Renamo representatives asserted that Naprama was a proxy army for the Frelimo government. Cabrita has echoed this claim, asserting that “The government armed António and his militiamen … airlifting them to war zones in Nampula and Zambézia’; and it does seem that Naprama was at least involved in a loose alliance with the military, consulting them before offensives and presenting them with captured weaponry and prisoners.\(^{63}\) From June Renamo withdrew units from the country’s north and south to concentrate their forces around the Gorongosa headquarters before any ceasefire might immobilise them. A counter-attack using these reinforcements left many dead in Gorongosa town on 6 September. The withdrawal of guerrillas did not preclude the continuation of attacks elsewhere though, a force of 130 Renamo fighters assaulting a Zimbabwean platoon near Chokwe, Gaza, during September.\(^{64}\) However, in September 1990 Zambézia remained the

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main focus of Renamo’s attacks, while the government launched another round of military offensives in Sofala, Manica, Tete and Zambézia, now aided by Naprama. The campaign’s key aims included cut Renamo’s key supply route from the tip of Malawi to Gorongosa and to reopen the road through central Zambézia from Mocuba to Milange. Increasingly the FPLM strategy was involving the old Portuguese counter-insurgency technique of forcing peasants into garrison-towns to prevent Renamo infiltration.65

Government forces in Zambézia also had the assistance of UNAMO’s forces in the north. During September 1990 General Chipande met UNAMO leader Gimo Phiri in Quelimane to negotiate for the help of his forces and it was reported that Phiri was offered the Governorship of Zambézia in return. Meanwhile, UNAMO’s Secretary-General Carlos Reis was authorised to operate openly in Maputo and began to organise representation in all Mozambique’s provinces.66 Reis had previously been arrested in Malawi during May 1990 accused of planning Afonso Dhlakama’s assassination, but Chissano personally intervened to ensure his release. UNAMO was thus the first party to enter the process of legalisation, and by November 1990 announced their intention to back Chissano for the Presidency.67 Frelimo was also having some success co-opting other dissidents as the former Head of RENAMO’s External Relations Artur Vilankulu, who was now living in Maputo, was considered a serious candidate for a high-ranking government position such as Ambassador to Washington or Foreign Minister. In addition, Frelimo continued to encourage the proliferation of the non-Renamo opposition by inviting another dissident living in Lisbon, Boaventura Dumangane, to return and register his new organisation the Pro-Civic Association of Mozambique.68 Renamo’s key negotiator Raul Domingos was also active in Lisbon at this time, meeting Portuguese ministers and lobbying other dissidents such as Antonio Rebelo de Souza, leader of the Movement for Peace in Mozambique. Both SNASP and Portuguese military intelligence sought a greater role for the Portuguese government in negotiations, though Portugal’s President and Minister for Foreign Affairs both wanted to remain removed from the process.69 Meanwhile, in September 1990 the

first rumours were emerging that Kenya had begun supporting Renamo militarily by
providing training camps for their fighters and allowing the use of its territory for the
transit of arms.70

Frelimo Divided as Talks Continue

As the Mozambican People’s Assembly began focusing on the details of the new
constitution during October, the debate over the requirements for nationality grew in its
intensity. Frelimo’s newly emerging radical nationalist wing was pushing for strict criteria of
nationality, which would limit the rights of most non-black Mozambicans. This position
was largely motivated by the fears of many within the state apparatus and military that their
economic position would be undermined if white Mozambicans returned to reclaim
confiscated land and property. Chissano thought such restrictions would create conditions
unfriendly to economic liberalisation and reconciliation with dissidents, and thus lobbied
for more open criteria. This debate split the traditional alliances with the Central
Committee that had formed around the pro- and anti-negotiation axes. The factions thus
appear to have aligned with Guebuza, Matsinhe, Antonio Thai, retired General Americo
Pfumo and Hungwana for tighter restrictions; and Chissano, dos Santos, Vieira, Machungo,
Chipande and João Ferreira advocating a more moderate position.71 The moderate faction
emerged victorious in the constitutional debate and on 1 November a new liberal
constitution was approved. This was a unilateral move by Frelimo towards creating a
modern representative democracy, but angered the Renamo leadership because it denied
them a role in creating the constitution they had claimed to be fighting for.72 The
announcement of the constitution was quickly followed by the third round of direct
negotiations in Rome, from 8 November to 1 December. However, during this period the
FPLM and Zimbabwean forces also stepped-up operations against Renamo, launching a
massive military offensive in Sofala that forced the abandonment of the Gorongosa
headquarters, with Dhlakama and his leadership transferring to a new base in Tete near the
Malawi border. Renamo actions during this time included attacks on Mocuba and near Ile,
Zambézia province, and on the Inhamizua suburb of Beira. The offensive on Gorongosa
may have been central to Renamo’s agreement to a partial ceasefire, though they won the
concession that Zimbabwean troops be restricted to within three kilometres of the Beira

70 “No Training for MNR”, Herald, 1 September 1990; “Mozambique: Nairobi and Military Aid to
RENAMO” Indian Ocean Newsletter, No 444, 8 September 1990, p2.
71 “South Africa: Inkatha’s Secret Network”, Indian Ocean Newsletter, no 448, 6 October 1990, p5;
and Limpopo corridors. A fourth round of talks in Rome during December was unsuccessful, with Renamo refusing to adopt Frelimo’s timetable or agenda. Some military actions did continue during December, including a number of attacks on convoys near Renamo’s temporary headquarters in Tete province, though conflict was generally subdued. The Joint Verification Commission (JVC) announced that fourteen violations of the ceasefire occurred between 1 December and 10 January and that Renamo was probably to blame in at least six cases. After the signing of the ceasefire Mocuba, Zambézia, became a Renamo target and the recapture of Gorongosa was another key goal.73

The Parties Battle for Advantage

Renamo representatives were confronted about the organisation’s ceasefire violations at the fifth round of talks from 28-30 January 1991, during which they voiced claims that Zimbabwean troops had also violated the agreement and declared that Beira, Maputo and Chokwe remained legitimate military targets. These talks were thus also declared to have resulted in a stalemate. Observers of the process noted that Renamo seemed to be experiencing great trouble transforming into a political party, partly because the rapid political and economic changes being implemented by the Frelimo government had stolen the wind from the opposition’s political programme. Therefore Renamo aimed to bolster their bargaining position by recapturing lost territory in Zambézia and Gorongosa during the wet season in early 1991. The Naprama movement remained a challenge in Zambézia, however, maintaining control over Murrua, Mualama and Mulevala, to the south of Alto Molocue in the province’s east.74 Thus from January 1991 Renamo organised a basic ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in Zambézia, while also devoting their highly-trained Grupa Limpa battalion to fighting Naprama in the province. It was hoped these tactics would break support for UNAMO and Naprama. Following the lack of progress in the January talks Dhlakama also announced that Renamo would resume attacks throughout the country because Zimbabwean troops had not been confined to the


transport corridors as previously agreed. This was soon followed by an ambush on the Tete road near Moatize, which killed almost 40 Mozambican soldiers, and a renewal of attacks on and sabotage of the Limpopo and Maputo-South Africa railway lines in the south. On 7 March Dhlakama issued a 30-day ultimatum for all Zimbabwean troops to withdraw to the corridors, claiming that 25,000 Zimbabwean troops still occupied 52 locations in violation of the ceasefire, though inspectors only found one small violation at Chimoio airport. In the meantime claims continued to emerge from some captured Renamo fighters that they had received trained near Nairobi in Kenya. What the Kenyan leadership had to gain from this assistance remains a matter for speculation, though sympathisers in the Kenyan government had allowed Renamo representatives to operate in the country for some time and Kenya is said to have been a key CIA station during the Cold War, perhaps suggesting collusion with Renamo’s putschist supporters in the United States.

Though negotiations were set to resume on 8 April, Renamo continued attacks throughout March, especially on the transport corridors in Maputo and Tete Provinces, as well as in southern Cabo Delgado. Government forces meanwhile destroyed a Renamo communications centre in Sofala on 30 March, and a regional headquarters in Inhambane. The April talks were subsequently delayed, with Renamo lobbyists claiming the organisation needed more money for the next round of talks and calling for the assistance of western advisors. As most of Renamo’s political demands were now being implemented by the Frelimo government some commentators claimed Renamo’s motivation for extending the war was now less ideological and they were continuing in the hope of securing further concessions. Renamo’s actions during April 1991 included: an attack on Ressano Garcia in Maputo province; the killing of 40 peasants at a village in Gaza; the destruction of Muidumbue in Cabo Delgado; and the occupation of Mecumburi, Nampula, though the latter was subsequently recaptured by Naparama. Renamo forces were also attacking Naprama in districts around Alto Molocue and Maganja during April, while

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government forces engaged in combat around Gorongosa with the aid of Renamo defectors. A sixth round of talks did take place throughout most of May 1991, however, with Renamo now receiving support from a number of conservative American lawyers and the pro-Renamo legal academic André Thomashausen. With their assistance Renamo had also redrawn their constitution, which included the call for an ‘equity tribunal’ that would aim to restore assets to former (pre-independence) owners, undoubtedly a concern for Frelimo’s radical nationalist faction. At these negotiations Renamo sought discussion of electoral laws and demanded that the United Nations be responsible for registering political parties, while Frelimo wanted to discuss Renamo’s integration into the new system. The underlying disagreement thus remained Frelimo’s refusal to recognise Renamo as a legitimate equal to be competed against in open elections. Frelimo was meanwhile encouraging smaller opposition parties to register in Mozambique. The Mozambique Liberal and Democratic Party (PALMO), based in Beira, was one of the first legalised opposition parties. In April it was reported that former Renamo members Sergio Amargar and João Branquinho, who were both Renamo instructors in Rhodesia, were involved in creating a new party called the Partido Democratico de Moçambique; while the Makonde-dominated Mozambique African National Union (MANU), based in Kenya, applied for legal status in May. PALMO also held a volatile founding congress in Beira from 6-11 May, which was beset by rivalry between representatives from Sofala and Zambézia. One of the movement’s leaders, Casimiro Nhamitambo, resigned and threatened to form his own party after SNASP sent a message to the congress claiming he was a Frelimo infiltrator. This bizarre occurrence might be explained as a disruptive measure taken by Frelimo moderates who were wary that PALMO was adopting the racist policies that had won favour amongst Frelimo’s radical nationalist faction and many black war veterans. The Mozambique National Movement (MONAMO), led by Máximo Dias, was another opposition group that resurfaced in Mozambique during June 1991, seemingly with ample finances.
A Coup Plot Foiled

By mid-1991 President Chissano had successfully implemented political and economic changes in Mozambique, and had walked the tightrope of engaging Renamo in negotiations while avoiding a settlement, but factional tensions still simmered within the Frelimo party. These tensions came to a head on 22 June when Mozambican security chief Mariano Matsinhe announced the arrest of Mozambican military officers and civilians for planning a coup d’etat, to be carried out on the evening of 25 June, the anniversary of Mozambican independence. Since January 1991 SNASP had increasingly focused on combating corruption within the armed forces, investigating large-scale black marketeering that included the export of arms and pharmaceuticals to South Africa. The disintegration of discipline within the armed forces had led to the summary execution of one local commander in the Moamba region during early 1991, after he had ambushed a convoy from South Africa. This crack-down on corruption, the planned reorganisation of the military after a peace agreement, forced retirement of a number of high-ranking officers from the armed forces, had inevitably sparked discontent amongst the war-profiteers and black nationalists Chissano had previously placated. In total it was alleged that there were eighteen coup plotters, whose leaders included Central Committee member General Domingos Fondo, former Army Chief-of-Staff General Sabastião Mabote, Chief of Operations in the General Staff of the military General Salvador Mutumuque, Brigadier Majinje, Colonel Mateus Khinda, retired Colonel Dinis Moiane, Samora Machel’s brother Boaventura Machel and Samora’s half-brother Malique Moisés Machel, who were reported have disapproved of political changes and negotiations with Renamo. A number of these individuals, including General Fondo and Colonel Moiane, had been removed from military posts following evidence of corruption and drug smuggling, while others had been marginalised within the leadership. The coup had been planned since March, with the plotters intending that on the night of 25 June they would assassinate President Chissano, Armando Guebuza and Foreign Minister Mocumbi, and then support Prime Minister Mario Machungo or Samora’s widow Graça Machel to assume the presidency. It was also assumed that black war veterans would support the plot. This would seem to indicate a convergence of interests amongst corrupt elements in the military, some former Machel-loyalists, and black nationalists dissatisfied with corruption in the upper echelons of the Frelimo party. Some confusion followed the coup plot, but just over a month later at the

Frelimo’s Sixth Party Congress radical nationalists took advantage of the shifting power relations within the party and made significant gains in the first election of a new Central Committee in which Machel-loyalist Sergio Vieira was dropped from the body while Guebuza, Matsinhe, Hungwana, Carlos Klint and Salamoe Moaine solidified their position. Almost 99% of the Central Committee voted to keep Chissano as President. At the Sixth Congress SNASP was also dissolved and replaced by the *Serviço de Informação e Segurança* (SISE), whose powers were limited to intelligence and counter-espionage.  

**Talks and Conflict Continue Side-by-Side**

Renamo and Frelimo entered their seventh round of the Rome talks in the first week of August 1991. Though Frelimo demonstrated some flexibility by offering Renamo an electoral advantage over other opposition parties in return for their recognition of the Frelimo government, Renamo rejected the offer and the negotiations again ground to a halt. Some commentators speculated that Renamo was stalling the talks until after their Second Congress, which was to be held in late 1991, and that some members of Renamo’s National Council believed Frelimo would implode if Renamo could maintain the war for a few more years. In the midst of the Rome talks the town of Lulaua in Nampula was recaptured from Renamo on 5 August. Renamo had captured Lulaua in June as part of their campaign against Naprama, and some historical memory of this particular event has been retained because initial reports from pro-Frelimo media sources claimed Renamo had massacred 1,000 people in the district. This was eventually proven to be false as Renamo guerrillas had actually ‘only’ killed 50 people in the town. Nevertheless, some pro-Renamo propagandists have clung to this example as ‘proof’ that the Mozambican media could not be believed. Some later reports from 1991 speculated that Renamo was aiming to permanently capture Lulaua so they could transfer their national headquarters to the area from the re-occupied Gorongosa base. This could create a permanent base logistically distant from most of Mozambique’s armed forces at a time when the Mozambican and South African governments were preparing a plan to permanently seize control of Gorongosa. From a northern headquarters Renamo could again attempt to split the country, which would at the very least strengthen their bargaining position. However, Naprama remained a major challenge for Renamo in northern Mozambique, with an estimated 20,000 followers, effective military units and an excellent intelligence network.

During August Naprama fighters attacked and destroyed a large Renamo base near Mecuburi, to the south-east of Lulaua, demonstrating their continuing strength. Meanwhile in the south Renamo made a number of large-scale assaults during August, killing 40 soldiers and 25 civilians in attacks near Chibuto, Gaza, attacking the town of Namaacha, Maputo, and ambushing traffic near Namaacha and the capital. By September, having been cut off from the most agriculturally productive areas in the north, Renamo fighters were issued a ‘counter-vaccine’ that would make them impervious to Naprama’s magic. Then in October 1991 a new guerrilla movement called the Mukuepas was formed in Zambézia, led by a pro-Renamo Chief and guided by local mystics. These fighters would challenge both Naprama and the FPLM, though 80 Mukuepas were killed in Gilé district, eastern Zambézia, when they attacked an FPLM unit with spears and machetes. Though the eighth round of negotiations in Rome began from 11-14 October and succeeded in passing the first Protocol, in which Frelimo agreed not to pass any laws conflicting with Protocols established in Rome, it is reported that Renamo stalled further negotiations so that President Dhlakama himself could join his guerrillas and Mukuepas fighters in the north and supervise their campaign. During Renamo’s offensive Naprama leader Manuel Antonio was himself killed, though his legend would live on. Negotiations later resumed and a second Protocol was signed in Rome on 13 November as part of the same round, establishing the criteria for the registration of political parties, including a minimum requirement of 2,000 supporters. These protocols effectively established recognition of each party’s legitimacy, the right of the government to organise elections, and Renamo’s right to organise politically following the conclusion of a General Peace Agreement. Round nine of the Rome talks, from 18-20 November 1991, began the debate on the details of Mozambique’s electoral laws.


86 Chan and Venâncio, War and Peace in Mozambique, p40.
The tenth round of talks in Rome, beginning in late January 1992, was preceded by some conflict in Mozambique. Government forces clashed with Renamo in the south for control of their Ngungwe base near Macaene in Maputo, which was reported to have received reinforcements of 1,000 guerrillas in late 1991; while Renamo fighters continued to harass the suburbs of Maputo city, and killed dozens of people and destroyed hundreds of homes in a number of attacks near Macia in Gaza province. The tenth round of talks then took place from 21 January to 3 March 1992, and resulted in the signing of a third Protocol guaranteeing basic freedoms and setting out some details of electoral law. Renamo still refused a general military truce, however, which had been requested to assist in the distribution of humanitarian aid. As 1992 began southern Africa was entering its worst drought in 30 years. This would have severe effects on both sides of the conflict. The scarcity of food increased Renamo’s level of taxation and coercion of the local population, which consequently led to increased discontent in areas under their control and migration away from rebel zones. This in turn increased malnourishment amongst Renamo forces, an increasing dependence on the use of child soldiers, and a general decrease in Renamo’s military effectiveness. The drought also increased unrest in the FPLM and further compounded Frelimo’s financial problems as crops failed and more refugees fled to the main cities. Though the peace process slowly progressed and drought began to take its toll on both sides, Renamo forces continued to pressure the government, predominantly through attacks on civilians. During March Renamo killed 37 civilians near Inharrime, Inhambane, and 23 civilians in attacks on Maputo’s outer suburbs; and in the north a large number of Renamo fighters attacked a Sisal plantation near Memba, Nampula, while Naprama who recaptured areas around Corrane, to the south-east of Nampula city, found evidence of atrocities committed by Renamo forces. In April a large contingent of Renamo forces continued to operate around Xai-Xai, Gaza, and desperation caused by drought conditions led to attack on 10 trucks carrying humanitarian relief in Gaza and Manica provinces. By the time of the eleventh round of talks, in June 1992, Renamo had


88 Vines, RENAMO, p142; Chan and Venâncio, War and Peace in Mozambique, p40.

increased their demands for funding to US$12 Million and claimed there would be ‘no democracy without money’, eliciting secret pledges of financial support from Lonrho and the Italian government. This was indicative of the drying up of Renamo’s external sources of support and the expense of developing a political superstructure around an essentially military organisation. Some analysts would also later point out that Renamo was encouraged to seek economic benefits by the overt corruption emerging within the Frelimo government. While corrupt elements within the Mozambican armed forces abused their positions through illegal sales of weapons, extortion and theft of government resources, those in the upper echelons of the state were resorting to corruption to maintain the living standards that were being eroded by structural adjustment, and had begun to benefit from privatisations of state property and enterprises. Meanwhile, some commentators were already noting that the conditions of structural adjustment were quickly allowing international financial institutions and NGOs to assume control of Mozambique’s economic and social policies.

During the eleventh round of talks in June 1992 the United Nations, United States, Britain, France and Portugal were confirmed as official observers of the peace process. Renamo continued to postpone discussion of military issues, instead prioritising constitutional matters, the workings of the partial ceasefire commission and criteria for the distribution of humanitarian aid. Eventually the round almost collapsed because Renamo continued to insist on a small army size of 30,000, which Frelimo opposed. Subsequently, during August President Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama met face-to-face for the first time in Rome signed a joint declaration committing both parties to the spirit of the Rome Protocols. The twelfth and final round of the Rome negotiations again ended in stalemate over the size of the post-war army, though Frelimo would eventually acquiesce after a summit between President Chissano and Dhlakama in Botswana. Finally, a ceasefire agreement was finally signed on 4 October 1992, officially ending Mozambique’s protracted conflict. Though Renamo quickly broke the ceasefire in late October by occupying Angoche and Memba in Nampula, and Lugela and Maganja in Zambézia (all of which were quickly recaptured by government forces), and over the next two years there

92 Chan and Venâncio, War and Peace in Mozambique, p40.
would be dozens of reports of ceasefire violations, the peace generally held in Mozambique.⁹⁴

The Long March to Elections

Much has been written on the final years of the Mozambican peace process, so only a brief summary will be presented here. With a final peace agreement signed in Mozambique the United Nations approved a US$331m budget and the deployment of 8,000 troops to Mozambique to supervise the implementation of the peace accords under the name ONUMOZ, overseen by the Interim Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General Aldo Ajello. Though Mozambique’s internal reforms, the massive changes in international relations that were accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union and Apartheid, the dissipation of Renamo’s external sources of support, and the harsh conditions of drought in southern Africa virtually ensured that a return to war was impossible, the timetable for peace was by now months behind schedule and both sides would continue to stall when it presented a tactical advantage. Renamo also adopted the attitude that they were a legitimate administration within the territories they controlled, and their reluctance to allow government access to those regions would become a long-running problem. They were even reported to be selling concessions to foreign companies for resources such as timber. In the short-term Renamo also delayed sending effective diplomatic representation to the capital until appropriate accommodation and funds were provided, which disrupted the implementation of the peace accord. These issues delayed the distribution of humanitarian aid and demining activities. Meanwhile, Frelimo remained concerned the United Nations was overstepping its mandate, and periodically alleged that Renamo was training troops in Kenya. Renamo, in turn, would continue to be afraid that Frelimo was demobilising loyal troops into the police force, and especially into the paramilitary ‘Rapid Intervention Police’. By early 1993 it was also believed by UN sources that up to one third of Renamo’s forces was made up of child soldiers, and that this motivated Renamo’s reluctance to allow access to their territory and their desire for a smaller size for the armed forces. On 22 January 1993 both parties finally accepted gradual cantoning of troops at 49 sites, though they proceeded carefully to prevent their opponents from gaining any geographic or strategic advantage. In the meantime the break-down of

discipline within the Mozambican armed forces was escalating, driven by desperation and sheer desire to end the war, to the extent that government soldiers were looting warehouses, hijacking food convoys and ambushing traffic throughout the country. In March members of the Presidential Guard even occupied their barracks and took their commander hostage. It was already clear that it was important for Frelimo to accelerate demobilisation, but that there could be serious problems reintegrating many soldiers with few skills or schooling, who had been trained to follow orders and commit violence.\textsuperscript{95}

Demobilisation would not begin for another year, however, and in the meantime Renamo halted the peace process in early March 1993, withdrawing most of their officials from the capital and both the Ceasefire and Supervisory and Monitoring Commissions, thus blocking the investigation of ceasefire violations and creation of assembly points. Renamo then announced they would not demobilise until all UN troops had arrived in the country. Subsequently in April Renamo revealed a secret agreement that had been reached during the Rome talks, in which donor nations would give Renamo up to US$15 million to assist their participation in elections. This money was eventually provided, some ONUMOZ officials claiming that since its operation costs US$1 million a day paying Renamo to avoid further delays would actually save money. However, as some commentators (notably Joseph Hanlon) later argued, the provision of massive financial and political support by the United Nations to only one participant in the process seems to have been an incredible violation of UN neutrality. Renamo representatives finally returned to Maputo in May 1993, ending their three-month boycott after being guaranteed accommodation at Hotel Cardoso and a UN Trust Fund to ensure Renamo had the financial ability to campaign. Frelimo accused Renamo of using this period to receive arms, continue military training and to disguise evidence of ceasefire violations, but the ceasefire had held and there were few incidents of mutiny amongst government soldiers.\textsuperscript{96} By June diplomats began openly blaming Renamo for delays and ceasefire violations, Special Envoy Ajello admitting that “quiet diplomacy didn’t work”, and asserting “the wishy-washy phase is over”. Renamo continued to push for more funding and in subsequent weeks issued


demands for up to five provincial governorships and to have representatives in the Ministry of the Interior. The United States finally started to intensify pressure on Renamo from July, as well as on South Africa and Kenya, to quicken the pace of negotiations. Meanwhile, Renamo’s delays had fostered further discontent amongst anti-negotiation elements in the Frelimo party and military who began to think that with their support from South Africa cut and their forces dispersing Renamo could now be quickly eliminated through a military offensive. They may also have planned to simultaneously eliminate their enemies in the Frelimo leadership. According the Fauvet and Mosse, in August 1993 the prominent Mozambican journalist Carlos Cardoso,

wrote of senior FAM figures pushing for ‘a military option against Renamo’. With Renamo no longer enjoying South African support and quite unable to produce 15 000 men for the planned united army, the FAM was finally in a position to ‘liquidate Renamo militarily’. Was there anything in these rumours? Dirk Salomons, executive director of Onumoz, waited until 2000 to reveal that some officers were indeed planning a coup. His version, though, was that officers who had been pocketing a large slice of the military budget regarded a successful peace accord as a blow to opportunities for corruption. They intended to take power – until the US Embassy heard of the plan and warned them through informal channels that any coup would result in the immediate suspension of all foreign aid.

Joaquim Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama finally met in Maputo for ten days from 23 August to 3 September and discussed issues surrounding territorial administration, the police and the media. Renamo continued to argue for conditions far beyond those agreed in the peace accord, and refused to grant free access to their territory or to demobilise their forces. Though Chissano rejected Dhlakama’s demands for governorships, the meeting resolved that each governor would be appointed three Renamo advisors. Renamo remained distrustful of government control of the police, pushing for control of police to be transferred to the army, and for the dissolution of the ‘Rapid Intervention Police’. While the two main parties continued to negotiate towards peace, by the end of August 1993 ten small opposition parties had officially registered and more had expressed their intention to do so. In April 1993 twelve unarmed opposition groups had formed an informal coalition following unsatisfactory talks with the Frelimo government. This volatile coalition changed its membership a number of times within a few months due to splits and expulsions. FUMO was expelled in June for being too close to the government. Eighteen parties would eventually run in Mozambique’s first elections, though apart from the two main players the

98 Chan and Venâncio, War and Peace in Mozambique, p60; Paul Fauvet and Marcelo Mosse, Carlos Cardoso: Telling the Truth in Mozambique, (Cape Town: Double Storey Books, 2003), p245.
only party to break the necessary five percent minimum threshold (with 5.15%) was the União Democrática (UD), an alliance of: Wehia Ripua’s Partida Democratica de Moçambique (PADEMO); Martin Bilal’s Partido Democratico e Liberal de Moçambique (PALMO); José Massinga’s Partido Nacional Democrática (PANADE); and the Partido Nacional de Moçambique (PANAMO). No party running in the election professed socialist values, and most were situated in the political spectrum between liberal democratic and reactionary chauvinism.\(^{100}\)

A meeting between UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and the two party leaders in October 1993 overcame a number of problems delaying the peace process, spurred by threats from Boutros-Ghali that there was a real danger the UN could pull out of Mozambique if there was no progress. A new demobilisation timetable beginning in January 1994 was agreed upon with an election scheduled for October 1994.\(^{101}\) While demobilisation of paramilitary forces began in January, the process still experienced delays. Demobilisation of the two armies eventually began on 10 March 1994, though both sides kept their best troops from demobilisation as long as possible, and Renamo cautiously began by demobilising troops with poor equipment and those from areas of peripheral strategic interest such as Niassa, Gaza and Inhambane.\(^{102}\) Only a few days after assembly began government soldiers at a number of locations throughout the country rioted for demobilisation pay, though in general the demobilisation was very successful and led to a decrease in tensions. By April 1994 60% of troops had moved to demobilisation areas, and by the beginning of July 84% of Frelimo troops and 91% of Renamo fighters were in the assembly areas. The actual demobilisation of these soldiers was to take longer, however, and by July discipline was collapsing as troops actually mutinied with the demand they be demobilised. In addition, most soldiers refused to join the new national army, threatening to leave the joint armed forces below even the smaller size agreed, and presenting the possibility three armies would exist at the time of the election (Renamo’s, Frelimo’s and a national force).\(^{103}\) Though both parties maintained private military forces and arms caches,
the enthusiasm of most soldiers for demobilisation was a positive sign that a return to war was unlikely. By August 5.2 million voters had also been registered, though there had been little education about the electoral process or campaigns by the parties, leading to apathy and fear amongst the general public. Rather than a battle of political values (there was now little difference between the platforms of Renamo and Frelimo anyway), voters would predominantly vote for those they believed would bring peace. The election campaign finally began officially on 22 September, with the election held just over a month later from 27-29 October. Dhlakama’s repeated comments indicating that he would not recognise a losing result caused some tension, as did his attempt to withdraw from the election hours before voting began, but in the end the voting ran remarkably smoothly and international observers declared the elections free and fair. The elections delivered a narrow election victory for the ruling party, with Frelimo winning 129 seats, Renamo 112 seats, and the UD nine seats. In the Presidential results Joaquim Chissano was returned with 53% of the vote, as opposed to Afonso Dhlakama’s 33%. The Frelimo party was now ruling an internationally-sanctioned liberal democratic government. The new parliament first met on 8 December 1994, Renamo soon deciding to boycott the institution’s first session, Renamo deputy Manuel Pereira declaring, “This is not the kind of parliament we expected. Just because it has the majority, it seems Frelimo rules here!” Chissano’s new government finally took office on 23 December, which was made up of long-time Frelimo stalwarts, but notably did not include the formerly powerful figures Alberto Chipande, Mario Machungo, Mariano Matsinhe and Jacinto Veloso. Armando Guebuza was also retired from the cabinet to be head of the party in the house. Chissano rejected any notion of a government of national unity, refusing to appoint any Renamo members to government positions or provincial governorships. Frelimo had emerged victorious from Mozambique’s transition and finally brought peace to a troubled land.¹⁰⁴

Conclusion

A Thumbnail Sketch

The Frelimo party came to power in independent Mozambique declaring a grand vision for the construction of a new society, though almost two decades of civil war ensured it never came to fruition. However, many within the country and the party itself did not share the vision that was personified by their charismatic President Samora Machel. Thus throughout the 1980s Machel would face opposition from elements within his own government, while Frelimo’s marginalisation of opposition and colonial elites ensured there was also a political milieu with varying agendas that, in the context of regional conflict, coalesced within Rhodesia’s counter-insurgency campaign of the late 1970s with the real goal of ousting Frelimo from power. To gain a full understanding of the history of the Mozambican Civil War it is thus necessary to appreciate the complexity within Renamo and Frelimo arising from the multiple and competing agendas of factions on both sides of the conflict. Already embodying the goals of the black opposition who sought power in Mozambique and the Renamo Branco who wanted the return of expropriated property and the end of communist rule, when transferred to South African control in 1980 Renamo also became the focus of strategic divisions between minimalist, maximalist and putschist supporters in the South African government. Competition between the South African factions’ sometimes mutually exclusive aims for Mozambique of encouraging dependence, ensuring complete destabilisation, and precipitating regime change, eventually led to Renamo’s abortive southern offensive in late 1982 and the assassination of Orlando Cristina by the Directorate of Military Intelligence in 1983.

Meanwhile, Frelimo was also internally divided and elements attempted to remove President Machel on a number of occasions because of his tough stance against corruption, his opposition to free market reforms and his efforts to build diplomatic relations with South Africa. Machel’s contacts with South Africa successfully led to the Nkomati Accord in 1984 and prompted an abortive coup attempt in Mozambique, after which Machel marginalised some of his opponents, though they remained too strong for him to purge them from his government. While the South African minimalists who crafted the Accord promised to cease assistance to Renamo, maximalists and putschists ensured a massive re-supply of arms and equipment before the treaty took effect and encouraged Renamo to forge new international connections to continue the war. Negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo that followed in October 1984 highlighted the factional divisions amongst
Renamo and their supporters, as the *Renamo Branco* represented by Evo Fernandes worked towards a settlement, while the black leadership held out for promises of political power and South African maximalists sabotaged the proceedings. In the meantime, Renamo had continued to strengthen connections in Europe and with elements in the US connected to the Republican party, far-right lobby groups and the intelligence agencies, thus further complicating the divisions within their support base.

With the failure of those negotiations Machel lost trust in South Africa and returned to combating Renamo militarily, but became disillusioned after the conquest of Gorongosa and the capture of the Gorongosa documents in late 1985. After this time Machel thus again set out for peace by dealing directly with Renamo. This involved establishing secret contacts with Secretary-General Evo Fernandes and using SNASP infiltrators in Renamo to encourage the control of Renamo’s more moderate, CIA-backed factions such as CUNIMO and Renamo’s Washington office. At the same time Machel began to push for massive restructuring with the Mozambican armed forces and moved away from the free market reforms advocated by the International Monetary Fund. In the context of raised international tension between Mozambique and its neighbours, Machel’s plans eventually led to an alliance between his enemies within the Frelimo party, Mozambican armed forces and the Apartheid regime that resulted in Machel’s assassination in October 1986. Joaquim Chissano thus attained the Presidency in late 1986, but had to follow a careful strategy of appeasing the conflicting interests of the factions that supported him, while marginalising Machel-loyalists within the government and military. This approach involved promoting economic reform and rapprochement with the West, while adopting a hard military line against Renamo. However, following a horrific series of massacres in southern Mozambique by Renamo in mid- to late 1987 that convinced many of their international backers to seek peace, and factional manoeuvring by SNASP infiltrators within the Renamo leadership, the guerrilla group was increasingly prepared to consider a negotiated settlement. Thus, in order to avoid negotiations and the divisions within Frelimo that would accompany them, Chissano had the SNASP agents Mateus Lopes and João Ataíde assassinated in Malawi in November 1987, and Renamo leader Evo Fernandes killed in Lisbon in April 1988. By this time the changing international and regional context ensured that negotiations were inevitable. However, though negotiations were gradually entered into, at first through the Mozambican Christian Council, then through the mediation of Kenya and Zimbabwe, and later between delegations in Rome, Chissano did his best to delay talks and undermine Renamo’s position by refusing to
recognise Renamo as legitimate, encouraging the growth of the non-Renamo opposition, continuing to prosecute a military campaign against the rebels, and implementing economic and constitutional changes without involving Renamo. This strategy also involved the encouragement of the grassroots anti-Renamo movement Naprama from 1990, in order to win back territory and pressure Renamo to accept Frelimo’s conditions of negotiation.

During this period radical changes occurred within both Renamo and Frelimo as the rebel group internally re-organised to face the challenges of political participation, and the government passed a new constitution separating the state from the party, providing for multi-party elections and guaranteeing new individual freedoms. These changes prompted the growth of an ultra-nationalist faction within Frelimo who sought to tighten citizenship laws in order to exclude non-blacks from powerful political positions and protect property expropriated after independence, and sparked an abortive coup against the Frelimo government in June 1991 by ideological opponents of the changes and corrupt elements in the military alarmed by new investigations into large-scale black marketeering. However, negotiations continued and eventually concluded a peace agreement on 4 October 1992. This would herald a new political and logistical struggle between the sides as Frelimo sought to accelerate the demobilisation process as its armed forces increasingly collapsed, while Renamo delayed in order to extract further financial concessions from the United Nations and donor countries, secretly demobilise their large numbers of child soldiers, and to cement their authority within areas they now claimed to administer as a civilian authority. Eventually, as the intense desire of fighters from both sides forced demobilisation to take place, Mozambique finally lurched into elections in late October 1994 creating a democratically elected Frelimo government and a parliament that also included representatives of the Renamo party and the União Democratica (UD).

**Future Research**

Many possibilities exist for further research on the history of the Mozambican Civil War. While archives in South Africa and Malawi were accessed for the production of this thesis, undoubtedly more relevant material exists at both archives, and other departmental archives in those countries. There must also exist a wealth of material in the archives of Mozambique’s other neighbours, and indeed virtually any country that conducted diplomatic relations with the Mozambican government. This is before we consider the documentary material that must exist in Mozambique itself, and would be invaluable to the continuation of this research. Oral histories should also be conducted with as many of the
conflict’s prominent participants as possible, and studies documenting the experiences of ordinary Mozambicans involved in the war are already underway. In short, examination of this history has only just begun and there remain many opportunities for research on this subject in years to come.

Why Did Mozambique Suffer?

Mozambique was laid to waste over seventeen years by greed, ideology and the lust for power. These were certainly the characteristics that motivated Renamo’s international supporters when they trained, armed and financed what would become one of the world’s most brutal guerrilla organisations. The Rhodesian forces who trained Renamo’s initial recruits and the Apartheid regime that supported them to the end both aimed to maintain the privileged position that arose from the maintenance of exclusively white power in their states by defeating the liberation movements who sought majority-rule. Some of those in the upper echelons of the Apartheid state who fought for white power in South Africa continued to resist even when a transition to multi-racial democracy had become inevitable, supporting ‘Third Force’ activities in which hundreds of people were killed. Even South African minimalists who advocated the strategic use of Renamo’s forces had developed Machiavellian strategies in which Mozambique would be made economically dependent on South Africa in order to quell its support for the ANC and turn it into a submissive recipient of South African trade, investment and tourism. Most of the Renamo Branco supported Renamo because they sought the return of property expropriated at independence, or dreamed of a return to the Mozambique of old rather than the new multi-ethnic society that most within Frelimo were attempting to build. While many of Renamo’s later supporters from far-right organisations, predominantly in the United States, were driven by their fanatical opposition to the omni-present communist threat and their desire to spread free market capitalism to every corner of the world, a campaign that contributed to the devastation of many countries that include Angola, Nicaragua and Afghanistan to name but a few. However, the conflict in Mozambique was predominantly a Mozambican one, and shamefully Mozambicans on both sides contributed to the destruction of their country. Unlike many of their countrymen who were forcibly press-ganged into combat, most members of Renamo’s black leadership had at least some opportunity to leave the organisation, but chose to stay and pursue victory. It is yet to be explained why an organisation that claimed the aims of ameliorating the conditions of their countrymen and ‘liberating’ the population from Frelimo’s rule decided to follow a strategy
that reliable estimates report resulted in up to 100,000 deaths due to conflict, up to a million deaths from war-related famine and disease, and displaced almost five million people.1 Whether for power or ideology Renamo’s tactics of killing, mutilation and mayhem were both horrific and counter-productive.

The Frelimo party was also dominated by ideology, but by one that led to national literacy and health campaigns, the building of a multi-ethnic society and the desire to escape the poverty sown by colonial rule through the development of Mozambique’s industry. However, within the Frelimo government and armed forces there were those who used their positions to wield uncontrolled power and accumulate wealth. The security forces operated without check until President Machel intervened in the early 1980s, though massive corruption continued throughout the period. Those elements within the state and military enriched by the status quo sought to delay peace and eventually conspired in the death of Samora Machel to ensure the war continued. How many more Mozambicans died because these officials blocked moves towards peace, or actually sold weapons and supplies to the enemy? How many died between 1987 and 1992 as both sides delayed negotiations when it suited their purposes and continued to press for the military advantage? The free marketers within the Frelimo government personified by Joaquim Chissano eventually achieved their own goals, swimming as they were with the tide of history. Today the international financial institutions have hailed liberalisation of the Mozambican economy as a success story, but authors such as Joseph Hanlon, David Plank and John Saul have chronicled the difference between rhetoric and reality. While many of the high-ranking politicians who oversaw Mozambique’s capitalist transition are now wealthy entrepreneurs and corporate board members, “Ordinary Mozambicans have yet to see any real changes in their daily lives, despite official World Bank figures”.2 Hanlon has described what he called the ‘recolonisation of Mozambique’, and has noted that in fact,

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In the midst of this history Samora Machel remains a figure worthy of his myth. Though he occupied Mozambique’s most powerful political position he maintained his integrity and was eventually killed because of his desire to build a better society. From the pain of Mozambique’s recent history the figure of Machel provides us with values that we should embrace and a passion that we should emulate.
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